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A LEGION OF LEGACY: TYROLEAN MILITARISM, CATHOLICISM, AND THE 
HEIMWEHR MOVEMENT 
by Jason Christopher Engle 
December 2017 
 
 This study of the origins of the Heimwehr (Home Guard) movement offers 
insight into the conditions under which such groups gained their following. As such, its 
story is a valuable one that shows a society groping with the problem of a complex, 
multi-faceted identity that was, at the same time, wracked with substantial economic 
privation and politically polarized. The paramilitary Heimwehr movement that began in 
1920 was the creation of Austria’s conservative provincial governments. It was intended 
to preserve the existing social and political order—that of the hegemonic social groups of 
the Habsburg Monarchy—against the growing threat of Marxist revolution, embodied by 
the Social Democratic Party. The movement understood itself as the continuity of the 
centuries-old, volunteer militia tradition and carried on its rituals and adopted many of its 
values. In post-Habsburg Austria, the Heimwehren sought to defend their homeland not 
from any army, but from an ideology—Marxism. With numerous sources—foreign and 
domestic—of financial, material, and military support, the Heimwehr movement was at 
the epicenter of anti-Marxism in Europe and waged an ideological war against the 
Austrian Social Democratic Party.  
The movement’s seemingly negative political agenda that extended beyond its 
aversion toward Marxism has been depicted by historians as indicative the absence of a 
 
v 
distinct, overarching sociopolitical outlook. The controversial and misunderstood—even 
by Heimwehr members themselves—Korneuburg Oath its federal leaders published in 
May 1930 outlined the agenda of the movement and, when carefully read, reveals the 
guiding hand of Catholic social thought. The fact that far right circles of Austria’s 
mainstream conservative parties birthed and reared the Heimwehr movement, 
differentiated it from the Nazis and Italian fascism, who only later gained mainstream 
support due to the desperation of the latter. 
Indeed, with the recent outpouring of populist, xenophobic nationalism in the 
United States and Europe, the Heimwehr movement in Austria, among other right-wing 
paramilitary organizations of Europe’s “Fascist Era” serve as useful, cautionary tales for 
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 The question of fascism, for better or worse, has framed the study of the 
Heimwehr (Home Guard) movement.1 Historians of fascism, the First Republic, and of 
the movement itself, all grappled with whether or not the Heimwehren were a fascist 
movement, a “proto-facist” movement, or merely militant reactionaries. Overall, these 
efforts have yielded limited fruit. As Robert Paxton has noted, many such examinations 
have produced little more than fascist “bestiaries,” with each “fascist” organization 
having its own entry in a “catalog of portraits…one beast after another, each portrayed 
against a bit of background scenery and identified by its external signs.”2 On the whole, 
such evaluations simply reiterate the fact that the Great War left Central and Eastern 
Europe in shambles and exposed to revolutionary and counter-revolutionary activity 
within which these fascist organizations were born. On the individual level, these 
exercises are ultimately unsatisfying, as they offer only present surface-level observations 
based on their place in the wider political climate of their respective state, offering little 
to no insight into the social and cultural influences that shaped the groups.  
                                                 
1 To establish a base understanding of the Heimwehr movement and terminology surrounding it, 
some explanation is in order. The Heimwehr movement refers to a confederation of provincial (or state) 
paramilitary organizations, which were themselves a confederation of local paramilitary groups throughout 
the province. A standardized naming convention was never established, so local and provincial groups 
assumed a wide variety of names (e.g. Heimwehr, Heimatwehr, Heimatschutz, Heimatdienst, 
Selbstschutzverband, etc.). The provincial organizations established several national and regional coalitions 
throughout the course of the First Republic, all of which had different names. To make matters more 
confusing, despite whatever specific name they designated for themselves, newspapers frequently referred 
to them in generic terms, typically “Heimwehr,” “Heimatwehr,” or “Heimatschutz.” Thus, historians came 
to refer to these local, provincial, and/or national confederations as the Heimwehr (or Heimwehren, the 
plural of Heimwehr) or Heimwehr movement for the sake of simplicity. 
2 Robert O. Paxton, “The Five Phases of Fascism,” The Journal of Modern History 70 (March 




In the case of the Heimwehr movement, for which no broad consensus has been 
reached among scholars, it fittingly resides in a state of limbo. Early assessments, on the 
heels of the Second World War, unsurprisingly identified the Heimwehren as “fascist 
formations, Austrian counterparts to Hitler's S.A.”3 Francis Ludwig Carsten clearly saw 
the Heimwehr as a fascist movement when writing, in 1976, that there was “no 
comprehensive history of Austrian fascist movements and the many links between them,” 
added that there existed “no history of the whole Heimwehr movement, and none at all of 
the Austrian National Socialist Party.” More explicitly he later explains that it was 
Heimwehr leaders in Carinthia and Tyrol, in particular, who “came under the spell of 
Italian Fascism.”4 
It is appropriate here to note that Austrian historians writing on the Heimwehr in 
the decades immediately following the World War II perpetuated the myth that Austria 
was the “first victim” of Nazi aggression, which originated from the Moscow 
Declarations and was spread by the Allies. The “coalition historiography,” which 
remained prevalent until the mid-1970s, used the defunct Heimwehren as scape-goats for 
the fall of the First Republic.5 Depicted as the instruments of the Fascist Italy and 
authoritarian Hungary, the Heimwehr movement could conveniently be divorced from 
                                                 
3 Charles Gulick, Austria: From Habsburg to Hitler, 2 vols. (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1948), 7; See also Alfred Diamant, “Austrian Catholics and the First Republic, 1918-1934: A Study 
in Anti-Democratic Thought,” The Western Political Quarterly 10 (September 1957): 609-10. 
4 Francis Ludwig Carsten, Fascist Movements in Austria: From Schönerer to Hitler (London: 
SAGE, 1977), 7, 167-172. 
5 Julie Thorpe has pointed out that there were other facets of early Second Republic scholarship 
that created politically expedient narratives, such as Adam Wandruszka’s three “Lager” (camp) model. See 
Adam Wandruszka, “Österreichs politische Struktur: Die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen 
Bewegungen,” in Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Wien: Verlag für Geschichte 
und Politik, 1954); Julie Thorpe, Pan-Germanism and the Austro-Fascist State, 1933-1938 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2011), 8; Tim Kirk, “Dictatorship, Fascism and the Demise of Austrian 
Democracy,” in Austrian Studies Today, Contemporary Austrian Studies Volume 25 (New Orleans, LA: 
University of New Orleans Press, 2016), 118, 120-1. 
 
3 
Austrian society at large, thereby deflecting blame from the Austrian population and the 
political figures involved, who the remained active in the government of the Second 
Republic. Ludwig Jedlicka, for example, would claim that the Heimwehr movement was 
“the sole repository of authoritarian and fascist thought in recent Austrian history.” Two 
important points are implied in this statement. First, it implies that none of these 
tendencies existed within the Christian Social Party, which has been proven time and 
again, to be patently false. Second, he is implying that National Socialism was an entirely 
German creation, once more divorcing Austria from Nazism.6 This too, is demonstrably 
untrue. The roots of National Socialism were firmly planted in the political anti-Semitism 
and pan-German rhetoric of Georg von Schönerer in 1890s Vienna, not to mention the 
fact that an overwhelming majority of Austrians supported Anschluss (unification) with 
Hitler’s Germany.7 Its own biases (which will be addressed later) notwithstanding, 
Charles Gulick’s exhaustive, two-volume history of the First Republic was correct in 
vigorously asserting that numerous segments of Austrian society actively worked to 
undermine the government and destroy the republic. In doing so, his foundational work 
was met with “unusually harsh criticism.”8 
Interpretations of the Heimwehr movement remained largely unchanged until the 
1970s when a younger generation of scholars began to re-evaluate the Heimwehr 
movement.9 The emergence of fascist studies, in particular, helped refine interpretations 
                                                 
6 Ludwig Jedlicka, “The Austrian Heimwehr,” Journal of Contemporary History 1 (1966): 127. 
7 John T. Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right in Austria, 1918-1934 (Copenhagen: The 
Royal Library Museum Tusculanum Press, 2007), 27; See also Franziska Schneeberger, “Sozialstruktur der 
Heimwehr in Österreich. Eine vergleichend-politische sozialgeschichte der Heimwehrbewegung.” (PhD 
diss., University of Salzburg,1988), 48-52. 
8 Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right, 30. 
9 See, for example, R. John Rath, “Authoritarian Austria,” in Native Fascism in the Successor 
States, 1918-1945, ed. Peter F. Sugar (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971), 30. 
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of the Heimwehr movement through comparative study of radical right-wing 
organizations across Europe. Bruce F. Pauley, in his comparison of the Heimwehr 
movement with the Austrian Nazi Party, concludes that, though they shared similar aims 
with the Austrian National Socialists in that they professed to be a non-partisan 
organization dedicated to the renewal of Austria, the Heimwehren differed in that they 
were “characteristically ambiguous” in their adherence to the “Führerprinzip” (leader 
principle). Their program called for obedience to strong central authority, but no single 
Heimwehr leader, including its federally elected leaders, Dr. Richard Steidle (Tyrol), Dr. 
Walter Pfrimer (Styria), and, later, Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg (Upper 
Austria), forged the ‘cult of personality’ maintained in other fascist regimes Hitler, 
Mussolini, or Franco.10 Thus, as Roger Griffin concludes that the “bulk of the Heimwehr 
stopped short of full-blown fascism.”11  
Indeed, Stanley Payne contends that the Korneuburg Oath—the controversial 
program published by the Heimwehr movement in May 1930, in which they vowed to 
establish an authoritarian, corporatist state—failed to articulate “clear-cut fascism,” and 
prompted division between the moderate Christian Social factions and its radical, “proto-
fascist” bloc.12 The fact that the Oath triggered division within the movement, is less than 
a ringing endorsement of fascism within a sizeable segment of the movement. Richard 
Schober has contended that the Korneuburg program Steidle championed, simply 
                                                 
10 Pauley, “Fascism and the Führerprinzip: The Austrian Example,” Central European History 12 
(Sept. 1979): 280. 
11 Roger Griffen, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991), 125. 
12 For interpretations of the Korneuburg Oath as an indication of the movement’s definitively 
fascist nature, see Carsten, Fascist Movements, 171-2; Tim Kirk, “Fascism and Austrofascism,” in The 
Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment, Contemporary Austrian Studies 11, ed. Günter 




articulated long-held positions in that it was “an openly anti-parliamentary doctrine, 
informed by anti-Marxism and an affinity for fascism.”13 Harboring an “affinity for 
fascism” is not the same as being a fascist movement. Payne concludes that even though 
some local groups defected to the Nazis, “most clung to a steadily amorphous if 
authoritarian conservatism.”14 Though the Heimwehren demonstrated general 
characteristics synonymous with fascism, they lacked key hallmarks of the fascist 
benchmarks—the National Fascist Party in Italy and the National Socialist German 
Worker’s Party or “Nazi Party” in Germany. The genre of fascist studies, with its 
comparative basis, marked the first real substantive efforts to examine the attributes of 
the Heimwehr movement, bringing into question earlier historiographic interpretations. 
This shift is also noticeable in studies focusing on the Heimwehr movement, as 
suggestions that the Heimwehren exhibited fascist leanings replaced ham-fisted, 
unsubstantiated assumptions typical of earlier, politically biased scholarship. Reinhart 
Kondert, for example, defines the Heimwehr movement as “a paramilitary organization 
strongly imbued with fascist tendencies and supported by Italian money.” Complicating 
the picture further, he adds:  
[T]he rank and file were democratically inclined whereas the leadership tried to set out in a fascist 
direction. When the Heimwehren leaders publicly announced that they would follow a fascist 
course (the Korneuburg oath of May 18, 1930), the majority rejected the plan and the organization 
became split even further. The evidence thus suggests that fascism (especially the Italian brand) 
was an unwanted import and had little chance of winning the hearts and minds of the Austrian 
people.15 
 
                                                 
13 Richard Schober, “Aufstieg und Fall der Tiroler Heimawehr (1928-1936),” Tiroler Heimat 61 
(Innsbruck: Universitätverlag Wagner, 1997): 182.  
14 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1995), 247. 
15 Reinhart Kondert, “The Rise and Early History of the Austrian Heimwehr” (PhD diss., Rice 




According to C. Earl Edmonson, “The Heimwehr belongs in both the paramilitary and, 
with some qualifications, in the fascist categories.”16 While Edmondson acknowledges 
that the Heimwehr leaders claimed the movement to be one of nonpartisan renewal, as 
was “typical for fascist movements throughout Europe during the interwar period,” he 
stops short of calling the movement fascist.17 While the Heimwehr movement exhibited 
general characteristics of contemporary “fascist” organizations in Central and Eastern 
Europe, its clear connections to historic paramilitary institutions, residual features of 
Habsburg military culture, and the support and direction of the leading social groups of 
the Habsburg Monarchy make it difficult to place the movement neatly into the fascist 
category.  
Fascist theoretician, Camillo Pellizzi, was right to be skeptical about the 
association of similar movements with Italian fascism. As Luca de Caprariis notes: 
In his view, however, most movements which called themselves fascist, such as the 
Austrian Heimwehr movement or the German Stahlhelm, were in reality conservative 
groupings. By and large, they represented entrenched interests. Fascism, Italian fascism, 
was radically different, strongly rooted in the popular classes and 'in its essence 
revolutionary, the impulse of a people struggling for living space and international 
respect'.18 
 
While the Heimwehren, the Stahlhelm, and to a lesser extent, even the Nazi Party, 
actively agitated for radical, revolutionary methods of restoring German pride and 
                                                 
16 C. Earl Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics 1918-1936 (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1977), 8; Konkurrenz meaning competition/rivalry between leaders/factions/organizations—
a prominent feature that Hitler nurtured within the Nazi Party. 
17 Bruce F. Pauley, Hahnenschwanz und Hakenkreuz. Steirischer Heimatschutz und 
österreichischer Nationalsozialismus 1918-1934 (Wien: Europa Verlag, 1972), 29. 
18 Luca de Caprariis, "'Fascism for Export'? The Rise and Eclipse of the Fasci Italiani all'Estero," 




prosperity, they were financially support by traditional, mainstream interests and 
conformed their aims to maintain that support, even if only temporarily.19 
The ambiguity of the Heimwehr movement’s fascist status reflects the more 
fundamental challenge of simply understanding fascism was or was not. The very term 
“fascism,” as Paxton notes, “has been so loosely used that some have proposed giving it 
up altogether in scholarly research.”20 Payne adds that the definition of fascism 
“bedeviled” even the original, Italian Fascists, adding that “[t]he term has probably been 
used more by its opponents than by its proponents, the former having been responsible 
for the generalization of the adjective on an international level, as early as 1923.” As a 
result, fascism became synonymous with violence, brutality, and repression.21 The 
numerous left-wing newspapers in Austria such as the Arbeiter-Zeitung, Der Rote Fahne, 
Arbeiterwille, the Vorarlberger Wacht, and the Tagblatt, illustrate this point quite well in 
their liberal application of the “fascist” moniker to the Heimwehr movement in frequent 
diatribes over the speeches of its leaders, their rallies, as well as its strike-breaking 
activities.22 These same newspapers, however, also condemned the Heimwehren as 
“monarchists” conspiring to overthrow the republic and install a Wittelsbach (the 
Bavarian royal family) king, before they were “fascists.” The ease with which one label 
was replaced with another indicates that the meaning of the label did not matter so much 
                                                 
19 Paxton, “The Five Phases of Fascism,” 12-16, points out that this willingness to sacrifice 
ideological integrity for the support of mainstream conservatives to have been a common, if but temporary, 
phase in the development of fascist organizations. 
20 Paxton, “The Five Phases of Fascism,” 9. 
21 Payne, A History of Fascism, 3. 
22 The earliest case of this can be found in the September 15, 1923 edition of Arbeiterwille, the 
Styrian Social Democratic news organ. “Heimatschutz oder Kapitalistenschutz?” Arbeiterwille, September 




as did the intent to isolate.23 Paxton points out, “It took two generations before the Left 
understood that fascism is, after all, an authentic mass popular enthusiasm and not merely 
a clever mass manipulation of populist emotions by the reactionary Right or by 
capitalism in crisis.”24 It is significant, therefore, that the extensive, negative depictions 
of the Heimwehren in the contemporary leftist media penetrated the earliest studies of the 
First Republic.25  
Nevertheless, the evolution from blanket assumptions of the movement’s fascist 
character to more complex and refined interpretations of the Heimwehr movement has 
been a positive development. Interpretations of the movement have progressed to 
recognize a more complex set of organizations more firmly planted in historically 
influential institutions and social circles than other contemporary right-wing paramilitary 
organizations. The term “paramilitary” here is important to recognize; the Heimwehr 
movement was a confederation of paramilitary groups, not a political party. Though it 
ultimately established its own political party in the form of the Heimatblock, this was 
never its original intent, rather it was the product of political and economic pressures to 
seek constitutional reform through legal, political channels rather than by force. Put 
differently, the Heimwehr movement was a paramilitary organization that created its own 
political party, not a political party that created its own protective paramilitary wing, as in 
                                                 
23 See, for example, “Ein Monarchistisches Landeschießen in Tirol,” Arbeiter-Zeitung, November 
18, 1920, 2. 
24 Paxton, “The Five Phases of Fascism,” 2-3. 
25 Charles Gulick’s two-volume history of the First Republic is among the earliest and is most 
clearly biased in its depiction of the Heimwehr movement. Paul R. Sweet, “Democracy and Counter-
Revolution in Austria,” The Journal of Modern History 22 (March, 1950): 53-4, points out the unabashedly 
adversarial position Gulick takes against the Heimwehren and the conservative establishment in Austria. 
Sweet also notes the extensive use of Austrian newspapers and periodicals (much of which was Social 
Democratic in orientation). 
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the case of the Social Democrats and the Republican Defense League (Republikanischer 
Schutzbund), the Nazi Party and its “Sturmabteilung,” or SA, or Mussolini’s 
“Squadrismo,” better known as “Blackshirts.” 
More recent scholarship has only reiterated the continued lack of clarity around 
identifying interwar right-wing governments and organizations. Tim Kirk’s recent survey 
of new scholarship on the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg governments highlights this problem, 
pointing to the disagreement between historians as to how best to define their regimes.26 
As for the Heimwehr movement itself, whatever refinements that have been made in 
understanding its relationship to fascism are still, at times, appear lost on studies where it 
is only tangentially related to the topic of discussion. Janek Wasserman, in his important 
examination of right-wing intellectuals in Vienna, for example, repeatedly labels the 
Heimwehren as “fascist groups,” even when referencing events that occurred before the 
organization had made contact with Mussolini.27 While he rightly points out the influence 
of Catholic social thought in groups like the Leo Society (Leo-Gesellschaft) and Austrian 
Action (Österreichische Aktion), he precludes any notion that it might have influenced 
the Heimwehr movement by identifying it as merely an extension of Italian fascism. Erin 
Hochman, in her comparative study of German nationalism in the Weimar and First 
Republics, by contrast, acknowledges the regional and cultural peculiarities—specifically 
Catholicism—that were formative in shaping the attitudes of the Heimwehren rather than 
dismissing them as simply being Mussolini’s acolytes.28 
                                                 
26 Tim Kirk, “Dictatorship, Fascism and the Demise of Austrian Democracy,” 114. 
27 Janek Wasserman, Black Vienna: The Radical Right in the Red City, 1918-1938 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2014), 2, 49, 91, 93, 115, 128. 
28 Erin R. Hochman, Imagining a Greater Germany: Republican Nationalism and the Idea of 
Anschluss (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 26. 
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To be sure, the question of fascism has proven as prohibitive as it has instructive 
toward understanding the Heimwehren in that its often-narrow focus on how its actions 
and ideology compared to similar European movements, has neglected to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the Heimwehren in its own native setting and historical 
context. The majority of scholarly examinations of the Heimwehren make sweeping, 
surface-level generalizations about the movement’s overarching political designs, which 
do not correlate with its intractable regionalism (that they also acknowledge). To that 
end, historians have also tended to take the words and actions of the movement’s leaders 
at face value, as a reflection of the outlook of its membership at-large. Those political 
studies often neglect the potential insights gained by analyzing their lexicon, activities, 
and espoused values. 
 
Purpose and Approach 
As with all research projects, this one materialized out of a desire to answer a 
question that has not been sufficiently addressed in the historiography—what was the 
Heimwehr movement? While much of the scholarship written on the Austrian 
Heimwehren offers surface-level explanations, this has not been a question that historians 
have sought to answer.29 This study is not an exhaustive examination; such an endeavor 
would require numerous volumes. Building on existing scholarship that has focused on 
                                                 
29 Franziska Schneeberger’s unpublished dissertation, “Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr in Österreich. 
Eine vergleichend-politische sozialgeschichte der Heimwehrbewegung,” is a significant step toward a more 
extensive understanding of the Heimwehr movement, though her important points get bogged down in 
sociological theory at times. 
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the political impact of the movement, this study emphasizes pre-war cultural continuities 
that helped shape the movement itself. 
Contrary to the conventional periodization, the Heimwehr movement cannot be 
fully understood without understanding the resonance of pre-war customs and attitudes, 
which did not simply vanish with the conclusion of the Great War. As Jay Winter 
explains, distinct traditional versus modern boundaries established in the cultural 
historiography of the Great War invites “distortion by losing a sense of messiness, its 
non-linearity, its vigorous and stubbornly visible incompatibilities.”30 Winter continues, 
“The ongoing dialogue and exchange among artists and their public, between those who 
self-consciously returned to nineteenth-century forms and themes and those who sought 
to supersede them, makes the history of modernism much more complicated than a 
simple, linear divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ might suggest.”31 More specific to the 
Austrian case, John Boyer rightly points out, future scholarship needs to connect “what 
happened before 1914 and what happened after 1918…in order to understand the broader 
structures and systems that defined Austrian political culture in the later twentieth 
century.”32 
Beyond the severe economic constraints of the new Austrian republic, its inability 
to achieve political stability reflected the fact that “the First Republic was deeply shaped 
by the memories, traditions, and institutional practices from the Empire, and…was hard 
                                                 
30 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), loc, 240. 
31 Winter, Sites of Memory, loc. 205. 
32 John Boyer, “Boundaries and Transitions in Modern Austrian History,” in From Empire to 
Republic: Post-World War I Austria, eds. Günter Bischof, Fritz Plasser, and Peter Berger (New Orleans: 




pressed to extricate itself from, much less to overcome, the stunning collapse of the 
Empire.”33 The hegemonic social groups of Habsburg Austria, despite suffering their own 
economic and legal setbacks, remained influential in the new republic and found 
themselves threatened by the rise of Marxism across Europe.34 The continued prominence 
of these social groups in the First Republic reiterates Winter’s conclusion that “the 
rupture of 1914-18 was much less complete” than has often been suggested.35 And when 
the new system of government proved unwieldy and ineffective in smothering the Social 
Democratic opposition, these same circles quickly lost their patience parliamentary 
democracy. Together, Christian Social and pan-Germanist party officials, Catholic 
clergy, declassed aristocrats, financiers and industrialists, and former k.u.k. officers 
actively worked to undermine the democratic system, primarily through the creation of, 
and continuous support for, the Heimwehr movement.36 Indeed, the Great War might 
have destroyed the monarchy in a physical sense, but it could not erase its impression on 
Austrian society. To Wolfgang Maderthaner’s point, one might as easily view the process 
of revolution and the creation of the First Republic as one of “de-feudalization” as much 
as state building.37 Ultimately, neither process succeeded, as the latter depended on the 
successful realization of the former. 
Indeed, there is a universal and enduring cycle of ‘old’ and ‘new;’ what was once 
the ‘new’ inevitably becomes the ‘old.’ Those who doggedly clutch traditional values in 
                                                 
33 Boyer, “Boundaries and Transitions,” 22. 
34 Wasserman’s Black Vienna admirably demonstrates this in its focus on conservative, backward-
thinking academics entrenched in Viennese institutions of higher learning. 
35 Winter, Sites of Memory, loc. 187. 
36 Gulick, Austria, 7-8, 129-30.  
37 Wolfgang Maderthaner, “Utopian Perspectives and Political Restraint: The Austrian Revolution 
in the Context of Central European Conflicts,” in From Empire to Republic: Post-World War I Austria, eds. 
Günter Bischof, Fritz Plasser, and Peter Berger (New Orleans: University of New Orleans Press, 2010), 52. 
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juxtaposition to those that gravitate toward the avant-garde invariably find themselves at 
opposite ends of a perpetual Kulturkampf, or “culture war.” While the Heimwehr 
movement indeed “reflected the conditions of central Europe in the interwar period,” as  
Edmondson contends, it was also a central part of an enduring struggle for political and, 
thus, cultural hegemony.38 To better understand the Heimwehren, one must understand 
the mass politics of the First Republic on a cultural level, as a fundamental struggle over 
the fate of traditional German values, which most Heimwehr leaders viewed as being 
inherently intertwined with Catholic social teachings and the ancient connection between 
southern Germans and the Church. As social scientist Edgar Shein explains,  
If we understand the dynamics of culture, we will be less likely to be puzzled, irritated, 
and anxious when we encounter the unfamiliar and seemingly irrational behavior of 
people in organizations, and we will have a deeper understanding not only of why various 
groups of people or organizations can be so different, but also why it is so hard to change 
them. Even more important, if we understand culture better we will better understand 
ourselves—better understand the forces acting within us that define who we are, that 
reflect the groups with which we identify and to which we want to belong.39 
  
This study approaches the Heimwehr movement on two levels. On one hand, it 
places the Heimwehren in the context of the wider phenomenon of counter-revolutionary 
Paramilitarism in what Robert Gerwarth and John Horne have called “shatter zones” in 
the footprint of the defeated Central Powers.40 In particular, it will focus on the anti-
Marxist “Ordnungsblock” forged through the paramilitary Bavarian Citizen’s Guard 
(Einwohnerwehr) organization and its successor, the League for Bavaria and the Empire 
                                                 
38 Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 8. 
39 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, Third Edition (San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass, 2004), 10. 
40 Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after the 
Great War, 1917-1923,” The Journal of Modern History 83 (September 2011): 493; For a useful discussion 
of the significance of transnational histories of the interwar period, see John Deak, “Austria in the 1920s,” 
in Austrian Studies Today, Contemporary Austrian Studies 25, ed. Günter Bischof and Ferdinand Karlhofer 
(New Orleans, LA: University of New Orleans Press, 2016), 205-214. 
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(Bayern Bund und Reich) the fledgling Austrian Heimwehr movement, and the Horthy 
government in Hungary between 1920 and 1923. Despite this coalition’s collapse in the 
wake of the Hitler’s abortive Beer Hall Putsch, the Heimwehren resurrected their 
Bavarian connections, establishing a close working relationship with the Bavarian state 
association of the Steel Helmet, League of Front Soldiers (Landesverband Der Stahlhelm, 
Bund der Frontsoldaten) in 1927. Utilizing contacts in the Horthy government in 
Hungary they facilitated a working relationship with Fascist Italy, which would last until 
1936. As these sections will demonstrate, the Heimwehr movement actively sought 
cooperation and support from neighboring governments and paramilitary organizations. 
In doing so, it functioned as a hub for transnational reactionary collaboration. 
On the other, this project analyzes the Heimwehr movement inside Austria. 
Specifically, it teases out the question of the movement’s popularity, looking closely at 
the support offered by its domestic patrons. It examines the activities of the Heimwehr 
organizations, such as military actions and training, rallies, religious ceremonies, and war 
memorial dedications, and what those events reveal about the movement’s cultural 
influences. While the battle with the Social Democrats was a clear cut, mobilizing force, 
the conflict that emerged with the Nazis in 1931 was much more complicated and would 
evoke divisions among Christian Social and pan-Germanist factions within the 
Heimwehren. Particular attention is given to the Tyrolean organization—the Tiroler 
Heimatwehr, also referred to as the Selbstschutzverband (S.S.V.) Tirol—whose 
leadership stood at the forefront of the movement throughout much of its existence. 
Alongside Dr. Richard Steidle, leader of the Tyrolean Heimwehren and Bundesführer 
(federal leader) of the national confederation, was his chief of staff, German émigré, 
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Major Waldemar Pabst. Pabst was the driving force behind the organization of a national 
Heimwehr front. Thus, the organizational files of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr offer not only 
a window into the Tyrolean organization but also into the movement itself. 
 
Figure 1. Dr. Richard Steidle and Major Waldemar Pabst, 1930 
(Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-2005-0413-501 / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de) 
 
What is more, in no other provincial organization were the peculiarities developed 
over the centuries of Habsburg rule more influential than they were on the Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr. Austria’s Alpine provinces historically relied heavily on the volunteer 
militia for self-defense and the members of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr understood 
themselves and their group as building on the province’s long legacy of civic militarism. 
Only in Tyrol and Vorarlberg, however, did they develop an extensive militia system 
(Landesverteidigung) outside the control of the House of Habsburg. This “privilege” 
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became part of Tiroler identity, illustrating the contrarian, independent-mindedness of its 
population. 
 
A Note on Sources 
In addition to the body of secondary literature written on the Heimwehr 
movement, this study draws from a variety of primary source material compiled over the 
course of months of research conducted at the Tiroler Landesarchiv (TLA) in Innsbruck, 
Austria and serves as the foundation of this study. Particular attention was given to its 
organizational files, which offer insight into a wide variety of aspects regarding the day-
to-day operation and logistical planning, training, and relationships with other 
organizations and important actors. Events that Tyrolean leaders were involved with and 
helped plan, such as the November 1920 shooting festival (Festschießen) at Berg Isel—
the first open clash between the Heimwehr movement and the Social Democrats—and the 
October 1928 rally in the Social Democratic stronghold of Wiener Neustadt, were 
especially insightful. Though not comprehensive in the fact that they do not span the 
entirety of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr’s existence, its rich contents complicate and dispel 
older interpretations of the Heimwehr movement.41 In addition to its primary source 
material, the manuscript collection at the TLA also has a number of doctoral dissertations 
focusing on all matters of the Tyrolean history, two of which were consulted in this 
study. 
                                                 
41 Unfortunately, this seems to be the case with records for the various Heimwehr organizations. 
The files for the Tyrolean Heimatwehr range from its inception to December 1929. As to what happened to 
the files after this period, it is unclear. One might reasonably infer, however, that the files from 1930-1938 
would have been of interest to the Nazi officials, since by 1938 the Heimwehren had opposed Anschluß 
with Germany for quite some time, and either taken by the Nazis or destroyed by the Heimatwehr. 
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The British National Archives houses copies of several German Foreign Office 
(Auswärtige Amt) files seized at the end of World War II. Document collections focusing 
on the Anschluss Movement in Tyrol in the years immediately following World War I 
(1919-1921), as well as “Secret Files” on the Tyrolean Heimatwehr (1927-1933) have 
also been consulted in this investigation, adding an outside, but knowledgeable 
perspective on the Heimwehr movement. Moreover, these record groups offer insight into 
the close cooperation between the Bavarian and Tyrolean governments in establishing 
defense agreements and contingencies for the dissolution of the Austrian state. An 
important, and stealthy, avenue of this cooperation was through the alliance between the 
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and the Tyrolean Heimatwehr. The ultimate change in direction 
of the Tyrolean government—to seek unification with Germany as an independent 
state—reflected the power of regional identity, particularly in the Tyrol. 
German Foreign Ministry “secret files” on the Austrian Heimwehr center upon 
the activities of the Heimwehren between 1927 and 1933, and provides useful insight into 
its efforts to establish collaborative relationships with Bavarian defense organizations. 
They present a German Foreign Office whose representatives discouraged Bavarian 
cooperation with the Heimwehren for fear of prompting international scrutiny that could 
bring further repercussions on Germany. Moreover, the documents offer valuable 
perspectives from German officials observing and evaluating the Heimwehren and their 
leading personalities. This was especially telling is their perceptions of Waldemar Pabst, 
whose gift for intrigue they were most leery.  
This study also draws on Heimwehren newspapers Die alpenländische 
Heimatwehr from 1926 to 1933, as well as the Tyrolean Heimatwehr Blätter from 1924 
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and 1925, housed at the Main Library of the University of Innsbruck. The Austrian 
National Library (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek) has digitized and made available 
for the public, an extensive online collection of historical newspapers—AustriaN 
Newspapers Online (ANNO)—that span, intermittently, from 1568 to 1944. The 
newspapers referenced in this project are, aside from the various Heimwehr newspapers 
mentioned above, are almost entirely drawn from the ANNO collection. The Austrian 
National Library has also digitized, and published online, stenographical reports from the 
provisional Tyrolean Tyrolean National Council (Nationalrat) from 1918-1919 as well as 
those of the Tyrolean Diet (Landtag) meetings for 1920-1921, which are also cited in this 
investigation. Older, relevant historical texts whose copyrights have expired are widely 
available online, and were utilized, as were published primary source materials available 
via digital literature collections maintained by the University of Innsbruck, the Hathi 
Trust Digital Library partnership, and Google Books.  
 
Arguments 
The overall structure of this study is topical, to better highlight themes and its 
principal arguments. However, it follows the general chronology where possible, for the 
sake of clarity, and to illustrate change over time. Using the Tyrol as its primary window 
into the Heimwehr movement, chapter one argues that the province’s long legacy of civic 
militarism exercised significant influence on the Heimwehren. Of special significance 
was the system of shooting ranges (Schützenwesen) that became the basis of its state 
defense system (Landesverteidigung). Though originally not an official component of 
Tyrol’s military infrastructure, these shooting ranges were constructed by local gentry 
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and were home to recreational rifle clubs. The democratization of firearms helped make 
sport-shooting increasingly popular, which lead to the construction of more ranges and 
the formation of more clubs. The gun culture that materialized from this past-time (as 
well as hunting) became deeply entrenched in the Tyrolean identity. 
By the early eighteenth century, some rifle clubs—in times of war—volunteered 
to serve as light infantry (sharpshooter) companies. Originally, these companies were 
under no formal obligation to the state, volunteering their skills out of patriotism for 
“Vaterland Tirol.” Over time, these “hand-shake” agreements evolved into more 
formalized obligations. These rifle club companies, or Standschützen, as they became 
known, formed the basis of Tyrol’s militia system (Schützenwesen). The Schützenwesen, 
in turn, formed the core of Tyrol’s system of defense. Likewise, the shooting ranges 
around which the clubs were based, took on an increasingly official, militaristic character 
until they—like the rifle clubs that used them—were wholly integrated into the Tyrolean 
defense system by the early twentieth century. Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
the Tyrolean Landesverteidigung had decayed and lost its autonomous character, 
becoming increasingly reliant upon, and subject to, imperial (Habsburg) funding and 
oversight.  
The codification of militia obligations added an increasingly formalized the 
militarism of the Landesverteidigung. This process was formative in that it helped to 
transform the vibrant gun culture in Tyrol into a more dynastically-oriented culture of 
civic militarism. Thus, the essence of Tyrolean civic militarism lay in the intersection of 
multiple facets of identity. One might argue that regional (Tyrolean) patriotism and 
loyalty to the Habsburg crown were the pillars, while their religious devotion was the 
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“glue” that held those pillars firmly in place. Throughout Tyrol’s history, the dominating 
presence of Catholic clergy proved crucial in motivating and directing—often both 
spiritually and militarily—the patriotic energies of its people. 
The shooting ranges, themselves, were conduits that fostered this civic militarism 
in that they were spaces where camaraderie and unit pride were forged, military skills 
were learned and honed, and dynastic and provincial patriotism were cultivated. The 
shooting ranges served dual purposes as nodes of community and military mobilization, 
which cultivated the militarization of Tyrolean society by subconsciously connecting 
military service with fundamental aspects of daily life. Thus, the unit pride of a 
Standschützen company was closely intertwined with its local identity. This connection 
was articulated by the participation of rifle companies in community, religious 
ceremonies, shooting competitions, and social events, such as concerts and dances, put on 
by the companies for their communities. As subsequent chapters will reveal, this process 
of militarization remained a formative influence on identity of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr 
and, by extension, the movement as a whole. Heimwehr propaganda framed the 
militarism of the movement in traditional, masculine terms. Military service and war 
volunteerism in defense of one’s home and hearth was a duty for which he had been 
trained from his youth through activities like hunting, sport shooting, and rugged, outdoor 
games boys played. As such, the activities Heimwehr youth groups centered around 
shooting contests, marches, map reading exercises, and various other outdoor activities. 
The parallels between Heimwehr and Schützen militarism is especially clear. 
Chapter two will examine the establishment of the Heimwehr movement within 
the broader context of reactionary Paramilitarism in the footprint of the former Central 
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Powers. The political upheaval of Marxist revolution was the catalyst for galvanizing 
counter-revolutionary defense organizations such as the Freikorps in Germany, the 
Hungarian National Army, and local Heimwehren in Austria. Their resistance to Marxist 
revolution in central Europe was heightened by what Wolfgang Schivelbusch has called a 
“culture of defeat,” which was founded on the myth that the loss of the war was the work 
of Judeo-Bolshevik revolutionaries scheming behind the backs of the German and 
Austro-Hungarian armed forces, not military defeat on the field of battle.42 As such, the 
violence unleashed in Germany and Hungary, in particular, was excessively brutal. 
The founding of Heimwehr movement in 1920 was achieved through 
transnational cooperation between reactionary circles that made the Austro-Bavarian 
border the epicenter of anti-Marxist paramilitary activity in Europe. With the cooperation 
of the Bavarian government, the paramilitary Einwohnerwehr helped to arm, organize, 
and train Heimwehr groups. Provincial Austrian officials provided legal protections and 
resources, while the Hungarian government was the major financier of the Heimwehren. 
While ultra-nationalism has been the watch-word for the radical right in interwar Central 
Europe, the transnational collaboration that took place in establishing the Heimwehren 
illustrates the counter-revolutionary right’s pragmatism, ideological flexibility, and very 
real fear of communist revolution. Their efforts in Austria would pay dividends, as they 
laid the foundation for what would be a strong, anti-Marxist bloc in Central Europe.  
Their cooperation was short-lived, however. In the face of intense international 
pressure, the Einwohnerwehr was dissolved in June 1921. Hungarian support also dried 
                                                 
42 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery 
(New York: Picador, 2001). 
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up that winter when it became evident that its aims for funding the Heimwehren—
regaining the Burgenland—was not to be. The predecessor of the Einwohnerwehr, Bund 
Bayern und Reich, proved divisive, prompting the Heimwehren in some provinces to 
leave its tutelage in favor of that of Erich Ludendorff, rival of Bund Bayern und Reich 
leader, Dr. Otto Pittinger. Nevertheless, money, arms, and equipment continued to flow 
from Bavaria. The cooperation between Austrian and Bavarian organizations all but dried 
up in the wake of Hitler’s failed “Beer Hall Putsch,” and would not be resurrected until 
the summer of 1926. 
 Chapter three analyzes the organizational culture of the Heimwehr movement, 
teasing out its founding charters, organizational hierarchies, mission statements, and 
membership data. Analysis of state leadership (Landesleitung) documents provide insight 
as to the identity and interests—and, therefore, the purpose—of the Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr. Documents detailing the leadership hierarchy of the organization at the 
district and precinct levels, offering names and professions where the information was 
known or communicated by the respective leaders, are also revealing. When compiled 
and broken out, the professions of Heimatwehr leaders indicate the predominance of 
elected officials in these roles, demonstrating how the organization was intertwined with 
mainstream conservative circles. Though purposefully vague so as to not outwardly 
violate the peace treaties ending World War I, it is clear that Heimatwehr was a 
voluntary, “patriotic,” German nationalist, and anti-Marxist organization.43 The statutes 
of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr also reveal its basic organizational hierarchy that generally 
                                                 
43 To see that the military-related requirements of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain 




followed existing provincial administrative zones, as well as its limited membership 
requirements.  
Though not addressed in the organization’s charter, two seemingly insignificant, 
but mutually reinforcing, membership policies emerged to drive the actions and decisions 
of its leadership and had profound impact on the development of the movement. The first 
was the fact that the Heimwehren did not require their members to pay dues for various 
reasons. This meant that the organizations did not generate any of their own revenue. 
Therefore, they were wholly dependent upon the generosity of private donors and the 
governments of their provinces, many of whom they served as auxiliary police forces. By 
depending solely on external sources of income, they found themselves beholden to the 
agendas of their patrons, at first willingly and later begrudgingly. Despite the pleas of the 
influential German émigré and federal chief of staff, Waldemar Pabst, this policy went 
unaltered.44 Second, the Heimwehren maintained a largely open membership policy: 
anyone who was not a member of the Social Democratic Party and was of non-Jewish, 
German descent was eligible to join. Combined with the absence of membership dues, 
this policy generated a broad support base across all socioeconomic strata and political 
ideologies. These policies worked well together in establishing the organizations as non-
partisan, civil-defense groups, amassing a combined membership of between 300,000 and 
400,000 at its peak. 
The activities, behaviors, and espoused values of the Heimwehr organizations 
reflected the fundamental place of Catholic social teachings. Beyond the incorporation of 
field Mass services in all Heimwehr activities, itself, an indication the primacy of the 
                                                 
44 Carsten, Fascist Movements, 180. 
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Church, Catholic social thought shaped the ideological development of the movement. 
The rhetoric of Heimwehr leaders, its propaganda, and its political platform—the 
Korneuburg Oath—clearly reconcile with the work of Catholic social theorists and papal 
encyclicals. The movement’s aversion to Marxism, Capitalism, liberalism, and Western-
style parliamentary democracy reflected the sentiments echoed in the encyclicals and the 
work of Catholic social thinkers. Likewise, its support for a corporatist alternative to 
Marxism and capitalism also correlated with the position taken in papal encyclicals and 
writings of Catholic philosophers. The lineage of these ideals clearly flowed from the 
writings of Karl von Vogelsang and Adam Müller as well as from the papal encyclicals, 
Rerum Novarum and the Quadragesimo Anno to political thinkers like Othmar Spann and 
his students, Heimwehr ideologues, Hans Riehl, Walter Heinrich, and Odo Neustädter-
Stürmer. Having to balance political Catholicism and German nationalism, these 
overtones had to remain subtle and may have been lost on readers not intimately familiar 
with the writings of Spann and his predecessors or the papal encyclicals. 
The basis of support for the Heimwehr as a mass movement is the subject under 
scrutiny in chapter four. The prevailing orthodoxy in the literature rejects Seipel’s claim 
that the Heimwehr was an “irresistible people’s movement,” citing estimations of its 
membership numbers. As this chapter will demonstrate, this simplistic method of 
measuring support tells a story that is consistent with efforts of “coalition historiography” 
to white-wash Austria to better fit the “victim” role prescribed by the Allies and the 
Soviets following World War II. Beyond the fact that the Heimwehr movement secured a 
sizable membership base (per capita) at its peak, it secured the support important cross-
sections of the Austrian population. That is, it was funded by industrial associations, 
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financial institutions, nobles, as well as state and federal governments at various times. 
Furthermore, the provincial governments were key to the movement’s success, providing 
essential legal protections from federal calls for its disarmament and dissolution. It also 
could count on sustenance from Catholic clergy members throughout Austria who lent 
the movement respectability. At the same time, the involvement and backing of nobles 
provided the movement with standing and flair, while the support of former k.u.k. 
officers gave the Heimwehren credibility as a paramilitary organization. Whatever the 
Heimwehr movement may have lacked in sheer numbers, it made up for in the fact that 
its backers were wealthy, politically powerful, and socially influential. In other words, 
their wealth, power, and influence were force multipliers. 
Chapter five picks up with the resumption of contact between the Heimwehren 
and Bavarian paramilitary organizations in the summer of 1926. Of particular importance 
was the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft” or “working group” between the Heimwehr and the 
Stahlhelm in Bavaria, among other defense organizations. Through the Stahlhelm, the 
Heimwehr secured access to arms, munitions, military equipment and money from 
Bavarian nobles. Agreements that obliged the Stahlhelm to come to the aid of the 
Heimwehren in the event of civil war or neighboring conflagrations proved elusive. The 
German Foreign Office was concerned that the Heimwehren would drag Bavarian 
paramilitary organizations into a reckless civil war by attempting to march on Vienna. 
The resistance of its German counterparts to agree to come to its aid did not deter 
Heimwehr leaders, who were simultaneously exploring similar agreements with 
Yugoslavian paramilitary organizations, Hungarian contacts in the Horthy government, 
as well as with Fascist Italy. The relationship forged with the latter would be its most 
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formative, permanently changing the trajectory of the Heimwehr movement and the 
Austrian state. Nevertheless, a productive “working group” with the Stahlhelm was 
achieved. Steidle and Pabst would also connect federal leaders Franz Seldte and Theodor 
Duesterberg with Mussolini, who aided them with political advice and support as the 
Stahlhelm entered the realm of politics in the 1930 German federal election.  
Shortly after Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg toppled Steidle and Pfrimer 
from federal leadership over the Heimwehr movement, he met with Mussolini who 
became something of a mentor to the young Bundesführer. In 1932, Starhemberg would 
in turn connect new Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss with “Il Duce.” Mussolini’s 
financial backing of the Heimwehren, economic stimulus to Austria, diplomatic support, 
and political guidance for the Dollfuss government helped stiffen its resistance to Nazi 
terrorism after the party’s banishment in 1933. The close support Austria enjoyed from 
Mussolini, for all intents and purposes, died with Dollfuss in July 1934. Shortly 
thereafter, Italy became embroiled in the so-called Abyssinia Crisis, the international 
reaction to which would, over the course of the next year-and-a-half, push Mussolini 
toward an alliance with Hitler. 
Ultimately, this dissertation will demonstrate that the development of the 
Heimwehr movement in Austria did not occur in a vacuum. Quite the opposite. It was the 
product of close transnational cooperation among anti-Marxist circles in Germany, 
Austria, and Hungary. Like its influential Bavarian mentors, the Heimwehr movement 
understood itself to be heirs to the heritage of Alpine civic militarism, embodied in the 
deep-rooted history of volunteer Schützen and Standschützen companies. As such, the 
Heimwehren adopted much of the longstanding rituals and ideals that were underpinned 
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by conventional Catholic notions of gender that glorified masculine duties of military 
service and war volunteerism. The voluntary character of the movement would, 
unintentionally impact the decision-making of its leadership and eventually prove to be 
its Achilles heel. Catholic social thinking figured centrally in the Heimwehr movement’s 
worldview, mirroring the values and beliefs espoused by Popes and Catholic social 
theorists. The ubiquitous place of Catholic clergy and ceremony in the events staged by 
the Heimwehren simply reiterated its firm Catholic underpinnings. The Schützen and the 
Church were not the only entrenched imperial-era institutions with which the Heimwehr 
connected. It also enjoyed the patronage and involvement of many members of the 
leading circles in Habsburg society. It was these continuities that, in part, helped inspire 
spirit of the Fatherland Front and the identity of the Austria corporatist state. The 
economic stagnation resulting from the Great Depression was the rock upon which the 
energetic Nazi Party broke the backward-looking Fatherland Front.
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CHAPTER I – AUSTRIA’S LEGACY OF ALPINE CIVIC MILITARISM 
 
Former Austrian Chancellor, Kurt Schuschnigg described the impetus for the 
Heimwehr movement from a historical perspective, explaining that “[t]he desire for 
military preparedness, more particularly in the Alpine lands, was deeply rooted in the 
character of the people.”45 Schuschnigg, a Tyrolean himself and founder of the Catholic 
paramilitary Östmärkische Sturmscharen (Eastmark Stormtroopers), was well acquainted 
with the militaristic nature of Alpine culture that remained prevalent throughout the 
interwar period.46 The specificity of “the Alpine lands,” implies a distinct group from 
those dwelling in Austria’s plains. Deep-rooted militarism in the Alpine lands represents 
what Edgar Shein calls “the critical defining characteristic of a group,” as “its members 
have a shared history.” He adds, “Any social unit that has some kind of shared history 
will have evolved a culture, with the strength of that culture dependent on the length of 
its existence, the stability of the group’s membership, and the emotional intensity of the 
actual historical experiences they have shared.”47 This shared historical experience did 
not simply vanish with the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, rather it remained a 
formative cultural influence in Alpine Austria. The paramilitary Heimwehr movement 
that emerged in 1920 was an indication of just how deeply-rooted that influence was, 
most especially in the province of Tyrol.  
                                                 
45 Kurt Schuschnigg, My Austria (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1938), 128. 
46 “Ostmark” was the medieval name for the hereditary Austrian provinces, Ostmark meaning 
“East[ern] Mark,” which was made in reference to its geographical location. When annexed into Germany 
in 1938, Austria once more became known as Ostmark.  
47 Shein, Organizational Culture, 11. 
 
29 
Focusing primarily on the province of Tyrol, this chapter establishes the 
functional, organizational, and cultural continuities from the imperial-era Tyrolean 
Standschützen, which fundamentally shaped the character of Tyrolean Heimatwehr and, 
by extension, the Heimwehr movement. First, the Heimatwehr emulated the 
Standschützen in its function; both served the purpose of civil defense against all manner 
of threats—rioting, rebellion, or foreign invasion—to their local communities. Moreover, 
the Heimwehr, like its Standschützen forerunners, served as an extension of the local and 
provincial governments. Second, the Heimatwehr emulated the Standschützen in its use 
of Tyrol’s extensive pre-war network of shooting ranges. Though it followed the general 
organizational model of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, which was structured to 
correspond to local, regional, and provincial administrative zones, it also utilized the 
shooting ranges to train and store weapons it smuggled across the border from Bavaria.  
Third, the impression of Standschützen culture could be seen in the organizational 
culture of the Heimatwehr on several levels. The Heimatwehr paralleled the 
Standschützen in its close relationship with local Catholic clerics; shared rituals and 
activities such as flag dedication ceremonies, shooting competitions, and parades, almost 
always included Sunday Mass service. Also like the Standschützen, the Heimatwehr 
maintained an active youth component that trained young men in marksmanship; in the 
case of the Heimatwehr, this extended to general military conditioning, drilling, and 
training. Too, both served as channels for social engagement. The Heimatwehr would 
also adopt the social conventions of Standschützen: holding concerts, dances, and family 
events and activities created a sense of community and togetherness among the families 
of the participants. As such, the Standschützen and the Heimatwehr both reflected 
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traditional Catholic ideas of masculinity, offered fellowship, and served as mediums of 
patriotic expression. 
Lastly, the connection with the Standschützen was expressed clearly by the 
Heimatwehr. Before the towering likeness of Andreas Hofer on Berg Isel, the 
Heimatwehr regularly drew inspiration from the courage and achievements of the 
Standschützen in 1809. These links were also articulated in Heimatwehr newspapers, 
propaganda, and speeches. Indeed, the Heimatwehr saw themselves as the heirs to Tyrol’s 
Standschützen tradition. These many shared characteristics took on new meanings in the 
hyper-politicization of the First Republic. Though the Heimatwehr understood 
themselves to be protecting the same communities and values as their Standschützen 
predecessors, they had become political militiamen who expressly combated the 
existential threat of Marxist internationalism. Andreas Hofer, himself devoutly loyal to 
the Habsburg dynasty, was portrayed as a symbol of the German nationalism, a defender 
of German culture against the encroachment foreign Enlightenment ideals. Heimatwehr 
Masses, flag dedications, and benedictions no longer represented ordinary religious 
conventions they did for the Standschützen ancestors, but were also protests against the 
godlessness of Socialism. Not to be dismissed, the fact that both functioned as extensions 
of their local and provincial governments also had new meaning for the Heimatwehr; 
their enemy was not from outside Austria, but were the Socialist enemies within that 
those governments used to intimidate and suppress. The Heimatwehr understood 
themselves as representing the same virtues as their forerunners, but in the new post-war 




Militarizing Alpine Society—A Medieval Origin Story 
In Tyrol, the beginnings of this “shared history of experience” can be traced as far 
back as the early Middle Ages, when geopolitical norms allowed duchies and counties to 
function as virtually autonomous realms despite owing allegiance to a king. In this way, 
nobles were obliged to defend their borders and communities with their own armies. 
Thus, the militarization of Tyrol during the Habsburg reign manifested out of necessity. 
This militarism evolved over the centuries, merging war volunteerism, provincial 
patriotism and imperial loyalty, expressed through the age-old mantra, “Für Gott, Kaiser, 
und Vaterland.” The militarization of Tyrolean society was a formative influence on 
population’s collective identity.48 Over time, even recreational activities such as hunting 
and sport shooting acquired increasingly formal, militaristic tinges.  
Time and again the Habsburg’s imperial army sought to gain control over matters 
of Tyrolean state defense (Landesverteidigung). Tyrol’s numerous shooting ranges 
(Schießstände) and clubs served as the infrastructure for the Landesverteidung. The 
official integration of Tyrol’s militia system into the imperial military industrial complex 
reduced its civilian complexion further. By the late-nineteenth century, traditional 
volunteer militia institutions had almost entirely been integrated into the k.k. Landwehr, 
Austria’s “National Guard.” As such, Tyrolean shooting ranges now became nodes of 
military mobilization for reservists and militiamen, beyond their original roles as 
community spaces for socializing, camaraderie, and target shooting. 
                                                 
48 It should be noted that discussions of identity, including, “Tyrolean identity,” should be 
understood as pertaining to “German” or “German Tyrolean” identity, for which this study is focused. 
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In 1363 the last of the Meinhardiner line, Margaret, Countess of Tyrol, bequeathed 
the county to Rudolf IV of Austria. In this way, Tyrol became a possession of the House 
of Habsburg. Feudal obligations required vassals, peasant farmers, and retainers 
(knechten) to serve as soldiers in the armies of their respective landlords’ private army or 
in the levies (Aufgebot) of the cities in which they lived. These levies were one of the 
“pillars” of the “military constitution” of the late medieval and early modern Tyrol. As is 
evident in the writings of chroniclers of sixteenth century Tyrol, military service was a 
significant aspect of the lives of the peasantry and townsfolk. Military campaigns, 
whether they be wars with neighboring duchies or “death feuds” (Totschlagsfehde) 
between nobles, were unwelcome interruptions in their lives. Not surprisingly, then, the 
topic of who was obliged to serve and for how long, was an “exceedingly controversial” 
one between noble and peasant, Bürgermeister and townsfolks, particularly from the 
fifteenth century onward. Not surprisingly, the “military constitution” framing the 
parameters of service became increasingly detailed and sophisticated.49 
For townsfolk, the genesis of codified civilian military obligations appears to have 
evolved from earlier civil defense duties such as watch duty (Wachtdienst).50 The city of 
Salzburg, for example, obliged citizens to man and defend the towers at Mönchsberg and 
its gates. In another instance, an executive decree (Ausfergenurkunde) dated 31 January, 
1278, required six crossbowman units (Armbrustschützen) to help defend the bridge, 
                                                 
49 Martin P. Schennach, Ritter, Landsknecht, Aufgebot: Quellen zum Tyrolean Kriegswesen 14.-
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Tyrolean Landmiliz, which will be addressed further below. 
50 Franz Schweyger, Chronik der Stadt Hall, 1303-1572, ed. David von Schönherr (Innsbruck: 
Wagner Universität Buchhandlung, 1867), 32, cited in Franz-Heinz von Hye, Die Tiroler Schützen und ihre 




ramparts, and walls of the city of Laufen (Salzburg).51  Nearly a century later, little had 
changed. Townsfolk remained obliged to perform civil defense duties. The Tyrolean city 
of Hall, for example, paid two watchmen at a time, stationed in the “Hallerturm” in 
1365.52    
Civil defense duties expanded to encompass more sophisticated schemes of 
military preparedness (militärische Bereitschaft). In one detailed example, a city captain 
(Stadthauptmann), typically a noble, and often the city’s mayor (Bürgermeister), oversaw 
district captains (Bezirkhauptmann), who commanded militia units from their respective 
districts of the city. This system of organization, used in the city of Hall, is among the 
earliest incarnations of civil defense in Tyrol. Further indications of the increasingly 
sophisticated nature of the Tyrol’s civil defense system can be found in documents such 
as a muster list (Musterregister) for the city of Lienz (Tyrol) from to 1410, which 
included not just the personal information of the militiamen but also the weapons that 
they were trained to use.53 In the late Middle Ages, such measures were local initiatives 
and, thus, varied greatly from one municipality to the next. Nevertheless, in Tyrol and 
across Europe, militia systems (Schützenwesen) were refined and standardized over the 
next five centuries. 
The transition from melee to ranged weapons, contributed greatly to the transition 
from well-trained, expensive, and unwieldy Söldnerheer (mercenary armies) to the 
formation of standing armies and the recruitment of subjects for militia duty.54 Officers 
                                                 
51 Friederike Zaisberger, Fritz Hörmann, eds. Salzburgs Schützen und Bürgergarden: 
Landesverteidigung und Brauchtum (Salzburg: Landesverband Salzburger Volkskultur, 1996), 21. 
52 Hye, Die Tiroler Schützen, 9. 
53 Hye, Die Tiroler Schützen, 10. 
54 Schennach, Ritter, Landsknect, Aufgebot, 16. 
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could train civilians to use crossbows and muskets in a comparatively short amount of 
time with a reasonable degree of efficiency, as opposed to mounted knights (Ritter), or 
mercenary foot soldiers (Fußtruppen) who required much more extensive military 
training to become proficient with the melee weapons. City governments constructed 
shooting ranges (Schießstände) outside city walls to provide spaces to drill and practice 
marksmanship on set days on the calendar.55 In 1461 in the city of Hall, a “shooting 
order” (Schießenordnung) was introduced that required shooting practice every Sunday.56 
Shooting ranges became crucial components in Tyrol’s system of defense 
(Landesverteidigung) in numerous facets beyond shooting exercises. They came to 
function, more importantly, as spaces where war volunteerism and dynastic patriotism 
converged with pastimes such as shooting competitions and hunting, fashioning a culture 
of civic militarism that became innately intertwined with the regional identity of 
Tyroleans. 
In 1511, Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian I, signed the much-venerated 
Tyrolean “Landlibell,” which obligated the County of Tyrol to provide the emperor with 
militia forces ranging between 5,000 and 20,000 troops, depending on the severity of the 
threat. In exchange for this commitment, Tyrolean militiamen would not have to 
campaign outside of Tyrol.57 Despite the reverence attained among Schützenkompanies, 
the Landlibell codified administrative practices that had already been in place—some 
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long before 1511.58 For example, in 1497 Tyrol was quartered for the express purpose of 
military mobilization. Each of the four regions had to provide up to 5,000 men depending 
on the degree to which the state was threatened.59 
While Tyroleans long placed much emphasis on the importance of this document 
as conferring special rights and a greater degree independence, it was not a unique 
arrangement. The Habsburgs had reached similar agreements with neighboring duchies 
before the Landlibell von 1511. In Lower Austria, the first set of laws declaring general 
levies in a state of emergency were written between 1278 and 1281. In Styria, similar 
defense edicts had been in place since 1443. In same year (1511), the Habsburgs brokered 
similar covenants in Vorarlberg and Carinthia.60 Nevertheless, the Landlibell was critical 
in that it laid the foundation for the Landesverteidigung (Tyrolean defense system), 
which, more or less, lasted until the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918. It 
established recruitment quotas for judicial districts and four-year obligations to the 
farmers and citizens that filled out its ranks with required weapons exercises in peace 
time. The right of militiamen to own their own firearms and the increasing availability of 
firearms helped facilitate the establishment of shooting ranges and the popular pastime of 
target shooting. What resulted was an increase in the number of shooting ranges being 
constructed and rifle clubs or guilds being established, most typically in or around more 
densely populated Tyrolean towns.61 The Landlibell, established the Landesverteidigung, 
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which created a framework for the militarization of Tyrolean society not only through 
militia service, but also by fostering its gun culture. 
 The growing fear of Ottoman invasion of Habsburg lands offered Maximilian I an 
opportunity to create a mutual defense policy in the form of the 1518 “Innsbrucker 
Libell.” Nevertheless, in terms of defense, the policy sought to secure the cooperation of 
the individual provinces. That is, the fragmented character of the Habsburg lands 
(Landesfürsten) was not only acknowledged in defense agreements, but those agreements 
perpetuated their individuality. The geopolitical landscape of medieval and early modern 
Austria guided imperial defense policy and would have a lasting effect on the identity of 
the Austrian people.62  
By 1633, the Thirty Years War had raged throughout Europe almost continuously 
for fifteen years, prompting further refinements of the Tyrolean civil defense system. 
Archduke Maximillian III increased community militia quotas, requiring men between 
the ages of 24 and 45 to perform militia service. The decree also required regular military 
exercises (every two weeks on Sundays and public holidays).63 The law divided into 
military districts, created an “Unteroffizierskorps.”  The county appointed uniformed 
officers who possessed authority to implement martial law in communities directly 
threatened by war.64  The excessive brutality of the Thirty Years War—particularly 
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toward civilians—wore on soldiers and populations alike, making it increasingly difficult 
to get militiamen to fulfill their service requirements. Some refused to from the outset 
while others marched out, slipping away later at an opportune moment, to return home.65  
The constant presence of violence and armed combat in the Middle Ages and the 
early modern era, forged crucial values of military obligation and sacrifice for family and 
community. This is not to imply that Habsburg subjects accepted military service without 
question; the examples above indicate quite the opposite. Rather, it was a protracted 
negotiation of expectations and limits that was an understood facet of ordinary life. 
Though the Tyrolean Landmiliz reforms reflected the circumstances specific to 1633, it 
also increased the proximity between civilians and military service in its demands for 
increased militia quotas. It also marked an increasingly formalized and sophisticated 
system of training and mobilization. 
 In the late seventeenth century, private gun clubs began organizing and fielding 
sharp shooter units in times of conflict. The defense order (Zuzugsordnung) of 1704 
codified the informal, voluntary actions, obligating sharp shooter companies to mobilize 
as called upon. Separate from the Landmiliz, they elected their officers, a tradition that 
remained intact over 200 years later when the Standschützen were mobilized in 1915 to 
protect Tyrol’s Italian border.66 This tradition was also a defining feature of the 
Heimwehren, which distinguished it from fascist paramilitary groups that operated under 
the Führerprinzip (leadership principle), which emphasized blind obedience to one’s 
superiors. As it were, it prevented the development of a “cult of leadership” that defined 
                                                 




the National Socialist and Italian fascist movements. Moreover, the continuity of this 
democratic feature enabled factionalism to develop within the provincial groups and the 
federal level.67  
By the mid-eighteenth century, the first levy of Tyrolean militiamen was 
organized into four regiments, which represented the first line of defense and the 
provinces’ most able-bodied men. These regiments mustered for inspection and drills 
twice biannually. The units formed from the second and third levies were mobilized “only 
in case of imminent enemy threat.” Virtually any and every able-bodied Tyrolean stood in 
defense of his community in one of these levies. Lengthy periods of peace and inactivity 
in the eighteenth century eroded the social and cultural resonance of civic militarism 
militia in the identity of Tyroleans. The French invasion of Tyrol in 1796 revived these 
virtues, however temporarily; the role played by Tyrolean sharp shooters remains a 
source of veneration in the collective memory to this day.68 Over time these various 
levies and the military formations to which they belonged, represented the three “pillars” 
of the Tyrolean Landesverteidigung: The Landesschützen (a provincial guard), the 
Standschützen (sharp shooter units), and the Landsturm (militia).69 
 The Tyrolean Landesverteidigung underwent numerous refinements over the 
centuries, but overall, the system remained largely unaltered over the centuries and 
continually stood out as the exception to otherwise universal changes instituted in the 
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Habsburg military. The provincial government consistently rebuffed imperial efforts to 
integrate Tyrol into its general military framework (such as, the imperial army’s 
unsuccessful attempt to introduce conscription in 1785 in Tyrol). Even the dramatic 
changes the empire’s military underwent during the monarchy’s transition to the dualist 
system were not enough to effect change on the Tyrolean system (whereas it had 
succeeded in other areas such as the old military border region of Croatia and in southern 
Dalmatia). The relationship between Tyrolean militia formations and the imperial 
government “remained informal and without legal foundation in the 1868 law.”70 Only in 
1870 did the imperial army finally implement compulsory military service in Tyrol in 
conjunction with its increasingly codified defense system.71 
Of particular importance to the Landesverteidigung was the Tyrolean 
Schießstandswesen. As Laurence Cole points out, the shooting guilds who constructed 
many of these shooting ranges, were not originally a part of the Tyrolean provincial 
defense system, but were reflections of corporative (noble) privilege. The term 
“Schützen,” then, carried the meaning of “shooter,” rather than “protector.”72 With the 
democratization of firearms, private and government-funded shooting ranges became an 
integral part of Tyrolean society, serving a variety of functions. Shooting competitions 
had been commonplace in Tyrol since the mid-fifteenth century, with imperial, state, or 
local officials offering prize money for the best shooters in various categories.73 In 
addition, the Habsburg government supplemented the shooting ranges with annual 
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“gifts,” (Gnadengaben), drawing the ranges and guilds into the imperial military system. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, the imperial government, in conjunction with the Tyrolean 
Ministry of Defense, implemented a new Schießstandsordnung (shooting range order), 
which instituted an increasingly standardized structure and hierarchy, as well as practices 
and procedures for all imperial shooting ranges in Tyrol and Vorarlberg.74  
As the 1845 shooting range order (Schießstandsordnung) indicates, the Tyrolean 
shooting range system mirrored the Austrian government and society in that it was a top 
down organization, with the Governor standing as its principal overseer. The shooting 
range system also closely paralleled the government administrative structures. Section 
one of the 1845 order recognizes the main provincial shooting range to be in Innsbruck, 
while order named seven counties (which also served as district court ranges) shooting 
ranges in Bregenz (Vorarlberg), Imst, Schwatz, Bruneck, Bozen, Trient, and Rovereto; the 
county shooting range in Meran was “entitled to equal respect.”75 In order to petition the 
Governor for a new range to be constructed, communities had to have a least twenty 
Schützen enrolled shooters. Once approved, the new imperial shooting range was entitled 
to its own flag with its own name, unique shield, and seal, alongside the Habsburg 
imperial eagle. In the 1845/6 revision of the Schießstandsordnung, communities 
constructing imperial shooting ranges would receive an annual contribution of 40,000 
florins from the imperial coffers. Additionally, ranges received another 40,000 florins 
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toward the purchase of rifles and ammunition members could use, but remained the state 
property (Ärar) of the range.76  
The compact between the imperial government and the Tyrolean shooting range 
system required that all ranges keep detailed records of its membership in the form of 
Matrikelbücher (enrollment books). These books contained the rights and duties of 
members and member information. The ranges kept enrollment books for documentation 
and collecting shooting fees, but also for the purpose of maintaining muster lists for the 
Standschützen units, should they be called upon by the Kaiser to protect Tyrol’s borders 
in times of war. Upon reaching eighteen years of age, young men could enter into the 
ranks of a shooting guild.77 Reforms to the Landesverteidigung and the 
Schießstandsordnung in the wake of the Franco-Austrian War in 1859 required men 
between the ages of 18 to 30 to enroll at their local shooting range.78 
Oversight of the shooting ranges was the responsibility of the 
Oberschützenmeister (Shooting Master) along with an Unterschützenmeister (Lieutenant 
Shooting Master) and a “corresponding number” of Schützenrat (shooting council) 
members, typically senior members of the guilds.79 The “corresponding number” 
pertained to the status of the shooting range, as previously addressed. Ranges were either 
the main provincial range, a county range, a court district range, or a municipal range. 
The main provincial range in Innsbruck retained an eight-man shooter council, while at 
the county ranges maintained a six-man council. The district court ranges were allowed a 
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two to four-man council depending on the size of the range. Range members elected this 
administrative hierarchy, who served fixed terms of service in their roles; the 
Oberschützenmeister served for a duration of five years, the Unterschützenmeister for 
four, and Schützenrat members, for two.80 Their duties and responsibilities consisted of 
all manner of shooting range business, including asset management, handling disciplinary 
matters, and jurisdiction over shooting matters.81 
 The grandest event among the Tyrolean shooting guilds was the imperial open 
shooting competition (Kaiserlichen Freischießen). The shooting festival cycled through 
the cities of Innsbruck and Trient, Bregenz and Bozen/Meran (alternatively), Bruneck and 
Imst, and Rovereto and Schwatz. The Kaiser would supply 200 ducats to assist the city 
hosting the competition for that year.82 The best shooters from their respective ranges 
were entitled to participate in the imperial shooting competition where they would 
compete for prizes (Gnadengaben) offered by the emperor. These often included a 
wreath-shaped target and a financial reward for the best shooter, which varied from one 
competition to another and from year to year.83 
 In the comparatively peaceful decades following the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, Kaiser Ferdinand I had encouraged the continued health of the 
Standschützen and Tyrol’s shooting ranges.84 By the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century, the Tyrolean Schützenwesen thrived beyond what would have been his wildest 
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expectations. Despite the military inadequacies of the Schießstandswesen, by 1875 there 
were 330 registered shooting ranges, 412 in 1895, and 501 by 1913.85 In the period 
between 1880 and 1914 overall shooting range membership doubled and, in nearly a 
quarter of the ranges, tripled.86 In preparation for the Jahrhundertsfeier (centenary 
celebration) in 1909, the centennial celebration of the 1809 Tyrolean uprising, of the 
shooting ranges recorded, 359 had a predominantly German speaking membership.87 The 
renovation and expansion of shooting ranges in Tyrol, Cole points out, was a product of  
genuine patriotism as well as friendly competition between neighboring communities.88 
At the same time the Tyrolean network of shooting ranges experienced exponential 
growth, the Landesverteidigungsgesetz (provincial defense law) of 1887 integrated the 
ranges into the larger imperial military infrastructure to serve as mobilization nodes and 
the sites where Landsturm men would take part in obligatory long distance shooting 
drills. From an organizational perspective, little changed except for the institution at the 
levers of power.89 
 The 1913 provincial defense law and shooting range order of 1913 was the final 
step in the full militarization of the shooting range system, integrating the last levee, the 
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Standschützen, into official military hierarchy.90 Little had changed in terms of the place 
of the shooting ranges in Tyrol’s overarching system of defense. Despite the order’s 
claim that the shooting range system was “an independent institution without military 
incorporation,” it is clear that the network had been streamlined into the Habsburg 
military system.91 Quite explicitly the law states: “The institution of provincial defense is 
organized through the shooting range system.”92 Moreover, it adds, Tyrol’s militia 
formations, as well as the k.k. Schießstände, were to maintain a “military character.”93 In 
the event of war and general mobilization, veterans’ association members—who 
comprised the bulk of the emergency Standschützen companies—functioned as a 
"volunteer" (Freiwillige) pool of emergency troops.94 
The 1913 shooting range order also tasked the members of the shooting ranges 
themselves with the responsibility of the general well-being of the shooting range system 
as an institution of provincial defense, to arrange formal training for young “Schützen” in 
the handling of firearms, and “to enliven the public spirit of the Schützen for the defense 
of the Fatherland and loyalty to the Kaiser.” To accomplish the penultimate task, they 
were to establish “Jungschützenschulen” (young shooter schools) to train youths to 
handle army rifles and get acquainted with the shooting range system, thereby better 
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preparing youths for their compulsory military service and expanding its military 
potential to include older youths.95 The Jungschützenschulen reflected a further 
formalization of longstanding practices. By 1865, if not earlier, a “Jungschützen” class 
appeared in Tyrol’s imperial shooting festivals.96 By 1868, the involvement of youths in 
local shooting ranges took another step toward the Jungschützenschulen through the 
creation of youth shooting groups (Jugendschützengesellschaft) who met regularly and 
engaged in shooting exercises and competitions.97 As will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this chapter as well as in chapter three, the youth organizations established by the 
Heimwehren carried on this tradition of acclimating Austrian youths to handling rifles 
and marksmanship. With the prohibition of compulsory military service, it also took on 
the task of instilling military education and virtues into its young members. 
The 1913 defense laws reflected the successful revival of popular interest in 
Tyrol’s gun culture. The construction of new shooting ranges, the renovation of old ones, 
and the consolidation of less active ranges created a bustling and ideologically healthy 
system. On a practical level, consolidation of less active ranges served the purpose of 
simplifying administrative processes, maintenance, and upkeep.98 Broadly speaking, it 
was the culmination of a slow, methodical process of integrating the principal elements of 
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Tyrol’s militia defense system—the volunteer Standschützen and the shooting range 
system around which they were organized—into the Habsburg military hierarchy.  
 
Schützenkompanies in the field 
 From their earliest incarnations, Tyrol’s rifle ranges and war were inextricably 
intertwined. They were important support centers of the three "pillars" of the 
Landesverteidigung, providing spaces for weapons training, volunteer mobilization, 
dynastic patriotism, and, in the late imperial era, spaces of imperial mobilization. 
Throughout the military history of the early modern Habsburg Empire, shooting range 
members, or Schützen, laid down the ‘tools of their trades,’ retrieved their rifles and 
powder, and defended Vaterland Tirol.99 Eyck makes the apt comparison of Tyrolean 
militiamen to colonial American militiamen “in their localism, formations, drill, and light 
armament” as well as in fact that they were used only periodically and for a brief time.100 
One might also draw similarities in their democratic nature and the fact that units elected 
their officers—almost always men who were respected figures in their communities and 
in some cases wealthy and influential in their respective communities. This unique 
attribute distinguished the sharpshooter units from those of regular imperial army.  
 Provincial Schützen detachments participated in the military campaigns of the 
empire’s major conflicts of the nineteenth century. Their most celebrated achievement, 
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however, was the 1809 Tyrolean uprising. In 1809, Tyrolean militiamen spearheaded 
military operations against French and Bavarians forces while the regular Austrian army 
served in an auxiliary capacity.101 The successful ouster of their French and Bavarian 
occupiers by the Tyrolean Standschützen became the centerpiece of Tyrolean lore. The 
story of the insurrection and its leading figures became legendary and an inextricably 
intertwined component of Tyrolean identity. Contemporary chronicler Jakob Bartholdy 
explained, “The most distinguished heads of civil and military matters in the war of 1809, 
the most remarkable in the history of the princely county, —were from the peasantry.”102 
In the more rural areas of Tyrol there was little distinction between nobles and wealthier 
peasantry. It was individuals of this strata led local Tyrolean militia groups. Since the 
peasantry accounted for approximately 85 percent of the population in Tyrol in 1809, its 
militia companies had a similarly peasant complexion. The largely peasant-driven 
insurrection reflected a developing fissure between town and countryside.103 
Innkeepers, for several reasons, played an especially prominent role in organizing 
and leading the Tyrolean insurgency. Four reasons, in particular, account for their 
conspicuous representation in the leading ranks. First, they were among the wealthier 
strata, owning their properties and businesses, which often made them influential figures 
in their respective communities. Second, inns often set at strategically important 
mountain passes where traffic—and information—flowed, making them ideally placed in 
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a position to communicate important information gleaned from guests and outside 
connections established by the nature of their business. Third, they were usually able to 
read and write and were shrewd businessmen. Lastly, inns often boasted shooting ranges 
and offered a convenient space to stow rebel weapons caches.104  
The most revered figure of the rebellion, Andreas Hofer, was a South Tyrolean 
innkeeper whose inn, the Sandhof, lay at the base of the Jaufen Pass that linked North and 
South Tyrol. Hofer served as the commander of all Tyrolean militia forces and, after the 
successfully expelling their French and Bavarian occupiers, was recognized by Kaiser 
Franz I as the Regent of Tyrol. His position, success, and “martyr’s death” elevated Hofer 
to a mythical status among Tyroleans in the decades and centuries that followed. 
According to a Tyrolean noble and contemporary of Hofer, Baron Josef von Hormayr, he 
was “the representative of the Tyrolean general will in 1809.”105 It would perhaps be 
more accurate to say that Hofer's sentiments represented the general will of the 
countryside, which consistently exhibited devotion to the House of Habsburg and its 
respect of traditional privileges exercised by Tyroleans. The 1809 insurrection was 
commemorated throughout nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Hofer and other 
figures such as Joseph Speckbacher and Joachim Haspinger, the Capuchin monk, 
insurrection orchestrator, and battlefield commander, became symbols of Tyrolean virtues 
of patriotism, dynastic loyalty, and civic militarism.106 
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Much of the success of the 1809 insurrection can be attributed to only lightly-
manned Bavarian garrisons, the overwhelming support of peasant militia volunteers, and 
the adept use of unconventional, guerrilla tactics that utilized their intimate knowledge of 
the mountain landscape. Moreover, many commanders of the sharpshooter companies in 
1809 had also fought against the French in their initial invasion of Tyrol in 1796, so they 
had combat experience.107 Combined, these factors enabled the Shützen companies to 
compensate for whatever they lacked in organization and military discipline. Ultimately, 
it was military defeat elsewhere and that forced the Austrian Empire—if but 
temporarily—to end its support of the rebels and its claims to the Tyrol. 
Though there were varying degrees of cooperation with the small Austrian Army 
force aiding the rebellion, the popular revolt was only loosely organized; the recurring 
pattern of "everybody commanded themselves" is readily apparent in the primary source 
literature.108 The voluntary participation of the militiamen and their leaders exemplifies 
the already strong legacy of civic militarism established by 1809. Moreover, the civilian 
nature of the Tyrolean insurrection was also demonstrated in Hofer's call for numerous 
war councils, which included Schützen companies leaders and Landsturm commanders, 
in order to get their input on the state of the situation and develop strategic and tactical 
responses.109 The nature of the insurrection was a seesaw affair in which Tyrolean militia 
forces would take control over Tyrolean cities only to be forced to abandon them shortly 
thereafter in the face of a reinforced enemy and, ultimately, Austrian defeat at the Battle 
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of Znaim (Moravia). Few Schützen wore uniforms of any sort, rather most were 
identifiable only by their plumes of feathers, peacock tails, or sprigs of rosemary.110 From 
concealed positions, Tyrolean sharpshooters harassed French and Bavarian ranks to great 
effect. They also, at various times, felled trees, and rolled large rocks down from enemy 
troops.111   
 
Figure 2. The tomb of Andreas Hofer in the Hofkirche, Innsbruck, Austria. 
(Photo by the Author) 
 
Not typically found in the commemorations of the brave Schützen of 1809 is what 
took place in the aftermath of the first and second seizures of Innsbruck (April 11-12, 
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1809). Numerous Schützen took to looting businesses and residences of purported 
Bavarian sympathizers, Jews, or homes of wealthy residents that simply looked worth 
looting. The general mistrust between the peasantry and city residents—a feature that had 
and would continue to surface—found expression in the pillaging.112 While there were 
undoubtedly Bavarian sympathizers in Innsbruck and others indifferent to Bavarian rule, 
much of the plundering underscored the diverging outlooks between city and countryside. 
This dichotomy remained firmly intact decades later and would be exacerbated by Karl 
Marx’s Communist Manifesto, which threatened the rise of the urban, working class in 
revolution against the bourgeois capitalist system. As his treatise gained adherents among 
the urban, working class, Austrian cities became symbols of Marxism for its peasant and 
bourgeois opponents. This was the backdrop for which the Heimwehren and the Marxist 
Republikanischer Schutzbund (Republican Defense League) would do battle throughout 
the duration of the First Republic. 
In 1816, after the final defeat of Napoleon and Tyrol was restored to the Austrian 
Empire, it was required to contribute manpower directly to the imperial army in the form 
of a Kaiserjäger Regiment. Maintenance of a standing regiment garrisoned in Tyrol 
increased the financial strain for the Tyrolean government (Landesregierung). The 
weakening of Tyrol's traditional militia defense system was the intended effect of this 
directive from Vienna, as it hoped to increase its authority in the process.113 As a result, 
the Landesverteiding fell increasingly into financial neglect, which would prove readily 
apparent in subsequent actions in which Schützenkompanies participated. 
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Quite unlike the 1809 rebellion in Tyrol, Schützenkompanies in subsequent 
conflicts would be the ones playing only minor auxiliary roles. During the revolutions of 
1848-49, Italian nationalists seeking to create a unified Italian state challenged Habsburg 
sovereignty in the crown land of Lombardy-Venetia, and in the largely Italian-speaking 
region of South Tyrol.  While six volunteer Schützen battalions from Styria took part in 
Field Marshal Josef Radetzky’s famous campaign to reassert Habsburg control in 
Lombardy-Venetia, some 144 German-Tyrolean Schützenkompanies—a total of 16,653 
men—engaged Italian revolutionaries on the south Tyrolean border in Judikarien, the 
Ampezzo, and Stilfser Joch.114 While the spirit of patriotism, dynastic loyalty, and war 
volunteerism was high in the Schützenkompanies, their performance in the field left 
much to be desired according to Habsburg officers. The mayor of Bozen, Josef Streiter, 
complained in 1848 that Schützen troops were unreliable and required close supervision 
by officers.115 As a whole, the Tyrolean Landesverteidigung was in a state disarray and 
lacked the organization and arms to field reliable militia units.116  
Military opinions of Tyrolean militiamen and their system of mobilization 
remained low during and after the 1859 war with Piedmont and France. An army report 
from Rattenberg complained of insufficiency of the Schützenkompanies weapons as well 
as their training.117 Furthermore, Feldmarschall-Leutnant Maximilian von Baumgarten 
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found the process of mobilizing the Schützenkompanies “inadequate and in need of 
improvement.” The antiquated practice of Schützen using their own personal rifles had 
also run its course; the army would need to supply the companies with military grade 
weapons. Furthermore, Baumgarten complained, Schützenkompanies were too large and 
that elected officers should maintain their positions in peacetime and supervise further 
training.118 Post-war reforms in late 1859 required Schützen to use military rifles when 
conducting their obligatory shooting exercises in hopes of acclimating the sharpshooters 
and militia companies with the rifles. 
In 1866, the Austrian Empire faced war on two fronts. In the north, the k.k. 
Nordarmee, along with its southern German allies, faced a Prussian-led north German 
coalition. In the south, the empire faced the Kingdom of Italy, which was determined to 
take the remaining Italian-speaking areas under Austrian control, including South Tyrol. 
This threat, as had been the case in 1848 and again in 1859, required the mobilization of 
the Tyrolean militia.119  The Schützen detachments that were deployed to the front lines 
spent much of their time fighting Garibaldi's invasion of South Tyrol.120 In the face of 
mobilization for war in 1866, members of the Innsbruck-Sonnenburg sharpshooter 
company were more concerned about their “lack of weapons and money,” had to look to 
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local aristocracy for both.121 Post-war evaluations of the Landesverteidigungkommando 
corroborate concerns the Innsbruck-Sonnenberg unit faced, complaining once more of 
poorly armed, ill-trained Tyrolean militia volunteers. The fact that only four of the twenty 
Schützenkompanies mobilized were deployed to the front and no more than six were ever 
“dressed out” illustrated the lack of organization and exercises in the peacetime prior to 
outbreak of hostilities.122 Be that as it may, the large number of volunteers that turned out 
in 1866 demonstrated their willingness to defend “Vaterland Tirol” against foreign 
incursion.123 Throughout the nineteenth century, Schützenkompanies actively participated 
in the defense of Tyrol's territorial integrity, Habsburg sovereignty, and values they 
symbolized—conservativism, Catholicism, and militarism. In the process, a rich tradition 
of civic militarism and war volunteerism was cultivated in the Schießstandswesen and 
through its sharpshooter companies. 
It would not be until the outbreak of the First World War that Tyrolean Landsturm 
and Standschützen companies were mobilized again for war. In the forty-eight years 
between the Austro-Prussian War and World War I, the imperial army had fully integrated 
the Tyrolean Landesverteidigung and all of its institutions into the imperial infrastructure. 
In the first weeks and months of the war, Tyrol—for the first time—sent some 85,000 
men to the fronts in Galicia and Serbia. Though traditionally understood as reserve levees 
to mobilize in the event that Tyrol's borders were threatened, the k.u.k. 
Armeeoberkommando (AOK) mobilized Landsturm formations—across the Austro-
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Hungarian Empire for that matter—almost immediately for front line service. 
Subsequently, the AOK activated 25 Standschützen companies for training, watch duty, 
and to guard prisoners of war.124 When Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary in May 
1915, only the Standschützen companies and a few Tyrolean replacement battalions 
(Marschbatallione) remained in Tyrol and could be immediately deployed to defend its 
southern Alpine passes. 
The composition of the Standschützen companies illustrated the totalizing effect 
of the First World War. With the exorbitant volume of casualties in the opening months of 
the war, the age limit for service in the Landsturm had to be expanded in both 
directions—from 19 years of age to 18 years of age and from 42 years of age to 50. This 
meant that the remaining individuals eligible for service in the Standschützen were either 
too young or too old to be conscripted into the Common Army or the Landwehr.125 Thus, 
it would not have been unheard of for a grandfather serving in the Standschützen with his 
grandson. On July 9, 1915, 14 year old Standschütze, Josef Egger of the Sillian battalion, 
was killed in front line duty, despite directives that required youths under the age of 17 to 
remain behind the front lines, in support roles.126 To be sure, the all-encompassing nature 
of the First World War reflected the climax of the militarization of European society that 
started in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. For Central Europe, the 
militarization of society did not end with the conclusion of the Great War. Instead, it was 
amplified in the “culture of defeat” that materialized in its aftermath. Many of the 
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institutions that contributed to the militarization of society survived in a very real, 
physical sense or in the subconscious of those formative years were spent as soldiers and 
in the war. 
The k.k. Schießstände as Cultural Fabric 
Tyrolean shooting ranges served in numerous capacities, making them an 
invaluable lens into the mentalité of a significant cross-section of the population. In 
addition to being spaces where Tyrolean militiamen participated in their required 
shooting drills, the k.k. Schießstände were essential spaces for inculcating military 
culture, dynastic loyalty, and provincial patriotism as well as for socializing, camaraderie, 
and community shooting competitions. Shooting ranges in Tyrol, thus, were dynamic 
hubs where numerous facets of a Tyrolean’s identity converged. As this section will 
illustrate, the shooting ranges were crucial nodes in the formation of identity and rituals. 
The interconnectedness of all of these facets of Tyrolean identity are captured nicely in 
the romanticized poetry of the early and mid-nineteenth century.  
Hermann von Gilm’s collection of poetry entitled Tiroler Schützen-Leben (The 
Life of the Tyrolean Shooter), self-published in honor of Tyrol’s 500th anniversary under 
Habsburg sovereignty, offers a useful case-study.127 The poems offer a window into the 
general outlook of the Tyrolean Standschützen in the mid-nineteenth century, highlighting 
the prominence of hunting and sport shooting in the communities and social lives of 
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Tyroleans. The sonnets also record (and mythologize) events Gilm deemed important in 
the broader narrative of the Standschützen.  
Careful examination of Gilm’s work reveals two main ideological threads. The 
Schützen’s idea of freedom appears as a principal force compelling the other recurring 
themes. In addition to being innately connected to imperial sovereignty, freedom is 
symbolized through the natural beauty of the Alpine setting, through God’s will, and in 
via Tyrol’s hunting and gun culture. War volunteerism in defense of Tyrolean freedom 
and integrity is the second recurring feature in Gilm’s poetry.  
The special liberty of owning guns, among other things, that Tyroleans enjoyed 
required special obligations, namely wartime service to the crown in defend its borders. 
The hallowed “Landlibell von 1511” established the basis of this arrangement.128 
Tyrolean men commonly viewed militia service as an obligation, to defend Tyrol’s 
borders, its freedoms, their communities, and their families. The obligation of militia 
service required the establishment of protocols for mobilizing formations and practices 
for the military training of volunteers, both of which took place at local shooting ranges. 
Thus, war volunteerism became an essential motif in Tyrolean society. These 
requirements went far in militarizing Tyrolean culture. The intersection of these 
fundamental values, not surprisingly, bolstered traditional social constructs and gender 
roles, the third major thread. Gilm’s verses accentuate the innately conservative and 
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masculine characteristics of Tyrolean identity. The fourth, and last, major thread evident 
in Hermann von Gilm’s volume, is German nationalism. Tyrol’s location on the border of 
Austria’s increasingly bitter enemy in the Kingdom of Italy, along with ethnic tensions 
between German Tyroleans and “walschtiroler”—a pejorative moniker for non-German 
(and usually Italian) Tyroleans—fortified German national identity.129 In turn, German 
Tyroleans saw themselves as defenders of “Vaterland Tirol,” the territorial integrity of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, as well as a first line of defense for the broader nation of German-
speaking kingdoms to the north.  
For most Tyroleans the high peaks and valleys of the Alps were symbolic of 
freedom. The beauty and purity of the mountains provided a landscape in which nature 
and independence seamlessly meshed. Gilm’s opening poem, called “Unsere Berge,” or 
Our Mountains, is demonstrative of this symbiosis. The last stanza is especially telling in 
that it also illustrates the militaristic outlook that often coincided with the freedom of 
Tyrol: 
Let the enemies break into the land, 
Let thousands and thousands come; 
We have whistling lead on hand 
And iron singing and swishing. 
Pulling freedom from this world, 
We’ll build the banished a secure camp 
On our mountain.130 
 
The Alps were also a defining feature of Tyrolean identity. Joseph Rohrer’s early 
ethnographic study of Tyroleans is an apt example. Throughout, he references Tyroleans 
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as “Bergvolk” (mountain folk) or “Berganwohnern” (mountain residents) 
interchangeably. He also employs the concept of ‘nation,’ referring to Tyrol as the 
“tirolische Bergnation.”131 In basic terms, the use of “mountain nation” uses the 
mountains as a delineating feature, while “nation” alludes to a group distinguished by one 
feature or another that separates them from another group. A French general who 
campaigned in Tyrol shortly after the Rohrer’s study, likened the province to “a natural 
fortress whose belligerent population constitutes an equally natural garrison.” As F. 
Gunther Eyck aptly notes, “Tyrol and the bulk of its inhabitants proved no exception…to 
the corollary that mountain people are generally combative, clannish, traditionalist, self-
centered, and self-reliant.”132 While early anthropological studies perhaps exaggerated 
their “backward” world of ancient rituals, traditional dress, and old-fashioned fables, 
there is plenty of evidence of self-centeredness, self-reliance, conservatism and 
militarism.133 These attributes underline would underline the reason Heimwehr 
movement thrived in the Alpine provinces.  
While the mountainous landscape played an important role in shaping Tyrolean 
identity and notions of freedom, so too did the geopolitical location of Tyrol. Located in 
the southwestern corner of the Habsburg Empire, it constituted a particularly important 
border region to the Swiss Confederation after 1363 and throughout the early modern era. 
The Landlibell von 1511 codified the parameters of existing regulations and practices in 
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Tyrol’s provincial defense system, which remained—in varying and incrementally lesser 
degrees—intact until the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1914.134 Unlike the 
other Habsburg crown lands, Tyrol long-remained “something of a self-contained defense 
unit,” with no professional troops garrisoned in the region.135 There were numerous 
reasons for this arrangement. Mercenary armies were expensive and often maintained 
counterproductive tendencies like pillaging the countryside of their employers, while 
exhibiting no higher motivation beyond what was necessary to receive their ransom. With 
the existing protocols in place, local militia forces, by contrast, could be mustered and 
deployed to the border quickly and had the added motivation of defending their 
communities from invasion. Gilm captures the attitude of Tyrolean militiamen (Schützen) 
in his couplet: 
Wir sind Deutschlands Grenzsoldaten, 
Seiner Freiheit Gemsenwacht 
 
We are Germany’s border soldiers, 
Its freedom watch.136 
 
While not as readily apparent in Gilm’s liberal, nationalist-oriented poetry, 
religious freedom was a central aspect of Tyroleans’ broader notions of freedom and is 
particularly evident through the role clergy played in sanctifying war in defense of 
Vaterland Tirol, the Kaiser, and the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, the primacy of 
tradition in Tyrol lent itself to rigid piety. The reactions of the “overly conservative” 
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German Tyrolean clergy and nobility to the enlightened reforms of Joseph II, which 
sought to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church throughout the empire, was 
especially truculent. The addition of the archbishoprics of Brixen and Trient to the Tyrol 
in 1803 further solidified the preeminence of the Catholic Church.137 Tyrolean resistance 
was not limited to the Joseph’s reforms, but opposed wider influence of Enlightenment 
ideals, which they viewed as undermining “the strongest, the primary foundation of the 
state, that is religion.”138  
The French Revolution further aligned Tyrolean identity and religious beliefs. 
Refugee priests’ stories of the persecution of clergymen and the church by revolutionaries 
incited increasing fear among Tyrolean clerics who, in turn, unleashed anti-
Enlightenment sermons that made obedience to the crown tantamount to obedience to 
God. Defense of “Vaterland Tirol,” the Kaiser, and the church was expressed in 
militaristic religious terms, as a holy crusade against a godless enemy in the French.139 
One Tyrolean memoirist wrote, that “the revered priesthood encouraged as much as 
possible only through prayer and prepared for the coming struggle by granting 
blessings.”140 Indeed, for most Tyroleans, the French Revolution and the Enlightenment 
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ideals propelling it was very much understood as a serious threat to their system of values 
and very identity. 
One observer of the 1809 Tyrolean rebellion noted their obsessive attachment to 
the Roman Catholic Church.141 The role of the clergy in sanctifying—and in this case, 
planning, and participating in—war and resistance reiterates the continuity of the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between religion and militarism. The central role of 
Capuchin monk, Joachim Haspinger, as an instigator, planner, and commander of the 
revolt is not a surprise.142 In April 1848, some 80 Tyrolean-born students at the 
University of Vienna formed a volunteer company, electing Dr. Adolf Pichler as their 
captain and, the then 72 year-old, Haspinger as their field chaplain.143 Haspinger’s story 
is not an isolated case, as he was not the only, nor the last, Tyrolean cleric to minister to 
and lead combat troops. In June 1915, Josef Hosp, chaplain with the 1st Standschützen 
battalion, Innsbruck, “led patrols, scouted enemy positions, and even served as an 
artillery spotter.” Hosp was supposed to have shot and killed enemy troops who 
approached his position while on one such patrol. As with Haspinger, Hosp was 
celebrated by his men who admired his participation in combat operations and, 
consequently, understood their own violent actions as having “divine sanction.”144 
Paralleling the Tyrolean devotion to the Catholic Church was their loyalty to the 
Habsburg dynasty, which had long viewed itself as the defender of the Roman Catholic 
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faith. This facet of imperial identity became particularly pronounced during the Protestant 
Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the Thirty Years War. The Turkish siege of 
Vienna in 1683, reinforced the belief, for Austrians, that they were the first line of 
defense for the Christian faith. Tyroleans remained loyal to the Habsburgs due to their 
continuous devotion to the church and respect for their special defense privileges granted 
in the sixteenth century.145 Gilm’s work also illustrates how dynastic loyalty was an 
important value of the Tyrolean Standschützen. His elegy, Der Kaiserstutzen, written 
from the perspective of a “poor son of the people,” whose innate obligations to “the 
Kaiser and to the land” are accepted without question: 
Call me when it's necessary to protect, 
I'll follow bold and blind, 
And I am not paying with my blood, 
So certainly pays my child.146 
 
Another poem of Gilm’s, Tirols Ehrentag (or Tyrol’s Day of Honor), printed in the Volks- 
und Schützenzeitung, pays homage to Tyrol and the person of the Kaiser, telling the story 
of how Tyrol became a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, the 500th Anniversary 
celebrations reaffirmed the loyalty of Tyrol to the Kaiser, who attended the festivities in 
Innsbruck as the guest of honor.147 The anniversary offers an important opportunity to 
examine how this milestone was celebrated and, consequently, what that reveals about 
Tyrolean culture and society at that time. 
                                                 
145 It is worth reiterating the fact that respect for these privileges remained largely intact until the 
late nineteenth century when Vienna finally—after numerous separate attempts over the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries—brought Tyrol into the broader imperial military framework. 
146 Gilm, Tyrolean Schützen-Leben, 24-5.  
147 Hermann von Gilm, “Tirols Ehrentag,” Volks- und Schützen-Zeitung, No. 117, September 28, 
1863, 711. Laurence Cole, “Province and Patriotism: German National Identity in Tirol, 1850-1914,” 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtewissenschaften 6 (1995): 77 points out that events were staged 
throughout Tyrol, though that in Innsbruck was the largest and officially recognized by the attendance of 
the Kaiser.  
 
64 
The celebrations concluded with a two-week shooting festival at the 
Hauptschießstand in Innsbruck. Indeed, as Laurence Cole explains, since the Middle 
Ages, nearly all celebrations included shooting matches, which symbolized the special 
military rights Tyroleans held sacred. At the same time, it represented the centrality of 
shooting and hunting in the identities of Tyrolean men. As noted in one contemporary 
source, “there cannot be a genuine Tyrolean celebration without a Schützen procession 
and a shooting festival.”148 Even today, Ernst Bruckmüller points out, “Costumes and the 
shooting clubs prove to be central symbols especially of Tyrolean provincial 
consciousness…reinforced through the celebration of certain festivals…connected with 
them.”149 
Some 5,160 Schützen participated in the competition as well as 162 Schützen 
from Germany (of which 151 came from Bavaria).150 The events taking place on 28 
September 1863 commenced with the ceremonial presentation of the honorary shield of 
the Habsburg Army in front of the Hauptschießstand with all of the Schützenmeisters 
gathered at its entrance and their Schützen surrounding. With the business of the day 
complete, patrons were treated to the festival theater and ended the night taking in 
fireworks from Castles Ambras, Büchsenhausen, and Weierburg, while enjoying a 
serenade in front of imperial Palace.  
On the morning of 29 September 1863, the festivities were to begin with a 
cannonade, volleys, and the “jubilant sounds of all of the musical bands.” A field Mass 
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for the Schützenkompanies was to follow at 10:00am, then came ceremonial processions 
through various plazas in Innsbruck at 11:00am. Nearly 100 former Standschützen and 
imperial soldiers who fought in engagements in 1809, 1813, 1848, 1849, and 1859 were 
to be recognized and expected to join the ceremonial procession of the Hall 
Standschützen.151 Several volunteer organizations also filled out the schedule of events 
and participated in festival activities; the Tyrolean Sängerbund (choral association) and 
the deutscher Turnverein (or German Gymnastic Association), among others, made 
noteworthy contributions. A ball, to be held on the evening 29 September, rounding out 
the celebration with the arrival of His Imperial Highness Archduke Carl Ludwig. The 
unexpected arrival of His Imperial Majesty Kaiser Franz Josef punctuated the anniversary 
celebrations.152 Save for the fanfare of the Kaiser and the royal family, if one were to 
divorce the specifics from the activities—leaving simply a procession, field Mass, 
shooting competition, honoring veterans, ball—one could seamlessly replace the program 
of activities for a large, multi-day Heimwehr gathering with this program of events from 
1863. 
In all, the festivities illustrated the general character of Tyrolean society: 
militaristic, loyal to the Kaiser, and pride in “Vaterland Tirol” and German cultural 
heritage, all of which Gilm expresses throughout his commemorative verses.  
„Tirol, die schöne Jubelbraut,  Tyrol, the beautiful cheering bride, 
Wird neu dem Kaiser angetraut.“ To the new Kaiser wedded. 
„Fünfhundert Jahre blühet schon Five hundred years already blooms  
Die Liebe zu dem Kaiserthron.“  The love for the Imperial Throne.  
„Wie uns're Berge hoch und frei, How our mountains high and free 
So fest besieht Tirolertreu.“153  So firm is Tyrolean loyalty.   
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However, there were underlying political and ideological tensions. For (the 
typically rural) conservatives, the festivities represented merely a “restatement of 
dynastic loyalty,” whereas, for (urban bourgeois) liberals, it was a broader expression of 
German nationalism conveyed through regional patriotism “within the framework of 
loyalty to the Kaiser.”154 Thus, fealty to the monarchy inhibited the maturation of a 
wholly German identity. Furthermore, pious obedience to the Catholic Church also 
trumped German national identity in the hierarchy of self-identification for many 
conservative Tyroleans.155 That is to say, in the larger ‘Kulturkampf’ emerging in the mid-
nineteenth century between the urban, liberal bourgeoisie—for whom Großdeutsch 
nationalism had become an increasingly central point of self-identification—and rural 
conservatives, religion limited the extent to which they sanctioned the notion of a unified 
German state.156 Only under Habsburg hegemony would a Großdeutsch nation be 
acceptable. A Prussian-guided (Protestant-guided) Germany was not an outcome 
conservative Tyroleans would support.157 This difference in ideological interpretation 
illustrated the divisions within the province, the continuity of what had was an already 
longstanding ‘Kulturkampf’ between urban and rural, liberal and conservative.158 The 
fracture amongst the Tyrolean population was symptomatic of a broader socio-political 
divide throughout German Cisleithania. The absence of consensus would continue to 
plague the hereditary Habsburg lands of Austria, even after the monarchy’s collapse. It 
                                                 
154 Cole, “Province and Patriotism,” 76. 
155 Leighton S. James, “For the Fatherland,” 43-4.  
156 Derrick Hastings, Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National 
Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 17-45 notes similar tensions between adherents of 
“ultramontanism,” or political Catholicism, and political nationalists, in Munich during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. 
157 Laurence Cole, “Province and Patriotism,” 79-80. 
158 Cole, “Province and Patriotism,” 78-9. 
 
67 
would be precisely this internal conflict that would wrack the Heimwehr movement and 
drive the struggle over Austrian independence. 
 
Militarism and the late Habsburg Monarchy 
The military complexion of such public festivals would be reinforced throughout 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the implementation of compulsory military service in 
1868. “It seems fair to assume that such aspects of military service as being obliged to 
wear ‘the Emperor’s uniform,’ swearing an oath of loyalty to his person, obeying the 
commands of his officers, traveling through and/or living in different areas of the 
monarchy, and being confronted with other ethnic groups (often on a daily basis in 
barracks, as well as on the outside) would all have raised the individual’s consciousness 
about the multinational state and its ruler,” Cole contends. His Imperial Majesty Kaiser 
Franz Josef set the militaristic tone for the Habsburg administrative culture, as was 
almost always in uniform; it was his long reign that the military assumed center stage in 
the projection of Habsburg dynasty and its history.159 The discipline and loyalty to the 
dynasty exhibited by the supranational imperial army were features the Habsburg 
government actively sought to inculcate in civil society whenever and wherever possible. 
The ‘federalization’ of private, voluntary veterans’ associations and rifle clubs are 
excellent illustrations of how the empire sought to guide their activities in the direction of 
imperial loyalty and military virtues.160 
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Militarism was indoctrinated into the broader civilian population at an early age. 
Elementary schools taught children not only to read, write, do basic mathematics, but also 
about the great figures of the monarchy’s past—most especially its military past. “The 
traditions of the Habsburg army [took] center stage. Victorious battles and commanders 
played an important role alongside prominently emphasized rulers…”161 As Ernst 
Bruckmüller reveals in his examination of elementary school textbooks, they were 
introduced to prominent Habsburg figures and important events in the construction of the 
empire. As students progressed through their schooling, the historical narrative became 
increasingly complex, particularly as they navigated the often-thorny issue of nationality. 
Attention to national myths, histories, and figures illustrated the notion that devotion to 
the Habsburg crown while taking pride in one’s nationality were not contradictory ideals 
according to student textbooks.162  
Outside of militarism in the Habsburg education system, Tyrolean youths were 
also indoctrinated with duty, camaraderie, and military service to the Fatherland in the 
Standschützen community. It was the duty of the older Schützen to impart on the youth 
the significance of these virtues. “The young shooters, and those who are called in ranks 
to protect the country, may procure from the course of the festival the conviction that 
their elder brethren will be united with them in good days and bad,” explained Vorarlberg 
Governor Sebastion von Froschauer at the Landeschießen in Bregenz, Vorarlberg in June 
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1865. The older Standschützen praised the valuable work of the young riflemen, adding 
that “they did not allow the love of the fathers' weapons to be broken, and preserved the 
old, impenetrable bond of brotherhood and loyalty to this day faithfully and 
unimpeded.”163 In Schwaz (Tyrol), the election of Gregory Tafatscher as 
Oberschützenmeister of its rifle range was, according to one observer, “of the best 
consequence,” as his vision emphasized young shooters and the Landesschützen.164 
The formation of the Akademischen Schützengilde (Academic Rifle Club) at the 
University of Innsbruck is an excellent example of the confluence of teaching state and 
imperial patriotism in school and the education young men received at the rifle ranges. A 
pamphlet written to document the guild’s flag dedication ceremony on 1-2 July 1901 
illustrates how some students embraced the traditional “pillars” of Tyrol: Gott, Kaiser und 
Vaterland.165 Flag dedication ceremonies like this one typically entailed a Mass service, 
which included the blessing of the flag by the church father (Pfarrer).166 As such, the 
“three pillars”—Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland—was ubiquitous. The identity of the 
Akademischen Schützengilde was firmly couched in traditional role of 
Schützenkompanies as the defenders of Tyrol, linking the new guild with the origins of 
Tyrol’s defense system (Landesverteidigung) and, thus, emphasizing its solemn 
responsibility. The passage below captures how innately militarism, religion, and 
patriotism were intertwined: 
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Undoubtedly Andreas Hofer and his heroes in holy joy look down today at the Berg Isel. 
For those young men who represent the hope of the future of the country, swear loyalty 
today for all the world the faith and the church, faithfulness to the holy covenant of our 
fathers.167 
 
The Akademischen Schützengilde (Academic Shooting Club) became the youngest 
association in the Tyrolean militia system and received congratulations for His Imperial 
Highness Kaiser Franz Josef. In the end, the effectiveness of teaching students state and 
imperial patriotism as a part of their broader education is difficult to discern, as on one 
hand, many of the most radical nationalists were educators and students. On the other 
however, students also demonstrated devotion to the crown, religious piety, and 
patriotism for their state. For the Tyrolean youth, the role of the Standschützen added 
another source of indoctrination that imparted the mixed signals of German national 
pride, patriotism for “Vaterland Tirol,” and loyalty to the dynasty. 
The 1909 Jahrhundertfeier (centenary celebration) of the 1809 Tyrolean rebellion 
against French and Bavaria occupation, was another occasion in which Tyroleans 
recognized the accomplishments of their brave predecessors, promoted the growing 
number of shooting associations throughout the province, and reiterated Tyrolean fealty 
to the Habsburgs. The celebrations of Anno Neun, as it had come to be known, were 
aimed at idealizing civic militarism in the form of the Tyrolean militiaman. Andreas 
Hofer, among others, was portrayed as the personification of Tyrolean militiamen’s 
mantra of “Für Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland,” which reflected the intersection of religious 
piety, provincial patriotism, and dynastic loyalty, which had been traditional tenets of 
                                                 




Tyrolean society for centuries. Thus, the occasion was utilized to exhibit and cultivate 
those virtues for the broader imperial population.168 
The two largest ceremonies took place on the “sanctified ground” of Berg Isel 
(Innsbruck)—the site of three important engagements of the 1809 rebellion—on 29 
August 1909 and illustrated the overarching themes of “Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland.” 
Here, during Mass, Tyrol’s oath of religious obedience was reaffirmed, followed by the 
recitation of Andreas Hofer’s oath of loyalty. Both of these oaths took place in the 
presence of clergymen and Kaiser Franz Josef, the benefactor of the celebration, which 
reflects the union of all three elements that impelled Tyrolean militarism. This ceremony 
was followed by the Schützenzug (Schützen parade). Indeed, the “whole event had the 
character of a military operation.” Uniformed members of the imperial family, army, and 
regimental bands were joined by the shooting guilds, who themselves, wore their own 
uniquely designed versions of traditional Tyrolean Nationaltracht (national dress).169  
Just as the 1809 Tyrolean Freiheitskrieg was executed largely by peasant militia 
units, the Jahrhundertfeier was aimed principally at the rural populations “aus allen 
Tälern” of Tyrol, as these were the Tyrolean elements most loyal to the crown. Local 
leaders of the rebellion in those valleys were recognized by their respective residents as a 
part of the commemoration. In doing so, as Laurence Cole points out, provincial and 
imperial officials attempted to shape the parameters of Tyrolean identity around the ideals 
and actions of loyal, devout, and patriotic predecessors and the “institution of the 
Schützen was at the core of the hegemonic version of Tirolean identity.”170 The approach 
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of the Jahrhundertfeier was an important event that helped revive interest in the traditions 
of Tyrolean rifle clubs and their volunteerism in sharpshooter companies during times of 
war, which had lapsed in the decades that followed the Napoleonic Wars. The re-
establishment of expired Schützen groups was bookended by the creation of new 
groups—some specifically for the celebration of the Jahrhundertfeier—both of which, 
however, were distinctly German in character.171 
Much of the ceremonies and festivities were orchestrated by voluntary 
associations, particularly shooting guilds (Schützenkompanies), veterans associations, 
state and local government from parish councils all the way up to the Governor 
(Landeshauptmann), as well as imperial institutions such as the army and the Militär-
Maria-Theresien-Orden (The Military Order of Maria Theresa), which honored the 
highest virtues of Habsburg militarism. The celebration of the Jahrhundertfeier engaged 
virtually all levels and institutions of Tyrolean society. The Berg Isel Mass gave the feel 
of a “ständisch (corporative) medieval society,” with clerics, nobility, peasants, and 
citizens all in attendance.172 The seating arrangement further illustrated the primacy of 
historical tradition with the Kaiser on one side of the pavilion surrounded by high-
ranking military officers in attendance one side and clergymen and courtesans on the 
other. Facing the Kaiser and his entourage were provincial representatives to the federal 
diet along with the provincial diet as well as the mayor, parish councilmen, local 
bureaucrats.  
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The Jahrhundertsfeier celebrated the courageous and efforts of Tyrolean 
militiamen to restore the province to Habsburg rule. It was also an important event in 
cementing a Tyrolean identity carefully constructed by Catholic conservatives. The 
commemoration of Anno Neun did not cease with the collapse of the Monarchy. As the 
heirs of the Schützen tradition, the Heimwehr movement regularly celebrated the 
patriotism, piety, and war volunteerism demonstrated by the Tyrolean Standschützen in 
1809. Their commander, Andreas Hofer, became a symbol of the legacy that the 
Heimwehren understood themselves to be upholding.  
 
Figure 3. The Schießstand at Berg Isel today 
(Photo by the author) 
 
 
The cult of Andreas Hofer 
No other figure in Tyrolean history—save for perhaps Kaiser Maximillian I—has 
been mythologized like the Standschützen major and innkeeper of the Sandwirt Gasthof. 
His ascent to mythical status corresponded closely with the resurgence of 
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Schützentradition in the popular imagination of Tyroleans in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Poets, writers, and composers attempting to document and pay 
homage to the life and exploits of Hofer and his role in the Tyrolean rebellion, played a 
central role in laying the foundation for the hagiographic process. The virtues authors 
chose to emphasize are instructive as to their political leanings. The cultivation of the 
Hofer myth, thus, benefitted from the political tensions inside Tyrol. The historical figure 
of Andreas Hofer was co-opted by competing political ideologies that, in parallel, made 
Hofer into the archetypal figure of Tyrolean identity.173  
The Hofer myth did not emerge immediately after his death in 1810, but decades 
later amid a “Kulturkampf” among Tyrolean Catholic conservatives and liberals. While 
the imperial house often worked closely with Catholic conservatives against liberal 
nationalism, its alliance sought to foster dynastic loyalty. Contemporary chroniclers 
conveyed more critical evaluations of Hofer’s deeds. His close cooperation with the 
Habsburg government during the 1809 rebellion, and subsequent recognition as the 
Kaiser’s regent of Tyrol, was problematic for some Catholic conservatives, as they saw it 
as clashing with Tyrol’s traditional opposition to Habsburg efforts to centralize. The early 
criticisms of Hofer did not stop them from utilizing Hofer has a vehicle for conveying its 
own Weltschauung. Instead, Catholic conservatives emphasized his virtues that aligned 
with their own. The construction of the Andreas Hofer Memorial Chapel in Hofer’s 
birthplace, Sand in Passeier, depicts Hofer as a deeply pious man and a “most ardent 
                                                 
173 Cole, Für Gott, Kaiser, und Vaterland, 225-321; Laurence Cole’s examination of the 
construction of the Andreas Hofer myth is among the most recent and is the most analytically sophisticated 




admirer of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and a relentless conveyor of this covenant.”174 
Indeed, Hofer was a “Christian hero” that “endured as a fearless martyr.”175 Given the 
humanist ideals of the Enlightenment that drove Revolutionary and Napoleonic French 
armies, Hofer’s religiosity—while not extraordinary for his time—could be readily 
highlighted.  
From a present-day perspective, the divergence of Catholic conservative and 
liberal interpretations seem barely distinguishable on the surface. The clearest point of 
divergence, however, was the religious embellishments of the former as opposed to the 
nationalistic window dressing of the latter. Tyrolean liberals—like their German 
counterparts—viewed Hofer, and the rebellion he ended up leading, in a broader context, 
as a German freedom fighter and the “embodiment of a national ideal.”176 Gilm, like 
other liberal authors, also understood the term “freedom” in the context of freedom from 
the “Zwangsmaßnahmen (coercive measures)” of the Church.177 The prominent place of 
the Catholic Church and the fervent anti-nationalist stance of the Habsburg Monarchy, 
however, prevented liberal constructions of the Hofer myth from gaining imperial 
recognition; memorial dedications and celebrations such as the Jahrhundertfeier 
accentuated conservative portrayals that stressed his piety and loyalty to the crown.178  
                                                 
174 Tiroler Landesarchiv (TLA), Akten des Landesausschusses (ALA), Landefest in Passeier, 
Errichtung der Andreas-Hofer-Gedächtnis-Kapelle in Passeier 1899, Z.1 Bericht, 1899, pages 4-7 „Aufruf 
des Comités der Hoferfeier“ from 10/4/1866, cited in Cole, Für Gott, Kaiser, und Vaterland, 251. 
Construction oft he chapel began in 1882 and was complete in 1899. 
175 TLA: ALA, Landefest in Passeier, Errichtung der Andreas-Hofer-Gedächtnis-Kapelle in 
Passeier 1899, Z.1 Bericht, 1899, „Aufruf des Comités der Hoferfeier“ from 10/4/1866, cited in Cole, Für 
Gott, Kaiser, und Vaterland, 252. 
176 Cole, Für Gott, Kaiser, und Vaterland, 238. 
177 Cole, Für Gott, Kaiser, und Vaterland, 252. 
178 During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, however, Francis II was not so 




In 1880 the officer corps of the Tiroler Kaiserjäger initiated a project to erect a 
statue of Hofer (as well as a Tiroler Kaiserjäger museum) on Berg Isel. The aim was to 
highlight Tyrolean patriotism and loyalty to the Habsburg crown. Hofer’s personage and, 
therefore, his deeds and martyrdom, became a representation of Tyrol. The proclamation 
of the committee overseeing the statue’s construction summarizes the sentiments 
underlining its intent: 
 
The monument has only the name and features of a man, but honors the country 
itself, it is embodied in him with all that has met a genuine Tyrolean heart and 
preserved through centuries. The faith of his fathers, the honesty of his 
sentiments, the strength and endurance of his heroism. Moreover, because far 
beyond its original meaning, the simple man is full unselfishness long since 
become a symbol of popular loyalty, unswerving devotion to his imperial family 
and faithful holding together with the brothers of the Empire countries.179 
 
Hofer, as a prominent symbol of Tyrolean identity, survived the collapse of the 
Habsburg Monarchy to which the Sandwirt was loyal. The competing interpretations of 
Hofer, and by extension, central elements of Tyrolean identity, became increasingly 
indistinguishable during the course of the interwar period as the end of the Habsburg 
dynasty meant the end of the Catholic conservatives’ hegemony over Hofer’s legacy. 
With the pervasiveness of nationalism in post-World War I Europe, the liberal 
construction of the Hofer myth would gain increasing traction. Indeed, Andreas Hofer in 
the First Republic exemplified a compliment of both the German nationalism and 
political Catholicism. 
 
                                                 
179 Tiroler Landesmuseum Ferdinandeum/Landeskundliches Museum Zeughaus, Vereinswesen, 
Karton B-D, Aufruf des Comités zur Errichtung eines Denkmales für Andreas Hofer, um 1880, cited in  
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Heirs to a Legacy 
 The revival of civic militarism that occurred in Habsburg Tyrol in the late 
nineteenth century was an orchestration of Franz Joseph I. The Kaiser saw the loyalty and 
discipline instilled through the army as archetypal virtues that he wanted to inculcate into 
the general population of the empire. The revival of interest in the ancient Tyrolean 
militia system, the construction of new shooting ranges throughout the province, and the 
establishment of new Schützenkompanies indicated the success of his initiative. This was 
also successful on a deeper level. The central role of the Tyrolean Standschützen in the 
celebrations of 500 years of Habsburg rule in Tyrol as well as in the centenary of the 
vaunted 1809 rebellion, demonstrated the central place civic militarism in Tyrolean 
identity.  
The Great War propelled the militarization of Habsburg society to its zenith, but 
also brought about the Monarchy’s collapse. In its downfall, the Monarchy reiterated the 
continued need for the civic militarism it nurtured for so many centuries. So too did the 
strict limitations the Allied Powers placed on the size of the new Austrian state’s army. 
Mistrust of the republic’s new army, the Volkswehr, also echoed the need for militia. 
Overseen by the heavily Social Democratic government in Vienna at the time, the 
Volkswehr was comprised of mainly unemployed industrial laborers sympathetic to the 
ideals of Marx and Lenin. While the immediate response to civil defense needs 
materialized at the local level with communities cobbling together their own militias from 
the remaining able-bodied men, the longer-term vision of Governor Josef Schraffl and his 
deputy, Dr. Franz Stumpf, was that Tyrol’s traditional militia system would continue to 
 
78 
function as the basis for peacekeeping measures.180 This was not to be, however, at least 
not officially. Article 128 of the Treaty of Saint Germain prohibited the continuity of this 
arrangement, stating that “all sporting and other clubs…must not occupy themselves with 
any military matters.”181 Schraffl and Stumpf would not be deterred, maneuvering easily 
around the vague language of the article, and in May 1920, the “Selbstschutzverband 
Tirol” (Self Defense Association of Tyrol)—often referred to as the “Tiroler 
Heimatwehr”—was born. 
Tyrol’s network of shooting ranges through which the Landesverteidigung was 
organized, served a similar purpose for the Tiroler Heimatwehr. The dissolution of the 
Habsburg Monarchy left the shooting ranges under the stewardship of the cities in which 
they were constructed; the close cooperation and support of Tyrol’s local and state 
governments facilitated their use by the Heimatwehr for the purpose of training and 
stockpiling illicitly attained arms.182 To that end, Landesführer of the Tiroler Heimatwehr, 
Dr. Richard Steidle quite successfully recruited many members of newly reconstituted 
recreational rifle clubs.183  
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The connections between the Standschützen and the Heimatwehr extended 
beyond utilizing the same shooting range system. In one article in the Tiroler 
Heimatwehr-Blätter, the organization’s newspaper, drew clear connections between the 
Tiroler Heimatwehr the province’s heritage of civil defense. Throughout the article, it 
highlighted the parallels between the Heimatwehr and Tyrol’s seventeenth century 
militia. Emphasizing the voluntary, democratic nature of both seventeenth century civil 
defense formations and the Heimatwehr, as well as the similarities carried forward in 
their organizational structures, comparing the Viertelgemeinden (quarter groups) of the 
militia system to the Schutzgemeinschaften (defense groups) of the Heimatwehr. A 
committee of four to eight mayors and other respected figures in the community would 
elect a “Quartermaster,” who would oversee self-defense measures for the representative 
communities. The residents of those communities, as it related to self-defense, were 
commanded by the Quartermaster. Similarly, defense group leaders were elected by local 
group leaders and would develop and maintain plans for the protection of the 
communities represented in those groups.184 
To understand the military culture of the Heimwehr movement it is necessary to 
look to pre-war provincial militarism. That is, the military character of the Heimwehr 
movement was underpinned by the traditional, patriarchal values of its Alpine provinces. 
Like Gilm’s poems idealized hunting, shooting sports, and the war volunteerism of the 
Standschützen, the language of Heimwehr propaganda romanticized military service as a 
                                                 




masculine duty, the requisites for which had been cultivated in them from childhood 
through hunting and sport shooting.185  
In November 1920, the Tiroler Heimatwehr staged a province-wide shooting 
contest (Landesschießen), which, as demonstrated above, was a centuries-old tradition of 
the Standschützen and the first to be held since before the First World War. Tyrolean 
People’s Party (Tiroler Volkspartei) representative and leading figure in the Tiroler 
Heimatwehr, Andreas Thaler, called sport shooting something that was “in our blood.”186  
The surroundings and trappings of the Landesschießen also exhibited the fact that the 
Tiroler Heimatwehr saw itself as continuing the Tyrolean legacy militia service. The 
ceremonial aspects of the shooting match took place before the massive statue of Andreas 
Hofer, at the old Hauptschießstand (main shooting range) atop Berg Isel in Innsbruck. 
The Heimatwehr men in attendance donned green and white armbands—the traditional 
colors of the Tyrolean Standschützen.187 As Steidle explained, the “true meaning” of the 
Landesschießen lay simply the fact that it represented the continuity of “ancient” 
Tyrolean Schützenwesen traditions.188 
The prominent role of the Church and clergy in the Landeschießen further echoed 
the traditional features of the festivities. Just as church fathers consecrated the flags of the 
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local Standschützen, they did the same for the Tiroler Heimatwehr. “Here held the forces 
of Andreas Hofer, Speckbacher, and Haspinger. Here tended their bullet-ridden war flags. 
Today we dedicate no war flag, but a simple banner for peaceful competition,” Steidle 
explained.189 The Landesschießen program fittingly ended with the singing of the Herz-
Jesus-Hymne (Hymn of the Sacred Heart of Jesus)—the cult for which Hofer had been a 
most vigorous champion. After the program at Berg Isel concluded, a procession of some 
1500 participants marched to the Tiroler Landeshymne (Tyrolean national hymn) to 
Basilika Wilten for Mass and the consecration of the Heimatwehr flag, carried out by 
Abbot Adrian Zacher, who spoke of the banner as a “symbol of peace, quiet and 
order.”190  
Social Democratic opposition to the Heimatwehr confirm the self-identification of 
the Heimatwehr with the province’s legacy of civic militarism:  
The Tyrolean Heimatwehren draws on the old traditions of the Standschützen. The 
military special rights of Tyrolean peasants stubbornly insisted on from the Habsburgs, 
but in the war, was the most fruitful undoing; the liabilities resulting from the rights 
forced children and old men into the murderous steel hail of the fronts and tore the 
wounds of the force of the Tyrolean people, which is far from healing. The Heimatwehren 
now in Tirol wreaking havoc, has nothing to do with the past of the Standschützen; they 
have been by Mr. Steidle an instrument against the working class, against the republic, 
against the Großdeutsche idea...191 
 
In a March 1920 interview published in the Allgemeiner Tyrolean Anzeiger, Steidle 
explained—in true, independent-minded Tyrolean fashion—that the Tyrol did not need 
the presence of the Volkswehr to maintain “peace and order” in the province, it needed 
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only the police and “our volunteer organization,” meaning the Tiroler Heimatwehr, with 
the support of “Schießstandorganisationen” (system of rifle ranges).192 
The Heimatwehr shooting festival was a controversial affair, which will be 
explained in greater depth in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say, Social Democrats 
opposed the event for several reasons. When it became clear that the Heimatwehr was 
determined to move forward in their decision to hold the event, the Social Democratic 
Party orchestrated a labor strike in Tyrol. An article in the Vorarlberger Tagblatt covering 
the Landesschießen and Social Democrats’ “wanton” response—in the form of a railroad 
strike—to the fact that “the Tyroleans are resuming their furrowed prewar customs again 
and that does not suit the leaders of the SDP.”193 The conservative Reichspost echoed 
similar sentiments, complaining that the annoyance of Tyrolean Social Democrats had 
forced “the sons of Andreas Hofer to bury the Stutzen of their fathers.”194 The articles are 
somewhat disingenuous in their grievances, positioning the shooting match as being 
staged by the general populous as opposed to one organized by the Heimatwehr. While 
there is little indication of the wider public opinion on the Landesschießen they, however, 
emphasize continuities of the pre-war past and backward gaze of conservative segments 
of Austrian society. Indeed, the expiration of the monarchy as a sovereign did not mean 
its cultural resonance ceased to be a formative influence.  
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Figure 4. Statue of Andreas Hofer at Bergisel, Innsbruck.  
(Photo by the author.) 
  
The desire of the Heimatwehr to maintain and revive disappearing customs was 
not an anomaly, but part of broader efforts of conservative circles to halt the shifting 
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sands beneath their feet. For instance, they campaigned for Austria’s youth to be taught 
their “glorious past.” As one flyer notes: 
The Austrian youth must not be deprived of the history of its people, for when youth 
knows nothing of the glorious, glorious history of its fatherland, it is only too easily the 
prey of paid, fatherland-less demagogues. Yes, it lies in the system of today's youth 
education, only if the history of their fatherland is partially falsified, or withheld, then, 
can youths become mindless, international socialists.195 
 
In another instance, an article in the Tiroler Heimatwehr-Blätter criticized Social 
Democratic opposition to religion education in school. “Who gives the Social Democratic 
leaders the right to strive with all their might to deprive the children of our people of 
values that they can never later acquire,” the article complained.196 
In promoting the Landesschießen, Tyrolean Heimatwehr propaganda praised the 
“old German passion” for hunting and sport shooting, explaining that the “beautiful, old 
custom” had been an integral part of their development into men and should remain a 
“right” of the youth:  
When I was a boy, it was our greatest pleasure to shoot a bow and arrow…More and 
more the old German lust for shooting-sport grew, the arm and eye steeled, the pleasure, 
quick and sure with a shot to hit a difficult target and to stalk and capture wild game and 
game birds in flight. The Tesching and lead ball, and soon, the rifle and cartridge became 
our inseparable companion. It was only when we knew how to handle them with 
complete certainty that we felt ourselves as men who were aware of their own strength 
and masters of their bodies, who did not need to crouch and shamefully stand aside when 
others put the bullet in the black.197 
 
Not only was mastering the rifle depicted as a rite of passage into manhood, but also that 
it was an extension of one’s body, a part of his being. The continuity of the region’s gun 
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culture was, therefore, a fundamental component of militarizing its young, post-war 
generation. 
The thrust for these efforts gained further impetus through the Treaties of Saint 
Germain and Versailles, which forbade compulsory military service in Germany and 
Austria, a requirement of all male citizens 18 years of age in both the Habsburg and 
Hohenzollern empires before the war. The limitations placed on their militaries reduced 
its ability to function as a formative institution in shaping the worldview of their youths 
and many bourgeois families feared that the values that military service instilled would be 
lost on their sons.198 As a result, there emerged a broad push to militarize youth scouting 
and athletic associations throughout Germany and Austria to compensate, in however 
limited the extent, for this loss.199 Hallmarks of military training such as physical fitness, 
discipline, and drills were introduced through these channels now. In Germany, for 
example, it was estimated that before World War I, 400,000 were enrolled in sports clubs. 
After the war, that number spiked to 3,500,000. At the same time, boy scout troop leaders 
were encouraged to conduct military exercises, marching, stage “surprise attacks” and 
“sham night battles on difficult ground,” among other military-related activities.200  
The absence of the formal institutional constraints traditionally exercised by the 
army allowed the most virulent and radical völkisch ideals to intermingle with the 
residual elements of imperial military, framed by fantasies of revenge for their humiliated 
state. The freedom of expression that accompanied the parliamentary democracies in 
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Germany and Austria allowed for this amalgam to spread into the political discourse of 
the interwar period, creating a political climate where the militarization of mass party 
politics became an accepted and, therefore, legitimate form of expression. Instrumental in 
this development was the militarization of scouting groups and the formation of 
uniformed youth combat leagues such as the Wikingbund, Reichsflagge, Werwölfe, 
Jungstahlhelm, Hitlerjugend, and Bund Oberland. The youths of these organizations 
provided the thrust (muscle) from below to push these radical reactionary ideals to the 
forefront of German, Austrian, and, to a lesser extent, Hungarian society. 
With that in mind, the fact that the leadership of the Innsbruck chapter of the 
German Scout Federation (Deutschen Pfadfindersbundes) approached the Tiroler 
Heimatwehr, in February 1925, to administer military training to its young scouts, 
requesting that they “agree to the formation of an independent company,” which was to 
be named the “St. Georg-Zug” (St. George Company) after the federation’s patron saint, 
St. George. Many of the older scouts—sixteen years of age—of this chapter were already 
members of the Heimatwehr youth formations, mainly in the telephone company of its 
Innsbruck machine gun battalion. As a part of their agreement of affiliation, those 
members would were to be transferred to the new St. George company. It was the desire 
the scout leaders, Kurt Mair and Franz Ferkow, to have the company trained as 
Jägertruppen (infantry troops) and receive the same training as that of a regular infantry 
company.201 
Just as the Standschützen made concerted efforts to orient Tyrolean youth to the 
virtues of loyalty, militarism, and wartime service in the defense of their communities, so 
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too did the Heimatwehr. From the outset of its efforts to establish a youth organization, 
the Heimatwehr leadership praised Tyrol’s centuries-old gun culture, positioning hunting 
and sport shooting as a natural German pastime. The connection of hunting to 
masculinity, independence, and confidence was a useful pivot to exalting the virtues of 
military service that followed. The youth organization of the Tiroler Heimatwehr, 
established in 1921, outlined a similar mission as that of the German Scout Federation in 
that it sought the “improvement of our youth morally and physically, so that each of our 
organization’s young members can become leaders…when the Germanic destiny calls, be 
it in the struggle for the spirit or armed combat.” In addition to marksmanship and sport 
shooting competitions, however, the Heimatwehr implemented a much more extensive 
military training and physical exercise regimen for its “Heimwehrjugendgruppe” 
(Heimwehr Youth Group). The more extensive military training program the Heimatwehr 
established, not only taught youths to shoot military-grade rifles as had long been done in 
the Jungschützenschule, but also proper technique for throwing hand grenades (using 
wooden hand grenades), military field exercises, and a physical conditioning regimen.202  
The activities of its youth groups, while paralleling the military training regular 
Heimatwehr units received, also paralleled the impetus of scouting that it emphasized 
being outdoors and in nature.203 In addition to military objectives like map reading, 
navigation, judging distances, and night hikes, they were to “arouse the body and the 
mind, stimulate cunning and imagination, strengthen the spirit of adventure and daring.” 
All of this was, “of course…only for boys and youths” and, thus, “not suitable for girls.” 
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In contrast to the rejuvenating power of hours spent in nature, their time spent in the city 
was “wasted.”204 Generally negative views of the city and city life emerged right-wing 
circles in the 1890s, as “[u]rbanization and the growth of the working class, as well as, 
more nebulously, the spread of values and modernist culture, were leading in this view to 
the increasing ‘degeneracy’ of the masses.”205 As Large points out, they shared the same 
views of cities as their Bavarian brethren—a haven for Jews and foreigners. As such, they 
“were seen as the root of all evil: while their rootless coffee-house intellectuals dispensed 
moral poison in the form of “asphalt literature” and atheist-socialist philosophy, their 
parasitic civil servants cooked up schemes to exploit and defraud the honest working men 
in the provinces.”206 As expressed in the romantic theories of Catholic social thinkers, 
nature was pure and organic, the work of God, while cities were manmade and became 
synonymous with the vice and ills of secular modernity that robbed men of their spiritual 
reason for being.207 
The Tiroler Heimatwehr was not the only organization to established a youth 
group. The Styrian Heimatschutz founded its own youth group on December 1, 1928, but 
it appears to have been short lived, as according to Pauley, no youth organization was 
worthy of mention appeared until the White-Green Young People (Weiß-grüne Jungvolk) 
and the Heimatschutz High School Group (Heimatschutz-Hochschulgruppen), both of 
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which were founded in 1932. The establishment of these two youth organizations roughly 
coincided with the founding of the national youth organization of the Heimwehr 
movement—Young Fatherland (Jung Vaterland). Nationally, the Heimwehr youth 
movement grew steadily from 1934, numbering around 15,000 to 103,000 by the end of 
1935.208   
The role of the war youth generation was clearly articulated in the in the 
Heimwehr movement’s vision for Austria. This is evident, for example, in the Heimwehr 
propaganda pamphlet, The Path to Austria’s Freedom (Der Weg zu Österreichs Freiheit), 
published in 1929, which makes clear the centrality of patriotic youths in the rise of the 
Heimwehr movement: 
[M]ilitancy is the new style with which the young generation leads the confrontation with 
Bolshevism and to commemorate the devastated homeland. The red blood of these youths 
is the liquid, other than the bilious black ink of Marxist scribes, that flows in the veins of 
Austria. No more cowardly compromise. It is the will of this blooming youth to kick in 
the barriers to what Austria's people think and feel. Their rallying cry is simply: the 
Heimatwehr!209 
 
College-aged young men were the building blocks of the movement’s military capability, 
forming the radical basis of its mobile shock units. To reinforce the virtues of military 
service, war volunteerism, and sacrifice to its youth formations, the Alpenländische 
Heimatwehr regularly printed entries “From the Tyrolean book of Heros,” which 
contained brief biographical portraits of young Tyroleans who died in the Great War.210 
Simultaneous lamentations of the Heimwehren are indicative, however, that such young 
men were among the minority of Austria’s war youth generation. The “craving of 
                                                 
208 Wiltschegg, Die Heimwehr, 284-5; Pauley, Hahnenschwanz und Hakenkreuz, 65. 
209 Der Weg zu Österreichs Freiheit (Innsbruck: Albert Schober, 1929), 28-9. 





pleasure,” “worship of foreign customs and dances,” and “dwindling love of the 




Shared historical experiences are, as Shein points out, the “critical defining 
characteristic” of a social group.212 In Tyrol, by the outset of the Great War, there was a 
longstanding culture of independence, illustrated in its citizens’ deep love of hunting and 
shooting—privileges not typical of the general population in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Its gun culture was a product of Tyroleans’ obligatory militia service 
in defense of the county (Landesverteidigung). This obligation allowed Tyroleans the 
freedom to maintain personal firearms during times of peace, as they served a dual 
purpose as the weapons they would carry into battle. 
Over the centuries, the parameters of militia service changed little from their 
original codification in the Landlibell von 1511. Simultaneously, the proliferation of 
firearms across the Tyrol facilitated the emergence of local rifle clubs who had 
constructed shooting ranges of varying degrees of sophistication. These clubs began as 
independent and unrelated entities to the militia levees that were mustered in times of 
war. By 1703, however, these rifle clubs were obliged to contribute sharpshooter 
companies to the Landesverteidigung in times of war. This marked the beginning of the 
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integration of rifle clubs into the Tyrolean defense system. The first shooting range order 
(Schießstandsordnung) was decreed in 1736, codifying the role of the shooting ranges 
and their members in the broader provincial defense system.  
The organization of the ranges and their members’ obligations remained largely 
the same until after the Austrian Empire’s defeat in the Austro-Prussian war in 1866, 
which paved the way for the dualist system to emerge in 1867. Among the government 
reforms of the compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867 was compulsory military service. This 
reform was an important step in the militarization of Habsburg society, as all able-bodied 
nineteen-year-old men would serve two years of military service and eight years of 
reserve duty. This exposure to the military culture of the Habsburg army during their 
active duty, and stints as reservists, were formative experiences that helped ingrain a 
sense of loyalty and duty to the empire. These residual effects of military service were 
also observable in the creation of veterans associations, which emerged as voluntary 
associations to help fellow veterans invalided or suffering through financial difficulties, 
as well as assistance for war widows and their children. Indeed, the presence of the 
military in Habsburg society was, as Mark Twain remarked in 1898, “as pervasive as the 
atmosphere. It was everywhere.”213 
With the outset of the Great War, the militarism of conservative Austro-Hungarian 
society reached its pinnacle. The features of Habsburg and regional militarism remained 
ubiquitous in the identities of provincial Austrians of all social strata even after the 
monarchy’s collapse. The chapters that follow will illustrate this continuity in greater 
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depth. The deeply entrenched virtues connected with imperial civic militarism, were 
formative in shaping the core values, espoused beliefs, behaviors, and activities not just 
of Tiroler Heimatwehr, but of the movement as a whole. Beyond informing the 
organizational culture of the movement, they would play an unintended role in effecting 
the decision making of Heimwehr leadership.
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The vicious feudal dogma of an absolute national sovereignty makes almost impossible 
all social life…All the states of Central Europe live in a state of clandestine anarchy. 
Nations have no consideration for each other either in economics or in politics. This 
system destroys all moral unity in Europe. European distress, misery, anarchy, and civil 
war are, in their deepest roots, a moral problem. What our most profound and noble 
thinkers…predicted long ago, has become a reality: Europe is in a state of dissolution, 
because the spirit of a new Machiavellism destroys private and public moral. 
-Oskar Jászi, 1923214 
 
 
The incredible death and destruction wrought by European armies on the 
battlefields of the First World War was, in large part, a result of the advances in weaponry 
made possible by the industrialization of European societies over the course of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Manifesto of the Communist Party, penned by 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1848, was also a product of industrialization that 
reproached capitalism and capitalist governments for the low wages, poor housing, 
unsafe, and unhealthy conditions in which factory workers languished because of the 
Industrial Revolution. That the war precipitated socialist-led revolutions, is ironic, but at 
the same time fitting. That war-weary soldiers and sailors were at the forefront of these 
revolutions, brought this vicious cycle full-circle. 
The theory of “class struggle” laid out in The Manifesto of the Communist Party 
helped drive the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917. Marx and Engels’ treatise detailed 
                                                 
214 Oskar Jaszi, "Dismembered Hungary and Peace in Central Europe," 280. 
 
94 
how the factory owners (bourgeoisie) emerged, over time, to control modern societies by 
exploiting the production of wage laborers (proletarians).215 Factory owners owned, and 
thus controlled, the means of production—the tools, machinery, facilities—to 
manufacture products, which they, in turn, sell at tremendous profit. The workers, whose 
labor physically produced the products are, on the other hand, paid meager wages on 
which they and their families could barely survive and were, thus, forced to live in 
dilapidated tenements. Marx and Engel’s “class struggle” was, thus, an ongoing conflict 
between the exploiter and the exploited, which the latter—the proletariat—would 
gradually triumph through its greater strength in numbers and seize control of the means 
of production in a violent revolution. The proletariat, they predicted, would reconstitute 
society in the more commensurate system of government in the form of communism. 
Through the communist system, “The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, 
by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in 
the hands of the State.” The manifesto goes on to list the measures necessary for 
“revolutionizing the mode of production,” which entailed the confiscation of all private 
property (including land), the abolition of inheritance rights, and the consolidation of 
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means of communication into the hands of the government.216 The overarching goal was 
to “level the playing field,” so to speak, through the destruction of class distinctions.  
While the First World War was the catalyst of the revolutions in Central Europe, 
the Social Democratic parties who guided them were inspired by the Russian 
Revolutions, which saw the fall of the Romanov dynasty in February 1917, only to be 
followed by the overthrow of the provisional government in October by a radical faction 
of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, calling themselves Bolsheviks, or 
“members of the majority”. In the case of the latter, Bolshevik revolutionaries stormed 
the Winter Palace in Saint Petersburg and arrested present government officials, thereby, 
seizing control of the primary administrative hub of the federal government. Radical 
decrees soon followed, placing land, industry, and financial institutions under the control 
of the Bolshevik government. These measures were part of a larger effort to suppress 
“class enemies,” which came to be known as the “Red Terror.” The term “class enemy,” 
while subjective, was generally understood to mean anyone who made money off of the 
labor of others, such as factory owners, managers, wealthy peasants (pejoratively known 
as “kulaks”), or army officers. It was also used as a moniker for members of the 
aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, Tsarist officials, or clergymen, amongst other groupings 
generally persecuted as the Bolsheviks consolidated power. Those deemed “class 
enemies” were typically either imprisoned, deported to the developing system of labor 
camps, or executed by the secret police organization, the Cheka, established by Bolshevik 
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leader, Vladimir Lenin.217 It requires little imagination to see why the ideals of 
communism, carried out by radical revolutionaries like the Bolsheviks were viewed by 
bourgeois and wealthy circles in Central Europe with great fright, as something akin to an 
intellectual contagion, especially given the weak economic and political positions by 
1918. The political discourse of conservative political parties and right-wing 
organizations in Central Europe illustrated as much, frequently calling Marxism a 
“poisonous bacteria,” a “red plague,” or the “Moscow Scarlet [Fever]” corrupting their 
society.218 
According to Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, four “overlapping and mutually 
reinforcing factors” were the catalysts for paramilitary violence across Europe from the 
later years of the Great War to the mid-1920s: 
the legacy of mass armed combat in the First World War; the Russian Revolution 
(and subsequent civil war) and the ideological counterrevolution that it generated 
internationally; the military collapse and dissolution of the multinational dynastic 
Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov empires, along with the often-violent attempts 
to create ethnically homogenous nation-states under the banner of “self-
determination” (including many contested nation-states that obviously contained 
sizable ethnic minorities); and, finally, the experiences of defeat that accelerated 
violence in those countries that had been on the losing side in the war.219 
 
As this chapter will demonstrate, there was little surprise that the outgrowth of 
reactionary Paramilitarism was most fervent in the footprint of the former Central 
Powers, as they were affected by each of these factors simultaneously. Chief among these 
forces was the fear of communist revolution. As news of the “Red Terror” and brutal civil 
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war in Russia spread westward, fears of a similar fate reached a fevered pitch in Austria, 
Germany, and Hungary. These fears were exacerbated by the political upheaval in Central 
Europe in 1918. Military defeat was the catalyst for political change in the region, as 
monarchy gave way to parliamentary democracy. The centuries of rule enjoyed by the 
Habsburg and Hohenzollern families provided their dynasties legitimacy. The 
declarations of the fledgling democracies, made at the expense of the abdicating 
sovereigns, were not universally welcomed or accepted as legitimate. 
 This was the attitude of many army officers who returned their homeland to find it 
in the throes of disarray and revolutionary demonstrations in November 1918. These 
officers, dismayed by the collapse of “peace and order” at home, would become the 
leading figures of the counter-revolutionary, paramilitary movement in Central Europe.220 
The post-war refrains of military officers touted that the armies of the Central Powers had 
been “im Feld unbesiegte” (undefeated in the field of battle), only to be “stabbed-in-the-
back” (Dolchstoß legende) by “Judeo-Bolshevik” revolutionaries at home. These 
sentiments illustrated the connection officers made between the revolutions and 
communism, which reinforced the impetus for the numerous paramilitary organizations 
that materialized after 1918. As Jászi noted, “According to their (the ruling “oligarchy” in 
Hungary) ideology Hungary was innocent of complicity in bringing on the World War, 
which was really caused by German-French capitalistic rivalry. The Hungarian army was 
actually victorious, and its collapse was brought about by conspiracy.”221 
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 This myth resonated not only amongst former officers but also gained credence 
amongst bourgeois and aristocratic circles throughout Central Europe, galvanizing these 
segments of society against what they perceived to be a common enemy.222 The outbreak 
of violence in Central Europe over disputed borders and the protracted process of 
deciding their fate only contributed to the political instability of the region. To make 
matters worse, inflation, unemployment, and food and material scarcity—particularly in 
Austria—only added to the sense of uncertainty. Combined, these conditions created 
environments in which the process of political demobilization from the war proved 
impossible.223 
Another influence that Gerwarth and Horne do not directly address is the 
hardships and uncertainty exacerbated by the treaties of the Paris Peace Conference. 
Indeed, the setting in Austria, like that of Germany and Hungary, in the months and years 
immediately that followed, was a subject of great concern for the international diplomatic 
community. One observer of the circumstances in Austria wrote, “[t]o Austria the Treaty 
of Versailles has been more destructive than any war or revolution or scourge or pest or 
natural calamity, for time can heal such things; but for the consequences of the Treaty of 
Versailles there is no remedy.”224 American diplomat, Philip Marshall Brown, declared 
that Austria was “so reduced in population and economic resources, so hopeless of a 
national future, that she now remains a proud beggar requiring both food and justice. Her 
situation is nothing short of tragic.”225 Sir James Salter, head of the League of Nations’ 
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economic and financial section, wrote that “Austria lived—but pitifully and precariously. 
She froze in the winter, and a large part of her population was hungry throughout the 
year. Her middle class was almost destroyed...Mortality was high and, among children, 
terrible.”226 The peace treaties emerging from the Paris Peace Conference were, indeed, 
the products of adversarial emotion, rather than objective consideration and was generally 
perceived as “war” carried out “with the weapons of peace.”227 
In the footprint of the Central Powers, the Paris Peace Conference carved out 
successor states, reducing the territories of Germany, Austria, and Hungary and causing 
significant national antagonisms. For the anti-Marxist, militant right in Germany, Austria, 
and Hungary, however, it created opportunities for transnational cooperation. Private 
organizations, political parties, and government officials worked together in establishing 
a coalition to defend themselves from communist revolution. The paramilitary Heimwehr 
movement was at the center of this activity, as the Bavarian and Hungarian governments 
and paramilitary organizations worked with provincial Austrian officials to fund, 
organize, arm, and train the Heimwehren. In doing so, they created an anti-Marxist 
“Ordnungsblock.” Its Bavarian counterpart, the Einwohnerwehr, was dissolved in the 
summer of 1921 and its successor, Bund Bayern und Reich, enjoyed a brief period of 
growth that tapered due to its decentralized character, its members defecting to emerging 
paramilitary organizations such as the Nazi SA. Unlike its Bavarian mentors, the 
Heimwehr movement remained intact and increased its membership and influence in 
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Austrian public life. At its pinnacle in 1929, the Heimwehren confederation was among 
the largest paramilitary association in Central Europe, exceeded only by the likes of the 
Stahlhelm and the “Reichsbanner Schwartz-Rot-Gold” (Black, Red, Gold Banner of the 
Reich), which constituted the largest paramilitary organizations in Germany.228 
Within Central Europe, the Heimwehr movement represented the linchpin of 
transnational cooperation amongst reactionary right-wing governments and paramilitary 
organizations working to create a strong, conservative paramilitary front in Austria that 
would, in turn, solidify an anti-Marxist bulwark in Central Europe. So long as the shadow 
of the Soviet Union loomed from the East, the threat of communist revolution remained 
palpable. The ascent of Benito Mussolini and the National Fascist Party (Partito 
Nazionale Fascista) to power in Italy, however, would inspire these militant right-wing 
organizations like the Heimwehr movement and the Nazi Party to attempt to implement 
their own militaristic, authoritarian governments. 
As this chapter will illustrate, the menace of communist revolution was the 
fundamental catalyst for the creation and continuity of right-wing paramilitary 
organizations and their collaboration in Central Europe. A communist coup attempt in 
Berlin and the establishment of violent communist regimes in Bavaria and Hungary 
triggered fierce reprisals from counter-revolutionary paramilitary groups like The 
National Army in Hungary and the Freikorps (free or volunteer corps) in Germany. The 
Einwohnerwehr, which emerged after the successful quashing of the communist 
government in Bavaria, was a byproduct of the wave counter-revolution in Germany and 
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was an influential force in the creation of the Heimwehr movement. From financial 
support flowing from Hungary to its East and the guidance of the Einwohnerwehr in the 
West, provincial officials were at the center of a transnational collaboration to create an 
anti-Marxist bulwark in Austria that would connect the states in a Central European 
“Ordnungsblock.”  
 
Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Central Europe 
In the post-war revolutions occurring in Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and even 
the Russian Revolution of February 1917, moderate social democratic parties were at the 
forefront. Their platform, while based on Marxist theory, sought a gradual transition to 
communism rather than violent revolution. Behind these moderates, however, lurked 
more radical communist elements waiting for the opportune time to orchestrate their own 
revolution.229 The nature and extent of the “Red Terror” in Bolshevik Russia sent 
shockwaves of anxiety among conservative and moderate circles across Europe.230 
“White émigrés” fleeing Bolshevik persecution brought with them first-hand accounts of 
“Red Terror” and, as Michael Kellogg argues, claims that Jewish capitalists were funding 
the Bolsheviks.231 These fears were realized in March 1919. 
Though paling in comparison to the excesses of the Russian Civil War that 
followed the October Revolution, the communist revolution in Hungary was, in spite of 
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its brevity, brutal. Amidst international controversy surrounding the Hungarian 
government’s resistance against the territorial revisions of the Treaty of Trianon, the 
ineffective Károlyi government resigned. Hungarian social democratic party leaders 
bowed to public pressure and agreed to merge the party with the Hungarian communist 
party, creating the Soviet Republic of Hungary. The confluence of the two parties 
promised political connections to the West through the Social Democrats and a direct line 
to the Soviet Red Army through communist party leader, Béla Kun. As the understudy to 
Lenin, Kun unleashed his own version of the “Red Terror.” Playing the role of the Cheka 
was a “terrorist corps” that came to be known as the “Lenin Boys.” Their leader, in the 
words of C.A. MacArtney, was “a particularly revolting and bloodthirsty Jew,” named 
Tibor Szamuely.232 While clearly written to insight the reactionary right, Ladislaus 
Bizony’s 133 Tage ungarischer Bolshevismus (133 Days of Hungarian Bolshevism), 
offers a contemporary account of Hungary’s “Red Terror.”233 The “Lenin Boys” outfit 
Szamuely commanded was composed of youths who were “convicted vagabonds and 
murders,” but absolutely loyal to him.234 Bizony details what became commonplace 
operations for Szamuely’s terrorist unit: 
Szamuely received a special train from the (Hungarian) Soviet government so that 
wherever it showed, counter-revolutionary movements appeared in due time. 
Szamuely traveled in a parlor car, while the terrorists, armed to the teeth, took 
other cars…Wherever he stopped, designated a legion of people to be hanged. He 
ordered the executions to be enforced without trials. Mostly he haphazardly 
collected together people in the individual villages and hanged them without 
hearings. He carried with him just a bunch of small perforated forms and a stamp. 
On the form he wrote the name of the person sentenced to death and stamped it, 
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having already led to the victim to the gallows. The people in the villages spoke 
with horror of Szamuely’s atrocities. For the scene of executions, he usually chose 
the main square of the community, the town hall, or the square outside the church. 
In most cases he ordered the residents of the village, chiefly the family members 
of the condemned, to the scene of the execution. He brought a chair and gave—
with icy calm, smoking his cigarette—the executioners his orders. After the 
executions he climbed in his car and drove between rows of trees on which the 
hanged dangled.235  
 
Bizony even quotes Kun as having said he feared Szamuely would eventually come for 
him. In total, Gerwarth estimates, between 400 to 500 Hungarians lost their lives in the 
Red Terror of 1919.236 This brutalization of perceived enemies of communism would 
prompt a subsequent, retaliatory “White Terror,” under the Horthy government. Taken 
together, such political violence contributed to a general state of affairs throughout 
Central Europe where political and military demobilization became an impossibility. 
Simply put, neither the left nor the right felt safe enough to “let down their guard.” In this 
environment of political omnipresence, the radicalization of politics was no longer a 
matter of “if,” but “when,” and to what extent and for how long. 
The outbreak of revolution in Germany and Hungary was met with and followed 
by strong counter-revolutionary violence. In Budapest, after the disintegration of Béla 
Kun’s communist regime and the brief occupation by Romanian troops, former k.u.k. 
Admiral, Miklós Horthy and his paramilitary “National Army” opportunistically fell on 
Budapest, claiming to ‘liberate’ the capital and securing Hungary’s national 
independence. This formation was composed largely of fellow former officers who were 
“[d]eeply resentful of Hungary’s dismemberment at the hands of former national 
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minorities and unable to cope with the severe economic dislocations of a lost war.”237 
More precisely, 3,800 of the 6,568 volunteers of Horthy’s National Army were former 
army officers or officers of paramilitary border guard and police formations.238 In 
addition to its loftier goals of restoring to Hungary its lost territories and, thus, its 
national pride, the National Army sought retribution for communist revolutionaries and 
perpetrators of the Red Terror. 
Between 1919 and 1921, reactionary paramilitary formations travelled throughout 
Hungary arresting, torching, and executing communist supporters of the Kun regime. Just 
as often, however, Jews and individuals against whom squadron leaders had personal 
vendettas were the targets of their brutality. Moreover, as Bela Bido explains, in rural 
Hungary, large land owners invited these paramilitary detachments to their estates to 
terrorize and intimidate the peasant farmers who worked their land through “a generous 
amount of lashing.” Estimations regarding the death toll of this “White Terror” vary 
between 3,000 to 5,000, with approximately 70,000 more individuals imprisoned.239 
In Germany, this took the form of the “Ebert-Groener Pact,” in November 1918. 
Quartermaster General Wilhelm Groener, fearing Germany would devolve into complete 
chaos, creating an opportunity for Bolshevik revolution, offered to throw the weight of 
the army—what remained of it—behind the new government of Social Democratic 
President Friedrich Ebert. In return, Ebert agreed defend the army and its traditional 
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structure and place in German society against calls for its dissolution in lieu of a 
“people’s militia.” What was left of the German army was augmented by Freikorps 
(volunteer corps) formations, which were comprised of demobilized soldiers and officers, 
frequently of the violent, ultra-nationalist persuasion.240 
In January 1919, communist revolutionaries—and disciples of socialist 
revolutionary Kurt Eisner, President of the “Free State of Bavaria”—and founders of the 
“Spartacist League,” Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, led the group in a rebellion 
against the Social Democratic Party over the direction of Germany’s government. At the 
request of President Friedrich Ebert and Minister of Defense, Gustav Noske, the right-
wing, paramilitary Freikorps (volunteer corps) crushed the general strike that came to 
known as the “Spartacist Uprising” and executed Liebknecht and Luxemburg (allegedly 
on the orders of Captain Waldemar Pabst, the future Stabsleiter (Chief of Staff) of the 
Tyrolean Heimatwehr as well as the federal umbrella organization, the 
Selbstschutzverband Österreich). A month after Luxemburg and Liebknecht’s execution, 
Eisner was assassinated in Munich by the young, right-wing nationalist Anton Graf von 
Arco auf Valley. 
In a confusing spate of successive and, by April 1919, competing governments in 
Bamberg and Munich that emerged in the aftermath of Kurt Eisner’s assassination, 
Russian communist, Eugen Leviné, seized control over what Ernst Toller had only a week 
earlier proclaimed as the Bavarian Soviet Republic.241 Inspired and encouraged by the 
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support he received from both Kun and Lenin, Leviné began arresting bourgeois 
opponents and executing others he feared to be reactionary spies. Dismayed by these 
events, German Minister of Defense, Gustav Noske, once more turned to the paramilitary 
Freikorps to smash the communist government in Bavaria. The Freikorps Württemberg 
worked with brutal efficiency, capturing Leviné and destroying his “Red Army.”242 Upon 
entering Munich and re-capturing its public buildings, Freikorps troops discovered those 
executed, “mutilated to the point of being unrecognizable,” of which three had been 
beheaded.243 In total, it is estimated that between 100 to 200 Germans died in various 
incidents of Red Terrorism in 1918-19.244 The communist revolution in Hungary and the 
coup attempts in Berlin and Munich created a palpable fear of communism throughout 
Central Europe that remained a driving motivation for counter-revolutionary 
Paramilitarism and their cooperation in the Interwar Period. 
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The recurring appearance of Jews in leading roles of communist revolutions 
between 1917 and 1919, helped solidify in the minds of Marxist opponents that there 
were legitimate connections between Judaism and Bolshevism. Moreover, given the fact 
that the Jewish population in Europe represented roughly only one quarter of one percent 
at the time, this would have likely seemed all the more conspicuous.245 This recurrent 
theme began with the fact that Marx, was a Jewish philosopher. Aside from Vladimir 
Lenin, the most widely known figure of the Russian Revolution was Leon Trotsky, 
founder of the Red Army, was the son of a wealthy Ukrainian Jewish farmer. The lead 
perpetrator of Red Terror in Hungary, Tibor Szamuely, was also a Jew.246 Leviné, Eisner, 
and Luxemburg were, likewise, Jews. In the case of the Bavarian revolution, it is worth 
nothing that Leviné was also a Russian national. As David Clay Large explains, “middle-
class Bavarians saw a Russian conspiracy at work” that, according to a police from June 
1919, was financially supported by Jews. This was important in creating an environment 
in Bavaria in which the idea of a “Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy” seemed particularly real 
and where the anti-Semitic National Socialists German Workers Party (NSDAP) could 
thrive.247  
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While effective in beating back the threat of Bolshevism in Germany, the Ebert-
Groener Pact was a pyrrhic victory in that it allowed the Prussian militarism that colored 
imperial Germany to survive. It also set a precedent for government-supported and 
subsidized Paramilitarism in Central Europe, a precedent that spilled over into Austria 
and was modeled elsewhere. In this way, it helped inaugurate a cycle of counter-
revolutionary political violence that would span the interwar period. The noteworthy 
number of Freikorps men who would become Nazi Party members also speaks to the 
significance of Ebert-Groener Pact. It encouraged the development of Freikorps 
formations, and their use in crushing revolutions provided them opportunities to engage 
in gratuitous, political violence. The Freikorps experience, to be sure, was formative in 
solidifying the foundational beliefs of Nazism for many of these members, particularly 
those of the war youth generation who were too young to have experienced the Great War 
from the front lines. In any case, National Socialism offered a platform that aligned with 
their patriotic fanaticism with the brutality inherent to its ideals. 
Meanwhile in Austria, state and local governments raised volunteer militia 
formations to defend communities and cities from marauding bands of deserters and 
transports full of Hungarian and Czech soldiers passing through on their journey home in 
the last days of the war. Moreover, these militia units fought to defend the territorial 
integrity of Carinthia and Styria. Quite apart from the notion that local self-defense 
groups “sprang into existence…virtually spontaneous[ly],” their formation was recruited, 
organized, and equipped through the cooperation of the Austrian local, state, and 
                                                 





provisional governments.248 On November 30, 1918, the ministry of war distributed 
1,156 machine guns, 80,345 repeating rifles, 13,627 carbines, 396 hand grenades, 888 
sidearms, 8,702,640 rifle cartridges, and 72,891 pistol cartridges to local militia units in 
an effort to maintain order, keep the peace, and defend citizens and their property.249  
Austrian newspapers published appeals for men to form or join local efforts to 
establish civil defense groups to protect unarmed citizens, homes, railways, factories, 
communication networks, and food depots. The Lower Austrian newspaper, Der 
Bauernbündler, called on farmers to keep their “head high” in this difficult time and 
“Form militias that patrol constantly!”250 The national council in Vienna—comprised of 
representatives of the Social Democratic, Christian Social, and German Freedom Party—
urged cooperation among all circles of society. “Should we, however, maintain order, the 
foundation of home defense is made up from all circles of the population, of workers and 
citizens, in this most urgent hour of need,” reads the Österreichische Land-Zeitung. The 
Lower Austrian city of Krems, for example, instituted the general conscription of able-
bodied citizens between 18 and 36 years of age, not employed by public services and 
utilities such as the railways, the post office, and electric companies. Those fitting the 
criteria were required to report to various locations in Krems and its outskirts within three 
days. These who were required to take part in watches and patrol duty every third day for 
a 24-hour shift; those on duty were provided lunch and supper as well as coffee at 6:00am 
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and 6:00pm. Individuals serving militia duty were paid eight kronen upon completing 
their service day.251 
Police and military assistance was required to protect food and weapons depots in 
its larger, more industrialized cities, which were prone to demonstrations, riots, and 
looting.252 In Tyrol, the state assembly (Nationalrat) established a defense committee to 
oversee civil defense.253 The committee was tasked with three initial goals: the disarming 
and removal of any non-German-Austrian troops, the removal of all prisoners of war, and 
the recall of German-Tyrolean troops and Standschützen. Available military supplies were 
used to establish ad-hoc fortifications throughout the city. Locally garrisoned troops were 
drafted into Sicherheitsgruppen (security groups) to man these posts and guard against 
plundering and unrest.254 Beyond the Sicherheitsgruppen, the Tyrolean state assembly 
also authorized the formation of voluntary Bürgerwehren and Bauernwehren, or citizen 
militias and farmer militias, respectively.255 The Innsbruck Bürgerwehr company, for 
instance, was under of the oversight of the mayor, Dr. Wilhelm Greil, and was broken 
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down into four platoons—a total of 140 men—who the city provided meals and six 
kronen per day compensation for their service. This auxiliary civilian force functioned as 
a standing formation, serving in six-hour rotations. Less experienced volunteers formed 
an emergency cadre mobilized only in dire circumstances.256 
After the plundering of the Austrian countryside had subsided, there was still 
reason for provincial militias to remain at the ready. The Social Democratic-led 
provisional government in Vienna had begun the project of raising a new federal army, 
tapping Dr. Julius Deutsch, a Landsturm officer during the war and the future leader of 
the Republikanische Schutzbund. The new army’s ranks were filled with unemployed 
industrial workers. The army’s leadership, despite including members of the Christian 
Social Party and German nationalists, was primarily Social Democrats.257 The markedly 
urban, Socialist complexion of Austria’s new army (the Volkswehr), complete with 
soldiers’ councils (Soldatenräte), a hallmark of the Soviet Red Army, evoked trepidation 
among conservative provincial officials and gave them cause to support the continuity of 
their militia groups. The deputy major of Innsbruck and finance committee chairman of 
the Tiroler Heimatwehr, Fritz Fischer, would liken the Volkswehr to “a red labor 
union.”258 
Another significant cause that prolonged the life of provincial militia groups that 
would form the basis of the Heimwehren, was the fact that bands of Yugoslavian militants 
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invaded southern Carinthia in an effort to ‘liberate’ its Slovene population. Carinthian 
Heimatschutz groups and the Volkswehr, under the direction of provincial commander 
(Landesbefehlshaber) General Ludwig Hügerth, cooperatively fought off the Yugoslav 
invasion, though not without tension. Lieutenant Hans Steinacher, who recruited 200 
volunteers from his former infantry regiment—K.u.k. Infantrieregiment Graf von 
Khevenhüller Nr. 7 (Klagenfurt)—to join in the defense, for example, was particularly 
hostile toward the “city slicker” Volkswehr troops. In his memoir he repeatedly refers to 
them as worthless “Red Guards,” who demonstrated more interest in exploiting the 
countryside than fighting the Yugoslavs.259 Despite an agreed ceasefire arbitrated by an 
American mission sent to investigate, the Yugoslav force once more attacked on April 29, 
1919, making only minor gains. An Austrian counter attack succeeded in pushing the 
Yugoslav force back, south of the Drau, recovering Grafenstein and Völkermarkt. 
Chancellor Renner, ordered Hülgerth—the future Landesführer of the Carinthian 
Heimatschutz—to halt any further offensive operations in order to let the negotiations run 
their course. Renner’s “defeatist” orders were promptly ignored and Hülgerth’s force 
ejected the Yugoslavians from Carinthian soil all together, illustrating once again the 
“general tension between Vienna and the provinces, characteristic of all of modern 
Austrian history.”260 
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The fighting in Carinthia was principal catalyst for the continuity of militia 
formations in Carinthian and neighboring Styria.261 A May 1919 report estimated that 
paramilitary formations existed in approximately 70 percent of Styria’s communities, 
varying from 15 to 100 men, depending on the size of the community.262 Dr. Willibald 
Brodmann, a regimental doctor in the Great War, established the first significant 
paramilitary organization in Styria, the Untersteierischen Bauernkommandos (Lower 
Styrian Peasant Squad). Brodmann was, according to Pauley, widely popular and “the 
soul of the south Styrian resistance against Yugoslavian aggression.” His sudden death in 
May 1922, at the age of 39, cut short his career as potentially the most influential 
Heimwehr leader in Styria.263 
In Tyrol, Social Democratic members of the Tyrolean Landtag balked that 
Governor Stumpf’s refusal of the IMCC request to disband the Bürgerwehr, complaining 
that his “mercenary army” was costing the state 2,500,000 kronen a year and would 
bankrupt the state. Tiroler Volkspartei representatives responded by agreeing to disband 
the Bürgerwehr only if the federal government disbanded the Volkswehr.264  
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Bavarian Humiliation and the Creation of the Einwohnerwehr 
The inability of Bavarians to suppress the radical Räterepublik on their own was 
“a source of great humiliation” and the principal impetus propelling Hoffman and Gustav 
von Kahr’s project of building a strong paramilitary organization in Bavaria.265 The early 
vestiges of the Einwohnerwehr would emerge from small units of civilians such as that 
from Rosenheim, commanded by Rudolf Kanzler, who took part in the first, failed 
attempt to liberate Munich. Local bureaucrats, like Kanzler, played a leading role in 
organizing volunteers into paramilitary militias. The other principal figure who would 
emerge from this process was forestry officer, Georg Escherich, who recruited and 
commanded a paramilitary unit in Isen and who would become the leader and principal 
driver of the Einwohnerwehr movement.266 Escherich’s connections to the nobility, which 
he established during his forestry studies, would get him a post as an organizer and 
administrator in the Bialowies district of occupied Poland during the Great War. Through 
this post, he came into contact with Quartermaster General, Erich Ludendorff, who came 
to admire his “harsh though efficient” style. His post-war career as a lobbyist for wealthy, 
landed aristocrats only expanded his network of influential contacts.267 These connections 
would prove crucial in funding and organizing the Einwohnerwehr. With the support of 
the federal government in Berlin, several Freikorps units had already been established in 
Bavaria. Freikorps Epp, established by Colonel Franz Ritter von Epp, was comprised of 
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junior officers, NCOs and soldiers and from his former unit (The Royal Bavarian Infantry 
Lifeguards Regiment). Freikorps Oberland and Kanzler’s Freikorps Chiemgau were 
among the other, larger formations organized.268 
It is worth pointing out that the composition of Freikorps Chiemgau—as was the 
case of most of the militias formed in Bavaria—was quite diverse, drawing from a range 
of social strata, with Catholic peasants, demobilized soldiers, and university students 
particularly prominent in filling out its ranks.269 Thus, the diversity of these formations 
tended to give them a more conventional, conservative outlook that contrasted the “rigid 
military organization and…grim fanaticism” displayed by the more radical, ultra-
nationalist Prussian Freikorps units that have come to symbolize the movement in the 
popular imagination.270 Nevertheless, in the same way Freikorps Chiemgau became a 
founding component of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, those more radical elements of the 
Freikorps would go on to serve as the hard core of the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA). And, 
whereas the Nazis would attempt their own coup d’état in Munich in 1923, the 
Einwohnerwehr worked hand-in-glove with the von Kahr government, serving as an 
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auxiliary police and security force ensuring that revolutions like those taking place in 
1918 and 1919 did not happen again.  
Though the growth and development of the Einwohnerwehr paralleled fears of “a 
resurgent Bolshevism,” it also reflected Bavarian separatism and a disdain for their 
Prussian overlords. As Large explains, in the mind of many Bavarians, Prussia became 
responsible for the war and, thus, all of their sufferings. At the war front, similar 
resentment was echoed amongst Bavarians who saw themselves as having been 
“exploited” by the Prussian General Staff for the benefit of Prussian troops. These 
tensions remained palpable after the war, as representatives of the Bavarian People’s 
Party declared prior to the opening of the provincial diet, “We are not going to tolerate 
being ruled from Berlin in the future…We categorically reject the ruthless one-sided 
Prussian domination.”271 Heimwehr leader, Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, in his 
memoir, similarly described the Bavarians as maintaining “an old and strong dislike for 
Protestant Prussianism.”272 These were, however, simply the most recent episodes in a 
long, strained relationship between Bavaria and Prussia, the roots of which extend as far 
back as the Protestant Reformation.273 Turning to its alpine, Catholic neighbors in 
Austria—as opposed to the Protestant north—is, therefore, not surprising. Large adds, 
that “[w]hile Bavarians and Prussians eyed each other suspiciously, if not with mutual 
contempt, Bavarians, Salzburger, Tyroleans, and Vorarlberger tended to see themselves as 
belonging to a common alpine heritage, even to the same ‘racial stock.’”274 For good 
                                                 
271 Large, The Politics of Law and Order, 5-7. 
272 Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini, 13. 
273 Large, The Politics of Law and Order, 7; Bayerischer Kurier, November 14, 1918, cited in 
Large, The Politics of Law and Order, 13. 
274 Large, The Politics of Law and Order, 53. 
 
117 
reason, Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr cooperation evoked the suspicion of Berlin, 
particularly regarding Bavarian intentions. German Consul General in Innsbruck, Hans 
von Külmer, quizzed Tiroler Heimatwehr leader, Dr. Richard Steidle, as to the Bavarian 
attitude toward the German Reich; Steidle assured him, perhaps somewhat 
disingenuously, of their “absolute Loyaltät.”275 
 
The Bavarian Einwohnerwehr—Clandestine Agent of Anschluss 
The Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr alliance was predicated upon two mutually 
reinforcing motivations. First, it was intended to strengthen the position of Munich vis-à-
vis Berlin.276 As one Einwohnerwehr representative explained, “[t]he Bavarians need 
above all support in their rear by the Tyroleans and Salzburgers if they should be forced 
to march to the north.”277 The phrase, “if they (the Bavarians) should be forced to march 
to the north” implied the possibility of the Einwohnerwehr marching on Berlin, which 
many Bavarian conservatives viewed as being “entirely oriented towards the left.” The 
strong anti-socialist reaction in Bavaria emerged in the aftermath of the Räterepublik, 
infiltrated the Reichswehr. As Captain Ernst Röhm explained to Colonel a.D. Max 
Bauer—adjutant to Erich Ludendorff and Kapp Putsch conspirator—in July 1922, the 
German army headquartered in Bavaria “formed the true center of all nationalist 
                                                 
275 The National Archives of the UK (TNA): German Foreign Ministry (GFM) 33/3812/K925/2, 
“Politische Beziehungen Österreich zu Deutschland – Anschluß von Tirol an Deutschland,” documents 
stamped K232474, K232479. Henceforth, documents from this record group will be cited TNA: GFM 
33/3812/K925/2 followed by the stamped document ID. 
276 Ludger Rape, Die österreichischen Heimwehren und die bayerische Rechte 1920-1923 (Wien: 
Europa Verlag, 1977), 64-5. 
277 “Protokoll der Sitzung am 13 Mai 1920,” Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NS 26, vorl. 648, cited in 




organizations.”278 Bavarians harbored a longstanding dislike of Protestant Prussia and 
came to see Berlin as a haven of unscrupulous leftist elements, beneath which communist 
revolution could bubble to the surface. The dread of this potentiality prompted the second 
motivation for the alliance between the Einwohnerwehr and the Heimwehr—the 
continued belief that Marxist revolutionaries were lying in wait for the opportune time.  
The best way to buttress the new “center of all nationalist organizations,” in 
Munich, was the consolidation of resources. Despite being expressly forbidden in the 
Treaty of Saint Germain, Anschluss (or unification) with Germany was strongly desired 
by the vast majority of the Austrian population. Not content to simply abide by this edict, 
the Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr alliance was also guided by genuine pan-German 
overtures. These sentiments were articulated quite clearly in the ceremonies surrounding 
the controversial Landeschießen (provincial shooting contest), staged by the Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr in November 1920. It was no coincidence that the shooting contest was held 
at Berg Isel; it was the site of three important clashes in the 1809 Tyrolean uprising in 
which Tyrolean militiamen defeated the French and Bavarian occupation forces. This also 
presented a convenient venue for Tyrolean Volkspartei and the Tyrolean Heimatwehr to 
emphasize the Landeschießen as an important foreign policy event.279 “We welcome the 
fact that the former opponents of 1809 celebrate with us today firmly in peace a faithful 
brotherhood,” reads a transcript of one speech.280 A report on the Landeschießen 
concluded:  
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As the sun of freedom, Tyrol induced the German people to a joint struggle against the 
proud Corsicans, ever may this Landesschießen of the H.W.—on the blood-soaked 
battlefield of the heroic struggles of Andreas Hofer and his death-defying heroes at Berg 
Isel—embellish and further deepen the union of all German crests and begin working in 
intimate collaboration between the Reiche and us, which has been ever successfully 
inaugurated in Munich in the interests of the whole German people.281 
 
Indeed, there was some truth behind Tyrolean Volkspartei contentions that the 
Landeschießen was an important “foreign policy” gesture—one couched not just in 
Tyrol’s tradition of civic militarism but also in a broader South German, Catholic 
militarism, both of which having adopted a distinctly anti-Marxist hue. 
Social Democrats were particularly outraged by the planned attendance of Escherich, 
Kanzler, and units of the Einwohnerwehr. Social Democrat Landtag representative, 
Martin Rappoldi explained the Tyrolean Heimatwehr “originally similar to earlier 
shooting clubs, has lost their sporty character by way of the influence of Orgesch and 
serve its monarchist purposes.”282 Thusly, Social Democrats vehemently opposed the 
shooting festival on the grounds of the “counterrevolutionary and monarchist character” 
of the Einwohnerwehr its Heimwehren functionaries. The Landesschießen, therefore, 
constituted a “provocative monarchist demonstration” by what was little more than a 
“monarchist mafia” colluding with the Bavarian Wittelsbach dynasty who was 
“determined to shatter the German Reich, to drown the idea of unity in the blood of the 
German nation.”283 The Social Democratic news organ, the Arbeiter-Zeitung, argued that 
the reason for the shooting festival was, in fact, to test the “war capability” of the 
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formations and their guns.284 Like the majority of articles published in both left and right-
leaning news organs, the facts were sprinkled in amidst the indignant sensationalism. 
Beyond the sharp criticism of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr and the Landesschießen, Social 
Democrats armed Tyrolean workers and implemented a general railroad strike in order to 
grind the rail system to a halt in effort to prevent the participation of the Bavarians. Train 
engineers removed critical engine parts to prevent Heimatwehr emergency technical 
assistance section (Technische Nothilfe) from restoring the rail system, while armed 
workers occupied Innsbruck’s gas and electricity works. Despite the best efforts of the 
Tyrolean Heimatwehr, who did manage to get the rail system working again on very 
limited degree, the strike succeeded in preventing a sizable contingent of Einwohnerwehr 
men from participating in the competition.285  
To be sure, the Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr coalition was not merely an alliance 
between two paramilitary organizations, it served as a channel through which Munich—
with the blessing of Berlin—collaborated with provincial Austrian officials of politically 
and culturally compatible Alpine provinces, to establish alternative paths toward 
unification.286 Kanzler and a staff of liaison officers to Austria, functioned as “unofficial” 
contacts between Austrian provincial governors and Munich, just as they did for between 
the Heimwehren and the Einwohnerwehr. Their efforts, naturally, focused on those 
bordering alpine Austrian provinces—Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg.  
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In the case of Tyrol, its Lieutenant Governor at the time, Dr. Franz Stumpf, who 
was the driving force behind the creation of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, and colleague, 
fellow Tyrolean Volkspartei member, Landtag (state parliament) representative, and 
Landesführer of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, Dr. Richard Steidle, were the two most 
influential proponents of Anschluss.287 Stumpf and Steidle, supported by a coalition of 
pro-Anschluss Christian Social Party members and Großdeutsch Volkspartei 
representatives within the Landtag, negotiated a general agreement in January 1921 that 
was designed to bring Tyrol into Bavaria’s orbit in the event of Austria’s “dissolution.” 
According to the agreement, the Tyrolean government was to inform Berlin of its 
intentions, but work directly with the Bavarian government to secure any “neighborly 
aid” needed. If Tyrol were invaded, Bavarian Freikorps units were to be sent in to aid in 
its defense.288  
This agreement was also intended to gage the Allied reaction to the development 
and to determine if a gradual integration of Tyrol into Bavaria might be possible if 
conditions in Austria continued to deteriorate. Steidle and the Tiroler Heimatwehr, did 
what they could to expedite the unrest, threatening that: 
if there is a conflict with Vienna, it is right on our side, because Vienna has caused our 
misery. The Balkanization of Austria has proceeded from Vienna; In the last few days 
there have been unscrupulous people exploiters, foreigners who have found a great 
witches' sabbath around the market, and the death of the State.289 
 
One can only make inferences based on the language of Foreign Ministry documents as 
to the source of this “dissolution.” References to “enemy states” and the discussion of 
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deploying armed force implies an organized foreign invasion. Moreover, Steidle’s alleged 
“Balkanization of Austria” makes the “Little Entente,”—Romania, Yugoslavia, and 
Czechoslovakia—who threatened military action should Austria or Hungary return the 
Habsburg dynasty to the throne or if Austria attempted unification with Germany, the 
most likely candidate.290 
 
Forging the “Ordnungsblock” 
The Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr “Ordnungsblock” was a reaction to Socialist 
Revolutions in Austria and Germany in 1918 and was designed to oppose any future 
communist coup attempts, as it proclaimed publicly at the Tyrolean Landeschießen: 
1. To protect the constitution 
2. To protect the people and their property 
3. To support existing protective institutions (primarily Tyrolean police) in keeping 
peace and order and in the event of natural disasters. 
4. To defend the rights of everyone against any Leftist putsch attempts  
 
The speeches delivered at the event—which was the first significant clash between the 
Heimwehr movement and the Social Democrats—decried Marxist doctrine and the Social 
Democratic Party. At the same time Escherich and the Heimatwehr leadership appealed to 
workers, explaining that the Heimwehren were not against the workers, but rather their 
Marxist leaders. He stressed that the Wehrmänner present were from all “Stände und 
Berufsklassen” (segments and professions), were men young and old, university 
professors, officers, workers, officials, and veterans.291  
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Many of the poorly organized and equipped militias that had remained under arms 
were retained by provincial governments for fear that the Social Democrats would use the 
Volkswehr to initiate a communist revolution. The association established between the 
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and the Austrian Heimwehren provided essential capital, 
weapons, and organizational support. Communications and transporting weapons from 
Bavaria to the Landesleitung (state leadership) in various Austrian provinces, however, 
proved difficult at times. As such, it required the organizations to utilize a variety of 
methods—trucks, train car, as well as via the wagons of sympathetic peasants—to 
transport arms. It also became clear that communications through the mail system were in 
danger of interception by Social Democratic postal workers. As such, the Heimwehren 
adopted “cover addresses” (Deckadressen), preventing interference and allowing them to 
communicate through the mail.292  
According to Kondert, it was the Bavarians who initially contacted the officials in 
Salzburg. In the spring of 1919, Dr. Hans Oellacher began organizing volunteers for a 
paramilitary unit in Salzburg, initially funded by Christian Social representative, Dr. 
Heinrich Mataja and armed by Styrian sources. By the end of November, Oellacher’s 
group had brokered an agreement with Escherich in which his group would send 400 men 
to Bavaria in support of Escherich—and vice-versa—in the event of unrest. By February 
1920, Kanzler attended the official founding of the Salzburger Heimwehrdienst and 
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discussed more a more extensive alliance that would help the organization reorganize, 
receive more extensive military training, and expand. Kanzler returned to Bavaria, 
leaving 2,000 marks to aid the Salzburger Heimwehrdienst, which expanded dramatically 
over the course of 1920.293 Throughout 1920 the Heimwehrdienst received numerous 
loads of weapons transported from Bavaria by train and truck. Rape details some 1480 
rifles, 110,200 rounds of rifle ammunition, 20 light and heavy machine guns, 35,200 
rounds of machine gun ammunition, 4 telephones stations, 5 kilometers of telephone 
wire, 50 pairs of boots, and 200 tunics.294  
A month later in Kufstein, Tyrol, Kanzler met with Steidle, Stumpf, and Professor 
Heinrich von Schullern, Chairman of the Andreas Hofer Bund. At this meeting it was 
decided that the Tyrolean Heimatwehr would follow the general model of the 
Einwohnerwehr, which was aligned with Bavaria’s administrative districts and 
precincts.295 By June of 1920, the Einwohnerwehr had delivered 2110 rifles of various 
types, two machine guns, five light machine guns, 106,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 
ten telephone stations with 20 kilometers of cable, and spare machine gun parts to the 
Heimatwehr.296 In his memoir, Starhemberg admits having direct involvement in stealing 
weapons from weapons depots around Innsbruck as well as being involved in trafficking 
weapons across the Austro-Bavarian border during his time in Tyrol.297 In addition to the 
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“generous material and moral support” they received thereafter, Einwohnerwehr leaders 
and Bavarian officials provided the Tyrolean government with much-needed credit, trade, 
food, raw materials, and supplies.298 Ahead of the Tyrolean Landeschießen, held in 
November 1920, Steidle had expected to receive a load of 5,000 rounds of rifle 
ammunition, machine gun ammunition, and pistols, but half of this shipment never 
reached the Heimatwehr. The Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IMCC), aided 
by intelligence supplied by the Social Democratic Party, began deploying patrols on the 
main roads that intersected the Bavarian-Austrian border. With some success, several 
weapons shipments headed to the Salzburg and Tyrolean formations in the fall and winter 
of 1920-21, were confiscated.299  
The Einwohnerwehr and Heimwehren redoubled their efforts to keep these routes 
open for weapons transportation.  Closer communication between the two sides and 
utilizing intelligence from sympathetic locals to help monitor the routes enabled weapons 
shipments to resume by March 1921. Between March and June 1921, the Einwohnerwehr 
successfully smuggled some 778 rifles, well over 50,500 rounds of rifle ammunition, 
2,500 cartridges, and 1000 ammunition clips, 14 revolvers, 700 revolver cartridges, and 
two crates of hand grenades. In total, despite the transportation challenges, the Tiroler 
Heimatwehr received more arms and equipment than any other Austrian formation.300  
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Einwohnerwehr representatives had made inroads into Vorarlberg as well, meeting with 
officials in April 1920. Just two weeks after the founding of the Tiroler Heimatwehr, the 
“Selbstschutzverband Vorarlberg” was officially founded.301 In July 1920, the Vorarlberg 
organization received 200 carbine rifles with 53,000 rounds of ammunition, four 
telephone stations with 10 kilometers of phone cable from Bavaria. Thereafter, police 
reports from districts throughout Vorarlberg documented the proliferation of arms from 
Bavaria. For example, an August 1920 police report from Bregenz, a small cache of 60 
rifles, a machine gun, and ammunition had been smuggled into across the Bavarian 
border. In another case, police reports from the village of Hittisau documented three 
wagons full of weapons and ammunition being deposited and held at an inn in Krumbach. 
Police in the community of Lingenau reported a delivery of 6,000 pounds of rifles, 
ammunition, and hand grenades.302 The Selbstschutzverband received another 500 rifles 
and 25,000 rounds of ammunition in October 1920. In early June 1921, Rape notes, 300 
more rifles, an additional 34,875 rounds of rifle ammunition, 3,250 rounds of machine 
gun ammunition, 8,180 ammunition clips, 80 steel helmets, seven munitions crates, and 
seven ammunition belts arrived from Bavaria.303 
The Austrian-Yugoslavian border dispute over the Slovene-populated areas of 
south Carinthia offered a logical incentive for a standing Heimwehr organization. Here 
too, Kanzler and its deputies played a central role in bringing the Carinthian 
Heimatschutz to fruition. Not only that, in days leading up to the October 1920 plebiscite 
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to determine the fate of the two disputed zones, they directed a pro-Austrian propaganda 
campaign in each zone. “Zone A” was occupied by Yugoslavian troops, so these activities 
were necessarily clandestine and carried out via “advisory councils,” that persuaded 
residents to vote that the zone remain Austrian. After the successful conclusion of the 
plebiscite, these resources turned their attention to recruiting and obtaining arms for the 
Heimatschutz with equal success.304 
Even in provinces where the connection between the Einwohnerwehr and the 
Heimwehren was not as strong still received arms and assistance. The Upper Austrian 
Heimwehren, for instance, received roughly the same number of arms as the Vorarlberger 
Selbstschutzverband, but needed some 6,000 rifles to equip their members.305 Most of 
those arms went to groups around the westernmost Innviertel (Inn Quarter) of the 
province.306 Despite the refusal of some Styrian paramilitary leaders—particularly the 
anti-clerical faction under Walter Pfrimer—to join Kanzler’s organization, he worked 
with Governor Anton Rintelen and Lieutenant Governor Jakob Ahrer to cobble together a 
cooperative agreement between the two main paramilitary organizations in the 
province.307 The Einwohnerwehr is known to have delivered 1,000 Mannlicher rifles, 
100,000 rounds of ammunition to the Rintelen-Ahrer organization in Graz in November 
1920.308 
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In July 1920, Escherich and Kanzler hosted the leaders of the various provincial 
Heimwehren in Munich “to gather into a single organization all elements who ‘wish to 
take up the struggle against Bolshevism by upholding the constitution and by maintaining 
order in the state.’” Steidle proposed to the other Heimwehr leaders present that the 
Austrian formations be under Bavarian, specifically Kanzler’s, direction.309 The other 
Heimwehr leaders agreed with Steidle’s proposal and accepted Bavarian leadership. By 
the end of October 1920, the reach of the Einwohnerwehr even extended into Vienna and 
Lower Austria, as Kanzler arbitrated an agreement with the retired Field Marshall, Josef 
Metzger, head of the Selbstschutzverband Wien und Niederösterreich (Self-Defense 
League of Vienna and Lower Austria). 
 Indeed, between 1920 and 1923, the Austrian Heimwehr movement received an 
extensive volume of weapons, military supplies, and equipment from Bavarian 
sources.310 British Foreign Ministry records document frequent transactions of weapons 
over the Austro-Bavarian border.311 By contrast, German Foreign Office records note 
only one, occurring on November 29, 1920, illustrating either the general success of 
Bavarian and Einwohnerwehr leaders at keeping federal officials “in the dark” regarding 
their clandestine operations, or the blind-eye federal officials turned toward 
Einwohnerwehr activities.312 The latter is more likely the case given the keen interest 
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Austrian Social Democrats took in exposing this weapons smuggling network. As 
Kondert indicates, numerous writings of Social Democratic representatives leveed 
accusations that the Heimwehren were being supplied by international counter-
revolutionary elements.313 Provincial party newspapers also documented Social 
Democratic complaints of the Heimwehren smuggling weapons from Bavaria.314 In total, 
it has been estimated that between 1920 and 1923, the Austrian Heimwehr movement 
received some 2,500,000 infantry rifles, 130,000 light machine guns, 3,000 heavy 
machine guns, artillery pieces, howitzers, and cannons, as well as 30 airplanes, from 
Bavaria.315 If Rape’s calculation is correct, these figures represented about 90 percent of 
the Heimwehr movement’s weapons stores.316  
Though the stamp of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr on the Heimwehr movement 
was clear, some of these similarities reflected a common Catholic, South German 
worldview. Like the Heimwehren, the Einwohnerwehr drew inspiration from a similar 
tradition of civic militarism, one rooted in Bavaria’s shared militia tradition, derived from 
hunting and sport shooting clubs throughout the state.317 As Large notes, 
The cult of the Schiessstände also embodied the Bavarian peasantry's traditional hostility 
toward standing armies and official state militarism. The shooting societies stood for a 
different kind of militarism: not that of the well-disciplined and tightly organized modern 
military machine, but a kind of home-grown, populistic, Lederhosen militarism, which 
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favored extreme decentralization, election of officers from within the ranks, the continued 
reliance on primitive weapons and styles of combat.318 
 
This was the very same style of civic militarism its Alpine Austrian neighbors had long 
nurtured and the Heimwehr movement embodied. Paradoxically, however, both 
paramilitary formations materialized with the oversight of their respective provincial 
governments and were intended to serve as auxiliary forces for the police and, in 
emergency situations, the military. As such, both claimed to be “non-political” 
organizations of “patriotic” volunteers, despite their openly anti-Marxist dispositions. As 
chapter three will illustrate, this “non-political,” open membership policy that served the 
Heimwehr movement so well in its formative years, would ultimately prove to be its 
Achilles’ heel. 
While booth organizations worked hand-in-glove with the state and local 
governments, they also received significant portions of their funding from private 
sources, particularly, industrialists and declassed nobles; in relation to the Heimwehren, 
this will be covered in depth in chapter four. It is unclear how much money the 
Heimwehren received from Bavarian sources or if those funds were funneled through the 
Einwohnerwehr or arranged independently, though the latter seems unlikely given the 
extent of control the Escherich and Kanzler exercised in other aspects of the 
organizations’ relationship. Archival sources indicate that the Salzburger Heimwehren, 
for instance, received a monthly stipend of 10,000 marks beginning in March 1920, 
which was increased to 12,000 marks in July 1920 due to the growth of the outfit.319 
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According to Kondert, Social Democratic sources contended that Steidle had received 
80,000 marks from German “monarchists” to purchase weapons, supplies, and 
equipment, however, this claim has never been substantiated by archival sources.320 
Similarly, German Foreign Ministry documents claimed that the Tyrolean Heimatwehr 
had been receiving 14,000 marks per month, as of the spring 1921, which does not appear 
to be have been substantiated through Einwohnerwehr records.321 It seems unlikely, 
however, that the Salzburg formations would have been the only to receive any sort of 
monthly remuneration outside of that which was Kanzler distributed to the Heimwehren 
to pay his staff in the various Austrian provinces.322 To this end, the movement’s official 
history, Heimatschutz in Österreich, the Tyrolean Heimatwehr was entirely dependent on 
Bavarian subsidies in its infancy.323 However, as Edmondson notes, foreign subsidies had 
been dramatically reduced by the end of 1921.324 
There were also many similarities in the social composition of their membership, 
both groups attracting a broad range of socioeconomic groups with a high number of 
former officers, civil servants, and middle class professionals serving in leadership 
positions.325 Of the 26 members of Kanzler’s staff in Austria, for instance, 13 were 
former army officers.326 Similarly, throughout the Austrian Heimwehren, former officers 
held a high percentage of leadership positions, particularly as organizers and trainers of 
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its various Sturmtruppen (storm troops) and Jägerbatallion (rifle battalion) combat units. 
As chapter four will illustrate, only elected officials outnumbered former army officers in 
the leadership of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr. 
Moreover, both frequently functioned as strike breakers, intimidating workers into 
breaking off labor stoppages and, in other cases, getting trains, buses, and utilities back 
up and running, thereby weakening the position of strikers. Like the Einwohnerwehr, the 
Heimwehren established special technical assistance groups (Technischen Nothilfe) 
intended to cancel out the paralyzing effects of general strikes by temporarily keeping 
public transportation and basic utilities online. In doing so, it blunted the most significant 
weapon in the Social Democrats’ arsenal.327 The relationship between the Bavarian 
Einwohnerwehr and the Heimwehren were close-knit on many levels, particularly with 
Austria’s western-most provinces. Heimwehr leaders quickly developed relations with  
 
Horthy’s Hungary: The other side of the Ordnungsblock 
 With the ascent to power of the Hungarian Communist Party, many Hungarian 
conservatives fled to Vienna to escape the Red Terror. Amongst them were individuals 
who would figure prominently in Horthy’s regime, such as Gyula Gömbös, Anton Lehár, 
István Bethlen. Bethlen, in particular, would play an important role in fostering a 
transnational counter-revolutionary block. While a refugee in Vienna in the spring of 
1919, he established the Anti-Bolshevik Committee, which met at the palace of Karl von 
Schönborn-Buckheim.328 It was at this same time that Kanzler established contact with 
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these men, who, upon the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, returned to 
Hungary and filled high-ranking positions in the Hungarian government.329 
 Hungarian contact with Austrian counter-revolutionaries began in 1919, most 
likely after the Horthy government took power. A November 1919 article in the Vienna 
newspaper, Neues Wiener Journal, reported that the “foreign club” operated out of the 
palace of former Habsburg foreign minister, Count Leopold Brechtold. “At the top of the 
company stands the former Imperial Economic Director, Imperial Councilor (Karl 
Freiherr von) Priles(z)ky,” the report contends. The “Wiener Kasino,” was a wealthy 
social club for international aristocrats, businessmen, artists, and scholars, modelled on 
similar clubs in London, Paris, and other “international cities,” was also a front for a 
clandestine organization known as the “Association for Law and Order.”330 Prileszky, a 
Hungarian noble, would have naturally been well-connected in Hungarian aristocratic 
circles, which were prominent supporters of Horthy’s government. According to 
Hungarian historian Lajos Kerekes, the Hungarian Embassy in Vienna made contact with 
the Wiener Kasino in January 1920. Hungarian officials offered the organization 
substantial material and financial assistance if it 1) agreed to overthrow of the Social 
Democratic government in power at that time, 2) establish a conservative authoritarian 
government, and 3) relinquish any claims to the Burgenland, which was formerly a part 
of Hungary.331 It is important to note that priest, leader of the Christian Social Party, and 
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future Chancellor of Austria, Ignaz Seipel, a member of the Wiener Kasino, was a key 
figure in these negotiations. The sum of 10,000,000 Hungarian crowns was distributed to 
Prince Johann von Lichtenstein, a leading organizer of the Wiener Kasino.332 
 In order to bring about such a concession of power from Chancellor Renner’s 
government, a strong, organized paramilitary organization would be needed; in Seipel’s 
mind, the Heimwehr movement was the ideal candidate. In March 1920, he provided an 
estimate to Hungarians officials that projected roughly 50,000,000 Austrian crowns 
would be needed to build the Heimwehren into such an organization. In the months that 
followed, significant funds from Hungarian sources poured into the reserves of Metzger’s 
Selbstschutzverband Niederösterreich und Wien.333 This occurred, of course, at this same 
time the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr was actively working with Austrian provincial 
officials and paramilitary formations to organize, train, and arm Heimwehren units. The 
subordination of the Heimwehren to the Einwohnerwehr necessarily brought Kanzler into 
the scheming for a right-wing putsch.334 It is also worth noting that Colonel a.D. Max 
Bauer, Ludendorff’s adjutant, had become involved in the Wiener Kasino-Hungarian 
putsch planning. It is unclear as to how, precisely, Bauer entered into these discussions, 
though it is well-known that after the failure of the Kapp Putsch, those involved fled to 
Bavaria and into Austria and Hungary. In doing so, Bauer spent some time in Vienna and 
Budapest, cultivating relationships with both Austrian and Hungarian counter-
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revolutionary organizations. It was most likely through these channels that he became 
involved.335  
During these meetings, held in the summer of 1920, various approaches were 
discussed, all of which envisaged Hungary undertaking the lion’s share of the financial 
responsibility; an apparently meager price to pay to keep the Burgenland Hungarian. In 
the midst of their planning, Renner resigned as Chancellor, paving the way for a 
conservative Christian Social-German National coalition government and a parliamentary 
majority in the first general election held in October 1920. With the Social Democrats 
ousted and subdued in the minority, the usefulness of a coup had expired.336 Nevertheless, 
the Hungarians still fearful of the potential of Austrian Social Democrats, continued to 
funnel a monthly stipend of 2,000,000 Hungarian crowns to the Heimwehren formations 
until the autumn of 1921, when it became clear that the Burgenland was not to remain 
Hungarian.  
Large contends, however, that Hungarian support “continued well into the 
twenties, despite disappointments in the Burgenland dispute and Austrian foreign policy,” 
but offers no specific source corroborating this claim.337 Kerekes explains that the Horthy 
government had maintained contact with the Heimwehren among other on the 
“österreichischen äußersten Rechten,” but stops short of saying that they continued to 
fund the Heimwehren.338 If Hungarian money did continue to flow into the coffers of the 
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Heimwehr movement it most likely did so through sympathetic private donors or came in 
the form of irregular contributions, as there is no evidence of consistent contributions 
from Hungarian sources. 
Historians estimate that between 1919 and 1921, Hungary had been the main 
financial backer of the Heimwehr movement, and Bavaria its main supplier of arms and 
military equipment—a clear indication of the centrality of Austria and its paramilitary 
organizations to the cooperative efforts of the counter-revolutionary right in Central 
Europe.339 The apparent halt in Hungarian funds, at the same time, demonstrates the 
subservience of transnational anti-Marxist cooperation to nationalist geopolitical realities 
in Central Europe. The collapse of the Austro-German cooperation reiterates this point. 
 
The Collapse of the Ordnungsblock 
Despite the immense volume of weapons, equipment, and organizational support 
the Einwohnerwehr supplied the Heimwehren, grumblings emerged both within 
Kanzler’s staff as well as amongst Heimweheren leaders. Those in Austria’s eastern 
provinces complained about the “special status” the westernmost states of Tyrol, 
Vorarlberg, and Salzburg enjoyed with the Einwohnerwehr. These grievances mirrored 
the grumbling of Kanzler’s staff members assigned to the various provinces to his chief 
in Austria. All signs indicate that Major a.D. August Hörl, Kanzler’s staff leader, oversaw 
the distribution of weapons and equipment to the various Heimwehren. His appraisal of 
the political state in the various provinces factored into which were ‘favored’ over others. 
                                                 




Captain Herbert von Oberwurzer, stationed in Upper Austria, and Major Max von 
Wandesleben, in Vienna, voiced complaints of favoritism, the former writing that, while 
the southwestern provinces received all the weapons, the rest got “nothing but promises.” 
To Wandesleben’s protests, Hörl explained that Vienna was “prone to fall to Bolshevism, 
and that it would serve the Viennese right as they were doing nothing against it.”340 
Indeed, the continued uncertainty over Austria’s viability as an independent state factored 
greatly into such logic. Carinthia and Styria, for their part, were awash with arms and 
military support from the border conflicts with the Yugoslavian military, so their reliance 
on the Einwohnerwehr for weapons and monetary support was less immediate.341 This 
left most of the Upper Austrian, Viennese, and Lower Austrian groups to languish without 
the requisite arms, explaining why the Heimwehr movement did not mature in these 
provinces until later in the decade. 
As a covert instrument of Anschluss, a chief propagator of pan-German 
Paramilitarism, and leading obstructionist of IMCC operations, the Entente pressure to 
‘dissolve’ the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr became too great and Bavaria’s recalcitrant 
President, Gustav von Kahr, finally caved in June 1921—a year after the Allies had first 
demanded its disarmament.342 What resulted from its dissolution was the decentralization 
of Bavaria’s network of local paramilitary formations. The heart and soul of the 
Einwohnerwehr organization was in its centralized hierarchy. Now beheaded, its 
constituent parts—local paramilitary units—were left to their own course of action, 
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which meant most devolved back into the localized civil defense groups from which they 
began.343  
The dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr opened the door to more radical, völkisch 
paramilitary elements, which emerged into the vacuum left in its wake.344 The void left 
by Einwohnerwehr was filled, principally by an organization born from its ranks, but far 
more openly radical in its pan-German, völkisch outlook, called Organisation Pittinger 
after its leader, Sanitätsrat (health inspector) Dr. Otto Pittinger. Unlike Escherich and 
Kanzler whose nationalism was tempered by their fondness for the institution of 
monarchy and Bavarian particularism, Pittinger was a strident anti-Semite, maintaining a 
völkisch, ultra-nationalist Weltanschauung (worldview); his organization followed suit.345  
Indeed, the openly pan-Germanist political agitation of Pittinger’s organization, renamed 
Bund Bayern und Reich, quickly strained relations with influential Christian Social and 
monarchist leaders, both within and close to the Heimwehren, who held fast to the 
“Austrian Idea” and preferred Austrian independence over unification and subordination 
to the Protestant North.346 As a result, clear tensions emerged between segments of 
Austria’s two main bourgeois parties, the Christian Social Party and the Pan-German 
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People’s Party, as well as within and amongst the provincial Heimwehren. A letter to 
Reichstag representative Dr. Max Pfeiffer, from Dr. Hans Wohlmannstetter of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, in April 1921, captured this disposition as it related to the 
Tyrol: 
the mass of the population seems generally favorable to the vote for Germany, but are 
strongly influenced by the doubts and concerns dominant in leading academic circles. 
The decisive factor in many circles is, first and foremost, the hardship of the women of 
the clergy. This clearly stands in opposition to the idea of unification. Even though the 
majority (of the clergy) are cautious and reserved, the opinion of the leaders of the clergy 
is much more pronounced, and widely known. The reasons for this attitude are, in part, 
monarchist-dynastic; on the other hand, considerable anxiety arises against the Reich, 
which is supposedly dominated by the Protestant Prussians.347 
 
In October 1921 Styrian Lieutenant Governor, Jakob Ahrer, expressed concern over the 
growing influence of “radical Reich German elements.” Ahrer called an urgent meeting 
of leading Christian Social Heimwehr members from each of the provinces, which took 
place on October 29 in Salzburg. Ahrer saw the Bavarians as being behind the ideological 
split of the Styrian Heimatschutz, complaining that a “united bourgeois front can no 
longer be observed.” As Steidle notes in his report on the meeting, the Christian Social 
faction of the Styrian Heimatschutz wanted nothing more to do with Major Hörl, 
Kanzler’s—and, later, Pittinger’s—chief of staff in Austria, whom Ahrer “addressed 
formally as the ‘evil spirit.’”348  
This opinion of Major Hörl was not isolated to Ahrer. The Upper Austrian 
representative at the meeting, Dr. Rudolf Reisetbauer, added to the indictment of the “evil 
spirit,” complaining that their political activism for Anschluß was too radical and stirred 
unrest. He continued, with particular distress over the radicalism exhibited by the German 
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paramilitary outfit in Vienna called “Brigade Wandesleben,” under the direction of Major 
Max von Wandesleben, an associate of Ludendorff’s. The conditions for the Heimwehren 
in Upper Austria were “very distressing,” as moderate Christian Social governor, Prelate 
Dr. Johann Nepomuk Hauser, maintained a reasonably cooperative relationship with 
Upper Austria’s Social Democrats. Christian Socials predominated the Upper Austrian 
Heimwehren in 1921, as pan-Germanist and Legitimist sentiments were weak.349 The 
strength of the Christian Socials in Upper Austria might be attributable to the fact that 
Hauser opposed any sort of collusion with Bavarian elements.350 
Similar concerns existed amongst Vorarlberg’s Christian Social leaders. The 
growing influence of Großdeutsch elements was also evident in Vorarlberg. Dr. Josef 
Feuerstein—a dedicated Christian Social—explained, however, that “Landesführer, 
Stefan Kohler from Bregenz, is a very popular man, he belongs to the Christian Social 
Party, but also enjoys the full confidence of the Greater Germany Party.” Feuerstein 
characterization of Kohler as an able administrator, but not a politician, perhaps worked 
in his favor in gaining the trust of both sides and maintaining a comparatively unified 
front.351 
The Carinthian Heimatschutz, Dr. Ignaz Tschurtschenthaler reported, was “for the 
most part in the hands of Pan-Germans.” However, he indicated that existing local 
Heimwehr groups were well-organized and that Christian Socialists were slowly gaining 
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ground.352 Landesrat Wilhelm Scherntaner described the Heimwehren in Salzburg as in a 
“satisfactory” condition, with the Zell am See district having been the best organized. 
Moreover, he added that relations between pan-Germanist and Christian Social elements 
were good. Deutsch-Freiheitliche Partei (German Freedom Party) representative and 
Landesführer, Dr. Anton Christoph was an important linchpin in maintaining good 
relations between the Pan-Germanist and Christian Social Party, as he was trusted by both 
factions.353 
In Tyrol, Steidle briefly noted, a united front had been maintained between Pan-
German and Christian Social circles.354 Steidle, having received substantial arms and 
funding from Escherich and Pittinger, maintained a warmer relationship with both than 
most other Heimwehr leaders and became the Heimwehr representative to Munich. Based 
on Steidle’s report of the October 1921 meeting, it was only in Styria and Upper Austria 
that the circumstances seemed especially bleak. The situation in the former is more 
understandable when placed in context. The Rintelen-Ahrer faction based in Graz, had 
Dr. Walter Pfrimer’s völkisch, anti-clerical faction to the north, to which it had been 
hostile. With Pittinger’s takeover of Kanzler’s organization, the Rintelen-Ahrer faction 
now had to deal with an equally unfiltered völkisch, ultra-nationalist organization in the 
role of its patron. The sour circumstances in Upper Austria, however, stemmed from 
Governor Hauser’s hostility toward Bavarian collusion, coupled with the general failure 
of Bavarian suppliers to make good on their promises of arms and equipment. 
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The misgivings voiced by Christian Social Heimwehr leaders were expressed in a 
meeting held on Sunday, March 19, 1922 between the Landesleitung of the Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr and the Oberleitung of Organisation Pittinger. Steidle’s agenda for the 
meeting made clear the desire of the Heimwehren leaders for more frequent and discrete 
communication between Munich and the Austrian Heimwehren in order to avoid 
information being leaked to newspapers. The agenda also expresses their desire for 
Pittinger’s lieutenants to refrain from the radical Pan-German political agitation and the 
“tactless” attacks the House of Habsburg, which did more harm than good, alienating the 
legitimist elements of the Austrian right. Steidle stressed, “the Heimwehr wants to 
organize not politicize.” Steidle offered the same message to the Greater German 
People’s Party leadership in January 1922, but with a markedly different tone. “The 
Heimwehr is, and will be, only a tool for the maintenance of peace and order; it has 
nothing to do with party politics, and will oppose taking up such a thing from all sides, 
with all of its power.” he warned.355 
 Their grievances fell upon deaf ears and the factionalism amongst the 
Heimwehren became even more defined. This, in turn, would cause further chaos 
amongst the various organizations in Bavaria that were jockeying for the allegiance of the 
Austrian formations. The distressed Christian Social factions abandoned Pittinger’s 
organization, turning, ironically, to Ludendorff and Bauer.356 The message of the 
Christian Social members to Bauer was echoed in a communication back to Ludendorff 
in Munich, explaining that Pittinger’s “untruthfulness, secretiveness and well-aimed 
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villany” had prompted the undoing of the alliance.357 Thus, the Heimwehren began 
dividing along political lines, fraying the very delicate balance the movement needed if it 
was going to grow into the powerful anti-Marxist bulwark in Central Europe its creators 
originally envisioned. Among the first of the Austrian organizations to fracture was 
Metzger’s Selbstschutzverband, as the nationalist faction broke off and formed the 
Deutscher Wehrbund (German Defense League), led by former k.u.k. general, Alfred 
Krauss and aligned with Pittinger.358 Conversely, Krauss wrote of Bauer, the new 
Christian Social champion, that he was “the greatest enemy of the German people and of 
Austria.”359 The divisiveness between the various Bavarian groups was more acute than 
those within the Heimwehren but brought about division amongst the latter nonetheless.  
Efforts to unify the Heimwehren on a national scale found only limited success. The 
formation of the “Alpine Club” in January 1923 indicated that the clear majority of the 
Heimwehren groups in Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Upper Austria, and Carinthia 
maintained allegiance to Pittinger. Carsten, painting with a broad brush, contends that this 
bloc was representative of the strength of the Großdeutsche sentiment within the 
Heimwehr movement, and offers an indication of why so many of its ranks would 
eventually defected to the Nazi SA when it they saw the tide shifting in Austria toward 
National Socialism. Conversely, by 1923, Bauer and Ludendorff had maneuvered more 
tactfully and had gained the cooperation of strongly Christian Social and monarchist 
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formations and was strongest amongst the with the formations in Vienna, Lower Austria, 
and Styria.360  
 Ultimately, multiple factors combined to condemn the transnational 
Ordnungsblock. As noted above, Hungarian subsidies for the Heimwehren dried up in the 
winter of 1921-22. The political agitation of Bund Bayern und Reich quickly became a 
source of irritation for Heimwehr leaders attempting to preserve bourgeois unity. 
Moreover, its agitation for Anschluss caused friction with pro-independence and 
monarchist segments of the Heimwehr movement as well as their supporters in the 
Austrian government. The growing tension between the two sides led to pro-
independence circles actively undermining the Anschluss activism of their Bavarian 
counterparts. An October 3, 1921 memo from German General Consul in Innsbruck, Fritz 
von Gebsattel to the Foreign Office in Berlin, warned of misinformation leaked to the 
French government by “local monarchist circles,” which revealed a scheme in which 
Tyrol would join Germany as an independent state with Steidle as its president.361 
While a Steidle presidency was most likely misinformation, the favor for a Tyrolean-
Bavarian union, by this time, had indeed shifted. Steidle and the Tyrolean Heimatwehr 
appear to have been central to this change in direction. In another memo from Gebsattel 
to Berlin, “Dr. Steidle and leading circles of the Heimatwehr are certainly not thinking of 
a union of Tirol with Bavaria, rather they are seeking unification of Tyrol with the 
German Reich as an independent federal state.” Gebsattel adds, citing a conversation with 
Steidle, who explained that  
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In the event of a catastrophe in Vienna, we will first declare the independence of Tyrol. 
However, we are thinking of an economic partnership with Bavaria, with the removal of 
customs barriers that separate us from Germany. Governor, Dr. Stumpf, is also of this 
point of view.362 
 
Tyrolean patriotism also factored into this shift. In 1809, Tyroleans had rebelled against 
their Bavarian rulers, to whom Napoleon had gifted the province for their loyalty to 
France in the War of the Third Coalition. Voluntarily submitting Tyrol to Bavarian rule 
would have, thus, undermined the deeds of their forefathers. In a subsequent letter, 
Gebsattel explained, “A proud, self-confident, and conservative people, like the Tyrolese, 
who are so rigidly strong in all their institutions, whose ancestors as the first among the 
Germans to try to shake off the Napoleonic yoke, and are now again at the head of a 
national movement, would surely not be able to give up their own political life, to 
renounce any sort of self-government and to go wholly into another state.”363  
A 1923 article by journalist Sigmund Münz, illustrated this shift in attitude, “A 
prominent German diplomat said to me lately: ‘While two years ago more than ninety per 
cent of the population of the Tyrol was in favor of annexation to Germany, today perhaps 
not more than twenty-five per cent could be found to favor a union with Bavaria.’ It 
should be emphasized that the Tyrol has turned against Bavaria in particular, but not 
against Germany as a whole.”364 While pan-Germanism was a powerful force in shaping 
the political climate in Austria and Germany, as the Bavarian and Tyrolean cases show, 
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regionalisms offered strong resistance, complicating and limiting the extent to which pan-
German ideals guided the agendas of the Einwohnerwehr and Heimwehr movements. 
Perhaps the main way pro-independence circles worked against pan-German radicals, 
however, was by cultivating a relationship between like-minded Austrian industrialists 
and Heimwehr leaders.365 Seipel and Styria Lieutenant Governor, Jakob Ahrer, were two 
central figures that worked to connect the Heimwehren with domestic patrons, in hopes 
that it would curb the general Großdeutsch disposition of the movement. This strategy, 
taking advantage of the existing strains in the Bavarian-Heimwehren relations, proved 
effective, demonstrating, once more, the limits of pan-German nationalism. 
 
Conclusions 
 The collaboration of the counter-revolutionary governments and organizations in 
Central Europe cannot be properly understood without realizing the impact of the First 
World War on the region. Military defeat caused the fall of the Habsburg and 
Hohenzollern dynasties that ruled Central Europe. Within the footprint of these empires 
remained but "shatter zones," which Gerwarth describes as “large tracts of territory where 
the disappearance of frontiers created spaces without order or clear state authority.”366 In 
these spaces the absence of “clear state authority,” combined with inflation, 
unemployment, and food and material scarcity creating a social and political climate 
susceptible to radicalism of all persuasions. The cognitive dissonance that developed 
amongst the officer corps of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies in the immediate 
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aftermath of the Great War, created an alternate reality in which the Central Powers were 
“undefeated in the field,” only to fall to a “stab-in-the-back” from Judeo-Bolshevik 
revolutionaries on the home front.  
This myth would prove to be a potent mobilizing force for demobilized officers 
who returned home to “mobs” waving red communist flags, fellow officers being beaten 
by soldiers and demonstrators or having their war medals and rosettes torn from their 
tunics and caps.367 Inflation reduced officers’ pensions to a starvation wage and 
unemployment reduced them to standing in bread lines. In such conditions, manufactured 
notions of sinister communist Jews pulling the rug from beneath their feet seemed 
plausible amidst the deteriorating economic conditions juxtaposed with the general 
success of Jews in white-collar professions. The resultant, general anti-Semitic outlook 
reinforced these ideas. As one author wrote of Austria in 1922: 
It is pointed out that the Jews possess nearly everything worth having in Austria. They 
own all the newspapers except one little clerical sheet, and therefore they control public 
opinion. They made practically all the money during the war; they comprise the majority 
of the medical and legal professions; they control the banks; indeed, they are all-
powerful. This, I am told, is particularly true in Vienna.368 
 
In the “culture of defeat” that consumed Central Europe, reconstituting their soiled 
national pride became something of a quest, and in a sense, a continuity of the war, an 
opportunity finish what they had started in 1914, by righting the wrongs propagated in 
these illusions and remedying the ills—Marxism, parliamentary democracy, capitalism, 
Jewish profiteering, the injustices of the Versailles “diktat,” and the like—of their 
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societies. Hungarian social scientist and émigré, Oskar Jászi, captured this mentality quite 
lucidly and with chilling accuracy, writing in 1923 that  
Hungary today, in her mutilated form, is a country incapable of existence. All serious 
economic and social reforms must await the restoration of her historic frontiers. 
Therefore, it must be Hungary's sole endeavor to create an efficient army and to get 
powerful allies for the new war which will come within a short time.369 
 
A principal vehicle through which they pursued this quest was the paramilitary movement 
that had emerged throughout the region, originally out of necessity, but that remained out 
of fear of communist revolution, and later, as an instrument of political force. 
 Indeed, attempts and fleeting successes of communist revolutionaries to 
overthrow the republics across Central Europe only served to verify the “Dolchstoß 
mythologie” (stab-in-the-back mythology). By the beginning of 1919, reports of the 
brutality of Bolshevik “Red Terror” were well-known in Central Europe; these stories 
became reality for some Hungarians under the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic. At 
the same time, German “Spartacists” attempted—with some success in Munich, at 
least—to seize power in Prussia and Bavaria, while Viennese communist cells were 
planning their own putsch attempt, which were snuffed out before they materialized. The 
tide of communism in Central Europe, however, was checked with ruthless efficiency by 
nationalist paramilitary groups such as Horthy’s National Army and the German 
Freikorps.  
 The numerous redrawn borders at the Paris Peace Conference also gave 
significant impetus to rise of Paramilitarism in Central Europe. Hungary’s periphery was 
awash with bloody fighting, as Bela Kun’s government stubbornly refused to comply 
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with the Allied award of historically Hungarian land to the new Czechoslovakian and 
Yugoslavian states, Romania, and Austria. At same time, Germany’s contested eastern 
borderlands of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Upper Silesia were the sites of violent 
clashes with Polish fighters. In Austria, fighting in southern Carinthia and Styria broke 
out when Yugoslavian troops attempted to seize control and annex these areas due to their 
sizable Slavic populations. The border disputes throughout Central Europe were 
expressions of the festering national resentments, as the territorial secessions were 
viewed as insult piled onto injury, a betrayal of the ideal of national self-determination 
Wilson pontificated in his Fourteen Points. 
The success of paramilitary formations in squashing communist insurrection and 
defending national borders guaranteed the quasi-official, volunteer groups a future in 
Central Europe. The largest and most-organized paramilitary organization was the 
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, who armed and organized the Heimwehr movement in Austria. 
The Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehren alliance established in 1920, formed a strong anti-
Marxist, civil defense force that also functioned as a quasi-official channel of 
communication and coordination between both the organizations and Bavarian and 
Austrian officials. While, the Einwohnerwehr was building up the provincial 
Heimwehren, Hungarian representatives initiated contact with the monarchist Wiener 
Kasino organization and offered finance a coup d’état to overthrow of the Socialist 
government in Vienna. Among the potential putschists were Heimwehr leaders in Vienna 
and Lower Austria, who agreed that the Heimwehren would be the perfect instruments for 
the coup. Accepting Horthy’s offer, financial support poured in from the Hungarian 
government throughout 1920 and 1921. The establishment of the Austrian Heimwehr 
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movement was the crowning achievement of transnational counter-revolutionary 
collaboration in Central Europe during the first-half of the 1920s. 
The ulterior motives of their Bavarian and Hungarian patrons proved to be the 
undoing of their collective efforts. Underpinning Bavarian support for the Heimwehren 
was the broad distrust of the Social-Democrat-laden government in Berlin. Building up 
and subordinating paramilitary outfits in bordering Austrian provinces was an imperative, 
should the Bavarian formations need to advance on the capital city. Moreover, German 
and Austrian provincial officials planned for an alternative contingency. Should the 
Austrian government collapse, Bavaria would, in effect, annex its neighboring provinces 
(Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg, and perhaps even Upper Austria). The popular desire for 
Anschluss made this an attractive possibility, at least initially. The dissolution of the 
Einwohnerwehr, however, and the influx of competing, radical-right elements into 
Austria triggered destructive factionalism amongst both the Bavarian organizations and 
Austrian Heimwehren. At the same time, Hungarian support for the Heimwehr movement 
was predicated on its desire to have a similar, conservative, authoritarian government 
installed in Austria, but also retain the Burgenland, which was about to be ceded to 
Austria in yet another territorial secession outlined at the Paris Peace Conference. When 
it became clear that neither of their aims would come to fruition, the monthly 
disbursements to the Heimwehren (for the purpose of overthrowing the democratic 
government) ended.  
Though historians of the Heimwehr movement explain that the Bavarian and 
Hungarian right offered financial and military aid, they have done so only to further the 
Austro-centric narrative along, failing to appreciate the significance of the movement in 
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the broader space of interwar Central Europe. Instead, the depiction of the Heimwehren 
has been one that, in many ways, parallels the narrative of the miserable and chaotic 
beginnings of the tiny, now-insignificant successor state. While there is certainly truth in 
those depictions of discord and turmoil, the focus of scholarly literature on this aspect of 
the movement has, by and large, neglected the fact that the Heimwehr movement was the 
product of a transnational collaboration that created what would become one of the 
strongest and most stable paramilitary organizations in Central Europe. Moreover, this 
collaboration was paramount in the fate of Central Europe in that it forged lasting ties 
between Germany, Austria, and Hungary, all of whom, along with Fascist Italy, would 
form the core of the Axis Powers in World War II. Indeed, the continuous presence and 
increasing politicization of Heimwehr movement over the course of the 1920s and early 
1930s, helped create a climate in Austria, and Central Europe for that matter, in which 
Paramilitarism became an acceptable mode of right-wing political and cultural discourse. 
The Heimwehr movement paved the way for the militaristic, authoritarian regime of the 
Vaterländische Front and, ultimately, the Nazi Party in Austria. 
As chapter five shall demonstrate, despite the erosion of this collaboration over 
the course of 1922 and 1923, the foundation for the Heimwehr movement had been laid. 
Four short years later, the movement would, again, be at the center of a much more 
extensive coalition of the radical-right that extended beyond Central Europe. In this 
iteration, the Heimwehren would supply the arms and support Bavarian formations, 
reconstituting the Einwohnerwehr in the form of the Bavarian Heimatschutz. On the other 
hand, however, it would, itself, be the recipient of aid, arms, and counsel from a heredity 
enemy—Italy. Through Hungary, which both the Austrian right and Fascist Italy had 
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developed close relations, Mussolini funneled arms, money, and political guidance. In the 
Heimwehr movement he, like Chancellor Seipel, saw an instrument through which to 
overthrow the republican government and install an authoritarian, right-wing regime. 
Like the coalition of the early 1920s, conservative government officials on all sides 
played key roles facilitating the next partnership, whose efforts would lay the 




















CHAPTER III – CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE MAKING OF THE 
HEIMWEHR MOVEMENT 
 
As has been demonstrated thus far, the Heimwehr movement was a product of a 
successful transnational effort to establish firm, counter-revolutionary footing in Austria; 
Bavarian and Hungarian money, arms, equipment, and organizational guidance created a 
firm foundation for the Heimwehr movement. Simultaneously, Heimwehr leaders, 
particularly in Tyrol, identified with the ancient traditions of Alpine militarism, the seeds 
of which were rooted in the gun culture that materialized with the democratization of 
firearms. The wartime volunteerism of sport shooting clubs was the paradigm in which 
Heimwehr organizations understood themselves to be the heirs. This chapter will 
demonstrate further continuities of the imperial past and how they shaped the Heimwehr 
movement.  
According to social scientist, Edgar Shein, understanding an organization’s 
culture enables one to attain a deeper insight into its identity, behaviors, and beliefs.370 
This chapter will examine the organizational culture of the Heimwehr movement in the 
hopes of doing just that. Shein suggests there are three levels of culture. The first level is 
what he calls “artifacts,” which constitute things such as documents, symbols, style of 
dress, rituals, songs, slogans, and so forth. In other words, things you can see, touch, or 
feel. Without very specific explanation, however, “artifacts” can be difficult to interpret 
accurately.371 In the case of the Heimwehren it would constitute its uniforms, rifles, 
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exercises, flag consecration ceremonies, rallies, field Masses, propaganda flyers, and so 
forth. They also reveal the “tangible, sensory, [or] felt experiences” that underpinned the 
culture of the movement; in other words, the emotional reactions, often times through 
sights and sounds, evoked. In short, these artifacts assimilate the emotional responses and 
aesthetic symbolism into a meaningful, “shared code” that members internalize, which 
reflects and informs an organization’s culture.372  
The second level of culture, Shein contends, are “espoused beliefs and values.” 
These are beliefs and values a group collectively validates, adopts, and articulates. As 
such, they are observable correlations between an organization’s cultural artifacts and its 
espoused values. The numerous anti-Marxism, anti-parliamentary democracy, anti-
liberalism, anti-capitalism, and expressions of the Heimwehr movement reflect some of 
its central “espoused beliefs.” Thus, the negative, obstinate nature of the movement’s 
“espoused values” was reflected in its appearance and activities as a self-defense 
association. 
Lastly, is what Shein calls “basic underlying assumptions.” These, he explains, 
are assumptions that “have become so taken for granted that one finds little variation 
within a social unit.” In other words, they reflect entrenched, fundamental truths in which 
behaviors to the contrary are unthinkable. “In an occupation such as engineering, it would 
be inconceivable to deliberately design something that is unsafe; it is a taken-for-granted 
assumption that things should be safe,” Shein offers as an example. Thus, basic 
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assumptions are such deeply ingrained shared values and beliefs that they are followed 
without question.373 Basic underlying assumptions offer the requisite context to make 
sense of the espoused values, the conspiratorial signal to Geertz’s wink.374 The “artifacts” 
and “espoused values” of the Heimwehr movement its artifacts were, thus, predicated on 
the “basic underlying assumptions” of Catholic social thought and imperial traditions of 
civic militarism. 
Indeed, the Heimwehr movement was driven by the shared historical experiences 
of its leadership and members as subjects of the former Habsburg monarchy and as 
Catholic parishioners. That is to say, features of imperial Austrian society continued to 
influence republican Austria, particularly in the provinces. The Habsburgs’ existential 
fear of nationalism translated into the suppression of that facet of identity and redirection 
toward cultivating regional identities in each its counties, duchies, and bishoprics. 
Moreover, the Catholic Church, which enjoyed a most productive relationship with the 
House of Habsburg throughout its reign, staked its claim to another facet of Austrian 
identity. This is not to say that German nationalism did not factor strongly into Austrian 
collective identity, but rather that it had been historically constrained through its pairing 
with Catholic, Habsburg, and regional identities; they were German Catholics, German 
Tyrolians, and German Habsburg subjects. Its ubiquity allowed it to be married it to the 
other more internally unique elements of self. The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire 
and, therefore, Austrians’ identities as Habsburg subjects, only strengthened regional 
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identity, much of which, however, was rooted in imperial traditions, making the Habsburg 
influence unshakeable.  
Catholic social thought served as the foundation of the two central characteristics 
that defined the Heimwehr movement—its militarism and its politics. On May 15, 1891, 
Pope Leo XIII published the Papal Encyclical, Rerum Novarum (or On Capital and 
Labor), which is widely accepted as the foundational text outlining Catholic social 
teachings.375 It codified the philosophies of Church theorists had held for centuries as 
well as spoke the Church’s position on the social, economic, and political issues caused 
by industrialization and urbanization. More specifically it spoke to the “misery and 
wretchedness” of the working class.376 On the fortieth anniversary of the publication of 
Rerum Novarum, May 15, 1931, Pope Pius XI published the Papal Encyclical 
Quadragesimo anno (or On the Reconstruction of Social Order), which laid out the 
Church’s vision for the reordering of society based on concepts laid out in the Leo XIII’s 
Rerum Novarum. It sought a middle ground in the face of the extremes represented by 
capitalism, fascism, and communism. The juxtaposition of these texts with the 
assumptions and values articulated in Heimwehr activities and propaganda reveal a 
strikingly consistent parallel that demonstrates that it was a thoroughly traditional 
movement. It opposed the greed and individualism of laissez faire capitalism. Heimwehr 
leaders did not entirely oppose democracy, but rather Western-style parliamentary 
democracy, where corruption and political partisanship belied the “common good.” Its 
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federal leaders also proposed a collectivist arrangement of society in the form of 
corporatism, they rejected the notion of class conflict proposed in Marxist theory and 
promoted by the Communist and Social Democratic parties; animosity amongst the 
various strata of society would not lead to the “common good.”  
Historians have depicted the Heimwehr movement as being almost entirely 
negative in its aims, conveying the false impression that the Heimwehr movement lacked 
a firm ideological basis. It rejected capitalism, parliamentary democracy, and socialism 
out of its own ideological obedience to the principles of Catholic social teachings. As 
such, they understood the purpose of the state to be, first and foremost, the promotion of 
the “common good.”377 Its Korneuburg Oath—along with its frustration with the 
bourgeois political parties—echoed this overarching belief as well as other fundamental 
elements of the Church’s teachings. 
Within the concept of Subsidiarity, the Heimwehr movement found importance in 
its role as a voluntary association. Founded on the establishment of local groups, the 
Ortsgruppen sought to assist their communities--a collection of individuals and families--
in protecting their communities and, therefore, improving the quality of their lives. At a 
higher level, the Heimwehren saw themselves as patriotic, voluntary organizations 
seeking to renew the pride and prosperity of their Heimat. In this way, they understood 
the confederation as serving in a valuable role in the decentralized approach of social 
order conceptualized by Catholic social theorists. As voluntary associations, their 
members paid no dues and went through no vigorous exclusionary process; its members 
needed only to be “patriotic” and possess the desire to service their communities and their 
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Heimat through the movement. Thus, the “renewal” for which they hoped to evoke in 
Austria was one wholly aligned with Catholic social thought and ultimately began to take 
shape with the establishment of the May Constitution of 1934. 
The traditional patriarchal outlook inherent in Catholic social theory underpinned 
the militarism of the Heimwehr movement. A central component of masculinity was—as 
the head of his family—the protection of home and hearth, his community, and his 
country. As chapter one demonstrated, the “throne and alter” relationship was a 
particularly potent in Habsburg Austria, most especially in its Alpine regions. Like an 
altar boy being introduced to the inner-workings of the church, young shooters were 
introduced to firearms and learned how to shoot and hunt. Familiarity and comfort with 
firearms served as an important precursor for military service, which after 1867 was 
mandatory in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The qualities young men learned from 
compulsory military service—duty, obedience, loyalty, sacrifice, discipline, and so 
forth—were virtues that Kaiser Franz Josef sought to instill in his subjects, but were 
compatible with Catholic social teachings, which had been instilled in them from birth. 
When obligatory military service was outlawed in the Treaty of Saint Germain, private 
scouting organizations and athletic clubs militarized their activities to help compensate 
for this loss. Similarly, the patriarchal foundations of the Heimwehr movement were 
observable in the activities of its women’s auxiliary organizations. The groups were 
geared toward the growth and development of the movement and the promotion of its 
social agenda, which was consistent with the main tenants of Catholic social teachings, 
focusing on the promotion traditional values, protecting children from the corrupting 
influences of modern society, and aiding families in need. 
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The close relationship between the Church and the Heimwehren is clear. The 
Church saw the Heimwehr movement as a protector from the anti-clerical, secular ideals 
of Marxism. As such, the Church and the Christian Social Party were the movement’s 
most ardent supporters.378 In virtually every Heimwehr event the Church was involved: 
shooting contests, war memorial dedications, rallies, and flag dedication ceremonies, all 
consistently included Mass services as a part of the program of events. As such, the 
alignment of the Heimwehren and the Church was frequently a point of ridicule by its 
Communist and Social Democratic Party opponents as an indication of the Church’s 
hypocrisy. To that end, not all clergy agreed with this association with the Heimwehren; 
however, most remained steadfast in backing the movement. Nevertheless, the 
fundamental tenants of Catholic social thought, cultivated through centuries of Catholic 
hegemony in the Alpine realms of the Habsburg Empire, shaped the character and 
outlook of the Heimwehr movement.  
 
The “Tyrolean Example” 
The Tiroler Heimatwehr was officially established on May 12, 1920.379 Steidle 
proposed utilizing the same organizational structure of the old Tyrolean Schützenwesen, 
with districts and district leaders. Like the old militia system, Innsbruck would serve as 
its main administrative hub.380 Given that the Standschützen had been outlawed by the 
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Treaty of Saint Germain, which was enforced by the IMCC, the statutes of the Tiroler 
Heimatwehr were necessarily vague and open to lose interpretation. Its statutes, 
coordinated with the Tyrolean government and finalized in October 1920, explain the 
organization’s general purpose, basic structure and hierarchy, parameters for 
membership, and the electoral process for its leaders.381 In §3 of its statutes, the 
Heimatwehr declared itself a collection of “patriotic-minded people” gathered for the 
purpose of 1) protecting the constitution from any attempt at “violent constitutional 
amendment,” 2) protecting the people, their personal property and work, 3) supporting 
existing authorities in “maintaining peace and order,” as well as 4) “intervention” in 
natural disasters. It adds, that the Heimatwehr is a private establishment that promotes to 
the reconciliation of all classes of people and, in particular, “the rebuilding and revival of 
the patriotic spirit.”382  
The first point and its reference to “violent constitutional amendment” clearly 
referred to the specter of communist revolution, which threatened to seize all private 
property and turn it over to the state. This was a point of Marxist theory with which 
Rerum Novarum took particular issue, citing Deuteronomy 5:21, “Thou shalt not covet 
thy neighbor's wife; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-
servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his.”383 Moreover, the encyclical 
explains, “every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one 
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of the chief points of distinction between man and…animal.”384 As such, the confiscation 
of private property by a state was “emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful 
possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion in the 
community.”385 
The phrase “peace and order,” is used repeatedly by Heimatwehr leaders in 
writings and speeches and, thus, necessitates unpacking. While the word “peace” is rather 
innocuous and quite understandable given the turmoil that Tyrol experienced since the 
end of the Great War. It is the word “order” that is more curious and warrants further 
examination. One might reasonably interpret “order” as having three different but related 
meanings. Its most obvious meaning can be derived from a literal interpretation—to 
regulate or manage, in this case, “keeping peace and order” as auxiliary support for 
protective institutions such as the police. In an alternative definition of the word “order” 
carries authoritative connotations in that it can also be interpreted as “commanding” or 
“directing;” in the context of the close cooperation with and support of the Heimatwehr 
by the Tyrolean state government, “order” takes on an authoritative tone. “Order,” in this 
setting, entails having control over Tyrolean society by the process of maintaining the 
peace and regulating the state’s political landscape. Interpreting “order” as a euphemism 
for tradition or conservatism is not too great a leap of the imagination given Tyrol’s long 
history as such in the former Habsburg Monarchy. The often-used, related turn of phrase, 
“order-loving people,” (ordnungsliebenden Bevölkerung) thus, might as easily be 
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understood as “tradition loving people.” In that sense, then, the “Ordnungsblock” formed 
between Bavaria and Alpine Austrian paramilitary organizations can just as easily be 
understood as a “conservative block.”386 Meanwhile, the term “Patriotic” is not given any 
special definition in the statutes so one must apply a generic definition, which entails 
devotion and support for one’s country. It is unclear, however, as to what “country” might 
imply—Tyrol itself, Austria as an independent state, Austria as a part of Germany, or the 
German cultural nation. The use of the words “rebuilding” and “revival,” however, imply 
a pre-existing patriotic sentiment in a pre-existing community. One might reasonably 
infer, then, that the Tiroler Heimatwehr was dedicated to the restoration of Tyrolean-
German patriotism. 
Beyond its role as a paramilitary auxiliary to the police and gendarmerie, the chief 
task of the Heimwehren was to maintain a unified bourgeois front. As such, its 
membership policy was open-ended. The statutes defined the parameters for membership 
in the Heimatwehren as follows: individuals at least eighteen years of age and of 
“reputable German descent” (beleumundete Deutschstämmige); Jews were specifically 
identified as being excluded. Local Heimatwehren leaders (Ortsführer) determined the 
admission of individuals, while provincial leadership (Landesleitung) determined 
whether other German associations could join and form their own formation; this allowed 
the Heimwehr movement to amass substantive membership numbers quickly. The 
practice also allowed the alignment of interests and the benefit of cross organizational 
support. Membership would be terminated by death, loss of citizenship, incapacitation, 
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alcoholism, mental illness, voluntary termination of membership, or ejected by 
committee for a “severe breach of duty” (schwerer Pflichtverletzung).387 
Thus, the Heimwehren considered themselves non-political organizations 
dedicated to maintaining an organized bourgeois front. Despite their seemingly dubious 
claim, maintaining its anti-Marxist, non-partisan bourgeois outlook was a task taken with 
the utmost determination. On numerous occasions, Steidle reiterated this point explaining 
to the leadership of the German nationalist party (Grossdeutschen Volkspartei), for 
example, that the Heimwehr “is and will only be a tool for the maintenance of peace and 
order, it has nothing to do with party politics and will come against such a carrying in the 
side from which it wants to set with all ounce of strength to fight back.”388 At the same 
time, they declared that they were “keine Fascisten.”389 The underlying motivation for 
preserving this equilibrium was three-fold. First, it allowed for the movement to create a 
sizable financial and material support base from adherents to both pan-Germanist and 
Christian Social parties. Second, in doing so, the Heimwehren could remain appealing 
organizations to interested recruits of all non-Marxist persuasions. Finally, as a result, it 
placed the Heimwehr movement in a unique position in Austria—and Central Europe for 
that matter—in that it functioned as a unifying force, a center of gravity if you will, for 
counter-revolutionary anti-Marxism. So long as the Heimwehren remained a source of 
bourgeois unity, it would be their most powerful weapon against communist revolution. 
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389 TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), I/1, fol.410, 154-6. 
 
164 
Though not stated in its charter, Heimatwehr members were not required to pay 
membership dues, as they were viewed strictly as private citizens volunteering their time 
and energy. The voluntary nature of the Heimwehr movement reflected its deep-rooted 
Schützen tradition of war volunteerism and civic militarism throughout its time under 
Habsburg rule. This had historically been reinforced by the clergy, who drew upon 
Catholic ideals of service and sacrifice for the greater good of their families and 
communities. The concept Subsidiarity in Catholic social teachings envisioned voluntary 
associations as serving important functions in society, as a vehicle for ordering society at 
local levels.390 
The implications of policy were ultimately of grave detriment to the Heimwehr 
movement. Pabst had implored Steidle and the other provincial leaders to institute 
membership dues in order to cull the membership of those not committed to the 
movement; to his consternation, they were not moved.391 Equally as critical was the fact 
this feature made the Heimwehren completely reliant on external sources of revenue.392 
As subsequent chapters will point out, this meant that the Heimwehr movement was 
limited in its ability to maneuver. That is, it was beholden to the interests of its 
financiers—provincial governments, private aristocratic supporters, financial institutions, 
industrial associations, as well as foreign supporters.393 Shackled to multiple, and often, 
conflicting interests, the Heimwehr movement was greatly reduced in its capability to 
affect the ideological and political changes it envisaged. This was not clear when the 
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principal target of its ire was the Social Democratic Party, as virtually all anti-Marxist 
circles backed the Heimwehren in this endeavor. It was only revealed when Heimwehr 
leaders found themselves at odds with the rising tide of the National Socialist German 
Workers Party, that this fatal flaw revealed itself, and by that time it was too late.  
Coupled with the absence of membership dues, the lack of meaningful 
membership criteria would prove detrimental to the Heimwehr movement in several 
ways. According to Wiltschegg, the spike in popular interest in the Heimwehren after its 
smashing the Social Democratic riots in labor strikes of the “July Events,” caused an 
unsuspected “mass influx of opposing elements,” which he adds, “would… have serious 
consequences.”394 The fact that Heimwehren began as an anti-Marxist, civil defense 
organization, admittance of individuals of all anti-Marxist persuasions into its ranks is 
logical. As was the case with its financial dependence on external capital, its diverse 
membership had conflicting outlooks that diverged primarily into two camps—those that 
wanted Austria to unify with Germany (Anschluss) and those who wanted Austria to 
remain an independent state. When the Nazi Party became the second largest party in the 
German Reichstag (parliament) in the 1930 general election, the Austrian Nazi Party also 
began to gain electoral ground, which would split the Heimwehren along these lines.  
 The general structure and hierarchy of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr is also described 
in its statutes. Its most fundamental unit was the Ortsgruppe (local group). The leader of 
the Ortsgruppe, the Ortsführer, along with his deputy and an admissions committee, was 
elected by the Ortsgruppe members. While maintaining a standard disposition of units, 
one defending the locality itself, one defending the locality’s infrastructure (train stations, 
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bridges, mills, factories, electrical works), and one defending the perimeter of the 
location, the Ortsgruppen were given the flexibility to organize their formations to best fit 
their unique situations.395 Formations protecting larger populations often developed a 
more sophisticated structure command structure and specialized units. By 1924, 
Ortsgruppe Hall, for example, created an ordinance service and a specialized platoon of 
storm troops. The locality was divided into six subsections (Abschnitt), each having its 
own Abschnittsführer, or section leader.396 
Ortsgruppen established in neighboring communities cooperatively created a 
Schutzgemeinschaft, or defense community. The leaders of the Ortsgruppen would elect a 
Schutzgemeinschaftführer and his deputy. Together, the established defense communities 
would form districts, or Bezirks. Defense community leaders would, in turn, elect district 
leaders, or Bezirksführer, his deputy, along with a finance committee that consisted of 
four to ten members.  
         
Figure 5. Organizational Levels of the Tyrolean Heimwatwehr 
 
The chairman of the committee, the deputy to the district leader, and the district leader, 
himself, formed the district’s executive committee. Collectively, the district executive 
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committees would be responsible for electing the provincial leadership, or Landesleitung. 
Shortly after the charter finalization of the charter, an additional hierarchical level was 
added beyond the district level, that of the Gau (section).Tyrol would be divided into four 
sections initially: Gau Reutte, Gau Mittel- und Westtirol, Gau Unterinntal, and Gau 
Osttirol.397 By 1928, however, this organizational structure changed slightly, collapsing 
Gau Reutte into Gau Mittel- und Westtirol and essentially making Innsbruck its own 
“Gau,” despite retaining the title of “Bezirk Innsbruck-Stadt.” Within these sections, the 
Bezirke (districts) were to parallel those of the political districts, signaling the changing 
disposition of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr from a paramilitary, civil defense organization to 
a paramilitary political pressure organization.398 
 
Figure 6. The Sections of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr in 1921 
(Modified with permission of the author, OpenStreetMap / Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY-SA-2.0) 
                                                 
397 TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), I/1, fol. 410, 202; Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler 
Heimatwehr,” 35-50; See Appendix A for further information regarding the structure and organizational 
hierarchy of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr. 




The city of Innsbruck, Tirol’s capital city, was, itself, a district (Bezirk) and had 
its own unique organizational structure. It was divided into six subsections, in which one 
might liken to the Schutzengemeinschaften. Each of the subsections was defended by 
groups that were organized into four platoons: a machine gun detachment, a combat 
detachment (Kampfabteilung) of former soldiers with military training, a watch 
detachment of typically older men not necessarily suited for fighting, and a school, or 
training, detachment (Schulabteilung) of teenagers who were trained to handle various 
types of arms and instilled with military discipline to ultimately take their place in 
combat detachments.399 
The Landesleitung consisted of, first and foremost, the Landesführer, or 
provincial leader, his deputy, the military leader, chair of the provincial finance 
committee (Landesschatzmeister), and the leader of the emergency technical assistance 
wing of the Heimatwehr, tasked with maintaining and restoring infrastructure in the event 
of a strike, civil war, or natural disaster.400 Naturally, the various levels of regional 
leadership served in supervisory roles beyond their duties as electors. The Landesleitung 
directed the provincial organization, oversaw the annual gather of the Ortsgruppen, and 
represented the Tiroler Heimatwehr outside of Tyrol. It made important high-level 
decisions, distributed funds to local formations, and maintained the ability to modify the 
organization, its structure, and hierarchy, as needed.  
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In guidelines laid out in 1928, Steidle defined specific duties and responsibilities 
of leaders at all levels of the movement. In general, however, all leaders were to work for 
the betterment of the movement through three areas of action: organizational work, 
promotional activities, and leadership activities. “Organizational work” involved the 
leader taking the necessary measures to ensure his group(s) was as effectively organized 
as possible as it related to deploying it in order to protect the community, district, or 
section under his charge. “Promotional activities” were undertakings meant to “deepen 
the Heimatwehr thought in the subordinate Heimatwehr organization(s) in his sphere of 
action,” with particular emphasis placed on youth groups. Lastly, “leadership activities,” 
as defined, speaks to the leader directing his organization(s) during the event of 
mobilization in defense of his sphere of action.401 
Most crucial in securing the success of these activities was the staff leader 
(Stabsleiter), who was the engine of the Heimatwehr, fulfilling a variety of functions 
corresponding with the general duties of promoting and organizing their respective 
Ortsgruppe, district, section, or provincial formations, depending on their place in the 
organization’s hierarchy. They were also responsible for establishing protocols for 
mobilization of their group. What all this meant in reality was that staff leaders were 
expected to function as administrators, promoters, event planners, liaisons between the 
group leader and the rank and file, the general public, and important groups in their 
respective community. The position of staff leader, thus, “requires a whole German man, 
as the glory and the shame falls on him with the success or failure of these united sons of 
the Heimatwehr when Tirol calls in its hour of need. So goes the staff leader, so goes the 
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county.”402 The centrality of staff leaders such as Herbert von Obwurzer, Waldemar Pabst, 
and Hanns Rauter, to the Heimwehr movement is no coincidence. 
 The organization of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, as was the case in all of the 
provinces, reflected the dual—military and civilian—character of its purpose as a 
paramilitary civil defense organization. It utilized the residual imperial infrastructure and 
assumed a similar character of the traditional Tyrolean militia system (Tyrolean 
Schützenwesen) and, as did its predecessors, it continued to work in closely with the 
Tyrolean state government. The Heimatwehr’s admission, finance, reception committees, 
as well as its executive committee (Landesvorstand) reflected the influence of state and 
local administrators and councilmen that filled the upper ranks of most of the provincial 
Heimwehren. Moreover, its “Emergency Technical Assistance” wing, whose primary task 
was to maintain the function of communication infrastructure in the event of labor 
strikers, was composed primarily of civilian members with expertise.403 From the 
standpoint of administration, the Tiroler Heimatwehr resembled a civil organization much 
more than a paramilitary one. As shall become apparent below, however, the military 
elements dominated the Heimatwehr from an organizational culture perspective.  
The statutes of the Tiroler Heimatwehr, as approved by the Tyrolean state 
government, were deliberately vague in an effort to allay IMCC scrutiny. As such, the 
statues emphasize the Tyrolean Heimatwehr as being a voluntary, “patriotic” self-defense 
organization that assisted the Tyrolean government and police as an auxiliary peace 
keeping force rather than disclosing itself as a collection of local, anti-Marxist 
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paramilitary bands. The charter of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr was virtually identical to that 
of the Salzburger Heimwehrdienst, among others, both of which were based on the 
statues of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, yet does not mention any affiliation with the 
Bavarian movement. The Heimatschutzverband Burgenland, formed in the Burgenland in 
1927, still maintained virtually identical by-laws, and reflected the formative influence of 
the Einwohnerwehr on the character and the direction of the Heimwehr movement.404 
A memorandum to the IMCC in Innsbruck offers further detail, explaining that 
the first task of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr is the maintenance of “peace and order,” 
supporting the police in emergency situations as a private security organization. It adds, 
the Heimatwehr existed as a counterweight to the Volkswehr, which the people in the 
Alpine lands mistrusted and viewed as an instrument of the Social Democrats, citing as 
evidence, the “Russian system of soldiers’ counsels.” Moreover, the formation of a 
workers’ guard (Arbeiterwehr) in Tyrol on May 1, 1920 was presented as a decisive 
moment prompting (or perhaps justifying) the creation of the Tiroler Heimatwehr.405 
 The Styrian Heimatschutz, for instance, was financed very early on by the Styrian 
provincial government, financial institutions, and industry and, thus, was not dependent 
upon Bavarian financial support and arms. As such, its organizational hierarchy was not 
obliged to follow that of Orgesch and, instead, mirrored that of the provincial 
government; the Landesleiter (provincial leader) functioning at the level of the 
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Landeshauptmann (provincial governor). Thus, the Styrian organization had an additional 
level of leadership in the Kreisleiter (circuit leader) beyond the Gauleiter, Bezirkleiter, 
and Ortsgruppenleiter that paralleled the hierarchy of its counterparts. Similar to their 
counterparts, however, the main combat units of the Heimatschutz—the Jägerbataillon 
(rifle battalions)—were well-equipped detachments consisting of its young, most 
physically fit and well-trained members. Other fighting units were organized with 
consideration for marital status, age, and employment and were generally anchored to 
their local areas. Likewise, Heimatschutz leaders were elected by their immediate 
subordinates and were expected to obey their elected leaders unbendingly.406 Generally 
speaking, most Heimwehren were ultimately organized around the administrative 
(“politische Bezirke”) structures of their respective province. As a result, they all 
maintained similar organizational structures, with minor variations. 
The 1929 charter of the Lower Austrian Heimatschutzverband, while maintaining 
a similar format, offered more specificity around the purpose of the organization and how 
it intended to achieve its aim. Though still a patriotic association whose aim was to 
protect citizens, their property and their work, the Heimatschutzverband also described 
itself as being dedicated to combatting “corruption in public life,” advocating for general 
well-being against individual interests, and the education of the youth on the “Austrian 
character in manners and customs,” among other fundamental objectives. Unlike earlier 
charters, there is less ambiguity around the “ways and means” of achieving its aims, 
which it defined as: the regular publication of patriotic writings, lectures, meetings, 
                                                 




rallies, and the holding of ski courses and shooting exercises and contests.407 The more 
specific discussion of objectives and means of pursuing those objectives reflected, by 
1929, the development of a stable organizational culture. That is, the objectives and 
activities described in the Lower Austrian by-laws were applicable to any of the 
provincial Heimwehr formations.  
Some historians of the Heimwehr movement have erroneously interpreted it as 
having been divided into two distinct sections: a political wing and a military wing.408 
The Heimwehr movement was a not a political party with a paramilitary force; it was a 
paramilitary movement that eventually created a political party (Heimatblock). The 
provincial Heimwehr organizations were comprised of local groups that, depending on 
their numbers and composition, were designated specific types of units, such as mobile 
storm troops, machine gun units, artillery units, local guard formations, or emergency 
technical assistances groups comprised members with infrastructure expertise, among 
other specific formations. More accurately, the “military leaders” of the Heimwehren 
were tasked specifically with overseeing the military preparedness, training, and physical 
fitness of the local Heimwehren (which is discussed in further depth in chapter three).  
 
The Heimwehr Movement by the Numbers 
The lack of membership rolls for the Tyrolean Heimatwehr makes attaining accurate 
membership numbers a challenge. References to member numbers in the historiography 
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are often gleaned from reports written by foreign observers whose sources close to the 
formations are unclear.409 For instance, Kondert, in his unpublished dissertation, relies 
heavily on correspondences from Sir Francis Oswald Lindley, British Ambassador to 
Austria in 1920-21, to the British Foreign Office for membership numbers. When 
compared with figures gathered from other archival sources, Lindley’s estimations appear 
to be consistently inflated and unreliable. For example, in a letter to Lord Curzon, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated December 17, 1920, Lindley estimates that 
the Tiroler Heimatwehr had as many as 25,000 members the time. Several weeks later, 
that estimation had fallen to 20,000 members, which is corresponds to figures found in 
Rudolf Kanzler’s memoir and from the Heimwehr propaganda publication, Heimatschutz 
in Österreich.410 Lindley’s estimate for the Salzburger Heimwehr in December of 1920 
was that it had 15,000 members.411 This figure is far more than approximations seven 
months earlier of no more than 2,000 members, according to a report based on Kanzler’s 
conference with the leaders of the Salzburger Heimwehr.412 As it were, Lindley’s figures 
cannot be utilized for analyzing approximate membership numbers. 
                                                 
409 See, for example, Kondert, “Rise and Early History,” 13, footnote, 31;  
410 Lindley to Curzon, Vienna, December 17, 1920, File 11591/3, No. C14276, cited in Kondert, 
“Rise and Early History,” 13. See also Heimatschutz in Österreich (Wien, 1934), 239; Rudolf Kanzler, 
Bayerns Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus: Geschichte bayrischen Einwohnerwehr (München: Parcus, 
1931), 205; and Lindley to Curzon, Vienna, January 11, 1921 Public Record Office (London), Foreign 
Office, 404/3, 13; all are cited by Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 23; Lauridsen, Nazism 
and the Radical Right, 104-5. 
411 Kondert, “Rise and Early History,” 21. 
412 “Bericht über die Vertrauensmännerversammlung am 7 März 1920 im Mödelhammerbräu zu 
Salzburg”: Bundesarchiv Koblenz NS 26, vorl.649, cited in Carsten, Fascist Movements, 46. Carsten notes 
that Kanzler had met with Salzburg leaders a month earlier and their membership was at 1,200. See also 




At the same time, Lauridsen finds the Heimwehren figures of the movement’s 
strength in its early years to be questionable, contending that they could, likewise, be 
inflated but for the purpose of gaining foreign financial support.413 Considering the 
Heimwehren, by 1920-21, had the active support from the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr as 
well as from the Hungarian government, there was little reason to exaggerate their 
numbers.414 Nevertheless, the decentralized nature of the movement makes the figures of 
questionable and little more than rough estimations. Moreover, they are inconsistent in 
terms of what point in time they were made. In short, they simply reflect a snapshot of 
the given provincial formation at the given time and must be treated with caution. Too, it 
is worth mentioning that the fact that high membership numbers in one province and low 
in another does not necessarily mean that support for the Heimwehr movement was 
stronger in that province than in the other, as it might simply indicate that the population 
was greater and participation in the movement reflects that variance. As such, these 
figures should be used to compliment qualitative data and should not be taken at face 
value on their own, for all of the reasons given.  
What the existing membership estimates indicate, however, is a pattern of 
expansion and contraction over the course of the movement’s existence and generally 
correspond to important shifts in Austria’s political landscape. As Table 3 (below) 
indicates, three events that elicited the attention of contemporary observers to the 
movement’s membership figures, are as follows: the founding of the provincial 
organizations in 1920-1921, the “Events of July 1927,” and in 1933, when Chancellor 
                                                 
413 Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right, 106. 
414 See chapter five for more detailed treatment of these relationships. 
 
176 
Engelbert Dollfuß seized an improbable opportunity to dissolve parliament and govern by 
emergency decree. In the case of the latter two events, the attention given to the 
movement’s membership reflected marked increases that amplified the visibility of the 
Heimwehr movement as a powerful instrument of the Christian Social-led federal 
government. 
 With the continued growth of the Heimwehr movement, total estimates have 
varied wildly, topping out anywhere from 200 to 800,000.415 Lauridsen, who as most 
recently examined this, places the height of the Heimwehr movement closer to the lower 
end of those figures, viewing the 227,401 votes the Heimatblock received in the 1930 
federal elections as corroborating evidence.416 While it does offer some indication of 
membership numbers, it is likely on the low side for reasons outlined in chapter four. One 
might reasonable surmise that membership figures at its peak lay in somewhere in the 















                                                 
415 See Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right in Austria, 140, footnote 48. 





Table 1. Membership Estimates of the Heimwehr Movement, 1920-1936417 
 
                                                 
417 The for these figures are largely derived primary source material cited in Carsten, Fascist 
Movements, 46, 48-9, 52, 114, 128, 131, 218; Wiltschegg, Die Heimwehr, 127-8, 136, 148, 154, 160-1, 
164-5; Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 23, 60, 319, n.29; and Pauley, Hahnenschwanz 
und Hackenkreuz, 61; Rebtisch, Tirol—Land in Waffen, 117; Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right, 
104-8, 138-146. Where figures conflict, their average was used. 


















1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
FKV 20,00
Vor. HW 3,3502,200 2,000 4,0003,000
Vienna HW 8,000 3,200 20,00
U.A. HW 23,00 20,0020,0030,00 15,00 10,00
Tir. HW 7,20012,0012,03 3,00010,0015,00
Sty. HW 28,50 120,0 18,00
SSV Vienna 33,00
Salz. HW 2,0008,000 7,200 10,00 5,000
L.A. HW 12,60 32,00150,052,00 12,00 31,00
Car. HW 9,000 24,46 6,000
Burg. HW 10,00 1,000
FKV Vor. HW Vienna HW U.A. HW Tir. HW Sty. HW
SSV Vienna Salz. HW L.A. HW Car. HW Burg. HW
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The Socioeconomic Makeup of the Heimwehr Movement 
Demographic statistics for the First Republic are limited due in large part to its 
chaotic birth in the aftermath of the First World War and its perpetual lack of funds to 
dedicate to a comprehensive socioeconomic study of its population. Consequently, 
attaining any sort of empirically dependable information on the composition of the rank 
and file of the Heimwehren is a difficult task, especially given the decentralized nature of 
the movement and the inconsistent availability of membership rolls. As such, it is not 
surprising that the socioeconomic composition of the Heimwehr movement has been a 
topic of much historiographic confusion. 
Franziska Schneeberger argues, quite effectively, that generalizations of the 
Heimwehr movement being a peasant-oriented is not accurate. This description, she 
contends, can be attributed to several factors. Schneeberger dedicates the first chapter of 
her dissertation to unpacking, is the different linguistic interpretations of the word 
“peasantry” (Bauernschaft). That is, the term in German is more ambiguous and 
applicable to a variety of different, but related professions. In English, however, the word 
“peasantry” means “farmers.”418 As Schneeberger explains, more precise terms are 
needed to define the necessary delineations between “rural,” “agrarian,” and “peasant.” 
She defines “rural” as the including the entire population of those not living in urban 
centers; the “agrarian” population, by contrast, should consist of those livelihoods are 
connected to the land, but not land-owning farmers, which belong in their own category, 
                                                 




represented in the term “peasant.”419 This differentiation, consequently, creates the 
potential for equally variable worldviews among the rural population.  
Schneeberger pinpoints the origins of this myth to a New York Times report 
written by American journalist, Clair Price, who estimated the composition of the 
Heimwehr movement as being 70 percent farmers, 20 percent members of the “old upper 
classes of the empire,” and 10 percent being workers.420 The authors of early works in the 
historiography of the Heimwehr movement, draw heavily from this assessment and, 
consequently, skew historical interpretations of the Heimwehren as being a largely 
agrarian, Catholic, militant movement. The broader, politically-oriented research aims of 
scholarship and the scarcity of reliable socioeconomic information about Heimwehren 
members, helped propagate this misconception throughout the historiography.421 Even as 
recent as 2008, studies of the Heimwehr movement continue draw from this inaccurate 
portrait.422 
Indeed, much of the historiography speaks to the socioeconomic consistency of 
the Heimwehren in very generalized terms, borrowing the same inaccurate portrait from 
existing works. Edmondson draws on recollections of Guido Zernatto, who described the 
“active core” of the Heimwehr movement as being: 
                                                 
419 Schneeberger, “Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr,” 14. Unfortunately, Schneeberger does not define 
what she considers “urban,” which, for Austria, is essential in order to clearly delineate its difference from 
“rural,” as most of Austria’s cities are relatively small by comparison to the United States. At what point a 
space considered urban? What is the threshold of population density that constitutes an urban space as 
opposed to a “rural” one?  
420 Schneeberger, “Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr,” 52-3; Clair Price, “Austria’s Hands Tied by 
Two Armed Parties,” New York Times, December 2, 1928, 4. 
421 See, for example, Pauley, Hahnenschwanz und Hackenkreuz, 60; Carsten, Fascist Movements, 
120; Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 59. 




degraded and maligned professional officers and aristocrats, left with a small 
pension or luckily—if they but realized it—most of their land; reserve officers 
who were not content to become merely school teachers or white-collar workers; 
and disillusioned youth who wondered at the military exploits of their bitter elders 
and who saw no future in a society that tolerated economic depression and 
unheroic politic.423 
 
Scholars who do attempt to offer more detailed information on the subject tend to 
contradict themselves. For example, Carsten contends that “Apart from the peasantry 
which provided the bulk of the local Heimwehr members, two social groups were 
particularly prominent, students and officers.”424 He adds that after July 1927, the 
Heimwehren received a “mass influx” of new members from a variety of socioeconomic 
backgrounds. Carsten further muddies the picture, stating that, based on a detailed police 
report from August 31, 1929, most members of the Heimwehren were “manual workers,” 
or “unemployed” men, between 25 and 40 years of age. The balance of the membership 
consisted of individuals from “all social groups, business circles, officials, employees of 
the state and of the municipalities, many of whom had joined recently.” He follows this 
up, stating that “there is no doubt that the Heimwehren were above all a rural 
movement,” whose leaders were drawn from the old aristocracy, educated upper and 
middle class professionals, and former military officers.425  
To Schneeberger’s point, it is unclear, how Carsten interprets “rural.” 
Schneeberger indicates, however, that based on articles from the contemporary press, the 
success of the Heimwehren in smashing the Social Democratic strikes in July 1927 
attracted large numbers of farmers and agricultural laborers, eventually comprising 
                                                 
423 Guido Zernatto, Der Wahrheit über Oesterreich (New York: Longmans, 1938), 71-3 cited in 
Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 38. 
424 Carsten, Fascist Movements, 44-5. 
425 Carsten, Fascist Movements, 113, 120. 
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substantial portions of several provincial formations, particularly the Lower Austrian, 
Styrian, and Tyrolean organizations. In the case of the Bauernbund (Peasant’s League) of 
Lower Austria, the association committed the entirety of its 100,000-members to the 
establishment of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr in 1929.426 This seems to contradict 
Carsten’s assertion that this influx was highly variable, illustrating the contradictory 
nature of the historiographic discussion of the Heimwehr movement’s socioeconomic 
composition. 
Given the local and regional orientations of the Heimwehren movement, each 
provincial formation had its own unique socioeconomic composition, making it difficult 
to apply generalizations. For provinces such as Styria, for example, where industry was 
more prominent than in neighboring provinces, there was a greater concentration of 
workers in its ranks. Similarly, the Lower Austrian Heimwehr would have a larger 
concentration of farmers and agricultural laborers, as its fertile plains along the Danube 
was Austria’s ‘bread basket.’427 According to Verena Lösch’s breakout of the Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr, replicated below, it attracted a quite diverse membership:428 
Table 2. Membership Breakout of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr 
35.2%  Public Officials: State Representatives, Mayors (Bürgermeister), Policemen 
officials, Government bureaucrats/administrators, etc. 
55%  Businessmen: commercial and industrial (frequently lower level functionaries 
of companies), shopkeepers, innkeepers, master craftsmen, etc. 
35% Former k.u.k. Army officers 
37% White Collar Professionals/Academics: Doctors, Lawyers, Engineers, 
Professors, Teachers, etc. 
                                                 
426 Schneeberger, “Sozialstuktur der Heimwehr,” 64. 
427 Schneeberger, “Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr,” 64. According to Schneeberger, farmers and 
agricultural laborers made up 80 percent of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr. 
428 Verena Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr von ihren Anfängen bis zum 
Korneuburger Eid (1920 - 1930)” (PhD diss., University of Innsbruck, 1986), 146-7. 
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14% Farmers/Agricultural Laborers 
5% Clergy and/or church functionaries 
5% Hausbesitzer or Landlords/Landowners 
4% Declassed Aristocrats 
3% Industrial Workers 
 
There is, however, cross-section of the Tyrolean population that played an important role 
in the Tyrolean Heimatwehr that is absent from this breakout. As Carsten notes, the 
Heimwehr movement “possessed a strong following…principally among students and 
peasants,” the former being absent in Lösch’s statistics. Students—some young war 
veterans and others, who were too young at the time, but who idealized the “front 
fighter”—played an important role, for example, in the Styrian Heimatschutz.429 In the 
case of the Frontkämpferverein (Front Fighters Association), students eventually became 
more prevalent in its ranks than actual war veterans.430 “In the Tyrol too, the mobile 
Heimwehr units were formed by the student companies of Innsbruck University,” Carsten 
explains.431 As chapter three will reveal in further detail, the Tyrolean Heimatwehr 
exercised substantial time, money, and effort into “winning” the Tyrolean youth. While 
offering a useful snapshot of the various socioeconomic groups involved in the Heimwehr 
movement, the absence of such a core social group calls into question the reliability of 
these figures. 
Based on archival records, such as organizational hierarchies and memorandums 
communicating the results of local and district leadership elections, limited but useful 
                                                 
429 Pauley, Hahnenschwanz und Hakenkreuz, 60. 
430 Gulick, Austria, 718. 
431 Carsten, Fascist Movements, 113, 45. 
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indicators can be compiled that indicate the composition of the leadership of the Tyrolean 
movement. For the sake of consistency, the same groupings specified in Lösch’s breakout 
will be maintained. Table 5, below, provides a statistical snapshot of the information 
gathered from these records.432 
Table 3. Breakout of Tyrolean Heimatwehr Leadership 
53% Occupation not given 
13% 
Public Officials: State Representatives, Mayors (Bürgermeister), 
Policemen officials, Government bureaucrats/administrators, etc. 
9% 
Businessmen: Bank Officers, Shopkeepers, Innkeepers, 
Attorneys, craftsmen (Blacksmiths, Carpenters, Tinsmiths, 
Saddlers, etc.) 
7% Former k.u.k. Army officers 
7% 
White Collar Professionals/Academics: Doctors, Lawyers, 
Engineers, Professors, Teachers, etc. 
5% Land/Property Owners 
 
Unfortunately, over half of the cases where individuals were identified as filling 
leadership positions, their civilian occupations were not given. Excluding instances where 
no occupational information could be derived and focusing on the known quantities, the 
figures align more favorably with existing evaluations of the composition of Heimwehren 
leadership across Austria: 
Table 4. Breakout of Tyrolean Heimatwehr Leadership excl. Unknown Occupations 
28% 
Public Officials: State Representatives, Mayors (Bürgermeister), 
Policemen officials, Government bureaucrats/administrators, etc. 
19% 
Businessmen: Bank Officers, Shopkeepers, Innkeepers, 
Attorneys, craftsmen (Blacksmiths, Carpenters, Tinsmiths, 
Saddlers, etc.) 
15% Former k.u.k. Army officers 
15% 
                                                 
432 The percentages illustrated in the table are based on a sample size of 165 Tiroler Heimatwehr 
leader names and, where indicated, their civilian occupations. The rank of the leaders varied from the 
Landesführer to Ortsführern within a ten-year span (1920-1929), though most of the information was 
extrapolated from documents created in the years 1921 or 1928. 
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White Collar Professionals/Academics: Doctors, Lawyers, 
Engineers, Professors, Teachers, etc. 
11% Land/Property Owners 
 
There are several socioeconomic groupings seemingly absent from the leadership 
breakout that were present in the general composition of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr: 
church functionaries, farmers and agricultural laborers, workers, and aristocrats. 
According to Lösch, her statistics do not accurately reflect the influence of farmers and 
agricultural laborers in the Tyrolean organization, as in smaller rural communities, 
farmers often served as Bürgermeister (mayor) or in other public office.433 Moreover, 
farmers could also constitute landowners, cultivating their own land (as was most often 
the case in the Tyrol). Similarly, members of the declassed aristocracy also owned estates 
and were considered landowners as well. Furthermore, they often served as elected 
officials at local and state levels. Clergy and church functionaries as “members” of the 
Heimwehr movement, must be understood as functioning in the capacity of officiating 
ceremonies, advocating for the movement, and other public support roles. Simply put, 
there is a good deal of potential overlap in these figures, meaning that they cannot be 
interpreted rigidly, but offer concrete suggestions of the social groups leading the 
Tyrolean movement. The remaining groups (aside from farmers and aristocrats) not 
present in these leadership statistics—agricultural laborers, workers, and students—
represented the core of the “rank and file” of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr.  
An examination of a different provincial organization would likely yield varying 
percentages, but the socioeconomic groups and their positions would have remained 
                                                 
433 Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 146-7. 
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reasonably consistent based on qualitative information gleaned from existing studies of 
the various provincial Heimwehr movements. Lauridsen offers an occupational breakout 
of the leadership of the Carinthian Heimatschutz in the years 1928 and 1933:434 
 
Table 5. Snapshots of Carinthian Heimatschutz Leadership 
 1928 1933 
Former Army Officers 7 3 
Aristocrats/Land Owners 0 3 
White Collar Employees 0 4 
Merchants 0 2 
Liberal Professionals 9 0 
Industrialists 0 2 
Unknown 2 1 
Total 18 15 
 
While it is unclear as to what exact professions these groupings include or the extent, if 
any, overlap existed in any of these categories that might skew its results, it indicates a 
clear turnover in, and diversification of, the organization’s leadership over the course of 
five years. Much of this variation was a product of the movement’s expansion, which 
peaked in 1929. 
 What conclusions can be drawn from these figures? Early generalizations that the 
Heimwehren maintained a largely peasant rank and file are over-simplifications that do 
not account for the wide range of rural and agricultural occupations and socioeconomic 
conditions. It was not until the Heimwehr’s coalition with the Christian Social 
Bauernbund in 1929, that it could be confirmed that the movement’s ranks swelled with 
farmers and agricultural laborers. Determining the composition of the rank and file is 
more difficult to prove with empirical data, at least for the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, due to 
                                                 
434 Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right, 226, footnote 107. 
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the absence of membership rolls. There is evidence, however, that indicates that this body 
was composed of the petit bourgeoisie, agricultural laborers, and students. The efforts the 
movement put into establishing independent workers’ unions reflected, at least in part, the 
fact that a sizable portion of its rank and file were unemployed. As chapter four will 
explain in further detail, the Heimwehr leaders’ connections to industrialists was a 
tangible benefit for this segment of its members. Lastly, there was a sizable contingent of 
university students—the core of its storm troop unit—involved in the Heimwehr 
movement, which, as Lösch’s assessment indicates, is not consistently represented. 
If the figures of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr are any indication of the composition of 
the wider movement’s leadership, it was local officials who were most frequently 
founding and leading Heimwehr groups, an indication that the movement was indeed an 
instrument of entrenched political interests. When considered alongside the fact that the 
next largest groups were firmly bourgeois and petit bourgeois elements, with the influx of 
the aristocrats into leading positions in the late 1920s, the composition of the Heimwehr 
movement’s leadership reiterates the fact that it defended socioeconomic interests of the 
middle class and wealthy elites. As chapter two explained, paramilitary organizations like 
the Heimwehren offered former k.u.k. army officers an opportunity to continue working 
in that capacity, often as chiefs of staff who received modest stipends, or as military 
leaders responsible for the training and operational leadership of Heimwehr units.  
 
The Heimwehr as a Paramilitary Movement 
The military character of the Heimwehr movement was its most unmistakable 
attribute. They wore military-style uniforms that varied from one province to another and 
 
187 
from one point in time to another. Most commonly associated with the Heimwehren is the 
wind jackets, which ranged in shades of green; the most recognizable one, perhaps, being 
the stone-green of the Styrian Heimatschutz. The wind jacket was commonly worn with 
trousers and shoes of all variations, and a leather waist belt with a shoulder strap. More 
varied was the headgear the formations donned. Most synonymous with the Heimwehr 
movement was the jägerhut (hunting cap), which varied in color depending on the 
province. For example, the Styrian, Lower Austrian, Viennese, and Burgenland 
formations wore stone-green hunting caps with dark green cords and a game cock feather 
on the side, while the Carinthian Heimatschutz wore a brown hunting cap and the Upper 
Austrians, a dark green cap. At other times, various formations wore the M1917 steel 
helmets.435 In the 1930s, the old imperial style field cap with a cock feather, like those 
worn by the Tyrolean mountain troops (Landesschützen) in World War I, became more 
common, particularly amongst the Schützenkorps (Defense Corps) formations established 
by Vienna Heimwehr leader, Emil Fey.436 
 Wiltschegg argues that the various styles of uniform—among others—are 
indicative of the movement’s provincial character and its general lack of unifying 
ideology. To be sure, the regionalism of the Heimwehr movement was a quite strong and 
stifled its capacity to affect the kind of change its leadership desired. At the same time, 
however, there is no evidence to indicate that variation of uniform styles was a reliable 
indicator of regionalism or ideological division. If anything, it is an indication of the 
                                                 
435 Wiltschegg, Die Heimwehr, 250-1. 
436 Even within provincial organizations some units wore different color or styled-uniforms. The 
St. George company, comprised of older Pfadfinder (scout) students wore olive drab wind jackets and gray 
ski caps. See TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), IV/1, fol.777, 292. 
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piecemeal manner in which the various Heimwehren were forced to procure clothing and 
equipment due to the ebb and flow of funds; this has more to do with the absence of 
membership dues and self-sufficiency than it does with underlying divisions. What is 
more, when placed in the broader context of the Austro-Hungarian army, variations in 
uniform reflect something of a continuity of practices not uncommon in the Habsburg 
army (or many other European armies, for that matter). Austro-Hungarian army units 
frequently wore differing facing, patch, and button colors on their uniforms.437 Some 
units wore differing styles of puttees, different shades of gray—the Common Army 
transitioned from pike gray to field gray uniforms in 1916. Bosnian units wore different 
caps from the Polish Legion, whose caps differed from the standard field cap; for that 
matter, the Polish Legion wore a different style of uniform all together.438 
 
Figure 7. The Styrian Heimatschutz at Wiener Neustadt, October 7, 1928 
(Bundesarchiv, Bild 102-00840 / Georg Pahl / CC-BY-SA 3.0) 
                                                 
437 See James Lucas, Fighting Troops of the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1868-1914 (Kent, UK: 
Spellmount, 1987). 




As previous explained, provincial Heimwehr organizations were typically 
organized in conjunction with official administrative boundaries. By the end of 1924, 
mobilization plans were established that connected various levels of provincial 
administration to roughly corresponding military unit in terms of size and numbers.439 
This structure enabled mutually beneficial arrangements between local groups 
(Ortsgruppen) and local officials, who, in many cases, leading figures in those 
Ortsgruppen. These local formations offered their communities a convenient source of 
auxiliary law enforcement. Given the severe restrictions placed on the Austrian military 
by the Entente in the Treaty of St. Germain, the Heimwehren was also considered, in 
conservative circles, a viable auxiliary defense force. These designs, in fact, align quite 
well with the very definition of “paramilitary,” which is “of, relating to, being, or 
characteristic of a force formed on a military pattern especially as a potential auxiliary 
military force.”440 
Table 6. The Military Organization of the Heimwehr Movement 
 
Administrative Level           English Translation   Military Unit Size 
Kreis Circuit Brigade 
Gau District Regiment 
Bezirk Precinct Battalion 
Ortsgruppen Municipal Company* 
* Companies were to be comprised of four platoons of 20 each 
According to Edmondson, the training regimen of the Heimwehren “consisted 
generally of target practices, lectures and map problems, and during the summer minor 
                                                 
439 Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 37-8. According to Edmondson, this plan 
was the work of Steidle’s Chief of Staff, Waldemar Pabst, as the Seipel and Steidle attempted to negotiate 
the creation of a national confederation. 





terrain exercises and practiced marches.”441 The training program established in October 
1928 was much more in-depth, however, laying out seven specific areas of training for 
infantry and machine gun battalions: shooting and weapons systems, exercise regulations, 
field service, service regulations, pioneer service, terrain, and military organization.442 
The aim of the shooting and weapons systems training constituted a substantial part of the 
Tyrolean Heimatwehr’s program. For the Innsbruck Heimatwehr formations, for 
example, regularly scheduled drills took place at the Berg Isel shooting range in the 
summer and autumn under the supervision of the shooting leader and in accordance with 
shooting range rules (Schießstandordnung). Ironically, though members did not have to 
pay dues, they did have to pay for the ammunition they used while participating in 
shooting drills; ten groschen per shot.443 Exercise regulations covered, among other 
things, marching, facings, falling into formation, troop movements, attack formations, 
close-quarter and hand-to-hand combat, as well as conducting attacks from up to 400 
paces away. The field service training focused on field operations, with sections on 
proper transmission of commands, announcements, and messages, transporting troops, 
marches, billeting, securing an area, and sentry duty. The training area of service 
regulations included the duties and behavior of a soldiers in various circumstances 
(interfacing with the general public, before the enemy, while on sentry duty, and so forth), 
personal hygiene and appearance, official channels, inspection service, escorting and 
                                                 
441 Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 61. 
442 TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), VII/1, fol. 2090, 335-342. The documents refer to section 
numbers, which likely correspond to a military service handbook, but the name of specific handbook is not 
given.  
443 TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), V/1, fol.829, 532-546. Ten groschen would be the 
equivalent to ten cents in U.S. currency.  
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guarding prisoners, relieving posts, and assisting the public. Pioneer training constituted 
learning to use infantry equipment such as pickaxes and field shovels to create 
encampments, dig latrines, cooking trenches, and so forth. It also sought to teach the 
basics of road and bridge building, using explosives, constructing obstacles, and dugouts 
for protection against artillery fire. The section on terrain taught Heimwehr troops to use 
maps, compasses, how to gauge time based on the position of the sun, functioning in 
mountainous terrain, determining heights, reading layer lines in the rocks, and reading 
various types of topographical maps. The last area, military organization, was simply 
learning military ranks, insignias, and badges of the Bundesheer as well as its 
organization and unit hierarchy. 
Apart from their efforts to understand the size of the Heimwehr movement, 
historians have also sought to establish the military strength and capability of the 
Heimwehr movement by examining the number and size of mobile, combat troops in 
each of the provincial formations. Their estimations of the military strength of the 
Heimwehren have differ quite substantially. A 1925 American intelligence report 
indicated that the Heimwehr movement could muster 31 brigades, 111 regiments, 405 
battalions, and 1,409 companies, but does not offer any figures regarding troop strength 
for any of these units. Pabst’s plan of each company having four platoons of 20 men 
each, would place the “actual strength,” based on the number of units given, 112,270 
troops. Edmondson finds this estimation far too high for 1925, when the movement 
experienced a marked decline in interest and membership numbers.444 Yet a June 1928 
report filed by American military attaché, Major W.W. Hicks—submitted within the 
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timeframe in which the Heimwehr movement grew significantly—contends that the 
Heimwehren had 52,000 organized and trained men, of which only 22,000 were readily 
deployable outside of their home communities. Next to the figure Steidle claimed the 
Heimwehr possessed in a letter to the Hungarian Premier, Count István Bethlen, this 
number seems quite conservative.445 At the time of Hicks’ account the Heimwehr 
movement was on the upswing due to the prestige it won in crushing the Social 
Democratic riots and general strike that occurred in July 1927. Moderate estimates 
indicate that the Heimwehr movement grew to 300-400,000 members, total, at its peak in 
1929.446 As such, one must reasonably assume that the military strength of the 
Heimwehren would have correspondingly grown. Wiltschegg roughly estimates the 
military strength of the Heimwehr movement as follows: 
Table 7. Military Strength of the Heimwehr Movement, 1930-1935447 
November 1930 146,000 
December 1931 44,000 
September 1932 46,000 
January 1933 35,000 
February 1934 32,100 
1935 121,880 
 
The sharp drop in troop strength corresponds with the increasing traction gained 
by the Nazi Party and its Sturmabteilung (SA). Despite the sharp dip in membership 
numbers after 1930, the organization arguably got leaner in terms of its military capacity. 
As Wiltschegg notes, Starhemberg, elected as new federal leader in 1930, established a 
                                                 
445 Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 61. Steidle claimed that the Heimwehren had 
“150,000 men organized in the ranks if the Heimwehr, who are prepared to risk [everything] for the victory 
of their Weltanschauung.” 
446 Wiltschegg, Die Heimwehr, 292. 




federal “Wehramt” (defense office) to improve efficiency by streamlining communication 
between the Bundesführung to the leaders of the various specialized areas (technical 
emergency assistance, medical, railway, and air corps) of the provincial Heimwehren.448 
It is unclear, however, how much more effective the Wehramt was in practice. 
Beyond the federal government’s distribution of arms to local communities for 
self-defense in November 1918, which most local militia groups kept and used to form 
the basis of the Heimwehr movement, provincial organizations also robbed weapons 
depots that were to be turned over to the IMCC. In Styria, for example, Governor Anton 
Rintelen would later recall that 17,000 rifles and rifle cartridges, 286 machine guns, 12 
artillery pieces, and even airplanes were stolen from local army stores.449 The reported 
theft of weaponry by the Heimwehren continued to be a trend throughout its existence. 
As future Bundesführer, Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg, later admitted, he played a part in 
the largest theft of artillery—some 22 mountain howitzers—from a store in Tyrol in 
January 1921.450 In a December 16, 1929 article covering the Nationalrat budget debates, 
Social Democrat, Dr. Julius Deutsch, accused the Tiroler Heimatwehr of “stealing” six 
mountain guns from a workshop of an army artillery brigade stationed in Innsbruck.451 
Given the close cooperation between the Heimwehren, local, provincial, federal 
governments, and provincial Bundesheer headquarters, one might reasonably view the 
“theft” of equipment was much more likely to be something of an arranged “transfer,” 
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given the fact that no investigative efforts of consequence ever materialized, outside of 
that conducted by the Social Democrats. 
As it were, Hicks’ 1928 report estimated the Heimwehren had ready access to 
some 10,000 German Mausers and another 30,000 Austrian Mannlicher rifles with 
sufficient ammunition. Edmondson adds that thousands of men also maintained 
possession of their rifles. Furthermore, Hicks projected that the Heimwehren also had in 
its possession 15 howitzers and 500 rounds of ammunition per gun, a surplus of hand 
grenades, gas bombs, and several armored cars.452 Here too, Hicks’ report does not 
reconcile with other sources. Starhemberg’s admission—which is also corroborated by 
other sources—that he and his men stole 22 mountain howitzers in a single theft, by 
itself, exceeds the total of 15 Hicks estimates all the Heimwehren to have possessed in 
June 1928.453 Hicks’ figures here appear dubious. Chapters five and six detail the arms, 
ammunition, and equipment the Heimwehren received from foreign suppliers—
principally Bavaria and Italy. 
The Hicks report also indicated that, despite having no formal connections with 
the Bundesheer (Federal Army), in several provinces Heimwehr groups participated in 
military exercises with Bundesheer units.454 Long-serving Minister of Defense (1921-
1933), Carl Vaugoin, maintained a close relationship with the Heimwehr leadership 
throughout his tenure and actively facilitated cooperation between the Bundesheer and 
the Heimwehren.455 The Heimwehren in Tyrol, Carinthia, and Styria, most frequently 
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engaged in training maneuvers with the local Bundesheer formations. Schutzbund leader, 
Dr. Julius Deutsch, naturally took issue with Heimwehr leaders observing Bundesheer 
maneuvers and vice-versa. Chancellor Seipel’s response to his complaint was to point out 
that it was not uncommon for “functionaries who were closest to the majority parties, 
such as deputies, federal committees, or provincial officials [to] have participated in such 
exercises as honored guests.”456 In other words, Seipel justified the presence of Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr leaders at Bundesheer maneuvers as having to do with the fact that many 
were elected officials observing as guests.  
The Heimatwehr also participated in exercises with the Tyrolean state police and 
gendarmerie, which Deutsch pointed out, once more, was also a “transgression of the 
law.”457 With a Heimatwehr-friendly chancellor and governor, Deutsch, his Schutzbund, 
and the Social Democratic Party had little recourse against the favor given the 
Heimwehren but to stage their own field exercises and openly, and often sarcastically, 
point out such instances in the numerous party-friendly newspapers.458 “The chancellor, 
of course, cannot search the Heimwehr for weapons,” juxtaposing the open Heimatwehr 
machine gun and rifle drills to the frequent weapons searches of workers’ tenements and 
union halls.459 
Beyond training exercises, the Heimwehren in Tyrol and Salzburg also 
collaborated with the Bundesheer to seal off Austria’s borders to prevent the infiltration 
of Nazi terror units from entering the country in 1933. In the brief conflagration in 
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February 1934, as well as in the days after the July 1934 assassination of Chancellor 
Dollfuss, Heimwehr men performed valuable duties. The fact that the Heimwehr 
movement was widespread in the provinces gave authorities the ability to react quickly to 
changing situations. Moreover, Heimwehr troops possessed a more intimate knowledge 
of the surroundings than did federal troop deployed from elsewhere. Heimwehr units 
bolstered gendarmerie posts, assisted in weapons searches, guarded bridges, railways, 
provided traffic control, prisoner escorts, and were able to take over security 
responsibilities after the withdrawal of federal troops. In this way, the Heimwehren 
served as effective force multiplier for a severely restricted federal army.460 
At the same time, Heimwehr military leaders were working to establish war plans. 
On February 23, 1928, the federal military leadership under Kletus von Pichler, met to 
discuss potential fighting scenarios based loosely around the events of July 1927. The 
primary scene consisted of a “red coup attempt” in Vienna, which was setup to kick off 
the following day (February 29). The plan called for a coordinated effort between the 
police, federal troops and the Heimwehren to “besiege” Vienna, surrounding the city and 
cutting off the roads and bridges into and out of the capital. The areas south and east of 
Vienna—particularly the Social Democratic strongholds of Wiener Neustadt and St. 
Pölten—were also emphasized in their planning. Any Red forces materializing from these 
areas would be neutralized by Styrian formations mobilized just to their southeast.461  
With the discussion of this war scenario were also estimations of how quickly and 
the military capability of formations in and around the areas surrounding Vienna. Major 
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Hans von Prankh projected that 2,000 trained troops from Judenburg (Upper Styria) 
could be mobilized and deployed to Leoben (Upper Styria) by the evening of March 2. 
Generalmajor Gottwald estimated a force of 1,500 men could be mobilized for operations 
by March 2—two battalions from Hartberg (Upper Styria) and one from Weiz (Upper 
Styria), while Major Arthur Karg von Bebenburg predicted that 1,500 men from 
Wolkersdorf (Lower Austria) could be mobilized by March 2, but lacked the necessary 
weaponry to be deployable. The small figures in these estimations most likely refer to 
mobile shock troops and would seem to favor the numbers presented in the Hicks report 
rather than those communicated by Steidle to Bethelen.462 Steidle’s estimate was likely in 
reference to the movement’s active membership in general and not its better-trained, 
mobile combat units. 
 As it were, the scenario Pichler and Prankh debated for nearly an hour over the 
potential for a “roten Durchbruch” (red breakthrough) in the Mürztal (Styria). Pichler was 
adamant that the Styrian Heimatschutz needed a single military command to avoid 
potentially being defeated if acting individually. Prankh’s obstinacy enraged Pichler who 
resigned his post as federal military leader of the Heimwehr out of sheer frustration.463 
Since the Heimwehren were never engaged in any meaningful combat scenarios, 
save for the several thousand men in the Wiener Heimwehr who saw action—and by all 
accounts represented themselves well—in the fighting in February 1934, it is difficult to 
speak to their fighting capacity with any accuracy. On one hand, as Wiltschegg points 
out, the movement relied entirely on volunteers, which meant that it’s military 
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effectiveness depended entirely upon their level of dedication to the movement, training, 
and discipline. Moreover, their members were working professionals and could train only 
in the evenings or on the weekends, thereby limiting their potential preparedness. 
Furthermore, he argues, the localized basis of the movement made it difficult for those 
Ortsgruppen to combine with any sort of unified outlook or cohesion. As such, the 
movement resembled more a “uniformed club.”464  
Furthermore, contemporary sources indicate that alcohol consumption was 
synonymous with Heimwehr men. For instance, Heimwehr exercises appear to have been 
frequently capped off with prolific beer drinking sessions.465 The Linz Social Democratic 
newspaper, Tagblatt, frequently made light of their reputation as heavy drinkers, 
sarcastically calling the “beer table” the “war front” of Heimwehren and complaining of 
the fanaticism Heimwehr leaders preached from their “beer table pulpit” (Biertisch-
Kanzel).466 In an October 1929 instance, Steidle received a memo regarding two drunk 
Heimwehr men present at a Ottakring (Vienna) Christian Social Union meeting. After 
one’s diatribe against Leopold Kunschak, head of the Christian Social Worker’s Union 
the other “declared the people’s representatives as inferior.” These men could “not be the 
ideal of a Heimwehr man,” the memo queried.467 
Though Wiltschegg makes several valid points around the potential military 
weaknesses of the movement and its general organization, on the other hand, his 
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assessment fails to take into account an important mitigating factor. According to one 
report Hicks filed, approximately 70 percent of Heimwehr men were Great War veterans, 
which would mean that the clear majority would had received at least some formal 
military training and/or would have had combat experience in the war.468 If true, a large 
percentage of its members would have had varying degrees of military training and 
experience, making the limitations around training time perhaps less detrimental than 
Wiltschegg surmises. Furthermore, having had the shared experience of wartime military 
service and being comrades in a common cause, there existed a common basis that could 
conceivably transcend the potential limitations of the movement’s local nature.  
Comparatively speaking, even if the Schutzbund had greater numbers than the 
Heimwehr movement, it is difficult to imagine them being any better trained, equipped, 
or armed, especially considering the frequency with which the police and gendarmerie 
raided—many initiated by Fey and Starhemberg in their time as Vice-Chancellor and 
Minister of the Interior—Schutzbund weapons caches in the early 1930s. In the case the 
Bundesheer, they were without question better trained and better equipped than the 
Heimwehren, but was numerically inferior, even after 1930 when Heimwehr troop 
strength sharply declined they still doubled that of the Bundesheer in 1931 and 1932. For 
the Heimwehr movement, its Achilles’ heel lie not so much in weapons, training, or troop 
strength, but in its decentralized organization and ideologically diverse membership—
these were the forces that limited its overall capacity as a paramilitary organization. 
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The Ideology of the Heimwehr Movement 
One of the principle criticisms historians have leveled against the Heimwehr 
movement was its lack of a unifying ideology, while others have called the movement a 
fascist movement, thereby lending it at least the base ideology that comes standard with 
“generic fascism.”469 Like in so many other facets of the historiography, there exists a 
great deal of contradiction in relation to the ideology of the Heimwehren. Lauridsen 
rightly recognizes that the Heimwehr movement did not suffer from ideological 
deficiency. He contends, “The “lack” of ideology—rightly understood as ideological 
restraint—was, however, a necessary precondition for the existence and development of 
such a politically heterogeneous movement and, not the least, for being not simply 
tolerated but also supported and promoted by the Austrian bourgeoisie.”470 He proceeds 
to speak to the antisocialism, antiparliamentarianism, anti-Semitism, militarism, and 
corporatism as ideological “traits.”471 The Heimwehren exercised little in the way of 
“ideological restraint,” particularly in juxtaposition to the “traits” he describes; 
Heimwehr leaders were quite vocal and descript in their views on socialism, 
parliamentary democracy, Jews, their corporatist platform, while putting the militarism 
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on display regularly in their marches and rallies. What is more, in his discussion of these 
“traits,” he misses an important unifying element—their basis in Catholic social thought. 
The Korneuburg Oath, the political manifesto published by the federal Heimwehr 
leadership in May 1930, according to some historians, reflected a clear turn to fascism 
influenced by Mussolini and Fascist Italian money.472 In reality, however, it was an 
unconscious affirmation of Catholic social teachings. A translation of the full oath is 
included below, which the Heimwehren incorporated into their national propaganda 
publication, Heimatschutz in Österreich: 
We are determined to rebuild Austria from its foundations! 
We are determined to bring into being the Volksstaat of the Heimatschutz. 
We demand of every comrade: 
undaunted faith in the fatherland, 
untiring zeal in service, and 
passionate love of his native land. 
We are determined to take over the state and to remould it and its economy in the 
interests of the whole Volk. 
We must forget our own advantage, must subordinate absolutely all party ties and 
party interests to the aims of our struggle, for we are determined to serve the 
whole community of the German Volk! 
We repudiate western parliamentary democracy and the party state! 
We are determined to replace them with government by the corporations (Stände) 
and by a strong national leadership which will consist, not of the representatives 
of parties, but of leading members of the large corporations and of the ablest, 
most trustworthy men in our own mass movement. 
We are fighting against the subversion of our Volk by Marxist class struggle and 
liberal and capitalist economics. 
We are determined to bring about an independent development of the economy 
on a corporate basis. We shall overcome the class struggle and replace it by 
dignity and justice throughout society. 
We are determined to raise the standard of living of our Volk by fostering an 
economy based on the soil and administered for the good of all. 
The state is the personification of the whole Volk; its power and leadership ensure 
that the interests of the Stände are contained within the framework of the needs 
of the whole community. 
Let every comrade realize and proclaim that he is one of the bearers of a new 
German national outlook, namely: 
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that he is prepared to offer up his blood and his possessions, and that he recognizes three 
forces only: Faith in God, his own unbending will, the commands of his leaders!473 
 
From the Oath’s first sentence the influence of Austria’s Catholic heritage: “We 
are determined to rebuild Austria from its foundations!” “From its foundations” is a clear 
reference to its historical roots. Rebuilding Austria from its historical roots was 
tantamount to the restoring the dominance of its German Catholic tradition.474 This was, 
of course, in line with the desires of its Christian Social patrons as well, and would be 
realized in the May Constitution of 1934. 
The Heimwehr movement’s rejected “western parliamentary democracy,” the 
“subversion of our Volk by…liberal and capitalist economics” and its goal of the 
“subordination of all party ties and party interests.” This was, in part, a reaction to the 
staunch support of the republic by the Social Democratic Party and the degree of parity it 
allowed them to achieve.475 Moreover, the arrival of Heimwehr leadership to the 
Korneuburg Oath was gradual and reflected a mounting frustration with parliamentary 
democracy, the Christian Social, and German National parties for their failure to more 
aggressively suppress, or their agreement to allow the Heimwehren to destroy, the Social 
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Democratic Party.476 They admonished the bourgeois parties for having “bowed” to the 
Social Democrats, beginning a “permanent state of cowardice.”477  
Heimwehr views were also consistent with the Catholic Church’s skepticism 
toward Western parliamentary democracy. The individualism and greed inherent to 
classical liberal capitalism lent itself to the corruption of the institution of parliamentary 
democracy.478 Thus, the corruption led to the favoring of party interest and ties over the 
“common good.” The Papal Encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, published a year later, 
spoke to Pope Leo XIII’s efforts, “boldly breaking through the confines imposed by 
Liberalism, [he] fearlessly taught that government must not be thought a mere guardian 
of law and of good order, but rather must put forth every effort so that “through the entire 
scheme of laws and institutions…both public and individual well-being may develop 
simultaneously out of the very structure and administration of the State.”479 In other 
words, the liberal democratic states must do more than preserve the population for the 
sake of maintaining the health of commerce, it must make the best interests of the whole 
population its priority. Pope Pius XI reminded the Catholic faithful, “let all remember 
that Liberalism is the father of this Socialism that is pervading the morality and culture 
and that Bolshevism will be its heir.”480 Indeed, as Diamant points out, several official 
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communications from the Austrian Church described liberalism as the “principal enemy 
of Catholicism because it had undermined the place of religion in Austrian life and had 
thereby become the pacemaker of socialism and, ultimately, communism.”481 Among 
them was Prelate Ignaz Seipel—twice chancellor, a stalwart supported of the 
Heimwehren, and leading personality of the far-right wing of the Christian Social Party—
who believed that this was precisely why Austria’s parliamentary democracy had to be 
swept away; political partisanship prohibited the government from administering to “the 
interests of the common good” and therefore contradicted Catholic social theory.482 
Like the lamentations of Heimwehr leaders, Pope Pius XI indignantly described 
the ills brought about by free market capitalism. “Free competition has destroyed itself; 
economic dictatorship has supplanted the free market; unbridled ambition for power has 
likewise succeeded greed for gain; all economic life has become tragically hard, 
inexorable, and cruel,” he laments. “To these are to be added the grave evils that have 
resulted from an intermingling and shameful confusion of the functions and duties of 
public authority with those of the economic sphere – such as, one of the worst, the virtual 
degradation of the majesty of the State, which although it ought to sit on high like a 
queen and supreme arbitress, free from all partiality and intent upon the one common 
good and justice, is become a slave, surrendered and delivered to the passions and greed 
of men,” Pius XI adds.483  
The Church and the Heimwehren did find agreement with capitalist liberal 
democracy in their fear of socialism, as it gained more adherents in latter half of the 
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nineteenth century and into the early twentieth. Marxism’s secular, anti-clerical stance 
threatened the Church as well as liberal principals of private property and free market 
economics were existential threats. “The notion that class is naturally hostile to class, and 
that the wealthy and the working men are intended by nature to live in mutual 
conflict…[is] irrational and so false is this view that the direct contrary is the truth,” Leo 
XII criticized.484 He adds, “every man has by nature the right to possess property as his 
own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and…animal.”485 Pius XI 
notes, that in the 40 years since Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, socialism “has sunk into 
Communism,” which intensified class warfare and the assault on private property. “To 
achieve these objectives there is nothing which it does not dare, nothing for which it has 
respect or reverence; and when it has come to power, it is incredible and portentlike in its 
cruelty and inhumanity,” he explains, referring to the communist revolutions in Russia 
and, perhaps, Hungary.486 Christian anti-Semites also frequently viewed Marxism as an 
“apocalyptic conspiracy, a coordinated international assault on Christian values.”487 
Heimwehr propaganda articulated this fear of Marxism, as illustrated above, in much 
more venomous, metaphoric terms, likening it to intellectual poison, bacteria, disease, or 
illness. 
In reality, it was not the fear of socialism that so much disturbed conservative 
Catholic and nationalist circles, rather it was the fear of Marxist revolution and the onset 
of communism. As Pius XI explains in Quadragesimo Anno, 
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[Socialism] not only professes the rejection of violence but modifies and tempers to some 
degree, if it does not reject entirely, the class struggle and the abolition of private 
ownership. One might say that, terrified by its own principles and by the conclusions 
drawn therefrom by Communism, Socialism inclines toward and in a certain measure 
approaches the truths which Christian tradition has always held sacred; for it cannot be 
denied that its demands at times come very near those that Christian reformers of society 
justly insist upon.488  
 
Its emphasis on the protection of the working poor and their interests, in particular, were 
congruent with Catholic social teachings. As such, there existed some overlap between it 
and the Church’s ambiguous proposal of corporatism. While Leo XIII lamented the 
disappearance of occupational guilds, Pius XI called for their reintroduction, as the 
fundamental component of the “Christian reconstruction of human society.” The revived 
occupational guilds would be charged with the duty of selecting their “apostles” among 
themselves who “should demonstrate that they are men possessed of the keenest sense of 
justice, who will resist with true manly courage the dishonest demands or the unjust acts 
of anyone, who will excel in the prudence and judgment which avoids every extreme, 
and, above all, who will be deeply permeated by the charity of Christ, which alone has 
the power to subdue firmly but gently the hearts and wills of men to the laws of justice 
and equity.” The Church would, naturally, play a central role in this “reconstruction” by 
providing Christian education, establishing “study groups guided by principles in 
harmony with the Faith,” and utilizing “Spiritual Exercises” within the occupational 
milieu.489 
 As its Korneuburg program outlined (above), Heimwehr leaders also sought to 
establish a Christian corporatist government in Austria, a middle path between the 
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extremes of socialism and parliamentary democracy. Its language was also similar to the 
expressions of Catholic social thought: “we are determined to serve the whole 
community;” replacing class struggle with “dignity and justice throughout society;” “for 
the good of all;” “of the needs of the whole community,” all of which are consistent with 
the Church’s fundamental understanding of the purpose of government. As Leo XIII 
explained, “the object of the government of the State should be, not the advantage of the 
ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he is placed;” in other words, it should “serve 
the common good.”490  
Heimwehr ideologues, Walter Heinrich, Hans Riehl and Odo Neustädter-Stürmer 
had been traditionally portrayed as the chief architects of its corporatist vision and were 
inspired chiefly by Catholic social theory and the writings Heinrich and Riehl’s mentor, 
Othmar Spann. Spann, Riehl, and Heinrich, among others, had been tireless critics of 
Austria’s democratic system. Spann, whose writings Catholic thinkers “drew heavily” 
upon, contended that there could only be two types of society, individualistic and 
universalistic. Individualistic societies were comprised of atomized individuals in pursuit 
of their own, selfish aims, at the expense of the well-being of the collective whole. In 
universalistic societies, Spann argues, people functioned more naturally as a part of a 
collective, which prioritized the general well-being of society over selfish individualism. 
This is also the overarching philosophy of Catholic social thought, which praises the 
righteousness of the “common good.” Spann blamed liberal individualism for the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which destroyed medieval “organic unity” of 
                                                 




European society.491 The latter, of course, corresponded with the ideals of Catholic social 
theory, as it “reinforced the Romantic tendencies introduced into Austrian Catholic social 
thought by [Adam] Müller (1779-1829) and [Karl von] Vogelsang (1818-1890).”492  
The Korneuburg program, and later, the May Constitution of the “Austrofascist” 
corporative state, extended beyond the rather cryptic, open-ended directive Pius XI to 
establish an authoritarian framework that reflected the theories initially forwarded by 
Vogelsang and refined by Heimwehr theoreticians. Heinrich explained at a Heimwehr 
leadership meeting in January 1930, “The goal is the national, Christian, and social 
German state, the basis of which are indicated in German history.” As Edmondson notes, 
“in his view the corporative state would overcome class warfare, expertly promote the 
economy, advance the common welfare, and be the guardian of social justice.”493 The 
influence of Italian fascism on the Korneuburg program has been greatly overstated. 
Furthermore, it did not mark a sudden and radical shift in ideology as historians have 
described, at least not inside the leading circles of the Heimwehren.494 Dr. Raimond 
Günther, an “ardent nationalist and anti-socialist,” whose work, according to Edmondson, 
helped inspire Pfrimer’s 1931 coup attempt in Styria, was no stranger to the Heimwehr 
leadership. He had supplied a basic framework for corporatist, authoritarian platform to 
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the Heimwehren in February 1927.495 Interest in pursuing the corporatist direction is most 
likely to have begun at least as early as 1926. 
What the Korneuburg program did reflect, however, was a longer, more gradual 
drift toward nineteenth century Catholic social theory that saw authoritarianism and 
corporatism as a more organic combination—given the history of the region and 
people—to ordering society as compared to the foreign, unnatural, and degrading effects 
of liberal democracy, capitalism, and reactionary Marxism. The interpretation of the Oath 
as being fascist and its rejection of various Heimwehr leaders indicates a widespread 
misunderstanding of the foundations of Catholic social thinking from which it drew. 
Carsten notes the potential for misunderstanding corporatism, questioning “how it was 
possible to foist this child of a German professional brain on to the Heimwehren most of 
whose members could not have made any sense out of Spann’s complicated and 
highfaluting theory of ‘universalism’, or could even have been expected to read his turgid 
prose.”496 Interpreting the Korneuburg Oath as fascist is, therefore, tantamount to 
interpreting Catholic social theory as fascist.497 Lastly, the Korneuburg Oath was very 
much indeed a “challenge” to their bourgeois political party patrons whose complacency, 
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they felt, had allowed the Social Democratic Party, and the potential for communist 
revolution, to grow into and remain a strong force in Austrian politics.498 
 
Heimwehr Ideals in Practice 
The activities and propaganda of the Heimwehr movement married traditional 
militarism and Catholic social thought. In addition to various types of print media, 
including posters, pamphlets, newspapers, books, leaflets, flyers, as well as radio 
broadcasts, the ideals of the movement found expression through events such as flag 
consecration ceremonies, rallies, war memorial services, as well as shooting 
competitions, among other types of events.499 Consistent amongst these gatherings was 
the presence of religious ceremony. Almost always held on weekends, each of these core 
types of events incorporated Sunday morning field Mass services where Church fathers 
reiterated the duties of the Heimwehren to defend God, the homeland, and its spirit.500 
The Heimwehr rally would become the calling card of the movement and a powerful 
political weapon, toppling one government and inspiring another. 
The Heimwehr rally, which at times included each of these various activities, 
served multiple purposes. To Lauridsen’s point, Heimwehr rallies were primarily 
intended to promote esprit de corps amongst the local and provincial formations and 
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reiterate the movement’s aims and ideals to the rank and file.501 However, rallies were 
also intended for public consumption, creating a backdrop for the recruitment of new 
members and inspiring public support.502 Federal leader, Dr. Richard Steidle, explained 
the reason the Heimwehr held their rallies: 
We hear so often that it would be better to spend money on other purposes than on our 
marches. These are, however, necessary and have paid off amply. We want to show our 
strength through our marches, and thus eliminate the organizing battles on the so-called 
bourgeois side, and, on the other hand, show the workers, who are forced to organize with 
the Social Democrats, to find shelter with us. Our marches have to take place mainly in 
the industrial areas and cities, because there can be no red reservations in Austria and in 
particular, Vienna cannot be a red one.503 
 
In other words, in their uniforms, and some cases bearing their rifles, they were intended 
to display the movement’s numbers, uniformity, discipline, and, thus, to project its 
military strength to the encouragement of their supporters and intimidate their Social 
Democratic and Republican Schutzbund opposition. 
 The rallies and counter-demonstrations of the Heimwehren and the Republican 
Schutzbund normalized the militarization of politics in the First Republic. The series of 
“monster” rallies in the autumn of 1928, which Steidle tabbed as “the fight for the 
freedom of the streets,” the cities of Wiener Neustadt and Innsbruck were each 
transformed into a “large military camp.”504 At the tension-filled October 1928 rally at 
Wiener Neustadt, the city’s population was more than doubled by the over 19,000 
Heimwehr men, 14,000 Schutzbund members, who were there to stage their own counter-
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demonstration, and the 8,000 gendarmerie and police officers to keep the peace, flooded 
into the city.505 Many observers—both inside and outside of Austria—feared that the rally 
would spark a civil war between the two paramilitary forces. 
Less than a month later, a Heimwehr rally held on November 12, 1928—the tenth 
anniversary of the republic—saw over 17,000 Heimwehr men from across Austria 
descend on Innsbruck. The anniversary was, according to Steidle, “purely a family matter 
for the Austro-Marxists,” insinuating that it was most definitely not a day of celebration 
for non-Marxist circles. Instead, he added, it was up to the Heimwehren to re-sow into the 
Austrian ground, the “Christian and national ideals of old” to remedy the contamination 
of “non-German cultural heresy” of Marxism.506 The result of the two-and-a-half-hour 
long Heimwehr procession before Tyrolean Governor, Dr. Franz Stumpf, was indeed 
reminiscent of the Austria of old.507 An account in the Vorarlberger Tagblatt described 
the “triumphal procession” through Innsbruck: 
Along the streets there formed innumerable rows of people. All windows of the 
houses were occupied. Everyone rejoiced, a rain of flowers spilled over the 
Heimatwehr men. It was an enthusiasm that has not been seen in Innsbruck for a 
long time. The most impressive moment of the whole event was the heroic feat. 
The peak of the train, surrounded by the exultation of the population, had just 
reached Maria-Theresa Street. Then the chime of all the churches began, the 
parade halted, followed by an impressive silence as a respect for the fallen 
members of the army. The impression of this honor was indescribable. 
Throughout the city there was a great silence.508 
 
The Heimwehr units carried their rifles over their shoulders as they paraded through the 
city, acknowledging the traditional Tyrolean “right to bear arms.” Indeed, according to a 
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report to the chancellor’s office in Vienna, the Heimwehren “made the best possible 
impression in view of their equipment and discipline.”509 After, Stumpf would liken the 
mood of the city during the rally to the outpouring of jubilation in 1914, when the people 
of Innsbruck sent their young men off to front.510 
The desire and efforts of the Heimwehr movement to re-institutionalization the 
prewar culture of militarism as a central feature of Austrian state was not unique to the 
Heimwehr movement, nor to Austria. Rather it was a consistent feature of the “culture of 
defeat” that emerged in radical right circles in the footprint of the defeated Central 
Powers. The virtues extolled in the militarism of the Habsburg army framed the 
militarism of the Heimwehren.511 It was “[n]ot the drill was the distinguishing mark of 
the old army, but discipline. An undisciplined people are resigned to the decay without 
rescue.”512 Within the Heimwehr movement, regional expressions of militarism, often 
couched in local mythology and patriarchal militarism, were also recognizable in its 
gatherings. In the case of Tyrol, for instance, this is evident in the continued veneration 
for the patriots of the Tiroler Freiheitkampf of 1809, most especially Andreas Hofer. As 
Gauführer (district leader) of the Lower Inn Valley (Tirol), Ludwig Psenner, explained to 
his subordinates, the Heimatwehr wanted to “to protect the home and hearth from the of a 
breakup of the country in order to preserve the inheritance which others have left us and 
to renew our lives for our children and their children…Whoever does not defend his 
home is not worthy of having a home.”513  
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One of the ways the Heimwehr movement glorified Austria’s legacy of civic 
militarism was through its participation in war monument dedications. If the estimations 
of American military attaché, Major W.W. Hicks, are to be believed, roughly 70 percent 
of the Heimwehr members had been in the military during the war, so such ceremonies 
also had personal resonance for many Heimwehr members.514 Furthermore, war 
memorial ceremonies provided the Heimwehren a platform to reiterate their credibility as 
quasi-official auxiliary peacekeeping troops, particularly given the fact that many 
Heimwehr leaders were, themselves, government officials on various levels. At 
commemorations in smaller cities, local Heimwehr groups often played a more prominent 
role, helping to officiate the ceremonies.515 They also presented the movement with 
opportunities to gain the approval of former high-ranking officers of the old k.u.k. army, 
whom remained respected figures in Austrian public life.516  
Usually held on Sundays, the war memorial ceremonies were typically 
concatenated with Mass services. Given solemn atmosphere of the occasion and the fact 
that many war memorials were on church grounds or inside the churches themselves, the 
centrality of the Church and the clergy to the events becomes obvious.517 In a particularly 
extraordinary case was the sermon from the war memorial dedication at Brixlegg (Tyrol) 
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in August 1926. Delivered by Prelate Anton Müller, a patriotic, Catholic priest and 
adamant German nationalist who wrote under the pseudonym of “Bruder Willram” 
during the Great War, and won acclaim for his glorification of war. His sermon did not 
disappoint, remaining consistent in his glorification of the war dead. “Death on the 
battlefield is a holy death,” he explains. Adding that “the hero’s death is like a sunset” in 
that it is “enveloped in quiet beauty.”518 Müller’s romantic view of death in battle echoes 
Hermann von Gilm’s idealized views of the masculine virtues civic militarism and the 
war volunteerism of the Standschützen.  
Following Mass, the planned orators would speak—lamenting the fallen, praising 
the courage of the veterans and the army in the Great War, extolling the necessity of 
perseverance, and preaching the need to restore the prestige and prosperity of German 
culture—, and the ceremonies would be closed out with musical arrangements. As the 
Reichspost detailed in one example memorializing the dead of the Deutschmeister 
Regiment No.4, “Particularly poignant was the laying of fir-wreaths by the orphans of the 
Deutschmeister Association, while the Regimental band played the song "Ich hatt’ einen 
Kameraden" (I had a comrade), hardly one eye remained dry.”519 
The rallies, memorial dedications, commemorations, and flag consecration 
services of the Heimwehren reflect a clear alignment of the behaviors and actions of the 
Heimwehr movement with its core values and assumptions. The central role of religious 
ceremony in all of these events reflected the fundamental connection between the Church 
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and the movement. Likewise, the gatherings, in each case, paid homage to vestiges of the 
monarchy or lamented its passing. The passing of the dynasty was not so much lamented 
as was the values bourgeois circles came to associate with it. Moreover, the rise of social 
democracy corresponded with the fall of the empire, giving further reason to bemoan its 
death. The ideology, behaviors, and activities of the Heimwehren, including its gendered 
conceptualizations of militarism, mirrored the teachings of Catholic social thought that 
undergirded the movement. 
 
Conclusions 
The Heimwehr movement—not unlike the Freikorps (volunteer corps) and the 
Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria—materialized from the political instability, economic ruin, 
and social upheaval in the wake of the First World War. The successful implementation of 
social democracies in Germany and Austria, the communist triumph in the October 
Revolution in Russia, followed by various, admittedly short-lived, communist 
governments in Hungary and Bavaria, and coup attempts in Vienna and elsewhere in 
eastern and central Europe, triggered widespread alarm in the conservative bourgeoisie 
and upper classes. The paramilitary groups that had originally been mustered to combat 
civil unrest and foreign invasion became anti-Marxist formations tasked with defeating 
any leftist attempt to seize power. The Heimwehr movement—beyond its role in 
maintaining “peace and order”—also served as a source of unity among the non-Marxist 
Christian Social, German National, and agrarian parties. Its latter aim depended wholly 
on the first, defending Austria from the grave threat of Marxist revolution. So long as the 
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Social Democratic Party and its paramilitary wing, the Republikanischer Schutzbund, 
remained strong, the Heimwehren would remain relevant and its survival assured.  
The charter of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr and those of the other Heimwehren, were 
derived from that of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, and not only proscribed their general 
organizational structure, but also included rudimentary parameters for membership; 
specifically, one only need be of “reputable German descent” to join the Heimwehr 
movement. This purposefully open-ended membership policy was designed to appeal to 
non-Marxists of all political persuasions, which was what allowed it to be the unifying 
factor that it was. Thus, its socioeconomically diverse membership ranged from elected 
public officials, to members of the declassed aristocracy, to industrial workers. This basic 
membership criteria, thus, prized numbers over a specific ideological uniformity—
disdain for anything “Rot” was sufficient. As such, it allowed the movement’s ranks to 
swell between 300,000-400,000 members at its zenith in 1929.520 Furthermore, a 
significant percentage of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr’s local and regional leaders were 
elected officials, which offered numerous benefits and reflected the organization’s 
attachment to, and dependence upon, local and provincial governments. 
This membership model was satisfactory for building a unified bourgeois, anti-
Marxist defense organization, but proved problematic when the Heimwehren became 
increasingly disenchanted with the perceived negligence of their political, industrial, and 
financial patrons in the mid-1920s. Moreover, it indicates that the Heimwehr movement’s 
eventual desire for independence from its patrons was not planned, but was an organic 
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development born of the unwillingness of their patrons to allow for the overthrow of the 
republic and the institution the Christian, corporatist state Heimwehr leaders came to 
view as the only viable option for Austria’s survival. Be that as it may, Heimwehr leaders 
remained true to the Schützen tradition of volunteerism and chose not to adjust its 
membership parameters.  
 The tradition of civic militarism and war volunteerism of the Schützen were not 
the only virtues the Heimwehr movement retained. It also reflected and cultivated the 
traditional patriarchal attitude of conservative Catholic circles in Alpine society.  The 
defense of home and hearth were foundational duties of men, which were to be inculcated 
from childhood. This was naturally intertwined with the gun culture of Alpine states like 
Tyrol, where hunting and shooting were taught from youth by their fathers and through 
the Schießstände. Combined with the institution of compulsory military service, hunting, 
shooting, and military service were fundamental experiences shaping the worldview of 
Austrian men and became foundational components of Heimwehr militarism.  The 
establishment of youth formations complimented the militarization of scouting 
organizations in post-war Germany and Austria in the creation of a “new militarism” that 
would propel the revitalization of the German cultural nation. 
Like its traditional notion of militarism, its ideals were also informed by Catholic 
social theory. This has been a point of misinterpretation by historians who have depicted 
the movement as being purely negative in its orientation.  The anti-Marxism, anti-
Liberalism, anti-Capitalism, and anti-parliamentary democracy was driven by Chuch 
teachings, particularly after Leo XIII’s encyclical, Rerum Novarum. Catholic social 
thinkers such as Adam Müller and Karl von Vogelsang constructed the foundation upon 
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which University of Vienna Professor, Othmar Spann, built his argument for corporatism 
in study, The True State (Der wahre Staat) and his students, Walter Heinrich and Hans 
Riehl, wrote the Korneuburg Oath. The call of Heimwehr theorists for a corporatist 
government was reiterated by the Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno 
published a year later, which called for the resurrection of occupational systems of 
representation as a middle between Marxism on one side and liberal parliamentary 
democracy on the other. The May Constitution of 1934 would marry the two, establishing 
an authoritarian, Christian corporatists government in Austria, replacing the 1920 
constitution. 
The rallies and events of the Heimwehr movement reflected the convergence of 
its conservative ideals and its brand of militarism that melded regional flavors with 
Habsburg imperial traditions. As such, the Heimwehr rally reiterated the movement’s 
purpose—as a paramilitary defense association and a source of unification for the 
bourgeois right—and aims—the destruction of the Social Democratic Party, 
constitutional reform, and ultimately, the implementation of an authoritarian, Christian, 
corporatist state—for to its supporters and to foster camaraderie in its ranks. At the same 
time, Heimwehr rallies were staged for public consumption to disseminate propaganda, 
cultivate public support, and recruit new members. In this way, it served as an instrument 
of political intimidation that helped normalize the militarization of politics in the First 
Republic. 
As chapter four will demonstrate, the Heimwehr movement enjoyed a broad basis 
of support, most especially from those social groups who wielded influence in Habsburg 
society, further echoing the its thoroughly traditional, mainstream character. The 
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provincial governments, dominated by the bourgeois right, particularly the Christian 
Social Party, created, supported, and protected the Heimwehr movement; Catholic clergy 
legitimized it, the Habsburg aristocracy gave it standing and panache, while Austrian 
banking and industry filled its coffers. While some scholars contend that the Heimwehr 
movement was never a mass movement, it enjoyed much broader support than most 
historians have given it credit for having.
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CHAPTER IV – THE HEIMWEHR: “AN IRRESISTIBLE POPULAR MOVEMENT” 
 
Charles Gulick, in his two-volume study of Interwar Austria, posits that the 
Heimwehr movement was never a “mass” movement based on its numerical strength.521 
Edmondson, contends that only at its peak—by the summer of 1929—was the Heimwehr 
movement “something approaching a popular movement.”522 To reduce perceptions of 
the influence and support the Heimwehr movement garnered throughout interwar Austria 
was a principal aim of the post-World War II “coalition historiography.” Austrian 
historians advanced the interpretation that the movement was propelled by foreign 
influences and, thus, not widely supported by the Austrian people. From this angle, the 
realization of the movement’s aims of rolling back the republic and destroying the Social 
Democratic Party once more depicts Austrians as the victims of foreign fascist designs. 
This interpretation has remained the orthodox narrative but is problematic in that it does 
not reconcile with the empirical evidence, nor with the overwhelming popular support for 
the Nazi dictatorship. 
How does one, then, define a “mass” or “popular” movement? What is the 
threshold that must be crossed in order for an organization or idea to be considered as 
having mass popular appeal? The illustration below offers a snapshot of approximate 
membership figures of the Heimwehr movement at the peak of its strength: 
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Table 8. Heimwehr Membership per Capita 







A comparison to current American membership organizations offers some useful 
perspective. At the outset of 2016 the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the American 
population to be 322,761, 807.525 If one takes this total, multiplied by the estimated 
percentage of Austrians who were Heimwehr members in 1929 (between 4.5 and 6 
percent), that would equate to an American organization having between 14,524,281 and 
19,365,708 members. By population percentage, the Heimwehr movement boasted three 
to four times as many members—at its peak—as the National Rifle Association, 
according to the most recently released membership estimates. Put differently, there were 
eleven to fifteen times as many Heimwehr members than there are active service 
members in the United States military.526 Just as membership numbers for the National 
Rifle Association are not representative of the totality of gun enthusiasts in the United 
States, membership figures for the Heimwehr movement, alone, did not represent the sum 
of all those who supported the its objectives and the ideals it represented. Like the figures 
for active military personnel do not include veterans who served before them, nor do they 
account for the families and friends of both soldiers and veterans that respect and support 
American troops and veterans in a variety of capacities, the Heimwehr movement’s 
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membership figures, alone, do accurately represent the broader popular support the 
movement enjoyed. Thus, membership numbers cannot account for alternative 
demonstrations of support in the form or monetary donations from provincial 
governments, bourgeois political parties, private donors, and conservative media outlets 
within Austria.  
 Thus, to determine the mass appeal of a movement by membership numbers alone 
ignores numerous other important factors. As sociologist, William Kornhauser, explained, 
“[m]ass movements mobilize people who are alienated from the going system, who do 
not believe in the legitimacy of the established order, and who therefore are ready to 
engage in efforts to destroy it. The greatest number of people available to mass 
movements will be found in those sections of society that have the fewest ties to the 
social order.”527 Scholars studying the Heimwehren have, by and large, considered it to 
have not had a mass following, yet their depiction of the Heimwehr movement aligns 
closely with Kornhauser’s classification and achieved a support from a significant 
percentage of the population. 
 A more accurate way to engage this historiographical contradiction is to examine 
the relationship of the Heimwehr movement with various segments of Austrian society 
during the First Republic. The diverse membership of the Heimwehren would indicate 
that had a wide appeal among various socioeconomic groups. Gulick suggests that:  
The real impetus and support within Austria for Heimwehr-Clerical Fascism came 
primarily from the following groups: 1. Big business. 2. Big finance 3. A few relatively 
big landowners such as Prince Starhemberg. 4. Many Roman Catholic political leaders of 
whom the most important were the priest, Ignaz Seipel (who was chancellor in several 
cabinets), Steidle, Dollfuss, and Schuschnigg. 5. Many Roman Catholic priests who, 
without identifying their Church with the movement, gave it substantial and important 
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support. 6. Disgruntled army officers and aristocrats who had been declassed by the 
disintegration of the empire. 7. Political adventurers, not to say "thugs," of the type who 
flocked into Hitler's S.A. and S.S. formations. 8. Large groups of peasants. 9. Middle-
class and "new" middle-class groups; that is, professional and small businessmen and 
white-collar proletariat.528 
 
If not mass in number, the socioeconomic groups which provided the Heimwehr the 
greatest degree of support were substantial in their influence over virtually every 
meaningful facet of life (political, social, religious, economic). The influence these 
groups held in Austrian society was a force multiplier; their preeminence in crucial areas 
of society enabled the Heimwehr movement to succeed with, perhaps, numerically less 
popular support than their Schutzbund rivals. Though the historiography of the Heimwehr 
movement has followed narrow numerical assessments, the wider support base of the 
movement deserves further attention in order to achieve a more sophisticated 
understanding as to the support it enjoyed.  
This section will demonstrate, most especially in the Tyrolean case, that the 
Heimwehren often drew their most dedicated supporters from those social groups that 
were most prominent and faithful in the former Habsburg monarchy, many of which 
Gulick identifies: the declassed aristocracy, former k.u.k. army officers, Catholic clergy, 
financiers and industrialists, as well as farmers and agricultural laborers. There was also a 
significant degree of overlap between these groups, particularly as it related to the 
aristocracy, industrialists, financiers, and the former officer ranks. That is to say, contrary 
to how they have been portrayed in the historiography of the Heimwehr movement, these 
were not entirely discrete social groupings; there are numerous examples of nobles being 
former officers or leading figures in the financial and industrial sectors. In this way, facile 
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assertions that one social group or another supported the Heimwehren, must be 
considered with greater care. 
Moreover, Gulick neglects to include the numerous government officials at all 
levels of administration, who were integral in establishing provincial Heimwehr groups, 
helping to secure funding and weapons as well as offering a legal basis for their very 
existence; without participation and support of local and provincial officials, the 
Heimwehr movement could not have materialized, much less survived. The establishment 
and development Heimwehr movement did not follow the grass-roots, revolutionary 
trajectory of contemporary “fascist” movements in Europe. Provincial Heimwehr 
organizations were thoughtfully created by, for the support of, those state governments 
who feared the advance of Marxism after 1917; thus, it was a product of the political 
crises spawned by the First World War and collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy. As such, 
the Heimwehr movement was an extra-legal vehicle through which mainstream 
conservative circles of Austrian society combatted the foreign ideals of Marxism and 
attempted to reassert a Church-guided authoritarianism that would, therefore, restore 
traditional German culture and destroy the international worldview of Marxist ideology 
and its subjugation to Western parliamentary democracy.  
 
Provincial Governments and the “loyal aspirations” of the Heimwehren 
Most fundamental in the foundation, survival, and expansion of the Heimwehr 
movement was the support of local, state, and federal government officials. In virtually 
all of Austria’s provinces, particularly in the movement’s early years, government 
officials worked closely with Heimwehr leaders. Numerous other provincial governors 
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played important roles in establishing the Heimwehr formations in their provinces. 
Kondert offers several illustrative examples, noting how Upper Austrian Governor Franz 
Langoth worked diligently to secure and distribute the necessary weapons to Heimwehr 
formations in the province. Vinzenz Schumy, a figure of later Heimwehr disdain, helped 
subsidize the Carinthian Heimwehr while provincial governor from 1923-1927. 
Vorarlberg Governor, Dr. Otto Ender, was instrumental in protecting the Heimwehren in 
his province, arguing in the Vorarlberger Landtag (Vorarlberg Diet), that the formations 
had the right to receive arms from Bavaria. Arguably the most strident supporter of the 
Heimwehr movement, among provincial governors, was Styrian Governor, Anton 
Rintelen. Rintelen aided in securing an immense stockpile of weapons and, with 
Lieutenant Governor, Dr. Jakob Ahrer, helped obtain an equally immense amount of 
money for the Styrian Heimatschutz.529 Further instances of collusion were offered in one 
particular speech delivered by Dr. Julius Deutsch, leader of the Social Democratic 
paramilitary organization, the Republikanischer Schutzbund, he spoke, as Gulick notes, at 
length about: 
the cooperation between the Heimwehr and local officials, both city and state, he went on 
to the matter of arms smuggling, giving precise dates, the license number of an 
automobile seized in Innsbruck, the character of the weapons being transported, and 
similar details. The most convincing item in his indictment was the official report of a 
gendarmerie inspector in Salzburg stating that every night between October 10 and 15, 
1920, some 30 to 40 men had crossed from Bavaria bringing arms.530 
 
In Tyrol, the state government supported the Heimatwehr in much the same 
fashion it had the Standschützen before the Great War, granting it semi-official 
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recognition as a, more or less, national guard and financing its operation.531 Against the 
demands of the Interior Ministry, concerned over violations of the Treaty of Saint 
Germain, the Christian Social and German nationalist officials played a key role in the 
creation of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr. Governor of Tyrol, Dr. Franz Stumpf, justified the 
formation of the Heimatwehr by pointing to civil unrest such as the hunger riots that took 
place in Innsbruck the year before, explaining that the “organization…serves to maintain 
peace and order and [is] therefore quite legitimate.”532 The Heimwehr organizations, most 
especially in Austria’s Alpine provinces where Christian Socials dominated state and 
local governments, functioned in similar auxiliary capacities. According to Gulick, their 
“peace keeping” mission as a euphemism for suppressing Social Democratic influence, 
labor unions, and workers’ strikes.533 
The 1920 Landesschießen (statewide shooting contest), staged by the Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr in conjunction with the Tyrolean government, is a useful example that 
illustrates the ardent support of the Heimatwehr by conservative state officials. The 
announcement of the Landesschießen sparked a national controversy. The close 
collaboration between the Tyrolean government and the Tyrolean Heimatwehr in 
planning the shooting festival prompted fear that it would violate Article 133 of the 
Treaty of Saint Germain, which stated:  
Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all arms, 
munitions, and war material, including any kind of anti-aircraft material, of whatever 
origin, existing in Austria in excess of the quantity authorized shall be handed over to the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Delivery shall take place at such points in 
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Austrian territory as may be appointed by the said Powers, who shall also decide on the 
disposal of such material.534 
 
According to the IMCC, the shooting festival was in “certain contradiction” of the treaty. 
The general fear was that the Allies would respond by reducing or withholding the food 
aid being poured into Austria, which Austrian citizens desperately needed to stave off 
malnutrition and starvation. In response, the Federal Foreign Ministry directed the 
Interior Ministry to compel the Tyrolean government to distance itself from the 
Landeschießen.535 Tyrolean Volkspartei (the Christian Social party in Tyrol) officials 
flouted pleas from Vienna to distance themselves from the shooting competition and, 
instead, took the opportunity to remind the federal government and the IMCC of the 
centuries-old right to bear arms Tyrol had enjoyed under the House of Habsburg, stating 
that “the use of rifles is a holy right of which no one can deprive the Tyrolese.”536  
 Stumpf was the key figure in the creation of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr and it 
functioned largely at his discretion, especially in the early years of its existence. The 
police force in Tyrol’s larger cities and, especially its capital city, Innsbruck, were, in 
Stumpf’s opinion, sympathetic to local Social Democratic leaders and, therefore, 
unreliable. He used the Heimatwehr as a counterweight to this problem and demanded 
that police leaders, and their subordinates, become Heimatwehr members. In this way, 
Stumpf essentially subordinated the police to the Heimatwehr prompting, then Minister 
of the Interior, Johann Schober, to counter that public confidence in the police would be 
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shaken if it were not completely impartial.537 The Governor responded to Schober’s 
warning, stating that: 
The policeman is civil servant; he must not be impaired in his civic rights. These include 
memberships in clubs. I am not aware of a single club that would prohibit the 
policemen…But the Selbstschutzverband (the Tiroler Heimatwehr) with its loyal 
aspirations focused on the restoration of our destroyed nationality is forbidden.538 
 
While no doubt this was Stumpf’s sincere belief, his rebuttal ignored the reality of the 
situation in the province—that he was using the Heimatwehr as, to use Charles Gulick’s 
words, “an instrument of force” to intimidate Tyrolean factory workers, police leadership, 
and the Arbeiterwehr (Workers’ Guards).539 As it were, Heimatwehr men—normally 
unemployed members—continued to function as auxiliary policemen, usually in 
emergency situations. On other occasions, such as in the autumn of 1924 when Tyrolean 
police forces were considerably shorthanded, Heimatwehr men filled the gap for an 
extended period of time.540 
 In May 1929 the federal government, in an effort to protect summer tourism, 
prohibited “all parades of uniformed paramilitary associations” during the summer 
months.541 Stumpf as well as the Governor of Styria, Anton Rintelen, did not enforce the 
ban, allowing the Heimwehren to continue their rallies and parades, “in open contempt 
for (Vinzenz) Schumy’s directive.” In Lower Austria blood was shed in a couple of 
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different instances in which the Heimwehren defied the moratorium.542 Despite the 
determination of the Styrian Heimatschutz to initiate a violent confrontation at St. 
Lorenzen, the incident illustrated disregard for the Vice Chancellor’s edict by both the 
Heimatschutz as well as the Republikanischer Schutzbund.543 Despite the fact that Allied 
governments continuously dangled loans as incentive for Austrian governments to press 
harder for the disarmament of paramilitary organizations, their efforts failed to gain 
traction, as the constitution afforded the provinces significant autonomy. As in the case of 
Tyrol, the Landtag simply passed measures to activate the Heimatwehr as an emergency 
police force, placing it under the protection of the Tyrolean government.544 
 Stumpf not only protected the Tyrolean Heimatwehr from the federal government 
in Vienna, he also insulated the formation inside Tyrol. In strictly confidential directives 
issued to district-level party officials, he declared that they were to 1) become 
Heimatwehr and Technischen Nothilfe (Technical Emergency Assistance) members 
themselves, 2) protect Heimatwehr members from threat of punishment, and 3) exempt 
Heimatwehr members from motor vehicle driving bans.545 The Heimatwehr was, for all 
intents and purposes, given carte blanche in Tyrol. 
 In addition to functioning as an auxiliary police force, and counterweight to the 
comparatively modest Arbeiterwehr and, after 1923, the Republikanischer Schutzbund, 
Stumpf also tasked the Heimatwehr to initiate preparations for an “eventual Italian 
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invasion.”546 The basis for this directive is not entirely clear, though it is likely predicated 
on the tensions between Austria and Italy over South Tyrol. It is clear, however, that he 
distrusted Italy. This makes the agreement that Steidle and Pabst eventually struck with 
Mussolini in June 1928 all the more ironic; in exchange for Italian financial and military 
support, they promised that the new authoritarian government they intended to install 
would clamp down on anti-Italian sentiments expressed in the Austrian media, which 
were due in large part to the annexation of South Tyrol in 1919. Günther Messner 
contends, however, that was unlikely that Stumpf was aware of the specifics of their 
agreement, as he would have otherwise rejected it because of his commitment to the 
South Tyroleans.547  
 Indeed, the Heimatwehr alliance with Fascist Italy cemented a new trajectory for 
the Heimwehr movement and challenged the generally close relationship with their 
respective provincial governments. Mussolini’s military and financial support allowed the 
Heimwehren to distance itself from Austria’s bourgeois parties, which it had previously 
relied upon and served, and develop its own, more radical, anti-democratic platform in-
line with Mussolini’s. According to Messner, when information regarding the relationship 
between the Heimwehr movement and Fascist Italy was exposed by Social Democrats in 
the Tyrolean Landtag (Tyrolean parliament) in December 1929, it put the Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr and its supporters in an unenviable position and hastened the codification of 
                                                 
546 Messner, “Landeshauptmann Dr. Franz Stumpf,” 116; See TLA: Landesleitung der SSV Tirol 
(Heimatwehr) V/I fol.829, correspondences with Nationalrat Ing. Hans Illmer with regarding a “fascist 
invasion” in connection to the tensions surrounding South Tyrol. This is also evidenced in numerous 
“Italien” files in the TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol) collection that document the strength of the 
Italian army at various points in time. 
547 Messner, “Landeshauptmann Dr. Franz Stumpf,” 228. 
 
232 
the movement’s commitment to an anti-democratic, authoritarian regime in the form of 
the Korneuburg Oath. The information revealed to the public highlighted not only 
Heimatwehr cooperation with Italy, but worse, its willingness to acquiesce to Italian 
possession of South Tyrol in exchange for Italian money and arms. Additionally, it also 
exposed the cooling of attitudes among Heimatwehr leaders toward the unification of 
Austria with Germany. Tyrolean Social Democrats adeptly exposed the “duplicity” of the 
Heimatwehr leadership and, by association, their bourgeois party supporters, particularly 
in their willingness to forgo the issue South Tyrol.548  
 At the same time, however, suspicions of a relationship between the Heimatwehr 
leaders and Mussolini should not have been a shock by December 1929. A November 3, 
1927 article in the conservative Allgemeiner Tiroler Anzeiger, for example, dismisses a 
report from the previous day’s Münchner Neuesten Nachrichten warning of right-wing 
putschist activity in Austria, stating that “circles in Austria, which have long sympathized 
with fascism and say that the active assistance of Italy in establishment of a fascist-like 
dictatorship in Vienna would not be too dearly bought with the final renunciation of 
German-South Tyrol.” The Anzeiger article continues, by dismissing earlier reports which 
claimed that Steidle had seen departing a Heimatwehr leadership meeting in Baden 
(Germany), accompanied by Italian and Hungarian representatives. Social Democratic 
propaganda was behind this ludicrous idea.549 It was not the cooperation with Fascist 
Italy that so much strained the relationships between the governments and the 
Heimwehren, rather it was the escalating anti-democratic hostility of Heimwehren 
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rhetoric that created rifts between the movement and its provincial supporters. So long as 
the Heimwehren continued to function as an anti-Marxist instrument of the Austrian 
bourgeois parties, connections to Italy could be overlooked. Open threats and ultimatums 
to the government could not be glossed over, as the foreign aid that kept Austria afloat 
was predicated on the stability of its political climate. 
 Whatever tensions that emerged between the Heimatwehr and the Tyrolean 
government as a result of the ‘revelations’ presented by Tyrolean Social Democrats were 
not readily apparent. The publication of Steidle’s Korneuburg program evoked resolute 
action from Chancellor Johann Schober. It was Schober’s belief that Pabst had been the 
“evil” force behind this turn toward fascism and had him deported to Italy. It was no 
surprise that Steidle criticized the government’s actions, but Stumpf’s reaction was an 
indication of the close personal relationships he had developed with the members of the 
Heimatwehr Landesleitung (state leadership) and his reluctance to readily abandon his 
creation.550 According to Stumpf, Pabst was: 
taken into custody without prior consultation with the Tyrolean government and removed 
from Austria. It sees this as an assault not only on the person of Major Pabst, but also on 
a movement which much of the state-abiding population closely adheres. The Tyrolean 
Government regrets this incident all the more as it is due apparently to a member of the 
Federal Government opposed to the Heimwehr and is regarded as an act of weakness 
against elements hostile to the state.551 
 
Furthermore, in letters to Schober and Vice-Chancellor Carl Vaugoin Stumpf appealed 
Pabst’s case and eventually petitioned the Administrative Tribunal in Vienna to have the 
expulsion order overturned, to no avail.552 
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 With the publication of the Korneuburg Oath, combined with Mussolini’s 
pressure for more decisive action, the new Bundesführer, Ernst Rüdiger Prince von 
Starhemberg, called for the Heimwehren to enter a list of candidates for the forthcoming 
federal election, which further soured relations with bourgeois party leaders. As a result, 
Christian Social and pan-German party leaders cut off what financial support they had 
either arranged or could influence. Starhemberg’s decision also aggravated Heimwehr 
members who were bourgeois party representatives, most especially of the Christian 
Social Party. Despite being couched firmly in Catholic social theory, the Korneuburg 
Oath evoked mixed reactions that spanned the gambit of complete support to outright 
rejection among the provincial Heimwehr leaders in attendance and was an immediate 
strain on the confederation. Division within and among the provincial organizations 
emerged between those favoring the Korneuburg course and Heimwehr leaders who 
favored continued cooperation with the bourgeois parties.553 
 The political challenge the Korneuburg program issued to the bourgeois parties 
placed the Heimwehren firmly at odds with many influential government officials who 
had, heretofore, supported the movement or, at the very least, did not oppose them or 
their activities. Many of the leading members of the Tyrolean Volkspartei, not 
Heimatwehr members, chided Steidle and his oppositional program and demanded that 
the Tyrolean government “break” with the Heimatwehr and create a new, government-
subordinate civil defense force.554 Stumpf acquiesced. It was not until the autumn of 1932 
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that the Heimatwehr and the Tyrolean government resumed close cooperation. In the 
meantime, however, it was clear that Italian funds alone were not enough to sustain the 
organization; as one report complained, the organization nearly withered away.555  
Nevertheless, the Heimwehren persevered and after March 1933, with suspension 
of parliament and end of democratic government, gained substantial power funding in 
Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss’s new authoritarian government. Dollfuss appointed 
Heimwehr men to high ranking federal government positions. Vienna Heimwehr leader, 
Emil Fey, was made Vice Chancellor, Starhemberg was given leadership over the 
Fatherland Front, the state political party, Odo Neustädter-Stürmer assumed the position 
of State Secretary, Steidle now served as the Federal Commissioner and Vice President 
the state radio system (RAVAG), and Dr. Ludwig Draxler—who would later serve as 
Finance Minister under Schuschnigg—became legal counsel for Austria’s national bank, 
Creditanstalt-Wiener Bankverein. The Heimwehren assumed the familiar role of an 
auxiliary peace keeping force, only this time at the behest of the federal government. 
Most importantly at this time, Heimwehr units served as border patrol forces to prevent 
the potential smuggling of weapons and equipment into the country from foreign 
supporters of the Social Democrats and most especially, a new enemy—the German 
National Socialist Workers’ Party (DSNAP).556 The Heimwehr movement, in terms of 
political clout, peaked under the Dollfuss government, only to be whittled down and 
eventually dissolved in October 1936 by his successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg. 
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 The paramilitary Heimwehr movement was a creation of the provincial 
governments of the new Austrian republic. The formations reflected the widespread fear 
of Marxism and the threat of communist revolution, which had overcome eastern and 
central Europe in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. For many conservative-
minded Tyroleans like governors Schraffl and Stumpf, the Heimatwehr also represented 
the continuity of its centuries-old militia system, which, by the outset of World War I, had 
become an integral part of Tyrolean culture and symbolized its regional identity of 
independence and historic opposition to centralized authority.  
 
Clerics, Political Catholicism, and the Heimwehr Movement 
 The protection and backing the Heimwehren received by provincial governments, 
and eventually by the Dollfuss government, was underscored by the broad support of 
Catholic clergy, church functionaries, and the Christian Social Party (CSP). Church 
fathers officiated flag consecrations, field masses at Heimwehren rallies, and performed 
invocations at events such as shooting contests, not to mention recruiting the support of 
prominent members of Austrian society. Clerical support for the Heimwehren also 
translated into the participation of Catholic associations in the movement, such as student 
groups, labor unions, agricultural associations and sporting clubs. Given the historical 
prominence of the Catholic Church in Austria, clergymen played a particularly vital role 
in legitimizing the Heimwehr movement in the minds of their parishioners.557 Moreover, 
the Christian Social Party, in which Catholic clerics such as Dr. Ignaz Seipel played 
                                                 




integral roles in guiding, dominated the government on the provincial and federal levels 
and supplied political support, which translated into flexible interpretations of the 
ambiguous statutes of the Treaty of Saint Germain, the passing of legislation to 
essentially protect party-friendly, anti-Marxist paramilitary formations, and, lastly, 
monetary support to the always-needy provincial Heimwehren.558 
One of the principal ways clerics exhibited their support for the Heimwehr 
movement was by officiating flag dedications and field Masses at Heimwehr rallies. The 
Heimwehr newspaper, the Alpenländische Heimatwehr, detailed the flag dedication 
ceremony of the Innsbrucker Heimatwehr in December 1925. On the hallowed ground of 
Berg Isel, with Landeshauptmann (or Governor) Dr. Franz Stumpf, numerous Tyrolean 
officials in attendance, Auxiliary Bishop of Brixen, Dr. Sigismund Waitz, presided over 
the ceremony, concluding his benediction with, “Tiroler Heimatwehr, your flag is blessed, 
it is raised and flutters in the wind, follow your flag, the blessing of God accompanies 
you!”559 In 1935, at the fifteenth anniversary of the Heimwehr movement, Starhemberg 
called Waitz, now Archbishop of Salzburg, “an old, loyal friend who has done much for 
the (Austrian) Heimatschutz and the enforcement of the Heimatschutz idea.”560 
Beyond their support in ceremonial capacities, clergy members leveraged their 
place in Austrian society to support Heimwehr objectives. Throughout Austria, 
Heimwehren, with the cooperation of Church clergy, used flag dedication ceremonies as a 
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way to circumvent the previously mentioned ban of public demonstrations by 
paramilitary organizations during the summer of 1929. Because the flag dedications 
included a Mass ceremony led by a Catholic priest, they could be considered church-
sanctioned events and were, therefore, had to be permitted under the law.561 One 
“Heimwehr-Priester,” Father von Rastbach, went so far as to consecrate a shooting range 
so as to permit the Heimwehr to hold an event that summer.562 Later that summer, Styrian 
Bishop, Dr. Ferdinand Pawlikovski, who was the Military Vicar of Austria, accompanied 
a Heimwehren delegation who met with Chancellor Schober, intent on pressing their calls 
for constitutional reform.563 
Catholic clergymen portrayed the Heimwehren as defenders of the Church in the 
tradition of the Habsburg Monarchy. Their politicized sermons that warned that 
Christianity was being threatened by the “godless” Marxists of the Social Democratic 
Party and their paramilitary wing, the Republikanischer Schutzbund, made their portrait 
of the Heimwehren all the more palatable to rural, traditional-minded Austrians.564 As 
Schneeberger explains, the smaller and more rural the community, the greater the 
influence of the parish church in the religious, social, and, consequently, the political 
outlook of its congregation. As such, local clergymen utilized their position in the Church 
and the Church’s position in the community to mobilize support among their worshippers 
for the Heimwehren and the Christian Social Party through sermons that depicted the 
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struggle against Marxism as a holy crusade of good against evil in which the very 
survival of Christianity was at stake.565 To be sure, the electoral success of the 
Heimatblock in Upper Austria during the 1930 national election, for instance, was aided 
greatly by the support of the clergy, who emphasized the positive relationship between 
the Church and the Heimwehr movement.566  
This does not mean that the relationship between clerics, the Christian Social 
Party, and Heimwehren was free of challenges and setbacks. Despite the outward 
appearance of unanimity, many Christian Social representatives were reluctant to support 
the Heimwehr movement. Despite the success of the Heimwehren in smashing the riots 
of July 1927 in Vienna and breaking the subsequent national railroad strike, most 
Christian Social representatives were disinclined to agree with Steidle’s—himself a 
Christian Social National Council member (Bundesrat)—request for financial subsidies, 
which he and Seipel were hoping to attain.567 Instead, party representatives called for the 
reduction of the Heimwehren, while others suggested that that money would be better 
served in dealing with the multitude of the unemployed. As Wiltschegg notes, numerous 
other Christian Social functionaries reflected their mistrust of the Heimwehren, arguing 
for the creation of the party’s own paramilitary organization (just as the Social Democrats 
had done in creating the Republican Schutzbund), as the Heimwehren represented an 
“tremendous danger.” Furthermore, the Christian Social Party’s labor union secretary, 
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Hans Müller, claimed that local Heimwehr groups “were terror organizations against 
Christian workers.”568 
Such discord was not limited to political representatives, as there were also clergy 
members who opposed clerical support of Heimwehr ideals and activities. Wiltschegg 
offers one particularly extraordinary example where the Bishop of Linz, Dr. Johannes 
Maria Gföllner, a strident opponent of the Heimwehren, had retired army chaplain, Josef 
Schorr, at the time the parish priest for Laufen in Bad Ischl and supporter of the Upper 
Austrian Heimwehr, transferred to Lower Austria, where Schorr proceeded to tend to the 
4th Lower Austrian Heimatschutz Brigade. Gföllner would also see to the resignation of 
Christian Social Party member and Chairman of the Catholic People’s Association for 
Upper Austria, Dr. Josef Aigner. Moreover, Gföllner forbade priests under his supervision 
to perform flag dedication ceremonies, while also forbidding Catholic women from 
participating in the Heimwehr Women’s Auxiliary (Heimatwehr-Frauengruppen).569 
The close association forged between Catholic clergy members and the Heimwehr 
movement did not proceed without criticism. Social Democratic newspapers attacked the 
sermons and speeches of clerics with biting sarcasm and disgust at what they perceived to 
be hypocrisy in Christian prelates condoning the rabid anti-socialist, anti-Semitic rhetoric 
of the Heimwehren. On Sunday June 12, 1920, the Shooting League of the Catholic 
Workers Unions—whose members were in the Tyrolean Heimatwehr—held a shooting 
contest at Berg Isel shooting range, in Innsbruck. As was typical, the contest was 
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preceded by a Mass service. The communist party newspaper, Die Rote Fahne (The Red 
Flag), disdainfully remarked, “So, first church and then practice for homicide! This 
Christianity to be proud of!”570 On another occasion, Die Rote Fahne, called the 
attendees of a Styrian rally in August 1928, “sponsors of murder.” The article continued, 
suggesting that perhaps Bishop Pawlikowski would “issue a pastoral letter, wherein he 
can request entry for the Heimwehr in God's name and his holy spirits, Amen.”571 The 
juxtaposition of the “hate speech” of Heimwehr leaders and the Catholic clergy members 
who officiated their events prompted wider criticism. A May 1929 article commenting on 
a Heimwehr event in Vienna, contrasted the fact that in one moment the priest blessed the 
flags of the newly established Heimwehr formations to enthusiastic applause, only to be 
followed minutes later by Steidle and Pfrimer’s hateful political diatribes that tactlessly 
railed against "the red whore," meaning, of course, Marxism or communism.572  
Beyond officiating Heimwehr ceremonies and advocating for the movement, 
clergy members also took a more active role in supporting the movement. For example, 
in Kollerschlag, Upper Austria, the parish priest, a Father Pichler, founded a Heimwehr 
group. He explained that founding a Heimwehr group “would prevent ‘whole villages, 
such as Hinternebelberg, from burning down’” in a Social Democratic terror attack.573 
There are numerous other cases of clergymen allowing their churches to serve as 
weapons depots for the Heimwehren.574 
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As previously stated, the decision of the Heimwehren to seek out Mussolini’s 
counsel, funding, and military aid enabled the movement to express its disapproval of the 
laxed position of Austria’s bourgeois parties vis-à-vis the Social Democrats. This was 
evident not only in the publication of the Korneuburg Oath, but also in the establishment 
of the Heimatblock, the movement’s own political party. Moderate Christian Social party 
officials saw this shift as an ominous development toward the imminence of a coup 
d’état. Thus, in December 1930, future Chancellor, Kurt Schuschnigg, founded the 
paramilitary Ostmärkischen Sturmscharen, which was intended to compete with the 
Heimwehren in recruiting Catholic youths. The Sturmscharen represented the realization 
of the aforementioned desires for the Christian Social Party to forge its own paramilitary 
wing.575 At the same time, the more moderate Christian Social representative and leader 
of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr, Julius Raab, and his followers withdrew from 
Starhemberg’s confederation, vowing to hold true to the movement’s pre-Korneuberg 
ideals. In a letter written to the Ybbstal Zeitung, rail worker, member of the Union of 
Christian Germans Transportation Workers, and Heimwehr member, Franz Bartik, 
defends the Christian Social Party, stating that they are not at fault for their split and that 
the Christian Social Party “prepared and paved the ground upon which the former 
Heimwehr was born and lived.” Imploring his rail worker colleagues to join him, adding, 
the “Richtung Raab,” is the “true idea of the Heimwehr.”576  
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Indeed, anti-clerical, pan-German leaders within the Heimwehr movement—most 
prominently, Walter Pfrimer—consistently opposed close cooperation with the Church 
and the Christian Social Party. In April 1931 Christian Social members of the Styrian 
Heimatschutz became so exasperated with Pfrimer’s—and likely overall—opposition to 
the Christian Social Party and his tirades against its affiliated labor unions, that several 
formations in the provincial capital of Graz, split from the Heimatschutz and formed their 
own organization, the Grazer Heimatschutzverbandes and elected as their leader, 
Oberstleutnant a.D. (Ret.) Ernst Haffenbauer.577  
Nevertheless, the relationship between the Heimwehren, the Christian Social 
Party, clergy, and their parishioners was reciprocal. Congregation members utilized the 
infrastructure and voice of the Church, the Christian Social Party, and the Heimwehren as 
a means of furthering their own economic interests. Through the Heimwehren’s 
opposition to the secular ideals of Marxism, ecclesiastical circles viewed the movement 
as one of potential renewal of German Christianity.578 Thus, the Christian Social clergy 
sought to integrate their devout Christians into the Heimwehr movement in order to 
insure its reliability as a force to protect the Church. An exchange between Steidle and 
pastor Thomas Tembler in Strassen (Lienz, Tyrol), provides an excellent illustration of 
how this relationship worked. In his letter dated February 22, 1928, Tembler explained 
that the Catholic Workers Association in Strassen sought to form for a “Wehrgruppe,” and 
requested from the Landesleitung, a supply of rifles to be sent via post (“for the sake of 
safety”) to the association’s office. Steidle graciously responded that he would gladly 
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supply the new “Wehrgruppe” with the rifles and would also write to district captain, 
Nationalrat Erich Kneussl and Oberforstrat Karl Ritter von Worzikowsky-Kundratitz, 
informing them of the transaction and to offer his support for the new group.579 
Chief among the clerical supporters of the Heimwehr movement was prelate and 
Christian Social Party leader, Chancellor (1922-1924, 1926-1929) Dr. Ignaz Seipel. 
Almost immediately upon Seipel’s appointment to the chancellorship, he attempted to 
seize upon the potential power of the Heimwehr movement to unify conservative 
Heimattreue Bevölkerung against the Social Democrats.580 Seipel brokered a deal in 
which sympathetic industrialists would provide 150,000,000 kronen per month to the 
Chancellor who would then distribute the funds to the provincial Heimwehren 
organizations. Despite Steidle’s efforts to unify the Heimwehren in support of Seipel’s 
proposal, the leaders of nationalist, anti-clerical formations in Vienna, Styria, and 
Carinthia opposed aligning their organizations with the Christian Social Party.581  
In Seipel’s second term as Chancellor, he again made clear his support for the 
Heimwehren. Amidst the tensions leading up to what has come to be known simply as the 
“Juli Ereignisse von 1927,” or the “July Events of 1927,” Social Democratic appeals to 
the Chancellor to disarm the Heimwehren were deflected by half-hearted claims that the 
federal government did not have the authority. While not entirely disingenuous, as the 
constitution granted the provinces substantial autonomy in administering to their internal 
affairs, Seipel had no intentions of even attempting to disarm the Heimwehren. 
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Furthermore, any attempt to do so would have most assuredly triggered civil war, as 
Steidle made clear the resolute resistance the Heimwehren would offer. On two occasions 
in October 1927, Seipel publicly commended the protection the Heimwehren offered 
against the “enemies of Jesus Christ,” meaning, of course, the Social Democrats. In the 
meantime, with the Chancellor’s encouragement, Steidle made another attempt to unify 
the Heimwehren. This time, the financial assistance Seipel facilitated was successful in 
creating a federal Heimwehr front—the Bund österreichischer Selbstschutzverbände.582 
Quite to the contrary of Jedlicka’s assertion that the Heimwehren utilized rallies 
and parades, such as that which occurred in Wiener-Neustadt in October 1928, to “drive 
the hesitant government, and above all Dr. Seipel, into altering the constitution, perhaps 
through some kind of putsch or coup d'état,” it was Seipel who utilized such 
demonstrations to press for the passage of controversial legislation and amendments to 
the constitution.583 In fact, in September 1928, prior to their march on Wiener-Neustadt, 
Steidle three and other Heimwehr leaders met with Seipel to ask for his backing should 
hostilities breakout with the Social Democratic Republican Schutzbund during the course 
of the demonstration. Seipel replied to the affirmative, so long as they did not intend to 
purposefully initiate hostilities.584 True to their word, the Heimwehren “Aufmarsch” 
(parade) and rally in Wiener-Neustadt occurred without incident. 
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Indeed, throughout this term as Chancellor, Seipel “encouraged [Heimwehr] 
activity in hopes of forcing the socialists to make concessions on bitterly contested 
legislation, including the revision of the constitution that he hoped would pave the way 
for a more authoritarian form of government.” During the tension-filled days leading up 
the Wiener-Neustadt rally, Seipel was resolute in his defense of the Heimwehren against 
Social Democratic calls to forbid the march, which many in Austria feared would trigger 
a civil war. As Edmondson notes, Seipel refused to restrict their activities and actively 
working to strengthen the movement in Vienna—the stronghold of the Social 
Democrats.585 The Seipel government continued to subsidize Heimwehren activities until 
its very end, as indicated in a March 2, 1929 letter Steidle wrote to Seipel, requesting 
“100,000 Schilling für den Grazer Aufmarsch.”586 
Seipel’s abrupt resignation in April 1929 was an indictment of the alleged failure 
of parliamentary democracy, which he viewed as Austria’s greatest crisis. Thus, his 
resignation was quite possibly a single move in a larger plan to undermine the 
parliamentary system. That is, Seipel, as the leader of the political Catholic Christian 
Social Party, perhaps believed that he could effect change more efficiently behind the 
scenes and outside of the office of Chancellor, which, by the very mechanisms of a 
republican state, limited the ways in which he could maneuver. He remained a devoted 
supporter the Heimwehren, calling the movement a “strong populist movement which 
wants to free democracy from party rule!” To be sure, Seipel supported the Heimwehr 
movement to see the his own designs for Austria come to fruition, which were most likely 
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not aligned with the more fascist, corporative state that sections of the Heimwehren 
would come to openly espouse. Nevertheless, as the German ambassador to Austria, 
Hugo von Lerchenfeld, reported to the German Foreign Ministry, Seipel supported the 
Heimwehr movement’s goals “from a to z.”587 Seipel remained a close and influential 
advisor to Steidle, as well as Lower Austrian Heimwehr leader, Julius Raab. While this 
aggravated the more radical anti-clerical elements in the Heimwehr movement who felt 
their cooperation with the Christian Social Party was hampering the changing objectives 
of the movement, Seipel continued to work to keep the Heimwehren unified. 
Eventually, the strong political position of the Christian Social Party within 
Austria proved irresistible to the new Bundesfüher of the Heimwehr movement, Ernst 
Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg, who had previously aligned himself with Pfrimer and 
the Nazi-friendly, German nationalist elements with the Heimwehr movement. The 
former Freikorps Oberland member publicly divorced himself from the Nazis and entered 
into an alliance with Seipel and Mussolini and renewed cooperation with Steidle and Fey. 
In the face of the defections that resulted, particularly amongst Styrian and Lower 
Austrian formations, Seipel worked to reaffirm and solidify their reconciliation.588 
Though the primary source of support within Austria’s federal government, Seipel 
was but one of many of the Christian Social officials who supported the Heimwehr 
movement. As has already been demonstrated, Franz Stumpf was the central figure in the 
creation and preservation of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr throughout the course of its 
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existence. Christian Social deputy, Dr. Heinrich Mataja, secured funds and arms from 
Styria for the fledgling Salzburg Heimwehr in 1919.589 Early on, Heimwehr formations in 
Vienna and Lower Austria won the support of the Christian Social Party, who connected 
the formations with the financial backers in the form of the Wiener Kasino, also known as 
the Vereinigung für Ordnung und Recht (Association for Law and Order).590 
The close cooperation between the Heimwehren and the Christian Social Party 
and the Church did not end with Seipel’s death in 1932. In fact, he did not live to see the 
fruits of his labors in the form of the “May Constitution.”591 Implemented on May 1, 
1934 and establishing what it’s preamble described as a “Christian, German State on a 
corporatist basis,” the constitution reflected the collaboration of Heimwehr and Christian 
Social leadership in its marriage of Catholic social teachings and corporatism. Chiefly 
among those teachings underpinning the new authoritarian constitution was Pope Pius 
IX’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. As Robert Pyrah contends, despite the institution of 
a contradictory governmental structure, the “spirit” of the encyclical was evident in the 
“anti-modern Catholic thinking” inherent in corporatism, itself a medieval 
construction.592 
To be sure, Catholic clergymen and many central figures in their political party 
played leading roles in creating and maintaining the Heimwehr movement throughout 
Austria. Without their financial, propagandistic, and political support the Heimwehren 
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would have never survived, much less matured into the driving force for authoritarian 
government. The Church-Heimwehren relationship reflected a continuity of traditional 
Habsburg civic militarism, reflected not only in its rituals and ceremonies, but also in the 
social groups that it drew its support—those of the leading stratum of the dissolved 
Monarchy. Particularly for the more traditional elements of the Heimwehren, their 
movement took on, for them, the feel of a holy crusade against the secular, anti-clerical 
ideals of Marxism. It reflected not only an assault on their economic and individual 
property rights, but also an assault on traditional forms of German cultural expression in 
the Catholic Church. "It is not without deeper reason we almost never hold our rallies 
without ecclesiastical assistance, without field mass, and as a symbol, it should be 
considered that our speaker standing often before the altar as upright men, to speak to 
you," explained one Heimwehr member.593 Thus, the relationship between the Church 
and the Heimwehren was a natural alliance in the protection of true (Southern Catholic) 
German values. 
 
Nobles, Industrialists, and Bankers: Money, Prestige, and the Rise of the Heimwehren 
 The Heimwehr movement found many of its most prominent adherents from the 
leading social groups of the old Monarchy. Not unlike the clergy, members of the 
Habsburg aristocracy—despite having lost governmental recognition of their titles—
continued to carry much influence in Austrian society. As Carsten notes  
[T]he great aristocratic names, which became prominent in the Heimwehren about this 
time (1929), simply looked like a revival of noble and dynastic claims. According to a 
report sent by the German legation in Vienna to Berlin, these circles were now thinking 
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of a come-back: ‘The Starhembergs and Czernins, the Hohenbergs and Morseys scent the 
new air; they even form cavalry detachments, the horses of which they keep and feed. 
One thinks the Middle Ages have returned…’  
 
Though Pabst, according to one Hungarian diplomat, complained that a great many who 
of them who had flooded into the Heimwehren were “incapable” leaders who “did more 
damage to the movement than their names were worth.”594  
Furthermore, the primary supporters of the “Ständestaat” would also come from 
the “old ruling circles,” particularly the Catholic clergy, and the former aristocracy, who 
leveraged the new authoritarian state as a means of “defending their established positions 
against the threats from the left and the right.”595 Those nobles active in the Heimwehren 
employed their social standing and wealth to help propel the movement into an 
instrument of political influence. The ascent of the Heimwehren to the highest ranks of 
political power in Austria, thus, restored them to a place of political prominence 
commiserate with their old imperial titles and legacy. Moreover, many of the aristocrats 
that became involved in the Heimwehr movement were former officers during or before 
the Great War, so their involvement in paramilitary organizations like the Heimwehren 
allowed them to again fulfill leadership positions, which also helped restore the 
legitimacy of their former status.596 Indeed, the Heimwehren, beyond their primary 
mission as the vanguard of the anti-Marxist front in Austria, through its deeply 
conservative sensibilities, its endorsement by the clergy, and rituals such as parades, flag 
consecration ceremonies, field Masses, and rallies, evoked a sense of nostalgia for the 
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ritual pomp and pageantry of the empire, among many nobles. The broad backing of the 
Austrian nobility highlights the residual culture of militarism inherited from the 
Habsburg Monarchy. 
Wiltschegg, pointing to the Association of Catholic Nobles in Austria as an 
example, contends that of its 1393 total members, only twenty-six—1.9 percent—were 
members of the Heimwehr movement.597 He then goes on to identify a total of 55 nobles 
who served in middle and high-ranking positions within the Heimwehren.598 








Thus, he concludes, “In the group of the highest leaders [of the Heimwehr movement] the 
nobility was in no way a strong presence.” Be that as it may, Wiltschegg does not 
consider those who were involved throughout the regional and local levels of leadership 
within the movement. Take, for example, the son of Karl Matz Graf von Spiegelfeld, 
Franz Xavier, who was a local Heimwehr leader in Lower Austria, Major Baron Karl 
Skrbensky, who was active in the Upper Austrian Heimatwehr, or Karl von Arbesser, a 
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district leader in the Styrian Heimatschutz.599 It is also worth reiterating that throughout 
European history, the nobility was always small and exclusive socioeconomic class, so 
size has never been an accurate barometer of influence in this case. Despite the fact that 
Austrian nobles had lost official recognition of their titles less than a decade earlier; many 
remained wealthy and influential figures in Austrian society and maintained much of their 
prestige in popular culture.600 Furthermore, the participation of nobles in the Heimwehr 
movement, was indicative of broader a counter-revolutionary trend. For example, of the 
132 Freikorps known formations in Germany, 42 were led by aristocratic former officers. 
In Hungary, 86 of the 163 members of the Prónay paramilitary unit were nobles who 
frequently used them to intimidate estate servants, thus, maintaining their place in post-
war Hungarian society. Thus, as Gerwarth notes, “aristocrats were highly overrepresented 
in the counter-revolutionary movements of Central Europe.”601 
Beyond active membership in the Heimwehr movement, it is necessary to address 
an important discrepancy between numbers and influence. As this chapter has 
demonstrated in the case of government officials and Catholic clergy, just because few of 
their numbers were uniform-wearing members, should not be taken as an absence of 
support for the Heimwehren. Edmondson notes, the “great land owners” (the nobles) 
were counted amongst the principal financiers of the Heimwehr movement as early as the 
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spring of 1921.602 An outstanding illustrative example can be found in the October 14, 
1930 edition of the Arbeiter-Zeitung, which published the names and land holdings of 
some 139 nobles who were either themselves Heimwehren members or had donated 
money to the movement. The article carped, “If you leaf through the Year and Address 
Book of Agriculture and Forestry, you believe yourself, at first, to have a noble directory 
from the Middle Ages.”603 Among the names on the list were indeed among the most 
illustrious houses of imperial history: Habsburg-Lothringen, Bourbon-Parma, Czernin, 
Schwarzenberg, Starhemberg, and so forth and so on. The source from which the names 
of these aristocratic donors were gathered is not declared beyond the vague explanation 
of “member lists and donor cards,” which would have likely not been freely accessible to 
Social Democratic news organs.  
The front page of the October 23, 1930 edition of the left-leaning Linz newspaper, 
Tagblatt, continued to push for land reform, as Social Democrats hoped to gain the 
support of agricultural laborers and, simultaneously, weaken the conservative, 
Heimwehren-supporting aristocracy. A graphic accompanying the article depicts the 
considerable portion of Upper Austrian land owned by nine “Heimwehr Nobles.” The 
schematic points out not only land owned by the families of well-known Heimwehr 
members such as the Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg, Count Karl Othmar von 
Lamberg, and Count Peter Revertera-Salandra, but also the land owned by the 
Rothschild, Kinsky, Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha, Württemberg, Almeida, and Arco-Valley 
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families were included among these “Heimwehradels.”604 Those identified by the Social 
Democratic press cannot, however, be considered comprehensive. The Arbeiter-Zeitung 
list was limited to those nobles who owned 1,000 hectares (2471 acres) or more of land. 
Thus, any aristocrat owning less than that was omitted. Absent from the list was, for 
example, Count Karl Matz von Spiegelfeld. In a letter dated April 8, 1928, Spiegelfeld 
requested that Steidle investigate why his son, an Ortsgruppenführer in the Lower 
Austrian Heimwehr, was yet to receive his 250 schillings monthly salary, reminding the 
Bundesführer of his “material support” in an effort to compel Steidle into investigating 
the matter.605 Clearly, the financial, material, and political support of Austrian nobles was 
an important pillar in the movement’s growth and popularity. 
The aristocracy and Austria’s banks and industry began funneling large sums of 
money into the Heimwehren as early as 1921. An article in the Arbeiter-Zeitung detailed 
that a meeting that reportedly took place on Saturday March 5, 1921 in Graz, in which 
Christian social representatives deputy governor Jacob Ahrer and Dr. Emanual 
Weidenhoffer, the “Hauptverbandes der Industriellen,” and representatives of the “Grazer 
Großbankfilialen und Banken,” which comprised fourteen financial institutions. The 
results of the meeting, according to these articles, was an agreement that the industrialists 
would donate 2,000,000 kronen, the banks would contribute another 2,000,000 and 
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Austria’s “Großgrundbesitzer,” another 1,000,000 kronen annually.606 Hauptverband der 
Industrie Österreich President, Ludwig Urban, admitted the association’s contributions to 
the Heimwehren in a June 1923 general assembly of its members.607 Vinzenz Schumy, in 
his memoir, attributed a 25,000 schillings per month stipend to the Heimwehren from 
Austrian financial institutions, though he offers no firm dates as to when these 
contributions began and ended.608 
The reach of the nobility was not limited, however, to owning large estates. Quite 
contrary to the orthodox narrative, the important industrialists, bankers, and aristocrats 
who subsidized the Heimwehr movement were not the discrete groups portrayed in the 
historical literature; there was a significant degree of intersection. That is, prominent 
bankers and industrialists who financed the Heimwehren could be counted, first, among 
the nobility. Placed in this context, the role of aristocracy in the movement emerges as 
being much greater than previously acknowledged. One prominent example of this 
intersection is Robert Freiherr von Ehrhart, vice-president of the Hauptverband der 
Industrie Österreich. The relationship between Hauptverband President Ludwig Urban 
and Vice President, Baron von Ehrhart and the Heimwehren is largely absent from the 
historiography—save for a brief mention that the Hauptverband had been donors to the 
Heimwehr movement since 1922, and Ehrhart’s efforts to smooth tensions between 
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Starhemberg and executives of the Styrian-based Österreichisch-Alpine 
Montangesellschaft (AMG) or, the Alpine Mining Association,—despite being an 
important figure in financing the movement.609 Kevin Mason’s study, which relies 
heavily on Ehrhart’s papers, housed at the University of Vienna, despite focus its focus 
on his political outlook, mentions nothing of the Baron’s contributions to the Heimwehr 
movement.610  
The Heimwehr movement experienced exponential growth upon crushing Social 
Democratic riots in Vienna, and the national railroad strike that followed during the 
tumultuous “Events of July 1927.” Seipel’s goal of establishing a strong presence in 
Vienna was fully underway with the creation of three formations in Vienna under the 
Bund österreichischer Selbstschutzverbände umbrella in December 1928. In addition to 
nobles such as Prince Heinrich von Schwarzenberg, who “selflessly” recruited new 
members and solicited financial support, Ehrhart played a crucial role in helping cement 
the presence of the Heimwehr movement in Vienna through mediating financial 
contributions from the Hauptverband to the Viennese groups under Dr. Franz Hemala, 
Major a.D. Emil Fey, and Hofrat Eduard Pichl.611 
Within a week of the creation of the Heimwehr umbrella organization, Bund 
österreichischer Selbstschutzverbände (Federation of Austrian Self-Defense 
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Associations), it was supplied with 55,000 Austrian schillings from “Austria’s bankers’ 
and manufacturers’ assocations,” which, over the course of the next two and a half years, 
would total some 1,500,000 Austrian schillings.612 Baron Ehrhart and the Hauptverband 
der Industrie Österreich were subsidizing the Heimwehren at this time with a monthly 
stipend of 17,500 schillings. By March 1928 it would appear that the Bund had received 
an additional 115,000 schillings in special subsidies.613 In addition to the monthly 
subsidies from Ehrhart and the Hauptverband, the association also created a reserve fund 
for which the Heimwehren could request advances from to help pay for larger rallies or 
extenuating circumstances, which is precisely what they did to help pay for the Wiener-
Neustadt rally in October 1928. Correspondences between Ehrhart, Steidle, and Pabst 
indicate that the Baron and his associates contributed at least 125,000 schillings toward 
preparations for the rally, with 40,000 schillings remaining in the reserve fund.614  
The paper trail throughout spring 1929 shows frequent correspondences Pabst, 
Steidle, and Ehrhart. Already by January 1929, Pabst had wrote to Ehrhart requesting a 
monthly increase of 400 schillings in addition to the 1,000 schillings the Hauptverband 
was already contributing to Fey and Pichl’s formations. Fey’s organization was in poor 
shape financially, having added 400 new members in less than a month. Additionally, 
Pabst requested a one-time grant of 5,000 schillings to a new reserve fund to be used 
specifically for the Viennese formations; the Hauptverband met both requests. Ehrhart 
granted another 4,100 schillings to Pichl to procure equipment for his Selbstschutz Wien 
in February. By the beginning of March, the monthly stipend the Bund received from the 
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Hauptverband had increased to 23,900 schillings per month, 53,000 schillings in one-time 
contribution, and 25,000 schillings to the Styrian Heimatschutz, which was to be paid 
monthly through August at 4,000 schillings per month. At the same time, Pichl added a 
fifth Viennese group, led by former Styrian Stabsleiter, Leutenant a.D. Otto Gallian, 
under his banner, adding further to the financial needs of his organization. The 
Hauptverband delivered once more, adding 300 more schillings to Pichl’s monthly 
stipend and 700 schilling contribution for equipping the new “Gallian Gruppe.”615 
Despite the fact that the archival paper trail of communications between Steidle, Pabst, 
and Baron Ehrhart ends in August 1929, it is clear that the Hauptverband der Industrie 
Österreichs played a significant role in the growth and expansion of the Heimwehr 
movement into the last remaining Marxist stronghold in Austria. Moreover, it represented 
the core industrial supporter of the implementation of the Ständestaat in the May 1934.616 
According to an article originating from London’s Daily Telegraph, alongside the 
AMG, Ludwig Freiherr von Rothschild was the central financial backer of the Heimwehr 
movement. Despite the generally anti-Semitic disposition of the Heimwehren, the article 
contends, Baron von Rothschild allied himself with the Heimwehr movement and the 
Christian Socials in order to combat Social Democratic-supported luxury taxes.617 The 
subsequent, and previously mentioned, Arbeiter-Zeitung article, which listed the major 
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aristocratic landowners backing the Heimwehr movement, named Baron von Rothschild 
among them.618 
Like Ehrhart, Baron Rothschild, save for a single instance in which he reportedly 
advised Steidle and Pabst, in November 1930, that a putsch executed quickly and with 
minimal bloodshed would not cripple the Austrian schilling, is virtually absent from the 
Heimwehr historiography.619 It seems more likely that his business dealings with 
Christian Social leaders and important industrial backers of the Heimwehr movement, as 
the chairman of Austria’s largest bank, Creditanstalt, placed him in the cross-hairs of the 
Marxist press whose penchant for sensationalism likely positioned Rothschild in much 
closer proximity to Heimwehr movement than was actually the case.620 On a personal 
level, however, Rothschild did help Heimwehr Bundesführer Ernst Rüdiger Prince von 
Starhemberg overcome his own financial difficulties that resulted from the heavy 
investment of his own money into his personally loyal Heimwehr jäger (rifle) 
formations.621  
However close Rothschild was to the Heimwehr movement, the financial backing 
by Jewish businessmen was not incredible. Indeed, despite the aggressive anti-Semitic 
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rhetoric of some Heimwehr leaders, Jewish bankers and businessmen came out in support 
of the movement’s opposition to the high taxation leveed by Vienna’s Social Democrat-
dominated city government.622 Moreover, some Jewish business owners acquiesced to 
Heimwehr demands that they dismiss employees who were members of the Social 
Democratic Party. Some Jewish bankers like Rudolf Sieghart, for example, industrialists 
such as Fritz Mandl, and businesses, like Phönix (Phoenix) Life, an insurance and 
financial company, the third largest company in continental Europe, in fact, sympathized 
with the strident anti-Marxism of the Heimwehren and indeed subsidized the 
movement.623 
There are much more concrete connections between the Heimwehr movement and 
AMG, however. The financial support and membership numbers the association 
contributed to the Styrian Heimatschutz and the Heimwehr movement in general, was 
well known. The AMG began funding the Heimwehren in 1921, as the lieutenant 
governor of Styria, Jakob Ahrer, secured 5,000,000 kronen in financial support for 
uniforms and equipment.624 While the Hauptverband der Industrie contributed between 
17,500 – 23,900 shillings per month to the Heimwehren, the AMG—Austria’s largest 
industrial company—made monthly contributions to the Heimwehren, which according 
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to Kondert, came to the sum of approximately 300,000 shillings annually, between the 
years 1927 and 1930.625  
AMG employees at all levels, were members of the Heimatschutz. The 
association’ General Secretary, Dr. Felix Busson, was the leader of the Styrian 
Heimatschutz’s “Rechtskampfgruppe,” or litigation group, while head of the blast furnace 
plant in Donowitz and former K.u.k. Army officer, Ing. Josef Oberegger, was the military 
leader of the Upper Styrian Heimatschutz and served as the industry representative in the 
Heimwehr’s abortive Bundeswirtschafts- und Ständeamt, or the Federal Economic and 
Corporation Office.626 Additionally, over half of the employees of the Donawitz works 
joined the Styrian Heimatschutz.627 In fact, preference was given to Heimatschutz 
members in the hiring and promotion process.628 Membership in the Heimatschutz was 
encouraged by the AMG, and eventually, in conjunction with the Heimatschutz, those 
employees formed their own, “independent” labor union. So successful was this 
marriage, that the AMG began hiring only non-Socialist workers, weakening the grip of 
the Social Democratic party in Styria.629 In 1930, the AMG fired hundreds of its workers 
for being members of the Social Democratic party or sympathizers.630 Indeed, the two 
sides worked hand-in-glove throughout the 1920s, while the Heimwehren crushed 
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workers’ strikes and Social Democratic labor unions, AMG filled its coffers, ranks, and 
openly defended the movement.631 
The close relationship between the AMG and the Heimwehr movement continued 
until the new Heimwehren Bundesführer, Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg, took 
the side of the independent labor unions, of whom so many were Heimwehr members, 
against the Montangesellschaft over laying off massive numbers of employees and 
reducing the wages of others. Unsurprisingly, the AMG cut off its subsidies to the 
Heimwehren in January 1931.632 In spite of the efforts of Seipel and Baron von Ehrhart to 
repair the relationship, AMG began throwing its money, instead, behind the Austrian Nazi 
Party (DSNAP) in 1932. 
Such efforts were not limited to the Styrian Heimatschutz, the Tyrolean 
Heimatwehr, along with other provincial organizations, actively sought to help find 
employment for its jobless members. As previously mentioned, unemployed members 
were given preference when opportunities arose to work shifts as auxiliary police arose. 
Moreover, their close connection with the Tyrolean Manufacturers Association, a major 
financier, the Heimatwehr gained for its members, preference in the hiring process.633 
Chancellor Ernst von Streeruwitz later confessed in his memoir that "Indeed, 
[Austrian] industry had raised substantial sums of money in order to strengthen the 
                                                 
631 Lauridsen, Radical Right, 205 points out AMG general director Anton Apold’s public defense 
of Heimwehren opposition to Chancellor Schober’s proposal of disarming all Austrian paramilitary 
organizations, including the Heimwehren for the purpose of gaining foreign economic aid. 
632 Carsten, Fascist Movements, 180-1; Lauridsen, Radical Right, 221-2. According to Lauridsen 
the Hauptverband also refused to pay their monthly stipend to the Heimwehren, but only temporarily and 
for a different reason—the divisiveness that wracked the movement in late 1930 and early 1931.  
633 Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 41; See also TLA: Landesleitung der SSV 
Tirol, VI/12 Stellenvermittlung; TLA: Landesleitung der SSV Tirol, VII/10 Stellenvermittlung; TLA: 




Heimwehr movement, without ever denying it. Often enough I cooperated in these 
resolutions by counsel and vote."634 The general theme amongst historical writings on the 
interwar Austrian republic has been that it was a state nobody wanted. Less emphasized is 
that parliamentary democracy was a system of government that the majority of Austrians 
at the time did not want. This was particularly true for Austrian industrialists who had, 
during the Monarchy, utilized connections to the royal court to maintain a favorable for 
doing business. The dismantling of the Empire left this group without a patron. At the 
same time, in the new government, organized labor grew substantially in power and were 
able to force concessions such as increases in wages and workplace improvements and 
protections through legislation and labor strikes. According to manufacturers, this 
accounted for between 22 to 25 percent of their annual expenses. This was, no doubt, the 
primary motivation for their cooperation with the Christian Social Party to fund the 
Heimwehr movement, which both sought to use as an instrument of force to break Social 
Democratic trade unions.635 Thus, as Gulick concludes, “Austrian industry 
furthered…with the greatest vigor the destruction of parliamentary democracy.”636 
An “Irresistable Popular Movement?” Popular Support for the Heimwehren 
 This chapter has demonstrated how the Heimwehr movement enjoyed from a 
significant degree of support from the leading social circles from the old Monarchy who 
retained prominence in new Austrian republic. The question remains, however, did the 
Heimwehr movement enjoy popular support as well, and if so, to what extent? This 
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section will expand on the initial observations made in chapter two and seek to supply a 
more definitive answer to the question posed above. 
Generally speaking, one could divide Austrian society along three principal 
socioeconomic lines: the urban proletariat, the rural peasantry and agricultural laborers, 
and the bourgeoisie, which is the most diverse of these basic groupings, including 
lawyers, university professors, business professionals, mid-level bureaucrats, and skilled 
craftsmen among others. As chapter two demonstrated, the social composition of the 
Tyrolean Heimatwehr and its leadership was quite diverse. In its efforts to unite the main 
conservative bourgeois political parties behind it, the Heimwehren drew its membership 
from a wide range of socioeconomic and educational strata and ideological outlooks. 
Logically, such diversity would imply the potential for broad popular support.  
 At the same time the federal umbrella organization, the Bund österreichischer 
Selbstschutzverbände, actively worked to increase Heimwehren presence in Vienna, it 
also initiated efforts to more firmly establish its formations in the Burgenland. Police 
reports from the provincial capital of Eisenstadt indicated that “a large part of the 
population” sympathized with the Heimwehr movement; even Social Democratic 
workers were joining the Heimwehren. Moreover, a separate report added that local 
Heimwehr groups could be found “in nearly all places.” Yet the same report claimed that 
the Heimwehr groups were inactive due to a “lack of interest.” The inactivity of the 
Heimwehren was much more likely due to a lag in being sufficiently furnished with 
money, uniforms, weapons, and supplies, as the focus on the Viennese formations would 
have received preference over those in the Burgenland. Altogether, over 300 local 
Heimwehr groups were established in the Burgenland after 1927, the vast majority of 
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which mustered from small villages, which likely meant that the size and strength of 
those Ortsgruppen were negligible.637 
 The prominence of the Heimwehr movement in numerous small communities in 
the Burgenland is exemplary of the broader trend throughout Austria’s provinces and 
would seem to corroborate Schneeberger’s assertion that the movement found broad 
support in tight-knit, traditional, “kleiner sozialsysteme,” or small social systems, where 
Catholic social thought was reinforced by local priests and where community officials 
were able to reiterate the virtues of the anti-Marxist movement more effectively. At the 
same time, she also finds that rural communities on the periphery of larger cities were 
also frequently ‘pro-Heimwehr.’ Their proximity to urban centers meant that their farms, 
as Heimwehr propaganda claimed, would be the first to be “burned down” by the 
“Reds.”638 Her caveat to these generalizations is that each community’s unique economic, 
social, and cultural make-up often played into the degree to which the Heimwehr 
movement found success in establishing local formations and support in the community. 
In communities that were more diverse and demonstrated clear political fault-lines, the 
Heimwehr movement tended to be able to establish more active, enthusiastic local 
groups.639 
 In Tyrol’s long legacy of civic militarism, the historic preponderance of the 
Catholic Church in the province, and the traditionally independent-mindedness of its 
population, the Heimwehr movement found its most ardent supporters. This seems 
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particularly the case in the Lower Inn Valley (Unterinntal) and its side valleys. An August 
1928 report submitted by Oberst a.D. Ludwig Psenner, representative for the Gau 
Unterinntal, to Steidle details the money donated by numerous private donors and 
communities throughout the region, when the money was received, and what it was used 
to purchase. The donations ranged from a five-schilling contribution from Wörgl 
shopkeeper named Johann Gollner that went toward the purchase of a signal flag to 1,650 
schillings in private donations collected in Kunfstein that went toward the purchase of 13 
half-liter oil cans, 10 Heimatwehr badges, labor costs for a construction of one artillery 
support crate (Requisitenverschlag), 2000 rounds of ammunition, and “repair costs.” The 
last page of the report also documented contributions of room and board and use of space 
for donations of accommodations in various communities in the Unterinntal. A letter 
November 1928 letter addressed to the “Landesleitung” of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr from 
a supporter in Tux who requested promotional copies of the Heimatwehr newspaper to 
distribute amongst the community, illustrates a shared outlook many conservative 
Tyroleans. For this segment of Austrian society, the Heimwehr movement represented 
“German men coming together to rescue our state from the rot to which it had fallen 
prey.” Furthermore, he adds, there were many “enthusiastic supporters of the Heimatwehr 
cause” in his community.640 Even after its falling out with Stumpf and the Tyrolean 
government after the publication of its Korneuburg program (May 1930), there remained 
“much sympathy” and “extraordinary enthusiasm” demonstrated by the Tyrolean public 
for the Heimatwehr.641 
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Statistics from the national elections held in November 1930—the first and only 
national election in which the Heimwehr movement entered candidates for the 
Nationalrat—have also been used to indicate of popular support for the Heimwehr 
movement. Lauridsen offers a detailed examination of these electoral results, which paint 
a complex picture. The statistics indicate that of the total number of votes the 
Heimatblock—the political party of the Heimwehren, created in 1930—received, 68 
percent came from districts where the population was under 10,000 people.642 These 
areas were predominantly rural, which would seem to corroborate Schneeberger’s 
conclusion that the Heimwehr movement was most successful in smaller communities. 
Yet compared to the overall percentage for those districts, the Heimatblock received only 
7.84 percent of the total number of votes. The assertion that the movement was 
comprised largely of peasants is much less compelling in this light.  
In districts where the population was 10,000 or greater, the Heimatblock received 
7.76 percent of the overall vote total, which represents the remaining 32 percent of the 
total votes it received. The difference between 68 percent and 32 percent, however, 
indicates a greater degree of support from rural populations. At the same time, these 
figures must be used with caution, as they are not representative of the unique 
socioeconomic attributes possessed by each province, as regional electoral results would 
naturally vary from one to the next. As Lauridsen points out, Styria was—not 
surprisingly—the Heimatblock bastion, followed by the Tyrol, where the party received 
12.36 percent and 9.28 percent of the vote, respectively.643  
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Overall, the meager 6.17 percent of the total popular vote the Heimatblock 
collected would seem to indicate that the Heimwehr movement was not the “irresistible 
popular movement” Seipel touted. At the same time, the results of the November 1930 
elections should not be entirely taken at face value as a referendum of popular support. 
As mentioned above, the 1930 election was the first and only attempt of the Heimwehr 
movement to field candidates for public office; to that point in time, the movement had 
been loose confederation of paramilitary organizations, not a political party that also had 
a paramilitary wing as was the case with the Social Democrats (Republikanischer 
Schutzbund) and Nazis (Sturmabteilung or SA). Moreover, the number of candidates 
running under the Heimatblock banner at the national and provincial levels was, 
comparatively speaking, quite limited; in Vorarlberg the Heimatblock was not permitted 
on the ballet. In Vienna and Lower Austria, votes cast for the “Christlichsoziale Partei 
und Heimatwehr” ticket might also be considered an indication of popular support for the 
Heimwehr movement in the same way it counted as a vote for the Christian Social Party.  
Popular support for the Heimwehr movement has been a much more difficult 
phenomenon to measure compared to the more tangible evidence left by its financial 
backers or well-documented evidence of the measures taken by provincial governments 
to protect the groups. Provincial and national electoral results have been leveraged by 
historians as a vehicle for understanding general backing amongst the population, but 
those results are problematic as a true barometer in that the Heimwehr movement was not 
a political party and entered the 1930 elections as such—a paramilitary organization 
submitting its leaders for election to public office. Prior to the election, it was entirely 
possible, and quite probably, for a conservative Austrian to be a member of the Christian 
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Social or Greater German People’s Party as well as sympathizing and backing the 
Heimwehren. As it were, there is concrete evidence of sizable popular support among 
conservative circles of all stripes, which increased greatly after the summer of 1927. 
 
Conclusions 
 Framed around the question of whether or not the Heimwehr movement was, 
indeed, the popular movement it had claimed to be, this chapter demonstrated that the 
Heimwehr movement enjoyed a significant degree of support from the provincial and 
national governments, prominent social groups such as the Catholic clergymen, many 
members of the former Habsburg nobility, wealthy industrialists, and Austria’s most 
powerful banks, not to mention a substantial segment of the general population. The 
governmental cooperation, and financial backing of these groups makes it clear that the 
Heimwehr movement was not a radical, right-wing political party like the Nazis, to 
whom it is typically compared. The Heimwehren were creations of provincial 
conservatives who distrusted the Social Democratic provisional government in the early 
months immediately following the establishment of the Republic. Many of these men 
were, themselves, high-ranking public officials, such as Franz Stumpf in Tyrol and Anton 
Rintelen in Styria, or who had close connections to those who did fill those offices. 
Provincial governments leveraged the 1920 Constitution, which gave them significant 
autonomy, which they used to shield the Heimwehren from the IMCC and the federal 
government, frequently utilizing Ortsgruppen as auxiliary policemen, giving them a 
quasi-official status.  
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At the same time, Catholic clergy members sold the Heimwehren to their 
congregations as an instrument of God to combat the mortal danger of Marxist secularism 
posed to traditional German culture. While not all members of the priesthood were 
supporters of the Heimwehr movement, a substantial number of clerics across Austria 
officiated Heimwehren events and, in the process, provided the movement with 
credibility among the devout Catholic population. Most prominent among those priests 
who enthusiastically supported the Heimwehren was Chancellor Ignaz Seipel. It was not 
Steidle or Starhemberg who was the lynchpin for the creation of a federal Heimwehr 
organization, but Seipel. His connections to great noble land owners, industrialists such 
as Baron Robert von Ehrhart, and bankers like Ludwig von Rothschild was absolutely 
essential in subsidizing the creation of a federal umbrella organization and facilitating the 
movement’s meteoric expansion following the events of July 1927. 
Indeed, as has been detailed in the historiography of the Heimwehr movement the 
Hauptverband der Industrie Österreich, of which the Alpine Montangesellschaft was a 
part, were its chief sources of industrial money. While breaking labor strikes was the 
principal reason for their financial support for the Heimwehren, important figures in both 
associations were ideologically aligned with conservative, anti-Marxist core of the 
movement. Baron von Ehrhart, a confidant of Chancellor Seipel, was a staunch 
monarchist and opposed the parliamentary system in the Republic. Similarly, AMG 
General Secretary, Dr. Felix Busson, and, plant foreman and head of the “independent” 
labor union formed by AMG employees, Josef Oberegger, were both active members in 
the Styrian Heimatschutz. 
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Alongside Austrian, industry, its financial institutions also funneled extraordinary 
sums of money into the Heimwehr movement. From as early as 1921, Austria’s major 
banking houses began financing the Heimwehren with monthly stipends. Next to AMG, 
Rothschild’s Creditanstalt—the state’s largest financial institution—was said to have 
been the movement’s greatest patron. Despite the anti-Semitic rhetoric of several high-
profile Heimwehr leaders, Rothschild’s business interests, like those of other Jewish 
companies, aligned with the anti-Marxist stance of the Heimwehr movement. Not unlike 
the AMG or the Hauptverband, their reasons for funding the movement were primarily 
economic, but much less ideological. 
Conversely, the various modes of support offered by the general public were, 
however, based entirely on the conservative ideals the Heimwehren represented. Beyond 
the anti-Marxist ideals shared with the Heimwehr movement by the peasantry and the 
bourgeoisie, the lamentation with which its leaders spoke of the weak and fragile state of 
Austria echoed the sentiments of traditionally-minded circles who desperately missed 
past times of pre-war economic prosperity. In the Heimwehr they found a movement 
whose militarism and activism not only represented their traditional worldview, but who 
vowed to renew German or Habsburg culture, even at the expense of parliamentary 
democracy. 




CHAPTER V – AMBITIOUS OPPORTUNISTS OR INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN 
INFLUENCE? 
 
 On October 28, 1922 Benito Mussolini and some 25,000 “Blackshirts,” the 
paramilitary wing his Partito Nationale Fascista (National Fascist Party) arrived in 
Rome. Rather than suppressing the insurrection with violence, the following day King 
Victor Emmanuel III asked Mussolini to lead the Italian government, appointing him 
Prime Minister. Mussolini won many admirers among radical right-wing nationalist 
organizations in Central Europe and his “March on Rome” became something of a 
blueprint from which to model their own machinations. Hitler was an admirer of 
Mussolini’s and his bold move to gain political power for himself and the National 
Fascist Party. In November 1923, Hitler contrived his own, ill-fated attempt to seize 
power in Germany, starting with the overthrow of the Bavarian government in Munich a 
little over a year later.644 Hitler was not the only one inspired by Mussolini and his rise to 
power. The leaders of the Austrian Heimwehr movement, too, fantasized about 
undertaking their own “Marsch auf Wien” and rolling back the Socialist constitution of 
1920. 
As it were, by the end of 1928, Mussolini had become a central financial backer 
of the Heimwehr movement. Its federal leader, Dr. Richard Steidle, and his Chief of Staff, 
Major Waldemar Pabst, further connected Mussolini with Franz Seldte and Theodor 
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Duesterberg, the leaders of the largest paramilitary organization in Germany, Der 
Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten (The Steel Helmet-League of Front Soldiers), to 
whom Mussolini provided political support as they sought to enter the upcoming German 
general elections. Particularly important in the Heimwehr movement securing Italian 
support was Hungarian Minister President, István Bethlen, who had, over many years, 
established a close relationship with the Heimwehr’s Tyrolean leadership. Between 
August 1928 and September 1929, through the Hungarian government, Mussolini 
funneled millions of Italian lira into the Heimwehr movement’s anti-Marxist and anti-
democratic campaign of provocation and propaganda aimed, ultimately, at expunging 
socialism and its influence from Austria. After a year of fits and starts the Heimwehren 
ultimately failed to meet their expectations, Italy pulled the plug on its joint 
“österreichsichen Aktion” (Austrian action) with Hungary. 
Nevertheless, Mussolini understood that winning Austria, despite its diminutive 
size and struggling economy, was an important piece in helping make Central Europe a 
sphere of Italian influence. By 1932 the Heimwehr movement had a new, young leader at 
its helm in Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg, who, once again, looked to Mussolini 
for help. This time, however, Mussolini had the added motivation of an aggressive, ultra-
nationalist Nazi Party that was gaining recognition and influence in mainstream German 
politics and in its government, signaling an increasing likelihood that an aggressive pan-
Germanist foreign policy could be on the horizon. Moreover, many Germans and 
Austrians still resented the Italian annexation of South Tyrol, in which a vocal German 
minority was split away from its German brothers in the north. As such, Il Duce feared a 
resurgence of Anschluss sentiment among the German and Austrian populations, making 
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decisive action more urgent than it had been in 1928, as a unification of Austria and 
Germany would bring a potentially belligerent, expansionist-minded Germany to Italy’s 
doorstep. The success of the network of reactionary paramilitary defense organizations in 
Germany and Austria and the authoritarian regimes of Hungary and Italy was, therefore, 
crucial to both Italian interests, as well as those of the hegemonic strata of Austrian 
government and society—the Catholic clergy, the declassed aristocracy, industrialists, 
high-ranking officers of the former k.u.k. Army, and most Christian Social officials—who 
sought to maintain Austrian independence, the arch patrons of the Heimwehr movement. 
This network also reflected the fact that sizable segments in German and Austrian 
society were disenchanted with what they viewed as frivolous political posturing and idle 
chatter of the various political parties. These circles rebuked Western-style parliamentary 
democracy as corrupt; the German people were hostages of political partisanship. 
Ideologically, the republics were amalgams of socialism and liberal capitalism, both of 
which were un-German and abhorrent. It also represented the developing view among 
radical-right circles that a fascist-style government—conservative, ultra-nationalist, 
authoritarian, and militaristic—was a potentially viable alternative to monarchy and 
democracy. Furthermore, it was not coincidental that the states in which these anti-
Marxist, anti-democratic sentiments found expression were those where revisionist 
‘cultures of defeat’ had firmly taken root, nor that the parties involved in this network 
were representative of what would become the core of the Axis Powers in a seemingly 




“From Self-Defense to Self-Help”645 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Heimwehr movement was at the center 
of counter-revolutionary activity in Central Europe in 1920-1. From the outset in 1920, 
the intention of its collaboration with German defense organizations and the Hungarian 
government was not simply to establish an anti-Marxist coalition to rebuff Bolshevik 
revolution, as stated in the bylaws of the Heimwehren. Rather, theirs was a loftier goal of 
ultimately remaking the governments in Germany and Austria, which they understood to 
be a decisive blow against Marxism by reversing the socialist revolutions of 1918. In 
doing so, they would help remake Central Europe into an authoritarian, anti-Marxist 
bulwark. While this aim, at times, receded into the background at times and became 
subject to the interests of its patrons, it never subsided, as it evidenced in the very fact 
that it approached like-minded foreign governments and organizations for financial and 
material assistance. 
Historians of the Heimwehr movement have interpreted the recurrent putschist 
designs as a confluence of foreign influences and the boundless ambition of its leaders to 
gain political power for themselves. Such assertions that Heimwehr leaders harbored 
ceaseless personal ambitions to rule Austria is overstated, attributed, in part, to 
disagreements among provincial Heimwehr leaders, at various times, over the direction 
of the movement. More specifically, scholars viewed the personal feud between 
Bundesführer Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg and Emil Fey (leader of the Vienna Heimwehr) 
as the most outstanding example. While both jockeyed for the allegiance of the 
movement’s provincial leaders, and did little to conceal their desire to head the 
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movement, they still acknowledged and respected the authority of the governments in 
power and acquiesced when demoted from cabinet positions, rather than moving to take 
power for themselves.646 It would, of course, be foolish to believe that the Heimwehr’s 
leaders were selfless ideologues with no personal ambitions of their own. However, the 
evidence indicates that their commitment to the movement, in the firm belief that 
Marxism reflected an existential crisis for German culture and elected to actively combat 
that threat and obtaining a voice for it in the direction of the country, surpassed any 
motives of seizing power for personal gain.647 
 To understand why the Heimwehr movement sought the assistance of neighboring 
governments and defense organizations, it is necessary to reiterate its quandary inside 
Austria. Two insurmountable and intertwined factors, which have been discussed in 
greater depth in prior chapters, hamstrung the Heimwehr movement in its efforts to 
achieve its ultimate objective. First, the extremely limited powers of its federal leadership 
allowed provincial leaders to retain much of their authority and the general independence 
of their formations, preventing the confederation from functioning as a cohesive whole. 
In addition, the Heimwehren, being voluntary organizations, had maintained the 
volunteer Schützen custom of electing their leaders, which only exacerbated those 
regionalisms. Second, the movement’s financially reliance—the refusal to initiate 
membership dues being the main culprit—upon its domestic patrons made the 
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that it would be most beneficial to Austria if the head of the new government was someone 
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Heimwehren prisoners to their interests. Generally risk-averse, they preferred the status 
quo over the uncertainty of an attempt to roll back the socialist republic. Approval to do 
so would require virtually all of its patrons—bankers, industrialists, nobles, provincial 
governors, and the bourgeois political parties—in all of its provinces to be in harmony 
with that aim, which had proved an impossibility. Moreover, so long as the bourgeois 
parties could sustain a majority in parliament and, therefore, keep the SDP suppressed, 
support for radical measures such as remaking the government on a corporatist basis were 
not seriously considered. Thus, it became clear that the only way the Heimwehren could 
end Austria’s wretched parliamentary democracy, to which they attributed Austria’s 
continued misery, was to look outside for the requisite money, arms, and resources. 
As illustrated in previous chapters, the legacy of civic militarism and war 
volunteerism of Alpine Austrian communities inspired the vision of the Heimwehr 
movement in Austria. This tradition was especially prominent in the Tyrol, which had 
long defended its own borders, rather than depending on the Habsburg dynasty in Vienna. 
At the ideological and logistical core of Tyrol's provincial defense system were the 
Standschützen, volunteer sharp-shooter units comprised of members of local shooting 
clubs. In times of war, when a threat to Tyrol's sovereignty was imminent, these units 
were mobilized around their local shooting ranges and deployed to protect their 
communities from foreign invaders. Though this institution perished in 1918, the 
voluntary and democratic civilian identity of the Standschützen was a hallmark of its 
collective memory and was adopted by the paramilitary Heimwehr movement. In the 
politically charged climate of First Republic Austria, however, the continuity of these 
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features remained foundational characteristics of the Heimwehren, despite undermining 
the ‘expanding’ mission envisaged by its leadership. 
By the autumn of 1926, Steidle and Pabst had already made efforts to reconnect 
with their old Bavarian associates, while also having developed a close connection with 
Hungarian Prime Minister, István Bethlen.648 They also briefly entertained potential 
alliances with Yugoslav nationalist organizations as well as attempted to gain the support 
of the Italian government. The catalyst compelling this outreach was the new party 
program the Social Democratic Party published on November 3, 1926, which has come to 
be known as the “Linzer Programme.” In it, the Social Democratic Party declared itself 
ready to utilize revolutionary violence, if necessary, to attain power, vowing to “preserve 
the working-class in a permanent, organized intellectual and physical readiness for the 
defense of the republic [and] cultivate the closest intellectual union between the working-
class and the soldiers of the Federal Army… But if, despite all these efforts of the Social 
Democratic Labor Party, a counter-revolution of the bourgeoisie succeeded in breaking 
up democracy, the working class could only conquer the power of the state in the civil 
war.”649  
The preface of “if a counter-revolution of the bourgeoisie succeeded in breaking 
up democracy,” seems to have allayed moderate fears of a Marxist revolution. The 
Heimwehr movement and its leadership, however, were indignant, and drummed up 
sensational fears of the inevitability of a Marxist revolution among its membership and 
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constituency. They leveraged those fears to whip up hostility throughout the movement’s 
rank and file, and according to some provincial leaders, struggled to contain that 
aggression.650 When asked in November 1926 why the Heimwehren had become more 
active in public and increasingly vocal in recent days, Steidle responded that the 
aggressive new party program and the “terror and street demonstrations of the Republican 
Schutzbund have forced the Austrian Heimwehren to expand of self-defense to one of 
self-help.”651 In other words, the Social Democrat’s new, aggressive party platform had 
compelled the Heimwehr movement to shift gears from being an organization oriented 
around defending bourgeois ideals and interests to one that would now take the initiative 
and more actively agitate for those ideals and interests, which they believed underpinned 
traditional German culture. As a result, movement undertook a concerted effort to 
reorganize and consolidate. The various Heimatschutz groups in Styria merged into one 
under Pfrimer. The leaders of the provincial Heimwehr organizations agreed to create 
something of a federal command structure, banding together under the banner of the 
“Bund alpenländischer Selbstschutzverbände” (Federal Alpine Self-Defense Assocations, 
alternatively referred to as the “Alpine Club”), with Steidle serving as its nominal 
leader.652 
 The increased aggression demonstrated by the Heimwehren disturbed foreign 
observers. The German Consul General in Innsbruck, Hans von Saller, expressed concern 
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over the potential for civil war inside Austria as the Heimwehr leaders intensified their 
agitation. “I am not of the opinion that the Heimwehr movement within Austria is 
defensive,” Saller reported, adding that Steidle “expresses quite frankly that the 
Heimatwehr also wants to take an offensive approach.” In this statement, he is referring 
to a speech Steidle delivered at a Heimwehr rally in Klagenfurt (Carinthia) on January 
30, 1927 
We want to be a movement of freedom to the people, not content with merely warding 
off…Is it not time to assert the will of our side, if necessary, outside the laws of 
Parliament? Are we not officially compelled to assert the wish for order in the state, in a 
different way? I do not conceal from myself, that we might soon test this example. We 
have been patient for too long. I do not hesitate to explain that the members of the Alpine 
defense associations feel the sacred obligation that after the fist is driven from its pocket 
in indignant holy wrath once, it will no longer be content with parliamentary 
delicacies.653 
 
It was with the release of the “Linzer Programme” that was the decisive turning point for 
the Heimwehr movement. Its leaders saw the opportunity to “expand” its mission and 
transform the waning self-defense movement into a political pressure group to compel the 
bourgeois parties toward constitutional reform.654 The “July Events” of 1927 
(Juliereignisse) represented the first opportunity for the Heimwehren to act in accordance 
with this new offensive trajectory, their success, and the international recognition it 
gained among right-wing and fascist circles. Steidle’s often-cited May 1928 letter to 
Bethlen, where he explains that the Heimwehr movement was no longer content with 
being the “chained watch dog, crouching until the owner…releases it…only to chain it 
again…after it has done its job,” simply reiterated sentiments he had expressed in the 
days after the Social Democratic Party Congress. Their success in aggressively 
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suppressing the riots of Social Democratic workers and thwarting the party’s general 
strike, won the movement widespread prestige, attracting a significant number of new 
members, prompting historians to point to the “July Events” as a critical turning point for 
the Heimwehr movement. The shift was, in fact, a more gradual process that was also an 
expression of its need to remain relevant in order to survive. The Linzer Programme 
proved to be the right medicine and the right time. 
A second factor stirring the Heimwehren to again look for allies beyond its 
borders in 1927, was the threat of war between Austria’s neighbors, Italy and Yugoslavia. 
As had been the case with virtually all of the redrawn borders of the Paris Peace 
Conference, two territories—Dalmatia and Albania—became ongoing sources of tension 
between Italy and Yugoslavia that ebbed and flowed over the course of the 1920s. In 
particular, the Treaty of Friendship and Security signed between Italy and Albania in 
November 1926, proved to be a source of consternation for the Yugoslavian government, 
as it made any sort of attempt to alter the state of affairs in Albania—whether by official 
Yugoslavian institutions or organizations manifesting in Yugoslavia—as potential 
grounds for war. Yugoslavia, for its part, feared that the treaty would establish a basis for 
the Italian annexation of Albania, as the agreement, for all intents and purposes, 
positioned it as a protectorate of Italy.655 Of particular concern for Austria and the 
Heimwehren was its southern alpine borders in Styria, Carinthia, and Tyrol.  
Heimwehr leaders expressed the fear, to their reactionary German counterparts, that 
either Italy or Yugoslavia—perhaps both—would use an outbreak of hostility as a pretext 
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to encroach on Austrian border regions. Pabst wrote to Oberstleutnant a.D. Julius von 
Reichert, Staff leader to the Bavaria Stahlhelm chief, Major a.D. Carl Wänninger, in May 
1927, explaining that the situation had become “extraordinarily critical,” based on 
conversation Carinthian Heimatschutz members had had with ethnic German refugees 
fleeing Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Pabst requested that he and fellow Stahlhelm member 
and friend, Emil Bems, seek an audience with the German Chancellor to discuss the 
matter of providing aid to the Austrian army and the Heimwehren in the event of war 
between the two, adding that Steidle and Oberst a.D. Thomas Klimann, leader of the 
Carinthian Heimatschutz were in Vienna, speaking to the Austrian Chancellor on the 
same matter. Nothing ever materialized out of the Pabst’s appeals to his contacts in 
Germany. In a subsequent letter to Reichert, Pabst discussed a conversation he had with 
an “influential member of the Foreign Office in Berlin” in which the official told him that 
Germany would not be able to offer any military or material support, as its foreign policy 
actions were limited by the French occupation of the Rhineland.656 
Concerns proved great enough that Steidle and Pabst reached out to Yugoslavian 
nationalist organizations such as Orjuna (Organisation of Jugoslavian Nationalists), 
Matica, and Sokol. In one instance, two leaders from the Orjuna had met with a 
Heimatwehr representative in Innsbruck, Dr. Walther Pembauer, but no agreement 
appears to have ever been reached regarding the establishment of an alliance between the 
two organizations in the event of war. Orjuna representatives offered to supply the 
Heimwehren sufficiently with arms to ensure that the Bludenz-Bischofshofen rail line in 
Austria was accessible for use against Italy. Negotiations appear to have broken down 
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when the Orjuna representatives insisted on the inclusion of officials from the 
Yugoslavian War Ministry in Belgrade. As the German Consul General to Innsbruck 
noted, one could assess the importance of the negotiations solely based on the fact that 
the Orjuna leaders were negotiating with Pembauer, rather than Steidle or Pabst. Given 
the fact that Yugoslavian troops had once tried to annex sections of southern Carinthia, it 
is not surprising that the province’s governor and supporter of the Heimwehr movement 
at that time, Vinzenz Schumy, was opposed to any sort of negotiations with Yugoslavian 
elements.657 
There was indeed legitimate concern over the potential of an Italian-Yugoslavian 
conflict over Albania in the spring of 1927. The efforts of Heimwehr leaders to establish 
contingency plans involving German paramilitary organizations, particularly in Bavaria, 
was a concern for the German Foreign Office, which followed these developments 
closely, discouraging Bavarian officials and paramilitary leaders from embroiling 
themselves in the foreign affairs of Austria and, potentially, other European states. As it 
were, the threat of an Italian-Yugoslavian conflict was settled by the League of Nations 
and the matter was soon forgotten. The cynical Consul General to Innsbruck, Hans von 
Saller, contended that Steidle and Pabst overemphasized the potential threat facing 
Austria in a Yugoslav-Italian war “because it is believed that it is easier to get material 
support from outside in this way,” as opposed to placing their requests for arms and 
equipment in the context of escalating tensions with the Social Democrats.658 Saller 
knew, however, that the Heimwehren were in bad financial condition at the outset of 
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1927, which was why they were reaching out to their Bavarian counterparts; Heimwehr 
documents confirm the organization’s poor financial shape.659 The Tyrolean Heimatwehr 
was so poor it could only afford to pay for a section of the organization to attend the 
soldiers’ monument dedication ceremony in Brixlegg (Tyrol) on August 8, 1926.660 
Despite receiving money from Austrian bankers and industrialists, the Heimwehren 
remained insufficiently funded, which can be attributed, once more, to its identity as a 
volunteer organization.  
Dr. Ignaz Seipel, Catholic priest, leader of the Christian Social Party, and twice 
Chancellor of Austria, publicly supported parliamentary democracy in the beginning, but 
was ideologically inclined toward the authoritarian, Catholic social thought. Over the 
course of his second term as Austria’s Chancellor, his disenchantment with the self-
interested, partisanship of parliamentary democracy became increasingly clear. The 
release of the controversial Social Democratic Party’s Linzer Programm, on November 3, 
1926, and the rioting and burning of the Justice Ministry in Vienna by Social Democratic 
workers on July 15, 1927, however, proved decisive in eroding the façade of support for 
what he would term a “sham democracy.”661 Steidle, who later explained to Hungarian 
Minister President, István Bethlen, that as President of the Austrian Federal Council 
(Bundesrat), he spent a good deal of time in Vienna and frequently spoke with Seipel 
about preparations for an inevitable government change in Austria.662 His turn toward an 
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authoritarian solution, historians have argued, became evident with his open support of 
the Heimwehr movement, whose rhetoric had become increasingly anti-democratic. 
Indeed, in the Heimwehren, he saw a force that could be utilized to destroy the Social 
Democratic Party, despite resistance within his own party, stating that “true 
democracy”—as opposed to the republic’s parliamentary democracy—was “one of the 
strongest driving forces of the Heimwehr movement.”663 However, Seipel’s support for 
the Heimwehren—as chapter four demonstrated—had been ongoing, from 1920 onward, 
as his aversion to the republic grew. The only difference between Seipel’s support for the 
Heimwehr movement in 1920 and 1928, is the fact that he made it public. 
Seipel’s efforts to establish closer relations with Fascist Italy in his second term as 
Chancellor was, in this context, not surprising. Mussolini had successfully crushed Social 
Democratic opposition in Italy and, as one Austrian Social Democratic newspaper 
pointed out, “it is certain that all anti-Marxists in Austria see their ideal in Mussolini.” 
The article continued, sarcastically, adding that if they could elect a king, “the ‘Duce’ 
would have long since moved into the Vienna Hofburg. Mussolini and Seipel hand in 
hand!”664 Similarly, Steidle, as the Bundesführer of the Heimwehr movement, was 
christened by the Social Democratic press as the “Tyrolean Mussolini,” and “little 
Mussolini.”665 Beyond a shared aversion of Marxism, there were several more explicit 
                                                 
663 “Seipel für die Heimwehren,” Die Rote Fahne, December 19, 1928, p.1; Diamant, “Austrian 
Catholics,” 613. 
664 "Der teilbare Hakenkreuzler," Arbeiterwille, March 26, 1926, 11. 
665 See, for example, “Korrespondenzen. Aus dem Kohlenrevier,” Tagblatt, July 29, 1927, 7-8; 
“Otto Bauers Absage an den Bürgerkrieg,” Neues Wiener Journal, November 1, 1927, 4; “Drohungen der 




indications that Seipel sought to improve relations with Italy. In an interview given to an 
American journalist, the Chancellor said of Mussolini: 
I have known Mussolini since 1923. He is a great man. Austria sees him with great 
sympathy, particularly because he triumphed over Bolshevism. Mussolini is not just a 
man of violence, he is a man of ideals.666 
 
Furthermore, in October 1926 Seipel sent Mussolini, through the Austrian embassy in 
Rome, a copy of a recently published compendium of his speeches, inscribing it to “His 
Excellency, the head of the Italian government and renewer of Italy, as a reminder of 
lasting friendship.”667 Despite the fact that Seipel’s friendly gestures received widespread 
negative attention in the Austrian press, they were signposts of a desire for closer 
relations between the far-right elements of the Christian Social Party and Fascist Italy. 
U.S. and German diplomatic reports indicated that the Heimwehren had also reached out 
to Fascist Italy. In 1925 Styrian governor, Anton Rintelen, through Camillo Castiglioni, 
an Italian entrepreneur living in Vienna at the time, sought—to no avail—financial and 
material support from Fascist Italy.668 In a February 4, 1927 memo, German Consul 
General, Hans von Saller indicated to the German Foreign Office in Berlin, that Steidle 
had been engaged in “exhaustive negotiations” with Italians to secure financial assistance 
for the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, contrary to the wishes of the President (Friedrich) 
Reitlinger of the Tyrolean Industrial Assocation, who was a major donor to the Tyrolean 
formation. In Saller’s view, Steidle was “foolish” and his endeavor was bound to “end 
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with great disgrace.”669 Despite the fact that German ambassador in Rome, Constantin 
von Neurath, indicated in October 1927, that Italian money and arms were going to 
Austria for the purpose of undertaking a change of government, there seems to be no 
tangible evidence that this ever took place, as the Heimwehr movement’s financial 
situation remained quite poor.670  
To be sure, the generally accepted notion that the Italian and Hungarian 
governments had the “idea to use the Heimwehren to achieve a right-wing take-over in 
Austria was mentioned by the Hungarians for the first time in conversations between 
Bethlen and Mussolini in Milan in April 1928: a right-wing Austria would form a bridge 
between fascist Italy and revisionist Hungary,” is simply not the case.671 The fact that 
Rintelen and Steidle, on separate occasions, had actively engaged official Italian channels 
at least as early as 1925 and had long maintained contact with representatives of the 
Hungarian government, signifies that the idea of supporting the Heimwehr movement to 
implement a new system of government was not a new idea, nor does it indicate that the 
Heimwehren were passively acted upon by opportunistic Italian and Hungarian 
governments—quite the opposite. Moreover, as the previous chapter detailed, the 
Hungarian government had supplied Heimwehr formations with substantial sums of 
money for just this aim in 1920-1. Indeed, by April 1928, a Heimwehr putsch of the 
Austrian republic had been germinating for quite some time. 
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While Kerekes contends that “Italy was not able to achieve any success on the 
official diplomatic path,” Chancellor Seipel’s overtures to Mussolini in the latter half of 
1926 certainly indicated that he was quite open to improving relations between the two 
countries.672 The lack of success to which Kerekes refers was, no doubt, connected to 
Seipel’s criticism of discriminatory Italian policies in South Tyrol, which prompted 
Mussolini to recall Italy’s ambassador to Austria for nearly the first half of 1928.673 In 
addition to the condition that the Heimwehr movement would initiate a new system of 
government in Austria, the new government would censure any discursive discussion of 
the South Tyrol question.674 Both illustrate the extent to which the question of South 
Tyrol obstructed the development of Austrian and Italian relations, but also underpinned 
Mussolini’s support of the Heimwehren.  
When Bethlen met with Mussolini in April 1928, and proposed their joint 
“österreichischen Aktion,” he had been contacted by Steidle and Pabst, who had 
requested the support of the Hungarian government in the form of 300,000 schillings and 
arms the previous August, as their ranks were greatly expanding in the months following 
their successful quashing of Social Democratic strikes and demonstrations in July 
1927.675 Moreover, Steidle outlined in a letter to Bethlen in May 1928, the Heimwehr 
movement’s reorganization to aggressively “force the so-called bourgeois parties to alter 
the half-Bolshevik constitution that came into being under the pressure of the red streets 
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of Vienna, regardless of the resistance or events unleashed thereby.”676 To be sure, Steidle 
and Pabst were using the Hungarians and Italians as much as the Hungarians and Italians 
were using them.  
This picture runs contrary to the prevailing notion among histories of the First 
Republic and the Heimwehr movement have interpreted its cooperation with Mussolini as 
having been one-sided; the Heimwehren were merely an “Italian foreign legion.”677 The 
continuity of this narrative reflects the creep of Social Democratic propaganda on a 
receptive audience of scholars more than it does the result of historical analysis and 
interpretation. The source of this narrative can be tracked to the Social Democrats’ 
discovery that the Heimwehren had been receiving financial support from Mussolini in 
January 1932. Social Democratic newspaper such as the Salzburger Wacht declared, 
referring to the Heimwehren, that “the Austro-fascists are in the pay of Mussolini,” while 
headline of the article that appeared in Die Unzufriedene read, “The Austrian Heimwehr 
in the Service of Mussolini!”678 To be sure, the reason Mussolini and Horthy supported 
the Heimwehren was that their action would lead to a similarly authoritarian-style 
government that would work in harmony with their own. Equally as certain was the fact 
that this was also what Steidle and Pfrimer—the movement’s two federal leaders—
wanted as well; both had made their disdain for the frivolous posturing of partisan 
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politics clear at every opportunity. The assertion that the Heimwehr movement was an 
instrument of foreign influence is true only in so far as it coincided with its own agenda.  
For Italy’s part, Mussolini’s arrangement with the Heimwehren, finalized in July 
1928, was but a single agreement in wider Italian foreign policy geared toward 
weakening French influence in the Balkans, which was exercised primarily through the 
“Little Entente,” comprised of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Italian 
relations with Yugoslavia had been particularly rocky, as both states attempted to lay 
claim to what was Habsburg Dalmatia and Albania after World War I. In September 1926, 
Italy and Romania signed a friendship agreement, two months later a treaty with Albania 
was signed, followed by a friendship pact with Hungary in April 1927, and, finally, a 
treaty with Greece in November 1928.679 Furthermore, Mussolini had established a close 
relationship with Bulgaria—a vanquished ally to the Central Powers who lost territory to 
members of the Little Entente at the Paris Peace Conference—which was reinforced with 
the marriage of Princess Joanna of Savoy to the Bulgarian King, Boris III in 1930.680  
Mussolini’s efforts to weaken French influence in Central Europe continued with 
consistent criticism of France for not allowing Germany to rearm itself on the “basis of 
equality with other nations.”681 Shortly after the Nazi’s seizure of power in the spring of 
1933, Hitler ordered that the Propaganda Ministry curb discursive press about the 
“Italianization” of South Tyrol, which the Führer had hoped would be sufficient to ease 
Mussolini’s opposition to Anschluss. To Hitler’s chagrin, it did not appease Mussolini’s 
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heretofore staunch opposition to the unification of Germany and Austria. As one 
contemporary observer pointed out, the whole reason Italy went to war with Austria-
Hungary in the first place was to get rid of its hereditary enemy (and annex as much of its 
territories as the Allies were willing to concede) that had loomed large over its northern 
borders; too allow Germany to annex Austria would simply replace one Goliath with 
another, still greater Goliath, effectively neutralizing the main benefit of the Great War.682 
Ironically, of all of the major powers of Europe, including Great Britain, only Italy 
demonstrated the willingness to stand up to Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy prior to 
1939. In the wake of Engelbert Dollfuss’s assassination by Austrian Nazis on July 25, 
1934, Mussolini ordered Italian Army divisions to the Austrian border, should German 
troops cross over into Austria.  
Hungarian foreign policy and its long-time connections with the Heimwehr 
movement made it a natural accomplice in this plot. Its designs for restoring its lost 
territories naturally put it odds with the Little Entente, all of whom gained as a result. 
This also placed Hungarian foreign policy aims in opposition to that of the French, the 
primary benefactor of the Little Entente. An alliance with Italy, despite their opposition in 
the Great War, helped solidify the Hungarian position in this new Central European 
setting. The establishment of a like-minded, authoritarian regime in Austria, which it 
would play a part in installing, would further fortify Hungarian interests in Central 
Europe. At the same time, it would weaken the grip of the French and Little Entente, who 
exercised influence in Austria in the form of promised economic aid and the threat of 
military intervention should monarchist elements attempt to restore the Habsburg 
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dynasty.683 Furthermore, Bethlen’s good relations with Steidle and Pabst and his 
persuasiveness with Mussolini was key in the development of this plan. 
 At Bethlen and Mussolini’s meeting in April 1928, it was agreed that Bethlen 
would mediate between Mussolini and the Heimwehr leadership. The Minister President 
was, by that point in time, very familiar with and trusted by Steidle and Pabst. Also, with 
Hungary functioning as the ‘go-between’, it masked the fact that the Heimwehr 
movement was receiving funds from Italy, for which there remained much resentment 
among the general Austrian population over its annexation of South Tyrol in 1919. The 
silence of contemporary sources indicates some degree of success of this strategy, as 
there was virtually no indication that the Heimwehren were receiving money or weapons 
from Italy. Even Social Democratic newspapers, which consistently proved themselves 
adept at exposing the Heimwehr’s illicit activities surrounding the theft and 
transportation of arms, among its other clandestine operations, were silent until late June 
1929 when they accused the Heimwehren of receiving money and support from Italy and 
Hungary.684 The well-informed, well-connected, and knowledgeable observer, C.A. 
Macartney, pointed to the same ‘unproven rumors’ that Pfrimer’s Styrian outfit had 
received money from Italy and that in 1927, Styria had “made a treaty with Italy in case 
of an Italian-Yugoslav war.”685 The German Foreign Office also speculated that the 
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Heimwehren were receiving money from Italy, though it had no definitive proof. Eduard 
Hoffmann wrote to Bernhard von Bülow in September 1929, astonished that “the Italian 
ambassador here had the imprudence to say in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Italy 
welcomed the development of the Heimwehr,” but offered nothing else in the way of 
concrete evidence.686 
In the weeks after their meeting, the Hungarian delegation in Vienna began 
facilitating a dialog between Bethlen and Steidle.687 Hungarian envoy, General Béla 
Jánky, contacted Steidle requesting an outline of the financial and military needs of the 
Heimwehren, which Steidle supplied on May 23, 1928. Bethlen and Steidle met in early 
June to discuss Steidle’s requirements, which Bethlen had also forwarded to the 
Hungarian embassy in Rome, who in turn relayed it Italian Foreign Minister Dino 
Grandi.688 In the meantime, Jánky met not only with Steidle’s military commander, 
Feldmarschalleutant a.D. Kletus von Pichler, on June 11, but also held a separate meeting 
the following day with several other key Heimwehr leaders in Vienna, Lower Austria, and 
Styria, securing their full, military cooperation in the planned putsch.689 Days later, 
Grandi informed the Hungarian envoy, András Hory, that the Italian government agreed 
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to meet needs of the Heimwehren on the condition that once the new government is 
established in Austria, it would cease claims to South Tyrol.690 After some negotiation on 
the wording of the written declaration agreeing to forgo efforts to regain South Tyrol, 
Bethlen confirmed with Rome that he had the signed declaration on August 1, 1928, and 
on August 23, Banca d’Italia released the equivalent to 1,620,000.00 lira—roughly the 
equivalent of 606, 741 Austrian schillings—to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry in the 
form of two checks. The checks were delivered the embassy in Vienna, where they were 
exchanged into Austrian schillings and personally delivered to Steidle by General 
Jánky.691 
 According to the detailed breakout Steidle supplied to Jánky, the money was to be 
allocated to five areas, extending from the autumn of 1928 to the general election in 
November 1930. During this time, the Heimwehren would “raise the political 
temperature” against the Social Democrats and their party army, the Republikanischer 
Schutzbund, or “Republican Defense League,” through provocative propaganda, 
violence, and intimidation on the way to the 1930 election.692 Italian funding would be 
used first and foremost to the provinces for “organizational purposes” such as smaller 
rallies (Aufmärsche) with 643,016.59 schillings allocated for these purposes. The amount 
of 224,186.72 schillings were allocated for the purchase of needed equipment, while 
another 241,540,04 schillings were estimated to be needed to fund large-scale Heimwehr 
rallies such as that planned for the Vienna suburb of Wiener Neustadt on October 7, 1928. 
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This rally would mark the first of its “fight for the freedom of the streets” (Der Kampf 
um die Freiheit der Strasse) and expected nearly 20,000 Heimwehr members. Over this 
period of time, Heimwehr leaders planned several provocative demonstrations in Social 
Democratic strongholds like Wiener Neustadt, in the hope to prompt a violent response 
from the Social Democrats and give them, Seipel, and Minister of Defense, Carl Vaugoin, 
the pretext to destroy the Social Democratic Party and install a new, more authoritarian 
system of government. Another 321,113.50 schillings were estimated to be needed for the 
print and propaganda. Lastly, Steidle projected that another 63,462.72 schillings would be 
needed for the next general election in 1930.693 
 Even though Steidle’s original breakout clearly illustrated the reality that 
achieving their shared aims might take some time, their Italian and Hungarian allies were 
disappointed by the failure of the rally in Wiener Neustadt to goad a violent response 
from the Social Democrats, which they hoped the Heimwehren would parley into a coup 
d’état. Their disappointment, however, does not illustrate a failure of the Heimwehren, as 
has been the prevailing notion in the literature.694 Rather it speaks more to the failure of 
the Italians to understand the situation in Austria. As Hungarian envoy to Rome, Andor 
Wodianer, tried to explain to a skeptical Dino Grandi 
…the situation in Austria was different from that of the Fascists in Italy. While liberals 
had shown themselves to be decidedly too weak to slow down Communist propaganda, 
the Fascists' action had found the approval of almost all bourgeois society, and Seipel had 
so far succeeded in restraining the movements from the left. It is, therefore, to a certain 
extent, understandable that Steidle, as far as possible, is to be provoked. I could not 
convince Mr. Grandi completely, but he concluded the conversation with the remark that 
at the moment there was nothing to do but to hope that the matter would soon be better.695 
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Seipel, who gave his sanction of the rally and of action by the Heimwehren, should the 
Social Democrats respond with violence, secured and agreement from Heimwehr leaders 
that neither they nor their men would initiate violence. The Chancellor did much to 
defuse the situation, “compelling” both sides to agree to demonstrate at different times of 
the day and to accept an overabundance of army and police forces on-hand to cordon off 
the Heimwehren from the Schutzbund. Seipel had also encouraged the Heimwehr 
leadership to reduce the men they were planning on bringing, to which Steidle 
acquiesced. Edmondson notes, “Seipel hoped to realize that political goal by his own 
political maneuvering and by the threat of force.”696 As such, Seipel was simply 
unwilling to commit to Wiener Neustadt being the turning point for realizing their shared 
aim of destroying the Social Democratic Party and, ultimately, remaking the Austrian 
government.697 
At the same time, Pabst, who not surprisingly figured centrally in orchestrating 
the event, should have foreseen the real potential that their plans to provoke a violent 
response from the Schutzbund would not take place. Moreover, why would the 
Heimwehr leadership have demanded that the government forces present guard their 
gathering during the program of events, effectively preventing “Marxist attacks or other 
hindrances”?698 If the true desire is to provoke a suitably belligerent response from the 
opposition, would it not have been more favorable to allow for as many opportunities for 
such “attacks and hindrances” as possible in the hope that they develop into the chance to 
violently suppress the Social Democrats? Moreover, why would Steidle have agreed to 
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reduce the number of Heimwehr men participating in the rally? Did Heimwehr leaders 
expect the Schutzbund to be so aghast at their invasion that the requisite attack was 
assured? What becomes increasingly evident when one looks at the lengthy, if not 
prophetic, document of planned Heimwehr events Steidle provided Italian officials, 
coupled with the extensive security preparations made around the Aufmarsch in Wiener 
Neustadt, is that the event never intended to be the flashpoint that their Italian patrons had 
envisaged.699 Instead it was, as Steidle had made clear, a single event in a lengthier plan 
to demonstrate the movement’s growing strength in the run up to the 1930 general 
election. This is not to say that preparations were not made to take advantage of the 
situation, should hostilities erupt, but rather that the event was never intended to be the 
flashpoint Mussolini had envisioned. From this standpoint, the harmony between Seipel’s 
vision of implementing an authoritarian government via legal channels and armed 
intimidation, and the plan Steidle laid out for his Italian backers, is quite clear. 
As it were, Steidle justifiably declared the rally a victory for the Heimwehren, 
citing that the federal government stood firmly beside it, having defended its right to 
demonstrate in the face of strong Social Democratic resistance.700 The numerous letters 
Steidle received also praised his leadership and the Heimwehr’s “victory of Christian 
power and of the ‘Right.’”701 Seipel, at the same time, parlayed the strong Heimwehr 
stand into Social Democratic concessions on rent control, a hotly contested issue on 
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which they had, to that point in time, stood resolute.702 With Seipel’s encouragement and 
Italian money, the Heimwehren continued staging large rallies and parades where Steidle 
and Pfrimer sustained their aggressive attacks on the Social Democrats and on the 
republic into the winter of 1928. With the toxic political discourse cultivated by the 
Heimwehren, the political situation inside Austria worsened, while unemployment figures 
climbed to quarter of a million by the spring of 1929.  
In March 1929, Bethlen and Grandi met in Budapest to discuss the situation of the 
Heimwehr movement and the political conditions inside Austria and agreed that a 
decisive action by the Heimwehren could tip the republic to its breaking point. As the 
Heimwehr movement steadily expanded, so too did its financial needs. Steidle explained 
that it needed another 970,000 Schillings to help the provincial organizations keep pace 
with their growing ranks. Upon Bethlen’s advice, Grandi made half of the 970,000 
Schillings available immediately, but withheld the remainder until the autumn, at which 
time they would once more reevaluate their continued cooperation.703 In early April, the 
Heimwehren received a lucky break in the fact that Seipel resigned the Chancellorship. 
Though Seipel had proven a consistent supporter of the Heimwehr movement and 
confidant to Steidle, he had opposed transforming the government by putsch and was a 
much more formidable politician. Moreover, Seipel’s long-time support of the movement 
and relationship with Steidle, no doubt created an uncomfortable situation on both sides. 
By the end of June 1929, with Seipel out of the way, Steidle would unleashed the full 
weight of the Heimwehren and its resources on a blistering campaign of brinksmanship. 
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The matter of supplying the Heimwehren with the requested arms and equipment would 
prove to be an unexpected source of consternation. The first shipments of weapons and 
supplies were to be delivered to its Lower Austrian formations and those in the eastern 
section of Upper Austria, some 5,000 rifles accompanied by 1,000,000 rounds of 
ammunition, and 40 machine guns with 4 belts each.704 Pabst’s deputy, Oberstleutnant 
a.D. Jaromir Diakow, was tasked with overseeing the shipments with the Hungarian 
embassies in Vienna and Rome. On September 22, 1928, Diakow left for Rome to pick 
up the first shipment. It is not entirely clear what transpired while Diakow was in Rome 
and on his return trip on September 25, but in a correspondence from Bethlen to Steidle, 
it was clear that he had made “a very unfavorable impression” on Italian officials, to the 
point that Grandi made clear that they would not have any future dealings with Diakow, 
requesting that he send another, more trustworthy representative for future 
transactions.705  
Steidle wisely charged Pabst with this critical task and in a subsequent 
communication Steidle finalized his request to Italy for 18,000 rifles with bayonets, 300 
rounds of ammunition for each, and 190 machine guns.706 It was agreed that Pabst would 
arrive in Rome on June 17, 1929 to take possession of the next shipment of weapons and 
equipment. Upon arriving in Rome and discussing the logistics of the weapons transport 
with the Hungarian envoy in Rome, András Hóry, Pabst realized the significant risk of 
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transporting a large shipment of arms across the border. Instead, they agreed that a 
request should be made of the Italians of between 500,000 to 600,000 lira in lieu of 
weapons and that they place the originally promised arms in a weapons depot near the 
Austrian-Italian border, where the arms could be retrieved “without any danger 
immediately after the beginning of the ‘Aktion’.”707 Mussolini, frustrated with the 
“hesitation” of the Heimwehr leaders, reluctantly agreed to release the funds and to 
deposit the promised weapons, but with the caveat that they would be required to provide 
a written statement declaring that he would undertake “decisive Action to modify the 
Austrian state constitution” by March 15, 1930. On August 24, 1929, Mussolini was 
handed the statement signed by Steidle, Pfrimer, and Pabst.708 
In the weeks following their written promise to Il Duce, Austrian Defense 
Minister, Carl Vaugoin, who had been kept up-to-date by Steidle and Pabst on the 
developments with Italy and Hungary, discussed plans for a joint action between the 
Austrian army and the Heimwehr with Hungarian military attaché Dr. Daniel Fábry. The 
plan was to seize the Rathaus (City Hall) in Vienna, while the Lower Austrian Heimwehr 
would block Schutzbund forces in Wiener Neustadt from coming to the aid of the 
Viennese units. The borders would be sealed in specific locations to prevent the 
intervention of the Reichsbanner in Germany, specifically at Hainburg an der Donau on 
the Lower Austrian border with Czechoslovakia. According to Fábry’s report to 
Hungarian Foreign Minister Lajos Walkó, the scheme was to unfold out of a planned 
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demonstration in Vienna on September 29, 1929.709 Moreover, the Heimwehr’s 
propaganda printed in conservative newspapers read as an ultimatum to the Steeruwitz 
government, eliciting concern from foreign governments crucial Austria’s economic 
stability.710 On September 21, the Heimwehr held a rally in Vienna where some 10,000 
members gathered at the Heldenplatz (Place of Heros) where Steidle excoriated the 
failures of the “Reds,” in addition to the planned September 29 “March on Vienna.” 
Amid fears that the Heimwehren would initiate a civil war with the Social Democrats, 
Steeruwitz stepped down.711 
 Forcing Steeruwitz to resign the Chancellorship won the Heimwehren 
“considerable prestige” and is indicative of the influence the movement carried in 
Austrian politics at its pinnacle. Vinzenz Schumy would later write that the Heimwehr 
leadership would look to Steeruwitz’s successor, Johann Schober, “as the man who would 
change the structure of Austria and bring the Heimwehren to a position of power or even 
predominance.” However, as Upper Austrian Heimwehr member, and future architect of 
corporatist Austria, Odo Neutstädter-Stürmer, explained several years later, the 
Heimwehren were strong enough at that time to have carried out any constitutional 
change they desired, but made the mistake of putting their confidence in Schober and 
elevating him to the Chancellor.712 Schober had cooperated with the Heimwehr in past 
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schemes in his capacity as Federal Chief of Police, in addition to putting down the Social 
Democrat-incited riots in July 1927. These instances of cooperation, and other 
expressions of sympathy for their aims, naturally gave Heimwehr leaders the impression 
that Schober maintained a similar vision for Austria’s future.  
 Immediately after his appointment as Chancellor, Schober held a lengthy meeting 
with the leaders of the Heimwehr movement. Steidle laid out their overarching 
objective—the “final liberation of the Austrian people from the rule of the Social 
Democrats,” which could only be achieved peaceably through constitutional reform. In 
particular, the Heimwehren had long been campaigning for reforms that gave increased 
power for the presidency, a parliament based on estates, not political parties, and the 
revocation of Vienna’s status as its own province. For Schober’s part, he requested that 
Steidle utilize his connections in the Hungarian and Italian governments to help Austria 
secure the League of Nations loan. On both matters, Schober and the Heimwehr leaders 
were in agreement. Steidle subsequently approached the Italian ambassador in Vienna, 
Giacinto Auriti, requesting Mussolini’s approval for the loan. Steidle added, however, 
that if Il Duce did approve of loan, he should do so on the condition that Schober 
oversees the successful reform of Austria’s constitution.713  
Two simultaneous developments would rob the Heimwehren of the momentum 
the movement had built up toward achieving the constitutional reform they desired. First, 
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Mussolini changed direction with Schober’s appointment as Chancellor. He believed that 
Schober could achieve the change in course he had hoped to achieve with the 
Heimwehren. As such, he encouraged Steidle to support Schober. Second, the 
relationship between Schober and the Heimwehr leadership quickly turned adversarial. 
Schober found out about Steidle’s recommendation to the Italians that they make their 
support for Austria’s League of Nations loan conditional on Schober’s passage of their 
desired reforms to the constitution.714 At the same time, Pfrimer’s thinly veiled threat to  
‘implement the constitutional reform that we seek or else,’ did little to maintain good 
will, no doubt.715 Moreover, the constitutional reforms Schober ultimately put to 
parliament were passed unanimously, as they were watered-down compromises he had 
made with the Social Democrats. Not only were none of the reforms passed those 
demanded by Heimwehr leaders, Schober had compromised, both of which were 
intolerable to Steidle and Pfrimer.  
It was a very public and humiliating defeat for the leadership of the Heimwehr 
movement that was only compounded by the fact that their Italian benefactors now 
supported the Chancellor, concluding that further financial support of the Heimwehren 
unnecessary.716 In fact, Mussolini agreed to provide Schober with a requested 20,000 
rifles and 500 machine guns to help buttress his position against a potential Heimwehr 
coup d’état. Bethlen and Mussolini conveyed once more to Steidle that their sympathies 
toward the Heimwehren were unchanged, but saw no reason for maneuverings against the 
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Schober government for which they were confident would position Austria in an 
agreeable orientation toward Italy and Hungary. Should the situation change, however, 
they would be ready to once again offer their support to the Heimwehren.717  
Steidle and Pfrimer remained bitter and continued holding anti-government rallies 
in February and March 1930. Their continued opposition prompted Schober to request 
that Urban and Baron von Erhardt, the President and Vice-President of Hauptverband der 
Industrie Österreich, withhold their regular subsidies to the Heimwehren as well.718 With 
the movement’s two major sources of funding cut, it effectively paralyzed the 
Heimwehren. In early December 1929, both Steidle and Pfrimer had offered to resign 
their positions as leaders of the confederation. Only after persistent appeals did Pabst 
convince the two to remain as the heads of the Heimwehr movement.719 Adding insult to 
injury, Schober followed through on his threats to have Pabst—a Reich German émigré—
deported. In early June, 1930 Pabst was arrested and deported to Italy; despite claiming 
that he no intentions of continuing his activity in the Heimwehr movement, he remained 
an important figure in mediating compromises between the Heimwehr leadership and 
brokering Italian and German aid for the Heimwehren.720 What is more, Schober played a 
central role in Starhemberg’s meteoric rise in through the ranks of the Heimwehr 
movement; in the course of a year, the prince rose from a section leader in Upper Austria 
to challenging its federal leadership. Replacing its present, obstinate leadership with a 
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young, charismatic, impressionable, and more moderate alternative was Schober’s aim in 
supporting Starhemberg.721 Despite the perceived failure of Steidle, Primer, and Pabst to 
achieve its goal of constitutional reform, it had been the weight of the Heimwehr 
movement and the pressure it exerted on the Steeruwitz government that brought Schober 
to power and delivered to Mussolini the man that both he and they believed would bring 
about the constitutional changes that would reorder Austrian society. After all, Bethlen 
and Mussolini understood that the Heimwehren would, by themselves, not be able to 
implement the changes necessary for a successful, sustainable right-wing government.722 
The relationship between the Heimwehren and Mussolini in 1928-30 was but a 
brief indication of the much larger and more direct role he would play in aiding the 
movement under Starhemberg. While a student at the University of Innsbruck, 
Starhemberg was active in the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, undertaking various duties 
surrounding the procurement of weapons through “theft” and smuggling arms across the 
Austro-Bavarian border.723 After this brief stint, it would not be until 1929 that 
Starhemberg would reemerge as a section leader in the Upper Austrian Heimwehr, raising 
and personally funding a rifle battalion of some 2,000 men. According to his memoir, 
Starhemberg, in separate conversations with Hitler and Bethlen, both suggested he meet 
with Mussolini and try to establish an alliance with him. Starhemberg, as a self-
proclaimed “prominent member of the Heimatschutz” in the spring of 1930, would have 
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surely been aware of the fact that the movement had already established an alliance with 
the Hungarian and Italian governments.724 As such, his presentation of it as a path-
breaking maneuver is dubious and represents a recurring pattern of self-aggrandizement 
and whitewashing of his motives and ideals, making caution necessary in utilizing his 
memoirs. While Hitler and Bethlen may have indeed encouraged Starhemberg to meet 
with Mussolini, it was through a letter Il Duce sent to his mother, Princess Fanny 
Starhemberg, that their meeting was arranged.725 Schober arranged for Starhemberg to 
meet Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi to meet with Starhemberg in early June 1930. 
At this meeting, Grandi informed Starhemberg of Italy’s “wasted financial ‘sacrifices’” 
for the Heimwehren to that point in time. Schober’s intention for arranging this meeting 
was to seize upon energetic support the young Starhemberg was receiving within the 
ranks of the movement to upend Steidle and Pfrimer.726  
In July 1930 Starhemberg met with Mussolini. According to his account of their 
discussion, Mussolini reaffirmed Austria’s importance to Italian foreign policy, stating 
that “[a]n independent Austria is essential to the maintenance of order and peace in 
Europe. For that reason it is absolutely imperative for Europe that Austria should be 
developed and made strong, and, if you get vigorously to work, you can count on my full 
support.”727 Subsequently, by his own admission, the meeting energized Starhemberg 
who began immediately upon his return, consolidating his support base in preparation for 
his challenge for the leadership of the Heimwehr movement; Starhemberg was of course 
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strongest in Upper Austria, but also enjoyed a great deal of support in Lower Austria and 
Vienna, in particular. At the September 5, 1930 leadership meeting Schladming (Styria), 
Starhemberg charged Steidle and Pfrimer with “incapacity and feebleness of purpose.” To 
his surprise, the two leaders did not challenge his indictment, but resigned. In the 
electoral process that followed, Starhemberg was voted Bundesführer, but by only a 
“small majority.” His narrow election was a clear indication of the lack of unity and 
purpose of mind among the movement’s provincial leaders.728 
 Shortly after being elected Bundesführer, Starhemberg was invited to Hungary to 
meet the Hungarian Minister of Defense at that time, Gyula Gömbös. By Starhemberg’s 
account of their meeting, a principal topic of discussion was procuring arms. As it were, 
both the Heimwehren and the Hungarian government encountered difficulties in 
obtaining small arms, the latter, against protocols of the Treaty of Trianon, was secretly 
rearming and rebuilding the Hungarian army. Gömbös explained that after the war Italy 
had confiscated some 100,000 rifles and machine guns while occupying Austria. Their 
plan was to persuade Mussolini to release those rifles—which according to their 
estimations, would have had only limited stores of ammunition due the different caliber 
from Italian rifles—to the Heimwehren and to Hungary whereupon they would split their 
windfall.729 
 Procuring arms was only one part of Starhemberg’s discussion with Gömbös. 
While in Hungary Starhemberg was informed of the collapse of his benefactor’s 
government, with the resignation of his cabinet on September 25, 1930. In his place, 
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stepped Chairman of the Christian Social Party, Carl Vaugoin. Vaugoin was a long-trusted 
supporter of the Heimwehren and asked Starhemberg to serve as Minister of the Interior. 
Additionally, he also appointed Dr. Franz Hueber, head of the Salzburger Heimatwehr to 
be his Minister of Justice. Fortune, it appeared, had turned in favor of the Heimwehren; it 
had prominent members and a trusted friend in the highest seats of power in the land. 
Starhemberg’s position, as Minister of the Interior, was especially important for 
successfully carrying out a coup d’état, as he tasked with maintaining order within 
Austria and had authority over the police and gendarmerie. He joined the Vaugoin 
government with the intent to do just that. Gömbös, unsurprisingly, supported his 
intended putsch, and encouraged Bethlen to do the same. On October 16, 1930 
Starhemberg informed the Hungarian envoy, Jenö Biró, that the Heimwehren intended to 
seize power on October 26. Pfrimer’s Styrian Heimatschutz would undertake the 
operation as planned by General a.D. Otto Ellison. Rumors quickly spread, however, 
about the ill-kept secret putsch and Seipel, Bethlen, and Mussolini all prevailed upon 
Starhemberg to shelve the planned putsch.730 While the historiographic view of aborted 
Heimwehren putsch plans have consistently painted the movement as an almost comical 
portrait of dithering ineptitude, it was more often than not, the vacillation of its allies and 
patrons that—one hand supported the idea of a putsch, but on other, feared the 
uncertainties that accompanied the reality of a putsch—that was the picture of fear and 
indecision. 
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 Be that as it may, Starhemberg and the Heimwehren had the November (1930) 
general election to attend to, which Mussolini and Bethlen had placed an undue faith. The 
election campaign of the Heimatblock, the movement’s political party, was funded 
largely by Italian money. Italian Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi, explained to 
Starhemberg that some of the money allocated to the election, as well as funds earmarked 
for other areas, should be used to pay for their campaign. In the meantime, Mussolini sent 
another large contribution to the campaign.731 In addition to funding the campaign, 
Mussolini also counseled Starhemberg, advising him not to 
leave the field free to the National Socialists. An election offers the best scope for 
political militancy, and political militancy is what is needed. Therefore, do not miss the 
opportunity, but take up the fight against the Nazis.732 
 
As such the Heimatblock entered the election campaign, in some provinces in association 
with the Christian Social Party and independently in others. This decision was not 
received well by Chancellor Vaugoin—who had been appointed Chancellor after the 
collapse of the Schober government—as he believed that Heimwehr candidates should 
run under the banner of the mainstream parties. Starhemberg, however, believed that 
running as a Christian Social or German People’s Party candidate would leave the door 
open to the Nazis to serve as the sole representative of the anti-parliamentary radical-
right, which both Seipel and Mussolini agreed—the Heimwehr candidates would run on 
an independent ticket.733 As detailed in chapter four, the results of the election gave the 
Heimatblock eight seats in parliament. 
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“Again, the Italian and Hungarian governments had been deceived by the 
Heimwehr,” Kerekes explains. Though election results were disappointing, the fact 
remained that the orientation of Austria was pivotal to Italian and Hungarian foreign 
policy and still required “the greatest of attention.”734 The year that followed did nothing 
but reiterate the continued need for their “österreichischen Aktion,” as Pfrimer’s Styrian 
Heimatschutz, in particular, drew closer to the Austrian Nazi Party. The Nazis were also 
gaining influence within Austrian industrial circles as well as in local elections, winning 
15 seats in the Viennese Diet, for example. In June 1932 Starhemberg flew to Italy to ask 
for financial support, weapons, and diplomatic support from Mussolini. “If you are still 
interested in the independence of Austria, then help us,” Starhemberg pleaded.735 To be 
sure, as Kerekes notes, “The prospect of not having the jovial Austrian customs officials 
at the Brenner, but Hitler's ever-determined Brownshirts, would be, in the eyes of the 
Italian Bersaglieri, unpleasant.”736 The growing strength of the Austrian Nazi Party was 
not just a grave concern for Mussolini, but also for the leadership of the Heimwehr 
movement and the newly appointed Dollfuss government.  
Mussolini agreed to support the Heimwehren once more; “Europe needs Austria. 
Italy needs Austria,” he reportedly said. According to Kerekes, he promised Starhemberg 
15,000 rifles and between 200-250 machine guns, though this does not match the figure 
of 100,000 Austrian rifles Starhemberg purportedly agreed to split with Gömbös. By 
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Starhemberg’s account, he mentioned to Mussolini that Gömbös was to receive 50,000 
rifles, implying that that Heimwehren would receive the other 50,000 rifles. As it were, in 
the first week of January 1933, forty truckloads of rifles and machineguns—which had 
been preceded by ten truckloads of “hardware” in last days of December 1932—arrived 
at Austrian arms factory Hirtenberg for reconditioning, after which they were distributed 
to the Heimwehren and to the Hungarians.737 It is unclear how many were sent to Steyr 
for reconditioning. Ever-vigilant Social Democratic workers made this transaction 
quickly known, which exposed Hungarian rearmament—a violation of the Treaty of 
Trianon. In doing so, it broadcast the dealings of Austria, Hungary, and Italy to the Little 
Entente and their French patrons. The “Hirtenberg Affair,” as it came to be known, 
despite its widespread attention ultimately came to nothing, as it was soon forgotten with 
Hitler’s inauguration as Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933 and Dollfuss’s 
March 4, 1933 declaration of the Bundesrat’s “self-elimination.” Some of the arms were 
smuggled into Hungary in the spring, while the remainder—84,000 rifles and 980 
machine guns—were split evenly between the Heimwehren and the Hungarians.738 
The close relationship Starhemberg forged with Mussolini paved the way for Italian 
support of Dollfuss’s government. In August 1933, they met for the first time in Rome. In 
addition to the money and arms Mussolini had provided the Heimwehren, he also aided 
Dollfuss with international diplomatic support, helping the Bundeskanzler gain approval 
for a temporary increase in law enforcement and defense forces to combat the Nazi terror 
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campaign in Austria during the summer of 1933.739 Mussolini also worked with Dollfuss 
and Gömbös to establish several political and economic agreements between Italy, 
Austria, and Hungary the following spring. Politically, the three agreed “to pursue a 
common policy directed to promote effective collaboration among European States, 
particularly among Italy, Austria and Hungary. For this purpose the three governments 
will proceed to common consultation whenever any one of them considers it desirable.” 
Economically, Italy and Austria agreed to purchase a set amount of wheat from Hungary 
above the market rate in one arrangement. In another, Hungary and Italy agreed to lower 
tariffs on imports from Austrian manufacturers. Italy also agreed to open the ports of 
Trieste and Fiume to Austria and Hungary, which they agreed to use as their primary 
ports for foreign trade. In short, they established a customs union amongst themselves, 
mutually conceding tariffs amongst themselves.740 
In addition to this economic pact, to which Dollfuss ‘capitulated’, Mussolini 
agreed to help the Bundeskanzler in his efforts to secretly increase the size and rearm the 
Austrian army, while agreeing to “regulate the flow of subsidies to the Heimwehr” as a 
means of keeping Fey and Starhemberg and, thus, the Heimwehren, “in line.”741 Though 
Mussolini had greater confidence in Fey, who demonstrated himself to be more 
aggressive and single-minded, he called Starhemberg to Rome in April 1934 and 
confirmed his (financial) support for Starhemberg as the undisputed leader of the 
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Heimwehr movement so long as he kept the Heimwehren reigned in and aligned with the 
Dollfuss government. Upon his return to Austria, Starhemberg’s position was further 
buttressed by his appointment as vice-chancellor, replacing Fey. In aligning himself 
clearly with Starhemberg, Dollfuss had effectively ended any debate over who was the 
top Heimwehr leader in Austria.742 
On July 25, 1934 Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss was assassinated in an abortive 
coup d’état; a small group of Austria Nazis infiltrated the chancellery building. 
Accompanying the events in the chancellery, armed Nazi groups in Styria, Carinthia, and 
Upper Austria rebelled against the government. After several days of fighting and 
bloodshed, the army and the Heimwehren put had crushed the Nazi putsch. While the 
putsch was thwarted, they had succeeded in killing their most steadfast opponent in 
Chancellor Dollfuss. In one last show of support for Austria, Mussolini mobilized Italian 
troops on the Italy’s borders with Tyrol and Carinthia, should Hitler make further 
attempts to takeover Austria by force.743 Close Italian support of Austria effectively died 
with Dollfuss. Italy’s subsequent war with Ethiopia not only diverted Mussolini’s 
attention from Austria, but increasingly isolated Italy diplomatically, which pushed him 
closer to Hitler, ultimately giving way to his consent to the annexation of Austria. 
 
The Heimatwehr, the Stahlhelm, and the Nazis 
 The failed Hitler-Ludendorff putsch in November 1923 effectively ended 
meaningful cooperation between Munich-based paramilitary organizations—particularly 
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Ludendorff’s own network of patrons and Bund Bayern und Reich—and the Austrian 
Heimwehren. This break proved to be only temporary. While the Tyrolean Heimatwehr 
might have not made contact with the VVVD in Berlin, as German Foreign Office 
diplomats posited, they were most certainly in communication with VVVB members.744 
In the summer of 1926, Pabst reached out once more to Forstrat Dr. Georg Escherich, —
former head of the Einwohnerwehr, to whom the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, among other 
Heimwehr organizations, had owed their allegiance—who remained closely connected to 
members of what had collectively become known as the Vereinigte Vaterländische 
Verbände Bayerns (VVVB), or the United Patriotic Associations of Bavaria, a 
confederation of independent defense and political organizations, which was part of the 
larger Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände Deutschland (VVVD), or the United Patriotic 
Associations of Germany.745 
In December 1926, Escherich set up two meetings to take place on January 15-16, 
1927 at the Hotel Deutscher Kaiser in Munich. The first, on Saturday, January 15, was to 
be limited to the “closest circle,” which included himself, Steidle, Pabst, Bavarian noble, 
Baron von Voithenberg, and the staff leader of the Bavarian Stahlhelm, Oberstleutnant 
Julius Ritter von Reichert. The second meeting was scheduled for the following day and 
was to include representatives from Bund Isengau, Bund Chiemgau, Bund Oberland, 
Schwabenbanner – Würtemberg, Reichsflagge – Nürnberg, and Bund Bayern und 
Reich.746 These meetings effectively revived active collaboration between the 
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Heimwehren with German paramilitary organizations that would continue into the early 
1930s. 
The underlying reason behind these meetings was two-fold. First, Heimwehr 
leaders sought to obtain support from the Bavarian paramilitary organizations in the event 
that civil war broke out in Austria. In wake of the Linzer Programm, Heimwehr leaders, 
while vociferously condemning the Social Democrats’ new party platform, began 
reorganizing their organizations to reflect their “expanded” mission to actively combat 
the threats posed by Marxism.747 Furthermore, rumblings from Vienna indicated that 
Social Democrats were negotiating military support from the German Reichsbanner 
Schwarz-Rot-Geld—the pro-Weimar, republican paramilitary organization—in the event 
of civil war, underscored the Heimatwehr’s initial outreach to The Stahlhelm, Bund der 
Frontsoldaten and the other VVVB organizations. In particular, the Heimatwehr 
leadership sought an agreement in which the Stahlhelm would move to check a 
Reichsbanner advance on Vienna. According to one memo to the Foreign Office in 
Berlin, the Bavarian Stahlhelm’s response was noncommittal.748 The overwhelming 
attitude of German officials was averse to any Reich defense organizations becoming 
embroiled in Austrian affairs, which they feared would rouse international suspicions of 
German designs for Anschluss. Moreover, German Foreign Office delegates were leery of 
leadership of the newly confederated “Alpenländische Heimatwehr.”749 Steidle and Pabst, 
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according to Hans von Saller, the German Consul General in Innsbruck, were reckless in 
their schemes, lacking “political vision.”750 Continued French occupation of the 
Rhineland, however, was the main reason officials discouraged such activities. The 
second reason was to seek further material and financial assistance from their Bavarian 
counterparts. As the previous chapter documented, the main source of arms and 
equipment to the Heimwehr movement in the early 1920s came from Bavarian 
organizations—the Einwohnerwehr and its predecessor, Bund Bayern und Reich, which 
had since fallen from its place atop Bavaria’s paramilitary community. Moreover, 
Bavarian aristocrats, for a time, had been sizable donors to the Heimwehren. Bavaria had 
been the land of milk and honey for the Heimwehr movement before and it was the hope 
of their leaders that it would be once again. 
While the Heimwehren sought financial and material support through both its 
Bavarian counterparts as well as from the Hungarian and Italian governments, its 
leadership maintained quite a different relationship to its neighboring Bavarian 
organizations. For obvious reasons, its relationship with Hungarian and Italian officials 
was necessarily discrete and quite limited, which generally prevented the establishment 
of close relations, save for, perhaps, the case of Hungarian Minister President István 
Bethlen, for example, who forged a quite close relationship with Steidle and Pabst over 
an extended period of time. Though comparatively limited in the monetary and material 
support that came from neighboring Bavarian organizations, Heimwehr leaders 
established much closer working relationships than was possible with their Italian and 
Hungarian patrons for several reasons. First, both the Heimwehren and their Bavarian 
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counterparts were only quasi-official paramilitary organizations, so there was a basis for 
empathy and camaraderie in their similar positions vis-à-vis state and local authorities. 
Second, they maintained similar anti-Marxist, anti-democratic orientations. Third, many 
of those individuals in regular contact across organizations were former officers and 
veterans of the Great War, so there was also the shared experience of soldiering that 
bonded these men. Fourth, they maintained a shared cultural and historical experience, 
which contributed greatly, of course, to the fact that they shared a reasonably similar 
system of values, customs, and organizational structures. In sum, these likenesses 
provided a useful platform for the exchange of ideas, which fostered close collaboration. 
While Heimwehr leaders were in contact with various member organizations of 
the VVVB, the one with whom it would maintain the closest and most meaningful 
connection was Der Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten. The Stahlhelm was the largest 
right-wing paramilitary organization in Germany, headquartered in Magdeburg (Saxony) 
and led, similarly to the Heimwehr movement, by two federal leaders—Franz Seldte and 
Theodor Duesterberg. Though contacts were established with the Stahlhelm’s Bavarian 
formation at least as early as January 1927, open cooperation between the two groups did 
not begin until later that year. The thorny issue of the Bundesleitung (federal leadership) 
of the Stahlhelm recognizing the establishment of local groups in Kufstein (Tyrol) and in 
Graz (Styria), was an issue that first had to be navigated.751 Much better funded and 
organized, recognition of Stahlhelm groups Kufstein and Graz by its federal office in 
Magdeburg represented an intrusion and threat to the Heimwehr movement as the 
hegemonic paramilitary organization in Austria. In particular, the Tyrolean Heimatwehr 
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had a storm trooper formation in Kufstein that Steidle and Pabst feared would suffer from 
the presence a local Stahlhelm group.752 While “discrete” efforts were made by Gauführer 
(Section Leader), Ludwig Psenner, to “win” the leadership of the new Stahlhelm group in 
Kufstein, for the Heimatwehr, Pabst and his counterpart in the Bavarian Stahlhelm, von 
Reichert, proposed that, with the blessing of the federal leadership of both organizations, 
the Heimatwehr would administer these local groups. In general, Pabst sought to establish 
an “Arbeitgemeinschaft,” or “working group” with the Stahlhelm.753  
Such collaboration would have to remain “unofficial,” however, as in September 
1927 the League of Nations—which Wäninger cynically referred to as the “Entente”—
had called on Chancellor Seipel to dissolve the Heimwehren as a condition for financial 
assistance. Steidle and Pabst had been assured by Seipel that he would reject those calls, 
but they understood that they need not draw further attention onto the Heimwehren, while 
other options were proposed. Nevertheless, there was a mutual interest in establishing 
closer cooperation between the Bavarian Stahlhelm and the Heimwehr movement. On 
September 2, 1927 Pabst and Major Carl Ritter von Wäninger, Stahlhelm leader in 
Munich, and thus over Bavaria, met in Innsbruck to discuss a formal groundwork for 
“unofficial” relations between the Heimwehren and the Stahlhelm. It was agreed that the 
“formation of local Stahlhelm groups hurts the unity of the Heimwehren and 
consideration should be given to the position of Austria and the upcoming events and 
must be necessarily maintained. I have promised that such foundings on our side will be 
omitted and will not be acknowledged.” Moreover, as Wäninger indicated to the federal 
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office in Magdeburg, “In addition to the most active connection, a lively exchange of 
ideas between the Austrian Heimatwehr and the Stahlhelm over the political situations 
relevant to both in this working community. It is also intended to send representatives to 
each other’s leadership meetings.” Wäninger also suggested that the Bavarian Stahlhelm 
manage this relationship and function as the singular channel of communication between 
the federal Stahlhelm office and the Heimwehren in this “working group.”754 
Bavaria also continued to be a source of arms, ammunition, and military 
equipment. The Stahlhelm and its associate organization, Bund Chiemgau, appear to have 
been a principal supplier of arms and equipment to the Heimwehren.755 These 
transactions continued, in spite the German Foreign Office’s repeated calls for the 
Bavarian government to tighten up on paramilitary organizations who continued to 
supply the Heimwehren with arms, ammunition, and equipment. The involvement of 
private German paramilitary organizations, which usually entailed the complicity of local 
officials on some level and, potentially, even provincial officials, was tantamount to 
Germany being involved in Austrian affairs.756 In either case, drawing further 
international scrutiny would be detrimental to Germany, as well as Austria.  
 Likewise, German nobles also contributed money to the Heimwehr movement. In 
this regard, former Einwohnerwehr leader and mentor to Steidle, Georg Escherich, played 
a key role due to his close connections with the declassed Bavarian nobility, which was 
not limited to business interactions. For example, in August 1927 Escherich informed 
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Steidle that he was unable to attend the upcoming Heimatwehr’s Jugendtag (youth day) 
in Wörgl (Tyrol), as he was going to hunting with His Royal Highness Prince Leopold of 
Bavaria.757 Thus, he connected Steidle to aristocrats like Baron von Voithenberg and 
Count Rudolf von Marogna-Redwitz—executed in July 1944 as one of the central figures 
in the attempt to assassinate Hitler—who was a supporter of the VVVB and the 
Heimatwehr.758   
The Heimwehr’s close connections to Bavarian Landesleitung of The Stahlhelm 
led to closer relations with its federal leadership. In early January 1929 newspaper tycoon 
and influential figure in the German Nationalist Party, Alfred Hugenberg, invited Pabst to 
come to Berlin and speak to a small group about the development and objectives of the 
Austrian Heimwehren. Among this closed session were the federal leaders of The 
Stahlhelm, Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg. Both would have most certainly 
known Pabst or known of him through the many contacts he maintained in German 
paramilitary circles. Upon hearing about their collaboration with the Hungarian and 
Italian governments, Seldte and Duesterberg expressed interest in establishing contact 
with Bethlen and Mussolini and requested that Pabst facilitate the connection. In addition 
to agreeing to connect Seldte and Duesterberg to Rome via Budapest, Pabst also secured 
monetary support from Hugenberg.759 
Shortly after Pabst returned to Innsbruck, he penned a letter to Bethlen explaining 
Seldte and Duesterberg’s desire for an active cooperation with the Hungarian and Italian 
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governments, where “conservative and paramilitary circles…and anti-Marxist elements 
have seized the leadership of the state.” Steidle continued, assuaging concerns over 
resistance to situation in South Tyrol, explaining that Seldte and Duesterberg viewed 
Hungary and Italy to be natural allies in their “common aims;” Steidle proposed a “White 
International.”760 The “lukewarm response” from Bethlen and Mussolini to the idea of a 
White International was indicative of their leeriness toward establishing any sort of 
climate in which pan-German sentiment might be fostered.761 Nevertheless, Bethlen and 
Mussolini agreed to establishing closer links to the Stahlhelm, advising Hugenberg, 
Seldte, and Duesterberg in the 1930 general election in Germany. 
Broadly speaking, Bethlen’s lack of enthusiasm, in particular, was illustrative of 
the perpetual predicament in which Heimwehr leaders found themselves. Too close of an 
alignment with German nationalist circles would frustrate pro-Austrian independence 
circles, while they feared collaborating too closely with pro-Austrian independence 
elements would similarly prompt the retraction of German nationalists. This conundrum 
can be attributed to three specific causes: the Heimwehren generated none of its own 
revenue and was entirely reliant funding from external sources, it continued to maintain 
an open-ended membership policy, and the scatter-shot method its leadership employed 
to recruit patrons. As a result, the movement was forever boxed-in and limited in the 
action it could take without alienating one important revenue stream or another. 
Consequently, it was an indication of the strength of the Social Democratic Party and its 
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paramilitary Schutzbund, against which Heimwehr leaders saw maintaining widespread 
support from all anti-Marxist circles to be of the utmost importance. In this way, it 
forsook one aim—effecting the constitutional change—for another—functioning as a 
unifying anti-Marxist front.  
Another demonstration of this conundrum occurred around joint rallys of the 
Heimwehren and The Stahlhelm. These joint rallies, shooting competitions, memorial 
ceremonies, flag dedication ceremonies, and other public events were expressions of 
solidarity and cooperation between the Heimwehren and their Bavarian counterparts.762 
In the May 23, 1929 edition of the communist newspaper, Die Rote Fahne announced 
that the Tyrolean Heimatwehr planned to host a delegation of the the Stahlhelm at 
memorial celebration of Andreas Hofer, on Berg Isel, Innsbruck following a massive 
Stahlhelm rally to be held in Munich on June 1-2.763 When Bethlen received word of the 
joint rally, he expressly forbid it; the pan-Germanist implications, he feared, would cloud 
the Hungarian-Italian “Aktion” and infuriate Mussolini whose motivations for funding 
the Heimwehr movement were diametrically opposed to fostering pan-Germanist 
sentiment.764 Thus, in the June 4 edition of the Tyrolean Allgemeiner Anzieger, Steidle 
denied that any such event had been planned, claiming the report was no doubt 
“consciously malicious libel” on the part of the Reichsbanner leader, Otto Hörsing.765 
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The Tyrolean Allgemeiner Anzieger reported three days later, however, that “A troop of 
the Reich German Stahlhelm from the Greater Berlin group” just happened to arrive in 
the town of Kitzbühel where they were warmly greeted by the local Heimatwehr 
group.766 This situation, too, illustrates the value Steidle and Pabst placed on attaining 
and maintaining anti-Marxist support across all geopolitical boundaries—however 
tenuous the balance—over achieving constitutional reform, which it stood a better chance 
of attaining through a concerted effort in tandem with their Italian benefactors.  
As it were, their collaboration with the Stahlhelm and other German defense 
formations continued. Joint events such as the “Frontsoldatentag” in Weis (Upper 
Austria), which took place on September 13-15, 1929. To Bethlen and Mussolini’s point, 
the event was markedly pan-Germanist in tone, encapsulated in the conclusions of Upper 
Austrian Frontkämpfervereinigung (Front Fighters Association) leader, “May the flames 
of enthusiasm blaze in all your hearts, into a great, holy fire which will be blown away in 
the wind of the storm, all the impurity and the non-peoples will emerge from this, and our 
free, great Fatherland - All - Germany!”767 To the dismay of the German and Austrian 
governments, no doubt, the close relations between the Heimwehren and the Stahlhelm 
was well-known to the French government by the end of 1929. French Social Democrat, 
Alexander Bracke, complained that the activities of the Heimwehr movement was “not an 
internal Austrian matter,” adding that “one their leaders, Herr Pabst, is not even an 
Austrian and that Heimatwehr is in closest of contact with the German Stahlhelm, which 
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supports them not just morally, but also with money and weapons.”768 Indeed, its desire 
to maintain a broad support base frequently put the movement at odds with its patrons, 
but demonstrated conflicting facets of the its collective composition. Edmondson 
contends: 
the Heimwehr marched to the beat of two, and at times three, different drums. The most 
regular ones were beat by Ignaz Seipel and István Bethlen, whose tempo much of the 
time was the same; then at crucial moments their rhythm was disturbed by Mussolini’s 
big boom and by the discordant notes coming from the west.769 
 
There was a fourth, disparate drummer, however, in pan-Germanism. German 
nationalism was a constant presence that added yet another beat that made it impossible 
for the movement to maintain a crisp, uncomplicated rhythm. While this drummer 
generally stayed in time with the Seipel-Bethlen beat when the Heimwehren were 
focused on their Social Democratic nemesis, the increasing traction of National Socialism 
in Germany would bring about an adversary that could disrupt its complicated tempo. 
 At the outset of the 1930s, German nationalism in the ranks of the Heimwehren 
would become increasingly vociferous with the ascent of the Nazi Party in Germany. 
According to Starhemberg, Nazi Party members “bribed” Heimwehr leaders to demand 
the establishment of a coalition with the Nazis.770 In the 1930 German federal election, 
the Nazi Party increased its presence in the Reichstag from 12 seats to 107, putting it 
behind only the German Social Democratic Party. This extraordinary increase had ripple 
effects in Austria. While the Austrian Nazi Party was only able to garner three percent of 
the total votes cast in the general election of 1930, the municipal elections in 1931 saw a 
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marked increase in those percentages. In Eisenstadt (Burgenland), they received 9.1 
percent of the total votes cast, while 25.9 percent of the votes cast in Klagenfurt 
(Carinthia) were for the Austrian Nazi Party.771 The corresponding uptick was also 
demonstrated in Austrian municipal elections the following year. Despite Starhemberg’s 
contentions to the contrary, these gains can no doubt be attributed to the arrival of 
German Nazi, Theodor Habicht, in July 1931. Hitler appointed Habicht to oversee the 
Austrian Nazi Party and authorized him to speak on his behalf, which finally gave the 
Austrian party the cachet and financial backing it had previously lacked.  
 Along with reorganizing the Austrian Nazi Party, Habicht set about seeking an 
alliance with the Heimwehren. Most receptive to his overtures were, of course, Pfrimer 
and his Styrian organization. On October 31, 1931, the Styrian Heimatschutz held a joint 
rally with Austrian Nazis. Despite the fact that Austrian Nazi Party, to that point, had no 
electoral successes to speak of, Habicht’s terms of alliance were that the Heimwehr had 
to recognize Hitler as their leader and to fight against any and all forces that opposed 
Anschluss. Pfrimer’s staff chief Hanns Rauter, pointed out that both their Landesleiter 
(Pfrimer) and Steidle wanted Anschluss and that their Bundesführer, Starhemberg, 
needed to join the coalition of the German nationalist leaders. Sufficiently pleased, 
Habicht concluded that the “National Socialist Party and Heimatschutz will fight 
shoulder to shoulder against this system and for the great Third German Reich.”772 The 
                                                 
771 Evan Burr Buckey, Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 12. 
772 Carsten, Fascist Movements, 183; Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 144; 




Nazi Gauleiter of Vienna, Alfred Frauenfeld, followed Habicht’s program, calling for an 
alliance with Heimwehren.773 
 The alliance to which Rauter spoke was that of the Harzburg Front, an alliance 
between the Nazis, the German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei or 
DNVP), and the Stahlhelm. By 1931, Pabst, in particular, had well-established 
connections with Seldte, Duesterberg, and Hugenberg, and who had been a patron of the 
Heimwehr movement. Through the Harzburg Front, the DNVP and the Stahlhelm would 
move increasingly closer to the Nazis as the gained more traction in German politics. In 
February 1933, Pabst invited Seldte and Duesterberg to Vienna to discuss the parameters 
of continued close relations between the Stahlhelm and the Heimwehren. Pabst, believed 
it would behoove both the Heimwehren and the Stahlhelm to establish good relations 
with the Nazis and benefit from Hitler’s appointment as chancellor.774 Seldte clearly 
shared the same opinion, as in April 1933, Seldte became a Nazi Party member and 
declared that the Stahlhelm was at Hitler’s disposal.  
 Rauter, among others, pressed Starhemberg negotiate an alliance with the Nazis. 
As it were, Starhemberg had already refused what would be his most handsome offer 
from Gregor Strasser, in which the Führer was  
prepared to recognize the Heimatwehr as the only Austrian defense force. Accordingly, 
all defense and sport organizations of the NSDAP (in Austria) will be incorporated in 
your organization under your sole leadership. For the settlement of political questions a 
supreme council of leadership will be set up, drawn from the Heimatwehr and the 
NSDAP. You will be the president of this council and will be assisted by representatives 
from the National Socialist camp, in all political questions you will be bound by the 
assent of the council or their representatives. In the event of a victory of the National 
Socialist revolution in Germany, Adolf Hitler would recognize you as his deputy in 
Austria. As regards to the material side of the arrangement, considerable financial 
resources would be made available; a subsidy of approximately 500,000 schillings a 
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month is suggested for defraying the expenses of the defense movement. For the joint 
electoral front, 2,000,000 schillings would immediately be placed at your disposal, of 
which 500,000 would be for your personal use. In return you will create a national front 
composed of NSDAP and Heimwehr and will acknowledge Adolf Hitler as the supreme 
head of this movement.775 
 
Whether or not these were the actual terms Strasser offered is not clear; there remains a 
possibility that Starhemberg exaggerated the extent of this “utmost accommodation” to 
distance himself from the Nazis, with whom he was connected in the early 1920s.776 To 
assuage the growing pro-Nazi segments within the Heimwehren, he agreed to meet with 
Habicht in January 1932. The meeting went nowhere. Starhemberg, by his account, “felt 
antagonistic to both men (Habicht and Andreas Bolek) and thought the whole interview a 
needless formality, from which I expected no result.” After Habicht refused to abandon 
his mission in Austria and allow the Austrian Nazi Party to be absorbed by the 
Heimwehren, Starhemberg ended the meeting.777 
 Starhemberg’s meetings with Strasser, Habicht, and, later, in Berlin with Röhm 
and Himmler, and finally, with Hitler, in April 1932, all ended in failure. The sticking 
point seems to have been the demand that Starhemberg subordinate himself and the 
Heimwehren to Hitler and the Nazis, though according to a letter Habicht sent to Hitler, 
Starhemberg was open to joining the Nazi Party, but wanted several of its Austrian 
leaders removed.778 As Edmondson notes, “Starhemberg could have went either way” at 
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this stage, and “[h]is concern was more practical than ideological.”779 On one hand, he 
had Mussolini, Gömbös, and an alliance with the Christian Social governments in 
Austria, and on the other he had Hitler and the Nazi Party who was making significant 
gains in Germany. The fact that he would have the backing of established governments in 
Austria, Hungary, and Italy was decisive; despite the advances National Socialism was 
making in Germany, they did not command the authority and resources potentially 
available to the Heimwehren from the governments already in power in Italy and 
Hungary; in the end he would throw his lot in with the former, pitting the Heimwehren 
against the Nazis. The Heimwehr/Vaterländische Front conflict with the Nazis would 
frame the existence of the Austrian Ständesstaat (corporatist state) until the Anschluss in 
March 1938. It will also serve as a useful construct to frame the conclusion of the study, 
as it will accentuate the unique characteristics of the Heimwehr movement in 
juxtaposition to that of the National Socialists. 
 
Conclusions 
 In order to understand the political activities and decision-making of Heimwehr 
leaders, it is necessary to examine the movement’s interaction with the governments and 
movements in neighboring states. The crux of the matter returns, once again, to the fact 
that Heimwehr leaders understood the movement to be a part of Austria’s ancient 
tradition of volunteer defense formations. As such, its members could not be, in keeping 
with traditional protocol, required to pay fees to start or join local Heimwehr groups. 
Thus, the movement did not generate any of its own income and was entirely reliant on 
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the donations of private patrons and subsidies of the provincial governments. Their 
principal reasons for establishing the connections with German defense organizations and 
the Hungarian and Italian governments, among others, was twofold. First, they sought 
financial and material support to help the Heimwehr movement keep pace with its grown 
membership. The industrial associations that were the largest donors inside Austria 
contributed enough to satisfy the pressure of Christian Social officials who favored the 
movement, but not enough to enable its provincial organizations to expand, which they 
did, especially after smashing the Social Democratic revolt and general strike in July 
1927. Second, Steidle, Pabst, and Pfrimer sought to create an external support base to 
allow them to function with greater freedom inside Austria by loosening the shackles to 
their domestic patrons.  
The active search outside Austria’s borders was provoked by the challenge laid 
out in the Linzer Programm, the product of the Social Democratic Party congress in the 
autumn 1926, which threatened civil war in the event of a Heimwehr putsch. This 
challenge aroused a more active opposition to the Social Democrats and its paramilitary 
Schutzbund. The transition from a policy of “self-defense” to one of “self-help” 
prompted Heimwehr leaders to set about reorganizing their formations to be more 
politically aggressive and to be more combat ready. As such, more money and more arms 
were necessary, neither of which were in great supply inside Austria. 
 It has long been the prevailing notion in the secondary literature that the 
Heimwehr movement was an instrument of foreign fascist influence in Austria.  This was 
only true insofar as it aligned with the designs of the Heimwehr leadership and their allies 
inside Austria. It had been Steidle and Pabst who had sought the financial and material 
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support from Hungary and Italy before Bethlen had recommended that Mussolini aid the 
Heimwehren to help bring about a more Italian-friendly, right-wing, authoritarian 
government in Austria in April 1928. These were designs were in line with the aims of 
Heimwehr leaders as well as that of Chancellor Seipel, who was committed, however, to 
bring it about through legal channels and not a coup d’état. Thus, even in its collusion 
with Hungarian and Italian interests, the Heimwehr movement was not out of sync with 
the right-wing of the Christian Social Party. Furthermore, the limits of Italian influence 
on the Heimwehren was illustrated in their disregard of Mussolini’s suggestion that 
Steidle and Pfrimer back Schober, who had turned on them once in power; they 
continued their protest of the Austrian government and campaign for reform unabated.  
 Schober, without protest from Mussolini, worked to weaken the Heimwehr 
movement in Austria, dealing them a humiliating political setback by ignoring the 
demands they made for constitutional reform after they had essentially put him into 
office. Schober, then, preceded to remove the driving force behind the Heimwehr 
movement, if but temporarily, by having Pabst deported to Italy in June 1930. What is 
more, he tapped a young prince, Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, to challenge Steidle and 
Pfrimer for supremacy over the movement. Armed with intelligence from Mussolini and 
Hungarian diplomats, Starhemberg confronted Steidle and Pfrimer, accusing them of 
being weak-willed and no longer fit to lead the Heimwehren; clearly demoralized from 
their setbacks, they stepped aside without a fight. 
 Under Starhemberg’s nominal leadership, the Heimwehr movement maintained 
its close alignment with the radical right-wing of the Christian Social Party, but faced an 
even greater foe than the Social Democrats. The Nazi Party’s electoral success in 
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Germany had a ripple effect in Austria. Hitler had sent one of his deputies, Theodor 
Habicht, and large sums of money to clean up and organize the Austrian National 
Socialist Party in the summer of 1931. Habicht’s leadership and party funds—while 
being subsidized by big business, the Nazi Party also charged membership dues, which 
meant that it was a much better-funded organization than the Heimwehr movement—paid 
immediate dividends as the Nazis showed marked improvement in provincial and local 
elections in 1931 and 1932. Habicht also embarked on a campaign to weaken the 
Heimwehr movement by appealing to provincial leaders to press Starhemberg to establish 
a united fighting front with the Nazis, against Austria’s mainstream political parties. 
While he made no progress with Starhemberg, he proved successful in provoking dissent 
and division with provincial organizations and causing a considerable number of 
defections from the Heimwehren.  
In the summer of 1932, Starhemberg successfully appealed to Mussolini to once 
more provide arms and money to the Heimwehren, to combat the National Socialist 
invasion, which Il Duce desperately wanted to prevent. The failure of several more 
appeals by the upper echelons of the National Socialist Party—including Hitler himself—
to persuade Starhemberg to align the Heimwehr movement with the Nazis and the 
commitment of most of the prominent Heimwehr leaders to the Dollfuss government, 
meant that, by the end of 1933, the political battle lines were drawn between the 
Heimwehr and the Nazis.  
Interestingly, Steidle and Pabst’s efforts to reconnect with their Bavarian 
counterparts would also led back to the Nazis. In the summer of 1926, Steidle had 
reconnected with Georg Escherich, to whom the Heimwehren had once owed their fealty 
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as leader of the defunct Einwohnerwehr. Despite the group’s dissolution, Escherich 
remained an influential member of the defense community in Bavaria. He set up a 
meeting with the leaders of the various defense groups in Bavaria that comprised the 
Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände Bayern (VVVB). Most prominent among these 
organizations was The Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten, which was the largest right-
wing paramilitary organization in Germany at that time. Steidle and Pabst, in particular, 
would establish a close working relationship with leadership of the Bavarian Stahlhelm 
Major Carl Wäninger and staff chief, Julius von Reichert. 
Their collaboration with the Bavarian Stahlhelm would eventually connect Steidle 
and Pabst to its federal leaders, Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg. Stahlhelm 
supporter, Newspaper magnate, and influential member of the Deutschnationale 
Volkspartei (DNVP), Alfred Hugenberg, invited Pabst to come to Berlin in January 1929 
and speak to a small audience about the developments within and activities of the 
Austrian Heimwehr movement. Pabst’s revelation that the Heimwehren were being 
funded by Mussolini by way of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, proved of great interest 
to Seldte, Duesterberg, as well as Hugenberg. As such, they asked Pabst to assist them in 
establishing closer relations with Hungarian and Italian officials. Sufficiently impressed 
with the Heimwehr movement in Austria, Hugenberg would offer a subvention of his 
own. Shortly thereafter, Steidle wrote to Bethlen, explaining the desire of Seldte and 
Duesterberg to connect with Hungary and Italy, proposing a “White International” 
alliance between the Stahlhelm, the Heimwehren, the governments of Hungary and Italy. 
Sufficiently pleased with this idea, Mussolini agreed to advise Seldte and Duesterberg—
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running as a part of the Hugenberg-Papen-Seldte “Kampfront Schwarz, Weiß, Rot” ticket 
in the forthcoming 1930 presidential election in Germany. 
Through the close relationship between Hugenberg and Seldte and Duesterberg, 
the Stahlhelm became essentially the paramilitary wing of the DNVP, joining the 
Harzburg Front, alongside the Nazi Party. Pabst, himself a German of völkische national 
outlook, sought to maintain close contact between the Heimwehr movement and 
Stahlhelm in the hopes that they might benefit from a Nazi ascent to power in Germany. 
By mid-1933, the Stahlhelm, as an independent defense organization, ceased to exist and 
would ultimately be collapsed into the SA. While Dollfuss and the leaders of the 
Heimwehr movement attempted to strike various compromises with the Nazis that would 
give the party a say in Austrian affairs, while allowing it to remain independent. A 
resolution to the violent political struggle that would emerge between the two sides 
proved elusive. The fight for Austria would last from 1933 to 1938, as the Nazis, who 
quickly amassed broad support of among the Austrian population, chipped away at the 
Fatherland Front that Dollfuss established, in many respects, as an Austrian alternative to 











Scholarly interest in the Heimwehr movement over the course of the 80 years 
since its dissolution has been disappointingly limited. Disappointing because the 
movement offers a window into many complex subjects like national identity, the 
militarization of politics and society, the impact of total war on a people, the impact of 
military defeat in total war on a people, the relationship between militarism and religion, 
fascism as an analytical construct, as well as political revolution and counter-revolution 
on a national and transnational level, among others. Of the studies that are available, 
early interpretations suffer from political biases that continued to be perpetuated for in 
the historiography for decades. In such studies, the movement became the scape-goat for 
the fall of the republic, depicted as an instrument of foreign influence driving Austria to 
wrack and ruin. In the aftermath of the Second World War, this allowed Austrian 
politicians to escape blame for their part in the death of Austrian democracy. For that 
matter, the common narrative of the Heimwehr movement erroneously depicts it as a 
typical anti-clerical, pan-German “fascist” movement that emerged in the wake of the 
Great War.  
It has been the aim of this study to contribute to the body of literature on the 
Heimwehr movement by challenging these notions. By highlighting important pre-war 
continuities evident in the values, rituals, ideals, and support base of the Heimwehr 
movement, this work has illustrated that the Heimwehr movement cannot be understood 
by simply examining interwar Austria without consideration of the Habsburg past. Its 
organization and culture was inspired by the rituals and values of a long legacy of Alpine 
civic militarism, as chapter one demonstrated. As the patriotic-minded, voluntary 
 
335 
defenders of the mainstream provincial right, the Heimwehr movement was firmly 
grounded in the traditions of provincial Alpine society, particularly in the Austrian states 
of Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Carinthia, and Styria. Especially formative was the legacy 
of civic militarism and war volunteerism in these provinces, perhaps best embodied by 
the Standschützen militia units of Tyrol and Vorarlberg and their provincial defense 
system (Landesverteidigung) that had long protected their borders from foreign invasion. 
These institutions originated from the provinces’ numerous local shooting ranges and the 
sport shooting clubs that formed around those ranges. In the early eighteenth century, 
shooting club volunteers formed sharp shooter regiments who fought off French invaders 
in the summer of 1703 during the War of Spanish Succession. Thus, the roots of 
provincial militarism could be traced to a thriving gun culture, which developed around 
hunting and sport-shooting. The Tiroler Heimatwehr recognized these influences in a 
variety of manners, chiefly through the staging of provincial shooting contests in Tyrol 
and Vorarlberg--the first since the outbreak of the Great War--and the veneration of 
hunting as a rite of passage into manhood and requisite for military service, which it 
viewed as the picture of patriotism. 
Over the centuries, as Habsburg authorities sought to bring Tyrol and Vorarlberg 
into the imperial military hierarchy, provincial militarism was increasingly colored by 
Habsburg military culture. This transpired primarily through imperial subsidies to build 
new shooting ranges and maintain existing ranges, as well as of private veterans’ 
associations. These subsidies were not without a price, however. In exchange for these 
subsidies, veterans and shooting club members agreed to muster as war-time volunteer 
rifle companies. This was an important step in that it formalized provincial militarism and 
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brought it closer into the dynastic orbit. By the start of the Great War, the Standschützen 
were no longer “volunteers,” but were rather emergency reserve forces comprised of old 
men beyond the age for military service, and adolescents who were not old enough yet to 
be conscripted. Nevertheless, their call to duty in 1915 to defend Tyrol’s southern borders 
against the new Italian enemy gave the Standschützen a new lease on life as fodder for 
ideological consumption. Though a motley crew, they displayed the best virtues of 
Tyrolean civic militarism and, in the framework of its broader tradition of war 
volunteerism and patriotism, served as the basis for the Tiroler Heimatwehr and its 
understanding of duty and patriotism, as was evident it is regular commemoration of 
Andreas Hofer and his Standschützen, the personification of Tyrolean civic militarism. 
At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that the “culture of defeat” 
emerging in central Europe following the Great War provided fertile ground for it to take 
root and grow. What made the Heimwehr movement a modern movement was simply 
these political realities into which it was born. The defeat of the Central Powers in the 
Great War crushed central Europe militarily, economically, politically, socially, and 
culturally. Despite being culturally rooted in the traditions of Alpine civic militarism, 
chapter two illustrated that the founding of the Heimwehren was not simply an Austrian 
development, but was the product of the transnational cooperation among counter-
revolutionary circles in Germany, Austria, and Hungary. Driven principally by what they 
believed to be the degenerative effects of the social democratic revolutions in 1918 and 
spread of communist revolution into central Europe, anti-Marxist circles in Germany and 
Hungary collaborated with their Austrian counterparts and, in many cases, provincial 
governments to fund, arm, equip, reorganize, and train the remnants of the local militias 
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that had been mustered in the last days of the Great War. These groups were the 
foundation of the Heimwehr movement. Local groups were organized under wider 
provincial umbrellas which owed their allegiance to Bavarian Einwohnerwehr head, 
Georg Escherich. 
This cooperative reflected the reactionary circles of the Central Powers attempting 
to regain their footing and restore “order” to their worlds turned upside-down. The new 
republican constitutions enabled the social democratic parties to challenge traditional 
power bases with greater parity than ever before. The Heimwehr movement represented a 
weapon through which those power bases could defend their besieged places of 
prominence. The wider trend of paramilitary organizations emerging across the German 
and Austrian landscape is a testament to this development, while at the same time 
indicating the severe restrictions the Allies meted out at the Paris Peace Conference, 
which resulted in insufficient numbers of police and gendarmerie to keep the peace in 
times of emergency. As a “patriotic” movement of renewal, the Heimwehren, like the 
countless other paramilitary organizations that emerged in Germany and Austria, sought 
to restore the dignity and pride to the German cultural nation. As such, they saw the “halb 
Marxistische” constitutions and partisan corruption of the republics created in November 
1918 as principal obstacles in the way of their endeavor. The anti-Marxist, 
“Ordnungsblock” this triumvirate forged in the aftermath of World War I would 
foreshadow the direction of the future governments of central Europe. 
This examination has also shown that the Heimwehr movement was grounded in 
Alpine tradition in virtually every respect. Even the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr drew 
heavily from these same traditions of civic militarism associated with shooting clubs and 
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sharp-shooter companies, as chapter three established. The influence of Tyrolean 
Standschützen was especially influential on the organization and culture of the Heimwehr 
movement in several ways. For example, members elected their immediate superiors, 
from local groups electing their leader to provincial leaders electing the Bundesführer. 
The very same shooting ranges that had served as the basis for the Landesverteiding of 
imperial Tyrol, served as a basis of mobilization and training for Heimatwehr groups. 
Schützen rituals such as parades, flag dedications, and shooting competitions, were also 
carried on by the Heimwehren. Similarly, they maintained a generally unrestricted 
membership criteria like their Standschützen forerunner. The voluntary character of the 
Heimatwehr, which it likened to its Standschützen predecessors, prevented it charging its 
members association fees; unlike its predecessors, however, it did not enjoy the same 
degree of support from local, state, and imperial coffers, placing the Heimwehr 
movement in virtually a perpetual search for funding.  
This chapter also argued that the deeply entrenched tenets of Catholic social 
thought were influential in two principal areas of the Heimwehr movement. First, through 
its activities and propaganda the movement illustrated a traditional outlook on gender 
roles and paralleled those expressed in Pope Leo XIII’s Papal Encyclical, Rerum 
Novarum, which explained that the proper role of women was in the home, rearing 
children. This view was similarly articulated in Heimwehr newspapers; mothers were the 
first line of indoctrination of the national youth. Moreover, the activism of its women’s 
auxiliaries proved consistent with this outlook. They advocated not only the xenophobic 
ideals propagated by the Heimwehren, calling for mothers to protect their children from 
the corrupting influence foreign fads and Jewish intellectualism. Instead, children should 
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be taught traditional German songs, dances, literature, and music and instilled with 
Catholic values.  
Conversely, the militarism of the Heimwehr movement was innately connected 
with traditional Catholic notions of masculinity. As heads of their households protecting 
the home and hearth from danger was the duty of the father/husband. As such, they were 
taught as young boys to use firearms recreationally for hunting and in sport shooting 
contests; these were precursors to prepare them for military service, once of age. The 
Heimwehr similarly began youth programs that taught their members not only how to 
shoot military rifles but also how to maintain them, throw hand grenades, navigating with 
maps, terrain exercises, marches, and other military exercises. The increasingly 
aggressive militarization of youths, exhibited in the Heimwehr groups, was a result of the 
loss of compulsory military service as a feature of Austrian society via the Treaty of Saint 
Germain.780 Without compulsory military service, Austrian youths would not receive the 
military training that many conservative circles believed was vital to instilling virtues like 
loyalty, discipline, duty, honor, courage, service, and sacrifice. 
Catholic social thought also exercised great influence on the broader worldview 
of most Heimwehr leaders. This can most readily be seen in the parallels demonstrated in 
the Korneuburg Oath, Heimwehr rhetoric, and propaganda with the Papal Encyclicals 
Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno, particularly in its aversion to the Marxist idea 
of class conflict, the atomization of society inherent to classical liberalism, the frivolous 
                                                 
780 The reason the Allies, particularly the French, prohibited compulsory military service in 
Germany and Austria was to cull the formative influences of Prussian and Habsburg militarism from their 
respective societies. By removing obligatory military service from the lives of average Germans and 
Austrians, the militarism that had previously been quite influential, especially in Prussia, would fade, 
thereby reducing their war-like tendencies. 
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partisanship of parliamentary democracy, and the greed and corruption that had become 
part and parcel of free market capitalism. Furthermore, the theories of Austrian Catholic 
social thinkers such as Adam Müller and Karl von Vogelsang were also apparent in the 
writings of Othmar Spann, his students, as well as Heimwehr ideologue, Odo Neustädter-
Stürmer, for whom the May (1934) Constitution is attributed. The authoritarian, 
corporatist direction taken by the Heimwehren reflected the confluence of these elements, 
which only found further reassurance in the movement’s close connections to the Fascist 
Italian government. Claims that Seipel introduced Heimwehr leaders to the idea of a 
corporatist state in 1928 are mistaken, as archival evidence indicates that this introduction 
occurred years earlier.781  
Lastly, chapter three also explained that the close ties between the Heimwehr 
movement and the Catholic Church was perhaps most evident in the events it staged. 
Presided over by sympathetic clergy, these events were indicative of the similarly close 
relationship the Heimwehr movement cultivated with Catholic officials, just as their 
Schützen forerunners had enjoyed prior to the Great War. This was an intrinsic element 
of all Heimwehr gatherings (war memorial dedications, shooting competitions, rallies, 
and flag consecration ceremonies), most typically in the form of Sunday field Mass 
service.782 While they served their primary religious purpose, clerics used the pulpits to 
remind the ranks of the movement that they were defenders of Church and religion from 
Marxism. Beyond the field Mass, Catholic priests proved effective propagandists for the 
                                                 
781 See, for example, Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right, 264, f.59; TLA: Landesleitung der 
SSV (Tirol), VI/17, fol.344, 91, 342-4. 
782 The Social Democratic newpaper, Volkspost indignantly cited one instance, a “Heimwehr-
Priester,” Father von Rastbach, consecrating a shooting range. “Sogar Schießstätten weihen die 
“Heimwehr-Priester”!” Volkspost, August 3, 1929, 5.  
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Heimwehren, preaching the movement’s virtues to their parishioners, supporting the 
movement politically through the Christian Social Party, and illicitly through allowing 
the Heimwehren to use their churches as weapons caches. 
Indeed, as chapter four determined, Church clerics were just one of several 
historically influential social groups that supported the Heimwehr movement. The 
disenfranchised nobility, provincial officials, as well as Austrian industrialists and 
bankers overwhelmingly supported the Heimwehr movement. The thoroughly traditional 
outlook of its leadership meshed well with that of the clergy and nobility who sought to 
protect their long-held positions atop Austrian society, while state and local officials—
who themselves frequently held leadership positions within the local and provincial 
Heimwehr organizations—utilized the Heimwehren not only as auxiliary police forces to 
maintain “peace and order” but also to intimidate and suppress local Social Democrats. 
Beyond minor violent altercations between Heimwehr men and Social Democrats or 
Schutzbund men, the principal way the Heimwehren bottled-up local Social Democrats 
was by undermining labor strikes. Its emergency technical assistance formations were 
frequently able to restore, at least to a limited extent, the services halted by striking 
Social Democratic labor unions. To take it a step further, the Heimwehren began 
organizing their own independent (from any one political party) labor unions and in 
provinces such as Styria and managed to establish agreements with the industrialists to 
lay off Social Democratic workers and hire only men who were members of their union. 




Financially, Austrian industrialists, bankers, and nobles were the major domestic 
patrons of the Heimwehr movement, contributing monthly stipends to the provincial 
organizations. Despite federal and international calls for the Heimwehren to be disarmed 
and disbanded, provincial governments held firm in protecting the groups, emphasizing 
their quasi-official roles as emergency police detachments. Staunch Heimwehr defenders 
on the Christian Social right such as Chancellors Ignaz Seipel, Carl Vaugoin, and 
Engelbert Dollfuss, had no interest in dissolving the Heimwehren. The powers granted to 
the provincial governments would have made it quite difficult for the federal government 
to have legally taken on the task even if it had wanted (which it did not after the 1920 
election placed the Christian Social and Greater German People’s Party firmly in control 
of the federal government). The rise in support and participation of Austrian aristocrats in 
the late 1920s further insulated the Heimwehr movement, offering, through their money, 
titles—despite being legally annulled—and familial legacies from the Habsburg 
Monarchy, prestige and legitimacy. This development reiterated the fact that the 
Heimwehr movement was no fringe, populist enterprise like the Nazi Party or 
Mussolini’s fascist party; it was organized and supported from the outset by state and 
local officials and remained—even in its most disruptive moments—an association that 
worked in lock-step with the right-wing of the major bourgeois parties throughout its 
existence. As one Social Democratic newspaper lamented in a 1929 article, the Christian 
Social Party shouldered the blame for instigating the Great War in 1914 and were, fifteen 
years later, as the “makers of the Heimwehr,” fomenting civil war.783 
                                                 
783 Laurenz Genner, “Vor Fünfzehn Jahren—und heute!” Die Unzufriedene, July 27, 1929, 2.  
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As chapter five documented, in order to confront the perceived threat posed by 
“Linzer Programm,” published in the autumn of 1926 and vowing to institute a 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” should the bourgeois parties attempt to overthrow the 
constitution, the Heimwehren, in Steidle’s words, had to transition from a passive “self-
defense” confederation to an active “self-help” movement. Put differently, the movement 
needed to take a more active part in Austrian public life, pressing their bourgeois party 
patrons. As such, Steidle and Pabst had to look beyond Austria’s borders for military and 
financial support for this transition. Pabst had successfully established a close working 
relationship with the Stahlhelm, while Steidle reached out to Hungarian Minister 
President István Bethlen, who eventually connected Steidle with Italian Prime Minister, 
Benito Mussolini. Mussolini agreed to fund Steidle’s endeavor to press the bourgeois 
parties to push through constitutional reforms empowering the executive. By August 
1928, flush with Italian funds, the Heimwehr movement staged a series of rallies and 
corresponding propaganda campaign that chided the bourgeois parties for placing 
partisan interests above those of Austria, of cowardice for failing to mount a staunch 
opposition against the 1918 revolution, and for negotiating with the Social Democrats 
thereafter.  
Furthermore, this investigation has established that, while the Heimwehr 
movement indeed sought to destroy social democracy in Austria, it was not merely the 
tool of fascist Italy as historians have erroneously argued. Both sides were in general 
agreeance as to the desired outcome of this campaign. Mussolini naturally exercised the 
final word regarding what activities Italy would fund and not fund, but Steidle, Pabst, 
Pfrimer, Seipel, and Vaugoin, among others, executed the plan Steidle had laid out with 
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crystal clarity. For that matter, Seipel exercised far more influence over the plan than did 
Mussolini or Bethlen. With Seipel’s “unexpected” resignation in April 1929, the 
chancellorship fell into the lap of moderate Christian Social politician, Ernst von 
Steeruwitz, who Steidle and Pfrimer did not trust to take a strong position against the 
Social Democrats. They ratcheted up the pressure, spreading rumors of a coup d’état to 
be kicked off under the guise of a large Heimwehr rally in Vienna, set for September 29, 
1929. Steeruwitz resigned. The Heimwehren pushed out the chancellor they did not trust 
and chose the next Chancellor, Johann Schober. This would prove to be a humiliating 
setback as Schober had no plans to work with Steidle and Pfrimer. In fact, he worked to 
systematically undermine the Heimwehr movement, helping to topple the two as federal 
leaders of the movement, and deporting Pabst to Italy. In their place, with the input of 
Mussolini, he helped position Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg as the new 
Bundesführer, which created a great deal of dissention among the provincial leadership of 
the movement, most especially between he and head of the Vienna Heimwehr, Major 
a.D. Emil Fey. Their rivalry would weaken the Heimwehren and the Ständestaat 
throughout it struggle with the Nazis over the fate of Austria.784  
 The original intent behind this study was to take a deeper look at the 
organizational culture of the Heimwehr movement, using the Tyrolean Heimatwehr as a 
                                                 
784 In particular, Julius Raab, leader of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr leader and future Chancellor 
of Austria after World War II, took the boldest stand against the Korneuburg program (after having initially 
agreed to the oath) in 1930. Exiting the federal association, Raab created division in the local and regional 
organizations of in Lower Austria. This opened the door for Starhemberg, as the newly elected 
Bundesführer, to create a competing group in Lower Austria. This development did not sit well with Fey, 
who had already began mobilizing his own, anti-Starhemberg faction, which included Steidle, among other 
provincial leaders. Pfrimer, among others, sided with Starhemberg, compelled by the latter’s Nazi past and 
ephemeral outbursts of German nationalism. Prior to these developments, however, the Heimwehr 
leadership worked in a generally cooperative fashion, with Pfrimer and the Styrian Heimatschutz being the 
only consistent outlier.  
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case study. As the research progressed it became clear that more fundamental gaps in the 
literature needed to be addressed first. It became the aim of this investigation to bridge 
the gap between political studies, which represent the clear majority of the literature, and 
social and cultural lines of inquiry. Thus, this study has attempted to lay a stepping stone 
away from the political narrative of the movement toward understanding the cultural 
influences at work within and around the Heimwehren. Given that the leadership of the 
Tyrolean Heimatwehr played such a prominent role in the movement throughout much of 
its existence, it remained a worthwhile approach to use the Tyrolean organization as a 
window into the wider confederation. Nevertheless, the regional nature of the movement 
leaves many potential stones unturned that could further refine or recast interpretations of 















APPENDIX A – Organizational Hierarchy of the Tiroler Heimatwehr 
 
With no existing membership records, the information available regarding 
Ortsgruppen varies, though references are typically limited to the groups’ elected 
leadership and initial member numbers. This appendix contains information pertaining 
to the organizational structure and hierarchy, gleaned primarily from the 
organizational records of the Tiroler Heimatwehr (1920 – 1929). The baseline for this 
appendix is, however, comes from the organizational files from 1921.785 Where 
possible changes in positions and dates are included where possible. The unpublished 
dissertation of Verena Lösch was most helpful in establishing dates for later 
alterations to the organizational structure of the Tiroler Heimatwehr and its hierarchy. 
Below is a snapshot of the provincial leadership of the Tiroler Heimatwehr as of 
December 1921:786 
 
                                                 
785 TLA: Landesleitung der SSV Tirol, I/1, fol. 410, 284-8. 
786 Schweinitzhaupt was replaced by Großdeutschen Volkspartei Rep. Dr. Friedrich Schmidt in 
July 1922; Schmidt was replaced by Ekkehert Pesendorfer in June 1923. Fischer appears to have been 
replaced by Ing. Richard Lazzer at some point after December 1921 and before October 1923; Lazzer was 















The Staff serving the Landesleitung in December 1921 was as follows:787 
1) Chief of Staff: Major (Ret.) Hans von Voith788 
2) Chief of Staff: Oberstleutnant (Obstlt) Johann Oberndorfer 
Registrar and Personnel Officer: Obstlt (Ret.) Josef Schröder 
Bursar: Obstlt (Ret.) Artur Schuschnigg 
Artillery Officer: Obstlt (Ret.) Haubold 
Leader of Technical Emergency Assistance: Ing. Richard Lazzer 
Officer of Technical Emergency Assistance: Major (Ret.) Erich Rodler 
Armory Ward: Guido Jenisch 
Railways: Dr. Felber 
Weapons Maintenance: Gunsmith Gasser 
Press Officer: Dr. Walter Leonardi. 
* * * 
Existing organizational documents list the leadership of these regions was as follows: 
1) Region Reutte Leadership789 
a. Region Leader: School Superintendent Josef Knittel790  
                                                 
787 The composition of the Landesleitung and its staff—aside from Steidle—underwent numerous 
changes over the course of the 1920s and 1930s. 
788 Oberleutnant Gasteiger served as the first Stabsleiter and was replaced by Hauptmann Herbert 
von Obwurzer; “As a result of internal disputes” Obwurzer was ousted and departed for the Upper Austrian 
Heimwehr and was replaced by Major Hans von Voith by September 1921; Voith was replaced by 
Waldemar Pabst (aka Walter Peters) in May 1922. See Peter Broucek: „Obwurzer, Herbert von,“ 
Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950, Band 7 (Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Wien 1978), 202. 
789 Region (Gau) Reutte existed as a separate area until 1927 and when it was collapsed into 
Region (Gau) Middle and Western Tyrol. 
790 At some point before 1928, church painter, Hermann Praxmair, replaced Josef Knittel. See 




b. Deputy Region Leader/Treasurer: G. Riesler791 
2) Region Middle and Western Tyrol Leadership: 
a. Region Leader: Hans Oettl (Bürgermeister, Steinach am Brenner) 
b. District Innsbruck-Land 
i. District Leader: Hans (Johann) Oettl (Bürgermeister of Steinach 
am Brenner)792 
c. District Imst 
i. District Leader: Franz Kepp793 
d. District Hall in Tirol 
i. District Leader: Josef Schiesser794 
1. For the city of Hall, in 1924, its local leadership looked as 
follows:795 
a. Leader: School Director, Josef Egg 
i. Deputy: Innkeeper, Hermann Bartl 
ii. Adjutant: Martin Berger 
iii. Ordnance Service: City Treasurer Dr. Ernst 
Verdross 
                                                 
791 At some point before 1928, Josef Ahorn replaced Riesler. See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der 
Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 49-50. 
792 Innkeeper Franz Schreiring replaced Hans Oettl as the leader of District Innsbruck-Land at 
some point prior to 1928. Schreiring’s deputy, in 1928, was artist, Andreas Einberger. See Lösch, “Die 
Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51.    
793 School Director, Philipp Barth, is listed as the District Leader of Imst in 1925, apparently 
replacing Kepp. Barth’s deputy was a Shopkeeper named Leopold Pischl. 
794 Johann Parth appears to have replaced Schiesser as District Leader. An Innkeeper Franz 
Tiefenthaler is listed as Parth’s deputy. See See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51. 
795 TLA: Landesleitung der SSV Tirol (Heimatwehr) IV/1, fol.777, 196; Apparently there was a 
miscount in the local group elections and suspected rigging of votes: "The previous sub-leaders remained 
provisionally to their posts. The present situation is quiet difficult…It is the desire to include only those 
people in the local group to which one can rely completely in all respects," 208. 
 
349 
iv. Storm Troop Company Commander: Karl 
Corazza 
v. Similar to the organization of Innsbruck, 
Hall was divided into six sections: 
1. Section I: Dr. Max Staufer 
2. Section II: Cavalry Captain Herold 
3. Section III: Josef Ebenbichler 
4. Section IV: “Gruppe der 
Gewerbetreibenden” 
5. Section V: Josef Kofler 
6. Section VI: Eduard Ebenbischler 
e. District Landeck796 
i. District Leader: Director Josef Jöchler 
f. District Wippthal797 
i. District Leader: Hans (Johann) Oettl 
g. City Captaincy Innsbruck 
i. City Captain: Ing. Otto Vesely 
ii. Deputy City Captain: Shopkeeper Paul Schneider 
                                                 
796 The information presented here for District Landeck is drawn from Lösch, “Die Geschichte der 
Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51, who states that the information represents the organization in 1928. Jöchler’s 
deputy was Innkeeper, Karl Kusche. 
797 Hans (Johann) Oettl served both as the Region leader and the district leader of the District 
Wippthal, which appears to have been created after 1921 and before 1928. Count Anton von Wörtz-





1. Section I Captain: Engineer Bruno Larsen798 
a. Section I Storm Troop Leader: Ernst Presepevisi 
2. Section II Captain: Paul Schneider799 
a. Section II Storm Troop Leader: Alfred Neuhaus 
3. Section III Captain: Engineer Auer800 
a. Section III Storm Troop Leader: Dr. Hämmerle 
4. Section IV Captain: Mathias Leitner 
a. Section IV Storm Troop Leader: Karl Papseh 
5. Section V Captain: Epp801 
a. Section V Storm Troop Leader: Johann Danninger 
6. Section VI Captain: Albert Harpf802 
7. Section VII Captain: Rasim803 
a. Section VII Storm Troop Leader: Jun. Zösmayr 
8. Machine Gun Detachment Leader: Dr. Walter Leonardi 
h. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Representative: Artur Speckbacher 
                                                 
798 Bruno Larsen was promoted to Deputy City Captain by 1925. Section I Captain was taken over 
by Director Hohenauer. Hohenauer’s deputy was a Major Larcher. See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler 
Heimatwehr,” 35-51. 
799 Scheider was replaced as Section II Captain by an Oberstleutenent Reiter, whose deputy was 
Hermann Greil. See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51. 
800 An Oberst Matz replaced Auer as the Section III Captain. Matz’s deputy’s last name was Lill, 
according to See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 51. 
801 According to See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 51, Epp is apparently 
replaced by Ignaz Platter, whose deputy was a Direktor Schuster. 
802 The information about the Section VI Captain comes from See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der 
Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 51, and is based on information as of 1925 (not 1921 as is the rest of the names). 
Also, Harpf’s deputy was a Hauptmann Kratz. 
803 Innsbruck was divided into six sub-sections as of 1925, which indicates a realignment of the 
section boarders and the apparent consolidation of Section VII. 
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i. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Representative/Armory Ward: Guido 
Jenisch 
j. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Administrator: Dr. Schaufler 
k. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Administrator: Alois Holzer 
l. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Office and Registry Leader: Ferdinand 
Thaler 
3) Region Unterinntal Leadership 
a. Region Leader: State Rep. Andreas Thaler 
b. Deputy Region Leader: State Rep. Theodor Scheffauer 
c. District Kufstein804 
i. District Leader: State Rep. Andeas Thaler805 
ii. Deputy District Leader: Former Mayor Josef Egger 
iii. Deputy District Leader: Shopkeeper Anton Huber 
1. City Captaincy Kufstein 
a. City Captain: Master Tinsmith Berkmann 
2. Protection Community Leader Brixlegg: Shopkeeper Anton 
Huber 
a. Deputy Protection Community Leader: Property 
Owner Johann Leitner 
                                                 
804 Protection Community Leaders or their deputies (Schutzgemeinschaftführer) for the following 
communities had yet to be elected: Langkampfen, Thiersee, Untere Schranne, and Schweich. By 1928, 
District Kufstein had been split between District Kufstein and District Rattenberg (under the direction of 
Georg Kögl and his deputies Property Owner Johann Leitner—listed above as Brixlegg Deputy Protection 
Community Leader—and, Farmer and deputy Major of Reith, Josef Rieser.     
805 As of 1928, the District Leader of Kufstein was Police Inspector Johann Galehr. His deputy 
was Property Owner Stefan Feuersinger (listed above as the Protection Community Söll Leader). 
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b. Deputy Protection Community Leader: Josef Kögl 
3. Protection Community Leader Kramsach: Property Owner 
Sepp Emberger 
4. Protection Community Leader Kundl: Teacher Arnold 
5. Protection Community Leader Söll: Property Owner Stefan 
Feuersinger 
a. Deputy Protection Community Leader: Property 
Owner Andreas Guggenberger 
6. Protection Community Leader Wildschönau: State Rep. 
Andreas Thaler 
d. District Kitzbühel 
i. District Leader: Property Owner Hans Karl806 
ii. Deputy District Leader: Kitzbühel Mayor Hans Hirnsberger 
iii. Deputy District Leader: Hopfgarten Mayor Hans Jessacher 
1. Protection Community Leader Hopfgarten: Mayor Hans 
Jessacher 
2. Protection Community Leader Kitzbühel: Mayor Hans 
Hirnsberger 
3. Protection Community Leader St. Johann: Property Owner 
Hans Karl 
                                                 
806 Hans Karl and Hans Hirnsberger appear to have shifted roles by 1928, with Hirnsberger as 
District Kitzbühel’s leader and Karl as his deputy along with Jessacher. As close observation of the 
Tyrolean Heimatwehr’s leadership shows, this degree of continuity in the same leadership positions was 
rare. See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51. 
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4. Protection Community Leader Fieberbrunn: Peasant 
League Section Chief Feidl 
e. District Schwaz 
i. District Leader: State Rep. Theodor Scheffauer807 
ii. Deputy District Leader: Property Owner Alois Graus808 
1. Protection Community Leader Schwaz: State Rep. Theodor 
Scheffauer 
2. Protection Community Leader Vomp: Head Teacher Hans 
Geiger 
3. Protection Community Leader Rotholz: Property Owner 
Alois Graus 
4. Protection Community Leader Achenkirchen: Property 
Owner Schrattenthaler 
5. Protection Community Leader Zillertal: “wird erst 
organisiert”809 
f. Region Unterinntal Leader of Technical Emergency Assistance: Works 
Inspector Überreiter 
g. Region Unterinntal Treasurer: Dr. Wippern 
h. Region Unterinntal Press Lawyer Staff: Dr. Pickert 
                                                 
807 Innkeeper Alois Schaller appears to have replaced Scheffauer at some point prior to 1928. See 
See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51. 
808 Graus appears to have been replaced as Deputy District Leader by Co-Deputy District Leaders 
Romed Angerer, who was Deputy Mayor of Schwaz at the time and, Forester, Hans Fleckel.   
809 By 1928, the Protection Community Zillerthal (Schutzgemeinschaft Zillerthal) had become its 
own district. Its leader was Dr. Karl Kreidel. Kreidel’s deputies were Shoemaker, Franz Sandhofer, and 




i. Region Unterinntal Representative: Col. (Ret.) Ludwig Psenner 
j. Region Unterinntal Administrator: Lt. (Ret.) Heinrich Mast 
k. Region Unterinntal Typist: Col. (Ret.) Karl Binder 
4) Region East Tyrol810* 
a. Region East Leader: Politician Gottfried Hassler 
b. District Lienz 
i. Section Leader Sillian: Webhofer 
ii. Section Leader Matrei: Mühlstatter 
iii. Section Leader Nikolsdorf: Gottfried Hassler 
c. Region East Tyrol Representative: Property Owner Jakob Obersteiner 
* The East Tyrolean Heimatwehr, by the Spring of 1928, was divided into three 
districts:811 
1. District Sillian 
a. Local Group (Ortsgruppe)Untertilliach 
i. Local Leader: Sebastian Innwinkl 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Johann Prünster 
b. Local Group Obertilliach 
i. Local Leader: Josef Obmascher 
                                                 
810 Mayors of the city of Lienz, Franz Henggi and Theodor Hibler also played a role in the 
leadership of the East Tyrolean Heimatwehr organization, though it is not clear what specific positions they 
held. It is likely, however, they served in the role of deputy leader(s). See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der 
Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51. By 1928, the East Tyrolean Heimatwehr looked dramatically different in 
terms of organizational structure.  
811 TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), VII/1, fol. 2090, 529-31. There is an additional local 
group for the community of Strassen that had not been allocated to a district as of that time; its elected 




c. Local Group Kartitsch 
i. Local Leader: Master Bricklayer Johann Walder 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Blacksmith Leonhard Klammer 
d. Local Group Abfaltersbach 
i. Local Leader: Jakob Duregger 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Franz Webhofer 
e. Local Group Sillian 
i. Local Leader: Shopkeeper Webhofer 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Inspector Paul Amhof 
f. Local Group Sillianberg 
i. Local Leader: Josef Senfter 
g. Local Group Panzendorf 
h. Local Group Ausservillgraten 
i. Local Leader: Anton Leiter 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Perfler 
iii. Secretary: Friedl Bachmann 
i. Local Group Innervillgraten 
i. Local Leader: Kassian Lanser 
j. Local Group Anras 
i. Local Leader: Josef Oberhofer 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Hermann Lercher 
2. District Lienz 
a. Local Group Assling 
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i. Local Leader Bichl: Josef Mairer 
ii. Local Leader Thal: Josef Lukasser 
iii. Secretary: Bürgermeister Johann Libiseller 
b. Local Group Lavant 
i. Local Leader: Anton Klocker 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Bürgermeister Josef Brunner 
c. Local Group Tristach 
i. Local Leader: Andreas Buntschuh 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Johann Felder 
iii. Secretary: Johann Klocker 
d. Local Group Dölsach812 
e. Local Group Nikolsdorf 
i. Local Leader - Nikolsdorf: Gotthard Winkler 
ii. Deputy Local Leader - Nikolsdorf: Hans Brunner 
iii. Local Leader - Langberg: Josef Rossbacher 
iv. Local Leader – Norsach: Franz Plautz 
v. Secretary: Sylverter Stranganz 
f. Local Group Leisach 
i. Local Leader: Josef Hanser 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Peter Senfter 
g. Local Group Thurn 
                                                 
812 As it is laid out in the document, it is not clear who was elected to what position, the names are 
simply listed in the following order: Stefan Buchacher, Johann Eichholzer, Peter Gasser, and Peter Mairl. 
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i. Local Leader: Anton Bacher 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Paul Unterweger 
h. Local Group Gaimberg 
i. Local Leader: Luis Kollnig 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Hintersteiner 
i. Local Group Oberlienz813 
j. Local Group Ainet 
i. Local Leader: Florian Forcher 
ii. Co-Deputy Local Leader: Gottfried Oberhauser 
iii. Co-Deputy Local Leader: Bürgermeister Thomas Pedarnig 
k. Local Group Schlaiten 
i. Local Leader: Florian Pedarnig 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Matthias Steiner 
l. Local Group St. Johann 
i. Local Leader: Josef Oblasser 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Andreas Vergeiner 
m. Local Group Bannberg 
i. Local Leader: Alois Salcher 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Weiler 
iii. Secretary: Principal Franz Ude 
3. District Iselthal 
                                                 
813 It is not clear who was elected to what position aside from Principal Gutwenger who was 
elected as the group’s administrator. The other names were listed in the following order: Josef 
Ruggenthaler, Leo Neumaier, and Principal Johann Polt. 
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a. Local Group St. Jakob 
i. Local Leader: Georg Schreiber 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Peter Ladstätter 
b. Local Group St. Veit 
i. Local Leader: Police Inspector Hafele 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Ortner 
iii. Secretary: Head Teacher Josef Mallaun 
c. Local Group Hopfgarten 
i. Local Leader: Hyazinth Blassnigg 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Chauffeur Anton Blassnigg 
d. Local Group Kals 
i. Local Leader: Peter Payer 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Stefan Schneider 
e. Local Group Matrei 
i. Local Leader: Peter Brugger 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Presslaber 
f. Local Group Praegraten 
i. Local Leader: Urban Kratzer 
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Johann Steiner 
g. Local Group Virgen 
i. Local Leader: Police Inspector Josef Fleckinger 
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